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Summary
This study seeks to account for and contest Ricoeur’s relative absence from the 
literary-theoretical canon in Britain. Whilst Ricoeur secured a highly influential 
position within American language philosophy in his lifetime, the literary 
consequences of his philosophy have been largely overlooked by literary-theoretical 
discourse itself. This is in spite of Ricoeur’s role within the revolution of French 
thought from whence the New Critical dominion was finally overturned in this 
country. I contend that the heightened socio-political exigencies of the theoretical 
revolution, whilst they facilitated a desirable renewal of thought, also fostered 
unhelpful polarities—between the subject and the text, between an idealist 
metaphysics and a sceptical Theory—and a submerged prejudice against philosophies 
which, like hermeneutics, maintained a positive dialogue with the Kantian tradition. 
Forged in the interchange of German romanticism and German historicism, modem 
hermeneutics developed as a response to the excesses of both, seeking to place limits 
on the claims of a self-authored genius and linguistic determinism alike. As a 
contemporary of phenomenology and structuralism, Ricoeur provides a similar 
negotiation of his immediate context, putting paid to the heightened polemic of the 
literary textualists and the literary relativists alike. Central to this achievement is 
Ricoeur’s concept of “semantic innovation”; it stands at the heart of his theory of 
metaphor and forms the basis for his semantic re-appropriation of the productive 
imagination. Through a combination of historical and philosophical analysis, this 
thesis seeks to demonstrate Ricoeur’s highly rigorous achievements as an astute 
theoretician and as one wholeheartedly committed to the liberating powers of the 
literary imagination.
For Julie and Lefteris
The power of impulses which haunt our 
phantasies, o f imaginary modes o f being 
which ignite the poetic word, and of the 
all-embracing, that most powerful 
something which menaces us so long as 
we feel unloved, in all these registers and 
perhaps in others as well, the dialectic of 
power and form takes place, which insures 
that language only captures the foam on 
the surface of life.
Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 63.
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1In tr o d u ctio n
Paul Ricoeur’s reputation as a hermeneutic philosopher and one of the 
twentieth century’s greatest thinkers is undisputed. Within the order of great literary 
theorists however, his place is less established. This is in spite of the fact that creative 
language stands at the very heart of his philosophy. In the parting light of the 
twentieth century, it was the genius Jacques Derrida and his illustrious cohorts at Yale, 
who blazed the brightest trail in Anglo-American literary circles. Their brilliance may 
one day prove to have been a swansong, not for the century, but for the literary 
theoretical revolution it bore. Propelling this study is an overwhelming perplexity 
regarding the culture of a monumentalised Literary Theory. Why, we ask, should 
literary studies have adopted a stance of such thoroughgoing scepticism as regards the 
literary object, abandoning the claim for the literary work and its aesthetic distinction 
for a discourse of the “merely” literary, a discourse at pains to demonstrate the literary 
status of all language, and one which works to erode the autonomy, and indeed the 
integrity, of both work and critic? The main topic of this study concerns Ricoeur’s 
relationship to this phenomenon and to his own treatment of literature as a 
philosophical concern. My focus is limited to just two of Ricoeur’s major works, 
namely The Conflict o f  Interpretations and The Rule o f  Metaphor. These works were 
written in close proximity to one another and reflect the development of what in my 
title I refer to as Ricoeur’s “theoretical imagination.”
“B e y o n d  th e  D e se r t  o f  C r it ic ism  w e  W ish  to  B e C a l l e d  A g a in ” 1
Before philosophy, literature, poetry and music; the mimicry of birdsong, the 
rhythmic beat of the battle drum, or the itinerant tales of gods displeased. This was the 
vision of Rousseau and the romantic philosophers of the eighteenth century, who cast 
out the thesis of divine attribution, of language as a fully-formed, God-given totality, 
for narratives of incremental acquisition, histories of naturalistic imitation (Condillac) 
and motivated expression (Rousseau). The question of external determinism and
1 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism o f  Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan, Beacon Press, Boston, 1992, p.349.
2internal, creative force dominated here as it did elsewhere in European debate. The 
sublime pathos of the felix culpa was replaced by pathos of a different kind, that of 
man’s self-exile in the pursuit of self-knowledge, the loss of “natural” language and 
the cultivation of ideas. In the heroic spirit of the eighteenth century, philosophy’s 
eminence lay in the formulation of their eventual reunification, in the culmination of 
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit.
In his Aesthetics, Hegel recognised the desideratum of artistic truth in terms of 
this essential paradox; that the means by which we come to truth may very well be the 
means by which we murder it, through the dulling precision of our very own concepts. 
Against the “risk of reason” and the untrammelled march of its rarefied ideas, 
dialectical idealism set its sights. If the task of the literary critic is somewhat humbler, 
the risk undertaken in the pursuit of truth is no less significant for it. The critic 
undertakes the cardinal risk of all translation, to remain true whilst saying differently; 
to explain and to show, without diminishing the sense of wonder by which criticism is 
inspired in the first place. How to explain without explaining away? How to clarify, 
without reducing magic to the alchemy of mere device, to the crafted repository of 
trade tricks, mere rhetoric?
Questions such as these presume a certain distinction between the customary 
exchanges of our everyday understanding and the order of understanding proper to the 
work of literature. Following Kant, aesthetics strove to determine the ineluctable 
essence by which such works are distinguished; artistic response being deemed 
suitably singular to warrant its own branch of enquiry. As an older discipline, 
hermeneutics had long presumed a distinction between ordinary, everyday forms of 
communication and the privileged obliquity of certain texts. Here however, the 
impulse to interpret was driven by forces external to the text itself, according to the 
pre-existent authority of universal laws, religious and judicial. Interpretation was thus 
a matter of correct interpretation. Since the truth of the matter transcended the 
historical particularities of both interpreter and empirical document, neither was 
deemed significant in its own right. Hermeneutics as we know it today, as the 
philosophy and not the practice of interpretation, conforms to the aesthetic view that 
interpretation elicits a form of reflective knowledge about human understanding itself. 
A crucial distinction ensures their separation however: philosophical hermeneutics 
contests the locality to which aesthetics, by the dedicated nature of its discourse, 
limits artistic understanding as a contrasting form of knowledge which would run
3alongside conceptual knowledge. Hermeneutically speaking, literary-aesthetic 
interpretation is universally relevant.
For both Heidegger and Gadamer, the experience of poetry is deemed to 
disclose a more original mode of understanding which, in its primacy, conditions all 
subsequent manifestations. As it conditions these other forms, it remains situated 
within a position of privileged distinction. For Heidegger, this “authentic” 
understanding must be opposed to the more derived forms of everyday sense. In 
Gadamer too, the reflective wisdom elicited in the poetic experience is treated as 
something to be set in elevated opposition to other forms of understanding. Both 
thinkers corroborate an essential distinction between the language of concepts, 
explanation and everyday rationality, and the modality of understanding proper to the 
poetic experience. Whilst the understanding of poetic insight conditions these 
subsequent forms, a gulf divides them nonetheless, making the communication of 
poetic experience a uniquely difficult task, and one which commands a thorough re- 
evaluation of our ordinary linguistic attitudes. But within the triune of great modem 
hermeneutic philosophers, Ricoeur makes a unique departure from both Heidegger 
and Gadamer, refusing the traditional romantic distinction between the imaginative, 
interpretive commands of poetic experience, and the faculties of non-poetic 
knowledge. If Ricoeur flattens the alleged hierarchy enjoyed by poetry, he also makes 
the hermeneutical claim for poetry all the more universal. In Ricoeur alone, the truth 
of poetry and the truth of concepts, of understanding and explanation (the division 
through which hermeneutics since Schleiermacher had conceived its task), are placed 
within an unsurpassable dialectic, at the base of which no priority can be given to 
either term. It only looks paradoxical that this more radical continuity between the 
two “realms”, should in fact assure the essential discontinuity of poetry and concepts.
In the context of literary interpretation, this dialectical relationship assures a 
basic distinction between the discourse of critical reflection and the discourse of 
poetry itself. In so doing, it serves to maintain poetry’s qualitative distinction amongst 
other discourses, and consolidate the claim for poetry’s uniqueness. It is Ricoeur’s 
claim for the dialectic of interpretation and explanation, and the productive distinction 
of poetry and concepts, which commends his wider acknowledgement in literary 
studies today. To be “called” once more to poetry, it is not enough to just confirm the 
particularity of poetic experience, or to claim an indubitable truth on its behalf; it is
4necessary to show how today, in the light of theory, such claims can still be 
maintained.
In the twentieth century, questioning of the aesthetic and reflective kind fell 
from literary favour, ponderous speculation being exchanged for the brisk pragmatism 
of the New Critics. As literary theory’s self-designated opening, the rise of the New 
Criticism, we may presume, marks the point at which,
The approach to literary texts is no longer based on non-linguistic, that is 
to say historical and aesthetic considerations or, to put it less crudely, 
when the object o f discussion is no longer the meaning or the value but 
the modalities o f production and reception o f meaning and of value prior 
to their establishment—the implication being that this establishment is 
problematic enough to require an autonomous discipline o f critical 
investigation to consider its possibility and its status.2
Occupying the furthest reaches of this continuum, the American deconstructionist and 
former phenomenologist Paul de Man makes a pretty stark, if indirect, association 
here, of linguistic scrutiny on the one hand, history and aesthetics on the other. For de 
Man, the depths of human experience and understanding purported of the work of 
literature were but the wishful projections of a discipline in search of a science. The 
mixed-bag of traditional literary critical practices, be they socio-historical or psycho- 
biographical, were merely the self-certifying illusions of a misguided positivism, 
whereby the work of literature was elevated as a special kind of historical document, 
as a privileged form of truth. Borrowing from other disciplines, the critic’s projections 
assure his findings, namely that the work of literature testifies to a very special, 
universal form of understanding. Speaking of the art he serves, the critic may 
proclaim that “all life is there”. The sceptic’s less joyous response would be “yes, 
because you put it there”. By this light theory is effectively nothing other than naive 
positivism, and criticism but a straw-man of antiquated reckoning; a curmudgeonly 
social-historian incapable of dispelling the illusions of a time-honoured credulity.
Against the classical stance of the liberal critic, the advance of structural 
linguistics in France had bequeathed literature an altogether different mode of
2 Paul de Man, “The Resistance to Theory”, Yale French Studies, No. 63, 1982, pp.3-20, p.7.
5reckoning. With the methodological detachment of the speaking subject (with 
Saussure’s distinction between the formal arrangements of the code, la langue, and 
the imputed meanings attached to language usage, la parole) it became possible to 
analyse language function as a system of abstract values, liberating signification from 
the complex pitfalls of psychology and motivation. Predicating a system of 
synchronic and differential relations, structuralism returned language to the quasi- 
transcendental status of a fully-formed totality, to a signifying system which must by 
logical necessity precede the conscious articulations and historical permutations of the 
speaking subject. The epistemological transformation to proceed from this was 
seismic; if man could no longer be placed at the origin of his meaning, then nor could 
he be trusted as a rationally adduced basis for self-knowledge. The classical humanist 
assumptions of Western metaphysics came under serious attack and with them the 
ostensibly self-evident practice of literary criticism. If the author is no longer the 
creative causa sui, the fount of a self-governing imagination, then it is not just the 
criticism of subjective intention and causal context that becomes suspicious. The 
critic’s own presumed powers of articulation and reflection, upon putatively 
unintentional or unconscious influences, or indeed upon formal considerations of style 
and composition, must also be called into question, the authority of these discourses 
stemming from the same tendentious origin as literature.
Naturally, the anti-rationalist implications of this argument were not to 
everyone’s taste. Within departments of literature and the wider critical debate, an 
atmosphere of heightened and at times even hostile polemic ensued. It was within the 
adversarial tumult of this atmosphere that Literary Theory, conceived as a pedagogic 
unity and an autonomous discourse, was bom. The polarising undercurrents 
accompanying de Man’s portrait of theory, of an unprecedented rise to critical rigor 
and scrutiny, betokens the dichotomising tendencies which, perhaps in fairness, attend 
the birth of all new discourses. But with them came some undesirable distortions and 
some overhasty reductions by the claimants of both sides.
For some voices of the critical orthodoxy, the new-wave scepticism of their 
cohorts was vaguely absurd; nothing encapsulated this absurdity better than Roland 
Barthes’ claim for the death of the author. Of course this was not a claim for the 
absence of authorship, but for the excoriation of the kind of foundationalist 
assumptions through which the traditional concept of the author was realised. By 
refusing to engage in the rationale behind Barthes’ rhetoric, otherwise judicial,
6discerning minds fell to satirising the empirical impossibility of the unbegotten author. 
In doing so, they could be seen to play straight into the hands of their adversaries, 
enhancing their own caricature as a bunch of critically naive positivists. For Barthes’ 
proponents, the radical nature of his rhetoric befitted the logic it propounded, namely 
the logic (or rather the illogic) of Text or textualism: the assertion that consciousness 
is not only mediated by language, but that the signifying system is so radically 
unstable, so thoroughly ungovernable, that there simply is no possibility of 
transcending its realm and “fixing” meaning. In the textualist paradigm, Saussure’s 
division of sign and signifier (the split between formal and semantic values) 
transforms into an all the more radical dehiscence of signification and intention. In 
this way the primary notion of a cognitive foundation is undone, both linguistically (in 
terms of philosophy’s primary terms and concepts) and transcendentally (in terms of a 
grounding consciousness). Indeed foundations of either kind are traduced as one and 
the same illusory phenomenon.
Textualism’s locus classicus came by way of Derrida and his now infamous 
assertion that “// n ’y  a pas de hors texte” (“there is nothing outside of the text”). For 
literary interpretation this was not only a command to reject the extra-textual 
significances surrounding texts, but to accustom oneself to an essential rift between 
the author’s putative content and the autonomous operations of text itself, to what 
Derrida referred to as the textual aporia within signification. Following his conversion 
to deconstruction, Paul de Man transferred his commitments from transcendental 
phenomenology (to a rigorously impersonal subjectivity) to the assertion of text: “the 
bases for historical knowledge are not empirical facts but written texts, even if these 
texts masquerade in the guise of wars or revolutions”. Accordingly, de Man treated 
Text’s historical counterpoise—the apotheosis of the romantic subjectivity—by 
means of its textual disinterment. In Allegories o f  Reading de Man deconstructs what 
he takes as the essential dissimulation of romantic rhetoric. The preferred topos of 
romantic literature—spiritual transcendence, man’s fleeting glimpse of the infinite— 
depends upon the elevation of symbolic and metaphorical tropes wherein the 
categories of mind and nature are purportedly synthesised. De Man’s rejection of the 
symbolic, his claim that all symbolic, metaphorical tropes can in fact be reduced to
3 Paul de Man, “Literary History and Literary Modernity”, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the 
Rhetoric o f  Contemporary Criticism, ed. Wlad Godzich, Methuen, London, 1983, p. 165, quoted by 
Sean Burke, The Death and Return o f  the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998, pp.2-3.
7the status of metonymy, works to abrogate the romantic claim for an aesthetic- 
synthetic transcendence with the less lofty proposition of analogy, allegory and an 
unimpeachable dualism between the orders of writing and “truth”. Insofar as this 
critique confirms the essential aporia within signification and the Derridean priority of 
text, it also testifies to the particular cultural inflections of deconstruction’s Anglo- 
American translation; a translation moreover, which left very little room for a 
hermeneutical discourse such as Ricoeur’s.
In Chapter One of this study, I chart the rise of the theoretical revolution at the 
site of its inception in France. Here, the intellectual divide between old and new was 
as much sociological as it was philosophical; indeed the claim for a new theoretical 
anti-humanism was a claim against philosophy’s traditional authority within the 
humanities. The disciplinary tensions which shaped the course of Anglo-American 
literary theory were derived from here. Tending towards the political Left, the leading 
claimants of France’s intellectual upheaval were very often critics of the university 
establishment, and figures who moved in different circles to those of Paris’s 
traditional intellectual elite. Published in 1969, Ricoeur’s collection of essays The 
Conflict o f  Interpretations was written from within the midst of France’s academic 
turmoil in the late 1960s. The themes of these essays reflect the French preoccupation 
with Cartesianism and its overturning. For Ricoeur, the affronts presented to the stable 
cogito—by Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, and most importantly for us, by structural 
linguistics—are by no means straightforward renunciations of the subject, of self- 
consciousness or the philosophical project. From Ricoeur’s hermeneutical perspective, 
they are testament to the essential detours through which self-understanding must pass. 
The hermeneuts of suspicion (Ricoeur’s collective name for Freud, Marx and 
Nietzsche) all testify to the existence of an essentially symbolic universe. In all three, 
understanding must make an indirect detour by way of these symbolic systems and 
their interpretation, whilst in structural linguistics the fabric of language itself 
becomes the mediating system through which thought is denied a direct hold upon 
itself.
Ricoeur is less interested in the absolutist claims of these discourses than in 
the structures of interpretation they collectively reflect. From the hermeneutical 
perspective, self-understanding must go by way of an essential detour, a journey 
“outside” of the self and through the symbolic universe of its own unconscious 
making. The self must be read “suspiciously”, as an ambiguous text therefore. The
8“conflict” of the Ricoeurian interpretation is not so much an empirical, historical 
struggle of the kind witnessed in 1960s Paris, as it is a transcendental conflict, against 
the cogito’s false consciousness on the one hand (the “truth” of self-presence and self- 
identity), between the competing interpretations of the symbolic universe (be they 
psychoanalytic, literary or theological) on the other. As Ricoeur would later write, the 
figure to emerge from The Conflict o f  Interpretations was not an anti-cogito but a 
“wounded cogito”, the eponymous conflict being “so thoroughly internalised” as to 
make it constitutive rather than destructive.
For two reasons it is Ricoeur’s treatment of structural linguistics which 
concerns us most in Chapter One. Firstly, it was the code’s extension beyond the 
confines of formal linguistics to other, previously historical disciplines, which 
precipitated the claims for a “post-philosophical” anti-humanism. In short it was 
structuralism which presaged the opposition to historical knowledge replicated in the 
work of literary theorists such as Paul de Man. Secondly, Ricoeur’s attitude towards 
structural linguistics is absolutely pivotal to his characterisation as a poststructural 
thinker. For Ricoeur, all understanding is linguistically mediated, but as a theoretical 
science, structural linguistics need not, and indeed should not be opposed to the kind 
of interpretive-historical recuperations described in a hermeneutics of consciousness. 
Ricoeur’s dialectical treatment of structure grounds his claim for the speaking subject 
as the locus of rational consensus. In speech the instability of the signifier is stabilised 
within the historical particularities of the speaking instance. Against the claims of a 
radical heterogeneity or Wittgensteinian “language games”, thought takes a hold of 
itself, grasping the formal impersonality of the linguistic system and making it 
“mean” within the particularity of the personal given instance. This claim for the 
speaking subject and for the power of intention will be central to the Ricoeurian 
argument for a qualified distinction between literary language and the language of 
critical reflection in The Rule o f  Metaphor.
In Chapter Two I make a return to intellectual history before France’s anti­
humanist revolt, to the era of Kant and the romantic idealists. Beyond historical 
interest, the purpose of this return is twofold. The “romantic prejudice” against 
hermeneutics is, I claim, an inaccuracy borne of the discipline’s critical proximity to 
post-Kantian idealisms, rather than any agreement with them. Gadamer’s critique of a 
“misguided Kantianism” at the beginning of Truth and Method is an unequivocal 
indictment of idealist aesthetics. Pinpointing certain ambiguities within Kant’s text,
9Gadamer charts the rise of the romantics’ “misguided” subject-centred aesthetics and 
the rise of a philosophically marginalised aesthetic discourse. Gadamer’s critique of 
the Kantian imagination anticipates Ricoeur’s positive re-working of imagination in 
The Rule o f Metaphor. The second reason for this Kantian-romantic detour is 
romanticism’s resoundingly negative impact upon literary theory. Clearly, the birth of 
the social sciences in France can be read as a direct backlash against the claims of an 
overbearing and seemingly limitless romantic subjectivity. The revolt nonetheless 
belies the deeper philosophical currents subtending such debate. Implanted within an 
Anglo-American literary context however, some of the wider philosophical filiations 
surrounding structuralist / poststructuralist discourse were lost.
At the hands of de Man and his fellow deconstructionists at Yale (Geoffrey 
Hartman and J. Hillis Miller), Anglo-American theorists situated deconstruction 
within a distinctly literary ideological setting, one which helped to obscure the 
aesthetic continuities subtending the hyperbole of a theory versus criticism, Text 
versus Subject divide. Ricoeurian hermeneutics was a casualty of this rhetoric. In a 
rather different way, Derrida was too. With the translation of French theory a 
misappropriation of Derrida’s work began to take root, the claim for the text and for 
the instability of the signifier being taken for an all-out renunciation of philosophical 
knowledge. Philosophers were quick to condemn the error of these purports. 
Characteristically, it was the theorist’s turbid grasp of philosophy that was blamed. 
During Derrida’s most endemically misread phase, Christopher Norris characterised 
these appropriations in terms of “a kind of radical euphoria, much like the 
consequence of reading Nietzsche before one got round to reading either Kant or 
Hegel.”4 Such assertions rightly beg the question of whether or not a coherent Theory 
is really possible without an element of re-interpretation or even reinvention. In all the 
essential ways, literary history may reflect the turns and innovations of philosophical 
history, but the cadence o f its debate and the weighting of its preoccupations remain 
unique; after all, the great work of art can arrive in the most unheralded of ways, 
steering the path of literary debate far from its anticipated course. This marks the 
obvious but important distinction of literary discourse, be it “theoretical” or “critical”; 
namely that it is a mixed and dependent discipline, and that it remains caught between 
the contingencies o f creation and reflection. Philosophical shortfalls aside, the
4 Christopher Norris, The Contest o f  Faculties: Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction, Methuen, 
London, 1985, p.223.
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particularities of the literary conversation into which Derrida was received also 
contributed to the heightened tenor of its debate.
In philosophical history, the subjective idealism of the romantics was but one 
extreme manifestation of the post-Kantian universe; even in aesthetics the romantic 
vision was a partial rather than a universal one. But in literary history it was the 
unrivalled successes of the romantic brotherhood which prevailed. These creative 
successes ensured the ubiquity of romanticism and romantic theories of creativity and 
subjectivity. In literature, the elision of aesthetics and romantic subjectivism was 
warrantable. With the advent of literary formalisms in the early twentieth century, a 
satisfying swing of the historical pendulum could thus be marked. Paradoxically, 
literary theory’s self-professed opening—with the intellectual sobriety of the New 
Critics, with their aversion to all things metaphysical—would one day determine the 
excessive “euphoria” of Anglo-American scepticism, and the exclusion of moderate 
poststructuralists such as Ricoeur.5
As far as the present study is concerned, the organising impetus behind Anglo- 
American literary theory and its consolidation as an independent discourse is an anti­
romantic one. Indeed, as a pedagogic tool (and this surely represents the essence of 
what literary theory is), one could go so far as to call it a discourse of enlightenment; 
the undergraduate’s journey from Abrams to Derrida conforming to a narrative of 
increasing liberation, from subject-centred epistemologies, from the constraints of 
formalisms and the naivety of cultural historicism, to the final dis-illusionments of 
postmodemity: radical heterogeneity within signification and the collapse of all grand 
narratives (except this one). In the march of theoretical progress there is a very real 
“risk of reason” of the sort named by Hegel, a marching-away with ideas which 
threatens to forget the very occasion of its calling, the work of literature no less. In the 
pursuit of ideas, the logical order between work and theory threatens to be subverted, 
with the work becoming an opportunity for theoretical demonstrations rather than the 
other way around. It is an attitude to which hermeneutics is wholly averse. 
Furthermore, the hermeneutical argument against methodological applications of this 
sort serves to emphasise the inherent contradiction of theory’s ultimate claims—for 
relativism, scepticism and irrationalism—and the mode of their reckoning.
5 Such euphoria being dependent upon the elision o f certain aesthetic continuities.
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In hermeneutical enquiry the means to interpretation cannot be pre-formulated 
in advance, in the form of a universal method. Interpretation must take the form of an 
encounter, or as Gadamer calls it, a dialogue, which takes place with all the openness 
and lack of pre-defined criteria proper to natural conversation. There would be no 
point conversing if one knew the outcome of the discussion in advance. Genuine 
conversation is guided by a shared theme, but this theme only develops in the shared 
pursuit of understanding. Like the genuine conversation, the genuine encounter with 
the work of art emerges within an inter-subjective space, not between two 
psychologies, but between a “fusion of horizons”, where the socio-historical 
determinates of one’s understanding are made to encounter the horizons of a different 
milieu. In this way the truth of the work of art takes the form of an historical event, an 
individual happening within the exchange of work and interpreter. It is for this reason 
that hermeneutical enquiry forgoes the claims for certain scientific knowledge in 
favour of “understanding”. On a philosophical level this argument is highly appealing, 
for the actual business of criticism however, its merits are less certain. In Chapter 
Three I develop the principle of poetic “singularity” to which both Gadamer and 
Heidegger subscribe, outlining the problems attached to such a position. Here also I 
elaborate upon Ricoeur’s critical relationship to Heidegger, and Ricoeur’s refusal of 
the epistemological opposition of explanation and understanding implicitly re­
awakened within the Heideggerian poetic.6 For Ricoeur, there is nothing inimical to 
explanatory method within the human sciences so long as philosophy recognises these 
methods for what they are, abstractions not absolutes. Within this chapter I also 
discuss the historical contexts of Heidegger’s receptions, as the author of Being and 
Time, as the sacerdotal “thinker” or “poetiser” of his later years, and finally, as Nazi 
operative, and author of the infamous “Rectoral Address”, with its questing call for 
Germany’s spiritual self-assertion.
The importance of Heidegger’s receptions relates to the contrary manner in 
which deconstruction and poststructural hermeneutics are regarded within literary 
theory. Ricoeur’s exclusion from the theoretical compass belies the many affinities 
uniting Ricoeurian hermeneutics and Derridean deconstruction. Chapter Four
6 Heidegger would deny this charge himself. The radicality of Heideggerian poetising is that it 
presumes access to a pre-conceptual realm o f understanding which thereby precedes any such division 
between the explanatory and interpretation/understanding. Nevertheless, in the elevation o f pre­
understanding, indeterminacy and openness, the effect to take hold is an opposition to explanatory 
knowledge.
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develops this overlap. But in Chapter Three I connect the exaggerated misprision of 
their discourse to the historical contingencies surrounding Heidegger’s name, and to 
their different negotiations of this deeply flawed inheritance. A critical advocate of 
Heidegger’s ontological ambitions, Ricoeur’s relationship to Heidegger remains 
constant throughout his career. It is this ontological commitment which vouchsafes 
the Ricoeurian mediation of interpretations from the anodyne or relativistic 
connotations of the “merely” interpretative. Interpretation for Ricoeur is ontologically 
significant, so too therefore is the interpretation of literary works. But Ricoeur rejects 
the claim for a “direct ontology” such as he perceives in Heidegger, claiming that it is 
only indirectly and “by degrees” that we may glimpse something of the ontological 
being caught within the movements of interpretation. Within the refusal of a direct 
ontology, an ontology which forgoes methodological questions regarding the manner 
of being’s interpretation, there resides an implicit censure to the ethico-philosophical 
inadequacies which historical revelations served to magnify within the Heideggerian 
text. Ricoeur’s philosophical relation to Heidegger possesses an in-built criticism of 
Heidegger’s politically related philosophical shortfalls I claim, whilst Derrida’s early 
deferment of ontological Truth helped to facilitate his false repute as a strong 
textualist averse to all truth-claims. Ricoeur’s relation to Heidegger serves to 
emphasise the points of cleavage between poststructural hermeneutics and Derridean 
deconstruction and the ontological justification for a philosophy of interpretation.
In the final and also the longest chapter of this study, Ricoeur’s arguments for 
a productively mediated form of understanding, and for the powers of critical 
reflection and literary distinction alike, converge within Ricoeur’s semantic theory of 
imagination. For Ricoeur, the diverse modalities of interpretation proper to the human 
sciences should not consign us to relativism or scepticism. On the contrary, 
conflicting interpretations present the very “documents” through which philosophical 
self-reflection can alone proceed. In their unity, the multiplicity of these discourses 
confirms the irreducible structure of double meaning at the origin of all interpretation. 
To understand the ontological, indeed the transcendental implications of this structure, 
and the relationship between interpretation and self-understanding, it is necessary to 
analyse the symbol semantically, under the linguistic aspect of metaphor. After all, it 
is through language alone that the symbolic content of experience reaches its manifest 
expression within understanding. In The Rule o f Metaphor, Ricoeur contests classical 
and structural substitution theories of metaphor to assert metaphor’s profound
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cognitive imports. The creation of new meaning within the metaphorical process takes 
the form of a semantic “schematism” between conflicting semantic fields. This power 
to create new meaning stands at the heart of Ricoeur’s theory of imagination and at 
the heart of his claim for the “wounded” cogito, mediated, yet still capable of critical 
reflection. The power to create new semantic pertinences, new references within the 
world even, testifies to the reflective powers of interpretation and imagination. In turn, 
these powers ensure the distinction of literary and non-literary discourse and with it, 
the dialogical relation of literary critic and literary work.
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C h a pter  One  
R ic o e u r  a t  N anterre
In the Spring of 1967 Paul Ricoeur reneged his professorship at the Sorbonne. 
His career so far was already one of prodigious merit. Incarcerated as a prisoner of 
war for five years, he had worked to translate Husserl’s Ideen into French, and co­
authored a work of commentary with fellow prisoner Mikel Dufrenne on the 
existentialism of Karl Jaspers. This had been followed in 1948 with the publication of 
a comparative study of Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel and in 1950, with the first volume 
of Ricoeur’s tripartite Philosophy (or Phenomenology) o f the Will, Le Voluntaire et 
Vimoluntaire} The text’s critical commitment to phenomenological ideas testified to 
the discipline’s predominance in French thought at the time, but it also prefigured its 
eventual decline and the distinct path Ricoeur’s own thinking was to take in a post- 
Husserlian and post-existential era. An implicit rejection of Sartre’s intractably 
individualistic freedom, Ricoeur’s text promotes a conditioned freedom (such as 
Merleau-Ponty had signalled with the notion of embodiment) consonant with the 
dialectical potentialities of both a renewed, and in Ricoeur’s case transformed, 
hermeneutic consciousness and the predominant socio-ideological paradigms of the 
1950s and ‘60s. Just as the hermeneutic consciousness consolidated by Dilthey, 
Heidegger and Gadamer took the constraints of its own ontology—its historicality, its 
situatedness and hence finitude—to be the negative condition of its very possibility, 
so Marxist-inspired theory of the time was obliged to reject Sartrean individualism in 
favour of the historically and politically constrained freedom of the communal realm;
1 Whereas existential phenomenology constituted a rejection o f Husserlian idealism, rejecting the 
precondition o f a synthetic transcendental ego with the atheistic dictum o f existence before essence, the 
work of Jaspers and Marcel constitutes phenomenology’s theistic side. Jaspers was a German Catholic, 
Marcel, French. The significance o f this in terms o f Ricoeur, himself an avowed Protestant, cannot be 
escaped. Ricoeur’s extensive work on religious themes does not constitute a “stage” within his career, 
and nor can it be marginalised as a competing interest. As he has often professed, it was his own 
frequently Christological hermeneutics o f the symbol which activated his presiding interest in the order 
of signs. In the manner o f Heidegger and Gadamer, Ricoeur places a limitation upon the referential sign, 
refuting the realm o f a purely representational signifier through the elevation o f the word. Only that 
which holds together in the symbol (sumballein, from the Greek sum (together) and ballein (to throw)) 
brings forth meaning existentially. The synthesis inherent to the symbol is also the synthesis proper to 
the understanding o f meaning, both as an historical feat and as a temporal process.
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the freedom of individuality being a notion proper to the bourgeois realm of self­
reflection.2
The dawn of a new theoretical anti-humanism sought to countenance the 
promises of the rationalist and speculative traditions and expose the philosophical 
edifice as just another ideology of mastery. Of course this drive towards 
epistemological neutrality was itself inherently ideological—having pulled the left- 
wing rug from under Sartre’s feet, rapidly enshrined it within the discourse of the anti 
- cogito, leaving him isolated and politically anachronistic—in this time of wider 
social foment, populist notions of existential liberty and the Subject’s rights still 
mixed freely with the generalised anti-establishment sentiments promulgated in the 
name of the new theoretical sciences. The student riots of May 1968 and 1969 were a 
symptom of just such transitional ambiguity and excitement, reinvigorating the 
existential edict to act (both on campus and in the unions) and reinvesting philosophy 
and politics with exhilarating immediacy and consequence whilst drawing upon the 
new theoretical scepticisms for academic integrity. Paul Ricoeur had himself warned 
the authorities of the potential for unrest within the universities. His decision to 
remove from the Sorbonne’s esteemed environment signified the culmination of a 
prolonged and public critique of the French university system, as well as being an 
expression of his own professed desire to teach unfettered by certain institutional 
conventions. Essentially it was a move to match his commitment to university reform. 
And yet with his deferral and election to the new and more egalitarian site of Paris X 
at Nanterre, Ricoeur was to become a symbol of precisely those constrictions he had 
chosen to abandon. Despite his own critical essays and the decision to act in 
accordance, Ricoeur’s position as Doyen meant that his own role as a public and 
official figure was automatically associated with the authoritarian rigidity which 
Parisian students were increasingly beginning to attack along with other disclaimers 
of the de Gaulle era. To left-wing sympathisers, the university was perceived as an 
instrument of State rule in which academic integrity was sacrificed to hegemonic 
interests. Moreover, such sentiments were in fact compounded by an increasingly
Critics had questioned the viability o f an existential community and a politics founded upon pure 
subjectivity, and Sartre had responded with “Existentialism and Humanism”: “When we say that man 
chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that 
in choosing for himself he chooses fo r  all men”. That Sartre should have chosen to re-categorise 
existentialism as an ideology, and a Marxist one at that, speaks o f the cross-winds that were gradually 
eroding subjectivity.
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radical re-evaluation occurring from “within” the university, in the form of a widely 
referred to “legitimation crisis”.
Of course, the critical atmosphere of the 1960s was one of ingenious 
innovation and exploration, but like any time of intense partisanship, it was also a 
time of crass polemic and oversimplified polarities. At Nanterre subtlety was 
sacrificed to enthusiasm when the campus became a battleground between the 
university’s own faculties, the Faculty of Letters where Ricoeur was elected Dean, 
and the Faculty of Law. According to Charles E. Reagan, both friend and biographer 
of Ricoeur, the colleges were politically divided between affluent middle-class law 
students and the Letters faculty’s more working-class Leftist sympathisers. Further 
internal divisions involved the competing, and retrospectively insular conflagrations 
of Maoist and communist students, involving what were often violent assertions of 
control over the campus. In hindsight such details of the student revolt can seem 
insignificant, especially within the wider context of national and global unrest. And 
yet, by this interpretation at least, they provide a salient focal point from which to 
assess the fate of hermeneutics, both then and now.
Just as his transition from Sorbonne Professor to Dean of Nanterre was both a 
move befitting the era of democratic change and a step up the prevailing order’s 
regimental ladder, so Ricoeur’s intellectual developments proved to be of antinomian 
significance in this critically partisan era. Within this context Ricoeurian hermeneutics 
and hermeneutics in general were to suffer an overhasty opposition to the idiom of 
crisis and radical questioning, becoming all-too easily sidelined as a humanist 
alternative to formalism in a post-phenomenological and purportedly anti-idealist age. 
Latterly, Ricoeur expressed reservations as to the true political import of the May 
“events”, unsure as to whether they were something of “profound cultural 
significance” or merely “a great waking, playful dream”, perhaps the dream of a 
colourful teleology or the formal dance of an arbitrary motion. For Ricoeur 
personally, they ended in resignation and a three year leave from the French 
university system, but political dream or not, it is fair to say that intellectually, 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy only gains its true distinction amid the conflict to 
which he was once so curiously central and peripheral.
3 Quoted by Reagan. Charles E. Reagan, Paul Ricoeur; His Life and His Work, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, p. 89.
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1.2
T h e  D e c l in e  of E xistentialism
Had politics and academia not entwined themselves so intimately, 
existentialism may not have sunk so swiftly. Yet an appeal to chance neglects the 
compelling circumstances which conspired to make Sartre’s fall from favour more 
than a mere accident in the revolutions of intellectual fashion. Indeed, Sartre’s fate 
cannot be disentangled from the fate that beset millions caught between the political 
extremities of Left and Right in the first half of the twentieth century. But there was 
also a much narrower history, pertaining to French culture and the organisation of its 
academic offices, which had its part to play. The importance of these practical 
accidents is numerously attested to in the accounts of French academic historians and 
French philosophers. By way of introduction to Modern French Philosophy Vincent 
Descombes writes of the university system and its procedures of recruitment in terms 
of a process of assimilation, in which applicants are groomed into “civic-minded State 
missionaries”, in an environment where academic focus and favour devolves to the 
bias of a select committee. He plants the seeds of an explanation for the birth of 
French irrationalism in the origins of the Third State. Keen to establish its legitimacy 
through the doctrines of positivism and neo-Kantian rationalism, the state entrusted 
philosophy teachers with a role closer to that of the civil servant than the independent 
intellectual. Philosophy was to propound the progressivist, scientific principles of the 
state’s own self-perceptions and a wholly rational and optimistic view of human 
progress. But of course the philosopher’s need to break these bonds was compounded 
all too violently by the retrograde savagery of war; “for the generation of 1930, the 
starting point was a desire to escape from this optimistic view of history.”4
It is not for poignancy alone that the historian Francis Dosse opens his 
capacious History o f  Structuralism with an heroic epithet for Sartre, possibly the last 
in a long tradition of French men of letters. “The law of tragedy requires a death 
before a new hero can come onstage” he writes, and there is no doubt that Sartre’s 
prestige had once been of heroic proportions.5 But poignancy aside, it was the
4 Vincent Descombes, M odem French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M Harding, Cambridge 
University Press, 1980, pp.6-7.
5 Francis Dosse, History o f  Structuralism, V ol.l, “The Rising Sign, 1945-1966”, trans. Deborah 
Glassman, University o f Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, p.3.
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ramifications of Sartre’s politics, and the politics of a literary and humanist 
establishment figure, which in their utterly French contexts (Rousseau, republicanism, 
le Parti Communiste Francais, the highly influential journals Les Temps modernes 
and Tel Quel), made Sartre not merely old-hat, but tragically dead in intellectual 
circles even whilst he retained populist appeal with the general public. Individualism 
makes for an unlikely politics or ethics, but the continuity invested in French politics 
and philosophy compelled Sartre to provide a social framework for the existential ego. 
Despite his intellectual superfluity Sartre remained an all-round cultural figure or 
“voice of a generation” for the French public, and they demanded an example of 
commitment from him in a time of raised social and political conscience. Compelled 
to break with his habit of political non-intervention, Sartre commited his voice to a 
political stance, but this was not without problems. Having failed to protest against 
Nazism during the war, Sartre later joined the French Communist Party in an attempt 
to appease his critics, and yet he did so precisely when the atrocities of Stalinism 
began to emerge during the Cold War, when the majority of French intellectuals were 
rapidly rejecting this affiliation. Sartre was to endure increasing isolation as former 
colleagues at Les Temps modernes, including Merleau-Ponty, Camus and Claude 
Lefort left the review. Merleau-Ponty-once Sartre’s closest friend and intellectual 
kin-published a sharp denunciation of Sartre’s alliance to Bolshevism soon sifter. 
Although Sartre continued to allure and fascinate many members of the younger 
generation, his monopoly was symbolically overturned in a debate with the young 
Marxist Louis Althusser; a voice of starker contrast is hard to imagine. 
“Existentialism was the expression of postwar optimism, but the new relationship to 
history was more disenchanted”. On the other hand “Structuralism was bom as an 
intellectual phenomenon that, in a certain sense, took up where Marxism left o ff’.6 No 
structuralist made this connection more explicit than Althusser.
At a time when Man and his destiny were taking centre stage, the transition 
from a deeply humanist existential phenomenology to a structuralist anti-humanism 
could not have emerged save through the mediation of Marxism and the tensions 
internal to its own decree. Both Marxist realpolitik and the proliferation of Marxist 
theories propounded in the advent of structuralism reflected the paradigm shift away 
from the centralised and individualistic subjectivity of liberal humanism. Universal to
6 Dosse, ibid., p. 158
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the extent that they were socially, politically and intellectually motivated, the events 
of ’68 signified a wholesale rebuke of the prevailing order, not only of political and 
ideological hegemony but also the prevailing critique which, in its oppositional role, 
could be said to “belong” to the status quo just as much. In such a way, the 
longstanding tensions between a “classical” economic determinism and the kind of 
“humanist” Marxisms propounded by the existentialists were both reinvigorated and 
supplanted. The atrocities attendant upon Leninist dogma dictated a swift revision of 
allegiance on the part of the intellectual Left in France. In droves it rejected 
Communism and the ossified mechanics of the Marxist vulgate, but by the same 
atrocious consequence, assimilation to a liberal discourse of human agency was for 
some all the more misguided than previously. In place of the old contest emerged the 
political face of structure and with it a far more sophisticated understanding of 
historical determination which, whilst it most certainly did not grant individual will a 
founding role in the determination of historical process, did incorporate a revised and 
highly compromised subjectivity within its horizon. Louis Althusser’s critique of 
economism sought to elevate the consequence of the superstructure over the base with 
an analysis of ideology (beyond cruder notions of deception and propaganda) in 
which its function is distinctly psychological but crucially pre-subjective and 
involuntary. The Althusserian model repudiates the notion of individual historical 
agency in much the same way as classical determinist economism, but where it differs 
and where it gains its structuralist character is in the fact that it also repudiates the 
natural-cientific categories upon which the latter depends, exposing them as just 
another ideological construct of the bourgeoisie. What it represents within the wider 
context is an overt expression of the profound political and philosophical 
consequences of structuralism; in other words, it epitomises the consequences of a 
post-dualist epistemology as it emerges from the flames of war and philosophical 
hubris.
In a time of deep political insecurity, existentialism was no match for the 
inherently political paradigm of structuralism or indeed, for the radical status of its 
anti-humanist epistemology. As a coherent paradigm structuralism expressed the 
vision of a borderless and utopian objectivity such as Marxism had promulgated with 
its Science of Man. Structuralism provided not only the method but also the ideology 
for a generation for whom political oppression and the failures of the human sciences 
were symptoms of an unchecked and misplaced faith in human rationality.
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Structuralism was the systematic indictment of liberal humanist optimism both as 
political practice and prejudiced epistemology. Once Claude Levi-Strauss and his 
cohorts had formalised the arbitrariness of the Sign’s relation to the referential world 
and transformed this formally expanded homology into an ontological trait beyond the 
realm of theoretical linguistics, Sartre’s romanticised ethos of authenticity was 
supplanted by the discourse of the anti-cogito, and what Levi-Strauss would later call 
a theoretical anti-humanism.
Sartre’s ethos of authenticity appeals to the political conscience as a form of 
philosophical praxis, appearing to prefigure what was to become Ricoeur’s 
philosophy o f will or philosophy o f  action. In both cases the judgements and 
commitments of the individual are prioritised over the preordained statutes of law or 
convention. For Ricoeur the activity of judgement involved in praxis is guided by an 
inter-personal principle of the good life such as Aristotle specified, and judgements of 
the individual are always shaped by what Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to as the 
individual’s “horizon of interpretation”, largely the context of a living tradition passed 
on through social institutions and cultural dialogue. Whilst both the hermeneutic and 
the existential principles of choice claim parentage in Heideggerian authenticity, 
Ricoeurian judgement is always involved in a dialectic of the self and the cultural or 
historical Other present within society. In Heidegger the socio-cultural is nowhere 
more than a theoretical shadow, a mere principle impinging upon the dynamics of 
individual Dasein. Whilst Gadamer’s corrective to Heideggerian authenticity is 
decisive in terms of hermeneutics’ capacity as an ethical discourse, the Sartrean 
individual is never truly submitted to the censure of social existence. As with 
Heidegger’s own characterisation of authentic Dasein, the Sartrean agent is distinctly 
inhuman and isolated; whilst it is not passive, neither is it a socially constituted, 
socially distinguished being subject to social constraints.
Sartrean choice received redoubled criticism when Heidegger distanced 
himself from the Sartrean model, condemning it for remaining trapped within the 
bounds of Cartesian subjectivity. Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism presents a more or 
less conclusive correction to Sartrean subjectivity and its failure to account for the 
Other. Interpreting Sartrean subjectivity as a less original mode of consciousness, as a 
kind of secondary affect of agency subsequent to being, he argues that the reciprocal 
relationship of subjectivity and Being, to which consideration of the Other and hence 
ethics inheres, gets obscured by the derived thought of a monadic consciousness.
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Whilst Heideggerian consciousness proved too inhuman for some, Sartrean 
subjectivity was for him and a great many others, an overly “humanistic” rendition of 
consciousness as a one-way process of self-creation rather than the dyadic relationship 
of self and all the non-self world and its Being.
Sartrean authenticity, like Dasein’s ontological authenticity in Being and Time, 
fails to satisfactorily account for the existence of the Other. So whilst existentialism is 
a philosophy of will and action, of self-determination and self-realisation that would 
appear in perfect accord with the rally-cries of global democracy, universal suffrage 
and equal rights for all, and whilst Sartre’s insistence that existence precedes essence 
bequeaths the most staunch opprobrium to laissez faire politics, when placed within 
the order of concrete political reality the philosophical and essentially ethical 
inadequacy of authentic Dasein becomes apparent.
Sartrean philosophy suffered the combined pressures of social and intellectual 
change, with the latter coming to full fruition at a moment of heightened social 
exigency. Sartre was thus compelled to defend his philosophy in terms of the most 
pressing contemporary demands and in an atmosphere of scepticism; the free will of 
the solitary agent was made to confront the immanent structure of a faceless historical 
necessity.
1.3
St r u c t u r a l ism  a n d  t h e  R ico eu ria n  Cr itiq ue
At the height of its popularity structuralism was both more than a method and 
less than a philosophy, and yet for many the implications of its method spelt the end 
for philosophy. For others, such as Ricoeur, structuralism was a new philosopheme to 
be accommodated within a revised epistemology and with a restricted pertinence. 
From a more extreme perspective, structuralism presented a new philosophical subtext 
or ontological strata upon which to ground the entire sphere of meaning both
7 What is more, in the realm o f  practical ethics, the absolute freedom to choose stipulated by Sartre is 
by implication an indictment o f anyone for whom choice has not facilitated freedom, and this not 
because enslavement or servitude is by necessity a symptom o f bad faith or inauthentic reasoning— one 
may authentically choose not to agitate after all— but because freedom is only recognised at the level o f 
individuals. If authentic behaviour does not lead to a state o f freedom-as-authenticity then the 
individual must judge himself inauthentic.
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philosophical and non-philosophical. The rise of structuralism not only prompted a 
drastic revision of the disciplinary hierarchy (placing the philosopher—as the highest 
symbol of rational enquiry—and his authority to question under grievous suspicion), 
it also forced the issue of truth beyond the speculative, in the natural sciences and 
history for example, where questions of theoretical truth and method, practice and 
hypothesis rested under positivism’s long dominion. In such a way epistemological 
questions were rekindled just as their classical relationship to philosophy was eroded.
Whether structuralism provided one a mere method, a hypothetical and yet 
practicable truth which may or may not require philosophical elaboration, or at the 
other extreme, a pre-ontological strata to philosophical truth, the movement 
commanded a challenge to the long-standing edifice of rationalism. That structuralism 
could encompass both a purely methodological position (practical and anti­
metaphysical) and a speculative ontology (purportedly anti-metaphysical) suggests the 
pervasive tenor of its sometimes ambiguous intentions and points towards the broad 
range of its compass, in sociology and anthropology, psychoanalysis and literary 
criticism, philosophy and political theory.
As a movement, structuralism flowed from the nascent collaborations of 
linguistics, anthropology and psychoanalysis in the earlier part of the twentieth 
century. Whilst the latter two disciplines were at this stage peripheral to the classical 
humanist agenda in France, it was the wholly peripheral and non-classical linguistics 
of Ferdinand de Saussure which, through the efforts of Jakobson, Levi-Strauss and 
Lacan (to name but France’s most auspicious pioneers), united these disciplines as 
they sought to furnish semiology’s revolutionary potentials beyond linguistics. The 
idea of universality—a model for all models, a structure for all structures—which 
accompanied so much of the structuralist enterprise, derived primarily from the 
Saussurean exclusion of the referent, but of course the desirability of such an 
exclusion was pre-empted by the wider epistemic ambition for a universal science of 
humanity based upon rigorous scientific method. The exclusion of the referent, like 
the Husserlian epoche before it, not only excluded the mutability of a changing world, 
with its shifting lexicon and sensory instability, it also brought with it the suggestion 
of pre-subjective intelligibility, implying not only the fulfilment of objectivity, but 
also determinism at the (pre-)ontological level. Such speculations wildly surpassed the 
remit of Saussure’s analysis, yet in an era that made a virtue of re-reading, with 
returns to Freud and Marx as well as Saussure, it was the latter’s concept of the sign
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as an abstracted and idealised entity, that facilitated the period’s hunger for revision 
and renewal. In this respect the utterly material point of structuralism’s historical 
context cannot be overlooked. Whichever the more powerful sphere of influence, 
social dissatisfaction and academic formalism emboldened one another. The rejection 
of establishment politics and learning was a rejection of the liberal individualism upon 
which they were both founded. Under the tutelage of Saussure, Marx, and Freud, 
structuralism appeared to provide the antidote to both a flawed rationalism and a 
wounded humanism.
The tacit politics of the academic world announced themselves in the overt 
competition of institutional and disciplinary politics which, as the events of 1968 
attest, were sometimes little more than a contest between the status quo and an 
inevitably left-wing avante-garde on the outside of institutional life. Yet behind these 
more transient alliances lay the genuinely authentic renewal of Marxist thought which, 
through the conceptual shift from systems to structures in the natural sciences, 
enabled the anthropologist Levi-Strauss to adopt the concept of structure in a social, 
trans-historical context, and in full consciousness of its Marxist overtones.
Before committing to ethnology and anthropology, Levi-Strauss had been a 
dedicated reader of Marx and his development of the linguistic model for sociological 
purposes was intended to “contribute to that theory of superstructures which Marx 
barely sketched out.” 8 Yet although structural anthropology reflected Marxism’s 
social reductions into what it claimed to be globally comparable sectors with their 
historically comparable functions, the vexed questions of history, diachrony and 
dialectical reasoning remained unmitigating obstacles which, for many, served to 
entrench a perceived ideological alliance between Marxism and structuralism. Despite 
the contradictions, a profound ideological (if not epistemological) kinship developed, 
uniting these discourses as co-combatants against the philosophical tradition. Long 
before Marxism’s structural revision at the hands of Louis Althusser, there were 
contextual factors serving to compound the revolutionary association of these 
disciplines.
An academically disparate group, the progenitors of structuralism were often 
geographically as well as institutionally peripheral to the French academy. 
Structuralism came from the outside, and nothing symbolised the French interior as
8 L6vi-Strauss, La Pensee Sauvage, quoted by Frederic Jameson, the prison-house o f  language, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974. p. 102.
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potently as the figure of the Sorbonne. This at least is one way in which structuralism 
was to acquire its decisive position in the ideological wars so neatly encapsulated by 
its own binary logic. If the Sorbonne signified the classical humanist tradition in 
France, if it stood for conservative politics and mores, then the de-centralised and 
frequently itinerant institution of structuralist thought bore with it the values of the 
maverick intellectual, so often coloured, if not in any way constrained by decisively 
foreign ideologies. The biographies of numerous structuralist luminaries fit this bill, 
their developments often expressing the expediencies of war as well as personal 
privations.9 What these histories demonstrate is that structuralism could very easily 
have remained an Eastern-Russian, Slavic, Scandinavian movement were it not for the 
politics of the period. Instead structuralism took root in France with all the excitement 
and enthusiasm of one lately released from an earlier preoccupation.10
By the time of Saussure’s death in 1915 the arduous process of collating and 
analysing the transcriptions of his student audiences had come to fruition with the 
publication of the Course in General Linguistics. Saussure’s lack of personal writings 
had delayed the project by at least four years. The text’s insistence upon the 
arbitrariness of the sign was not of itself original but what was original was 
Saussure’s insistence upon the idea of a synchronic system of value which, being 
strictly divorced from semantic content, explained value through the concept of 
difference.11 The change from a genetic model to a synchronic one introduced 
linguistics to the notion of the pre-existent and total structure which repudiated the 
historico-empirical model of the nineteenth century. This wholly abstract formation
9 Saussure was a Swiss man; his intellectual journey took him by way o f Geneva, Leipzig and Berlin 
before he relocated to Paris, the site o f his lecture course in general linguistics. Roman Jakobson 
promulgated structuralist reading in Russia (Linguistic Circle o f Moscow) before evading Stalinism 
with a move to Czechoslovakia (Prague Circle). He also enjoyed strong links with structural linguists 
of the Copenhagen Circle, most notably Louis Hjelmslev. The Nazi invasion o f Czechoslovakia 
necessitated a third move, this time to New York where linguists were keen to forge links with 
European schools. It was here in New York that Jakobson eventually met with the anthropologist 
Claude L6vi-Strauss; a meeting which forcefully compounded structuralism as a universal 
epistemology.
I i.e phenomenology.
II Dosse writes “Saussure only consolidated the idea o f system, thereby reducing its field o f study to 
the synchronic system in order to give it the greatest possible impact, but abandoning the historical and 
panchronic aspects.” He progresses to say that Saussure “cleaned-up the fundamental principles needed 
by the linguists o f his period, which is to say historical linguistics” (History o f  Structuralism, Vol. 1, 
p.47). In essence, Saussure prepared the formalist ground, his achievement being the honing o f a 
method which promised new potentials. For Roland Barthes, whose practice evinces a more diffuse, 
culturalist brand o f structuralism than the linguists’, the Saussurean break represents “an 
epistemological change”: “analogy replaces evolutionism, imitation replaces derivation”. (Barthes, 
“Saussure, le signe, la democratic”, Le Discourse Social, nos. 3 and 4, April 1973.)
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was to shift linguistics away from empirical and historical research, eventually 
presaging the renewed aspirations towards a universal science of humanity as rigorous 
and coherent as the natural sciences. Saussurean semiology severely restricted the 
linguistic field in order that it may eventually broach its disciplinary confines and 
become the “science that studies the life of signs at the heart of social life”.12 
Linguistics, according to the Saussure of the Course, was to constitute just one part of 
this universal science. By introducing the formalist possibility of a general theory of 
value, the Course in General Linguistics brought the isomorphic potentials of a 
differential system for inter-disciplinary research by way of theoretical import. For 
such insights is Saussure accredited as the father of structuralism, the ambition of a 
general science being for so many, the driving force behind the structuralist epoch.
For the semiological system to breach its linguistic confines and become the
“science that studies the life of signs at the heart of social life” a second intercession 
1 ^was necessary. In keeping with the period which made a virtue of re-reading, with 
returns to both Freud and Marx, the return to Saussure was more like a discovery than 
a re-discovery in France, the Sorbonne, still the bastion of intellectual propriety in the 
1950s, having conceded nothing to Saussurean method between the 1920s and 1940s. 
Truly Saussure had not been abandoned in France, even if his influence had not led to 
linguistic schools founded upon his principles. Saussure and hence the recognition of 
structure lived, but only in the intellectual margins. Even in the 1950s, when figures 
such as Andre Martinet and Andre-Georges Haudricourt were publishing texts along 
the same lines as Jakobson and the Prague School, their unconventional career paths 
and lack of institutional clout could not rouse the French academy from its 
traditionalist, and by now downright retrograde slumbers. Only in the 1960s, when not 
only the Sorbonne but the entire nation’s ideological aspirations were challenged did 
the by now sure and steadfast trails of structuralist epistemology blaze incandescent in 
the popular imagination of a young and revolutionary France.
Elsewhere in Europe and America things were quite different. One may hazard 
that in France however, had it not been for the war, Saussure’s delayed reception may 
not have blossomed at all, France’s tardy acknowledgement being the product of 
emigres who had spent the war years exploring the wider implications of Saussure in 
receptive American institutions. By the time they reached France these figures had
12 See Dosse, History o f  Structuralism, Vol. 1, p. 45.
13 Saussure’s definition o f semiology, quoted by Dosse, ibid., p.45.
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already established careers in the name of structuralist epistemology (rather than pure 
linguistics or semiology). Pre-eminent amongst this group are Claude Levi-Strauss 
and Roman Jakobson, without whom the structuralist movement is virtually 
unthinkable. And it was their chance encounter in New York in 1942 which helped set 
alight the interdisciplinary and universalist aspirations first envisaged by Saussure.
The bond established between Levi-Strauss and Jakobson led to such a close 
intellectual alliance that whilst their work was not collaborative, it was profoundly 
linked in such a way that the claim for underlying universal structures could not be 
overlooked. Russian by birth, Jakobson had led a peripatetic existence at the service 
of his intellectual commitments. In 1915 he had established the Moscow Linguistic 
Circle, dedicated to the linguistic aspect of poetry and literary immanence. The 
inevitable ideological clash between formalism and Stalinism had led to his first exile 
in Prague where his comparative interests, in Czech and Russian poetry, contributed 
to the birth of structural phonology and the Linguistic Circle of Prague. Whilst taking 
on board the name of structure, the Prague Circle did so on the understanding of a 
“dynamic ensemble”. The circle was certainly influenced by Saussure and Russian 
Formalism, but equally it owed its debt to the thought of Husserl and the Gestalt. 
International in spirit, Jakobson also enjoyed close links with the Vienna Circle and 
the high formalism of Louis Hjelmslev and the Copenhagen Circle. With an 
advancing Nazi occupation Jakobson was destined to travel through Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden before he was eventually in the position to meet his future friend 
and colleague in New York. Meanwhile Levi-Strauss’ exile from France led him 
directly to New York. Whilst perhaps not exposed to the same degree of international 
exchange, Levi-Strauss’ own form of intellectual eclecticism, with its over-riding 
intent for epistemic syntheses, was a certain match for Jakobson. No one except 
possibly Saussure did more to establish the spirit and tenor of structuralism-culturally, 
ideologically and intellectually-than Claude Levi-Strauss.
Claude Levi-Strauss
As the sire of modem method, Levi-Strauss’ career was devoted to questions 
of disciplinary worth and scientific measure within the human and the social sciences. 
His questing spirit, to discover and to inscribe the very bounds of human knowledge, 
is evident in both his earlier ethnological research and the renowned anthropological
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innovations of his later years. With Durkheim, his predecessor in sociology, Levi- 
Strauss shared an holistic perspective on such matters; significantly it was a brand of 
universalism from which philosophy’s traditional dominion over other disciplines was 
ejected.14 Both men owed this anti-philosophical predisposition towards a global 
science of the human—fit to supplant philosophy—from Comtean positivism. 
Perversely, structuralism was impelled by the same anxieties that had shaped both the 
German hermeneutic defection from Romanticism and Husserl’s withdrawal from 
dualism, namely an objection to regionalism and an ambition for methodological 
consensus amongst the humanistic disciplines. Comte’s aspirations before them were 
accompanied by an aversion to the synthetic idealisms of contemporary philosophy; 
only by borrowing from the empirical sciences and transforming themselves into 
theoretical equivalents could the humanities (life-sciences by name only) achieve any 
sort of objective and systematic parity. Whilst Durkheim and Levi-Strauss shared 
Comte’s aversion to speculative thinking, neither could be accused of his uncritical 
dependency on scientific models and nor could they be accredited with sticking to his 
positivist agenda.
In so many instances, the ambition of a general science of man equal to the 
universal and objective criteria for natural science compelled the paradoxical 
tendency towards an arch formalism purged of all mutability. When Levi-Strauss 
imported Jakobson’s phonological model into his own research on kinship models, he 
took what some may call an epochal step into the realm of abstract methodology, 
driving an irrevocable wedge between observational practice and theoretical method. 
In Elementary Structures o f  Kinship, the transposition of value is justified on the basis 
of an analogy between kinship and language, whose characters are linked by the 
concept of exchange. The value-exchange of words in kinship is reflected in language 
through the circulation of women; a process that enables the healthy distribution of
14 Due to the occlusion o f “ethnology” from the English language, the distinction marking 
anthropology’s significance as an independent discourse from sociology is obscured. Ethnology, 
according to L6vi-Strauss comprises just one stage o f anthropological research. Previously ethnology 
(ethnologie) and anthropology {anthropologie) had been interchangeable terms with ethnology being 
the more common. In English this equivalence did not exist. L^vi-Strauss’ preference for 
“anthropology” signified the wider remit o f his discipline, to which ethnology was but the singular 
process of synthesising data gathered in the prior empirical stage o f ethnographic observation 
(fieldwork). Rejecting the previous equivalence o f ethnology and anthropology, L6vi-Strauss 
subsumed the ethnographical and the ethnological within the global perspective of a reassigned 
anthropology. By L6vi-Strauss’ prescription therefore, anthropology encompassed the wider field of 
abstraction and reflection to which sociology had previously claimed singular tenure, presiding over 
ethnology as its own sub-discipline. Anthropology was provocative by design.
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genes as well as knowledge and social interaction between clans. On the pragmatic 
level, social interaction and the distribution of knowledge equate with the semantic 
charge of words. On the organisational level, clan relations operate like signs, “not on 
the level of the terms but on that of the pairs of relations” such as Mother-Daughter, 
Mother-Father, terms which cannot function in isolation but only within a system of 
synchronic value, like that of the signs representing them.15 By “defining a limited 
number of possibilities as elementary kinship structures”, Levi-Strauss according to 
Dosse, “made a reduction in the mathematical sense of the term”;
...the L^vi-Straussian revolution consisted in debiologizing the 
phenomenon [of kinship] and removing it from the simple structure of  
consanguinity and from ethnocentric moral considerations.16
There were critics and advocates alike for whom this decisive manoeuvre represented 
the dawn of a new idealism, whereby the sign’s synchronic purchase over the 
historical and hence the existential, the prioritisation in linguistic terms of langue over 
parole, led, in Frank Lentricchia’s words “to the Platonic pursuit of the taxonomy or 
model as transcendentals”.17 By this account, the Elementary Structures o f  Kinship 
expunged the problematic variables of history and the individual from the field of 
kinship and in so doing prepared the ground for similar research in other fields. 
Accordingly, Levi-Strauss represented the premier voice of a new idealism, with 
Saussure’s Course on General Linguistics providing a direct and purportedly 
unequivocal lineage.
Incontrovertibly, arch formalist, anti-humanist epistemology would be 
unthinkable without the founding demonstrations of a formal homology transferable 
between disparate phenomena. But whilst it is true to say that Levi-Strauss 
“debiologised phenomena”, it is thoroughly wrong to judge him as an out and out 
formalist. On the contrary, neither Jakobson nor Levi-Strauss sought to defer from 
Saussure’s original constitution of the sign, which entailed a bracketing rather than an 
unequivocal voiding of the semantic field and external reference. Indeed by Dosse’s 
analysis, Levi-Strauss represents a hero of mediation, one who gained the hard-earned,
15 Ricoeur, “Structure and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde, Continuum, 
London, 2004. p.34.
16 Dosse, History o f  Structuralism, Vol. 1, p. 19
17 Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, Methuen, London, 1983. p.l 17.
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albeit precarious balance—between observation and theory, chance and 
determinism—to which the life-sciences had so long aspired.18 But Levi-Strauss’ 
position at the centre of structuralism also represents the near-miss of a genius whose 
imperfections ricocheted into the ever-widening sphere of formalist excess on the one 
hand and recalcitrant positivisms—historical, empirical, deductive—on the other.
Even whilst astute critics recognise that the semiotic template begins life as a 
theoretical and not a transcendental model, that the theoretical was not intended to 
supplant the practical, and that, along with the continuation of traditional observation 
into empirical particulars, Levi-Strauss also maintained a profound interest in 
conspicuously anti-formalist, literary fields, they also recognise a point at which the 
sheer power of the structural-anthropological model can be seen to engulf its author’s 
original, pioneering intentions, and that at this point theoretical mediation does 
transform into transcendental totalisation.19 This occurs when the purely formal 
homology is corrupted, when language can no longer retain the character of an 
external analogy and becomes itself a feature of the analogon; in short, anywhere that 
the subject-phenomenon is in any way constituted through discourse. This auto­
implication represents the impossibility of a non-transcendental, abstract or merely 
propadeutic description of the sign occurring wherever language bears an internal 
relation to the phenomena under scrutiny. It is for this, rather than any one-sided 
assessment of the code itself, which leads Levi-Strauss’ most even-handed critics to 
place limits upon the code’s analogic remit.
Levi-Srauss’ Marxian apprenticeship is a telling indictment of his formalist 
credentials. Even while he would affect a withdrawal from overt politics—announcing 
that it was dangerous “to enclose political realities within the framework of formal 
ideas”—he remained attached to the idea of developing an understanding of ideology
90beyond the crude notions of propaganda initiated by Marxism. It is therefore 
paradoxical that a structuralist critique of ideology should expose the Platonising
18 He writes that “In an era in which the division of intellectual labor limited a researcher to 
increasingly fragmented knowledge, L6vi-Strauss sought to balance the material and the intelligible. 
Tom between a desire to restore the internal logic o f material reality and a poetic sensibility that 
strongly tied him to the natural world, Levi-Strauss forged important intellectual syntheses in much the 
same way as one writes musical scores.” Dosse, ibid., p. 10.
19 For L6vi-Strauss and the embryonic discipline o f anthropology, observation was not a counter to 
theoretical methods but in fact an indispensable preparation for the elucidation o f underlying structures. 
In such a way the Saussurian sign itself did not signify the decisive wedge between methodological 
abstraction and practical analysis but the great clue to their indissolubility.
20 Quoted by Dosse, ibid., p.l 1.
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tendency and hence the predisposition towards totalisation inherent to its own 
operations. A structuralist refinement of the concept of ideology cannot work unless 
the linguistic system is shown to be the pre-eminent basis upon which all discourse is 
founded, and in order to do this, one must presume a kind of detached and pre- 
ideological system, an idealised system of completely neutral values (a formal 
oxymoron) which contradicts the very relations upon which dialectical materialism is 
founded. To suppose some theoretically neutral originality for the semiotic code is to 
assume what Frederic Jameson, one of Levi-Strauss’ most perspicacious and even- 
handed critics outside of France, describes in terms of a “false autonomy of the 
superstructure”:
...one cannot place a superstructure between parentheses for descriptive 
and analytical purposes and still remain true to the impulse behind the 
terminology; this is so even if, as L^vi-Strauss feels, the forms of 
linguistic organization which he has revealed are those which characterize 
the superstructure as a whole.
The contradiction of such a totalising move is that it fails to honour the social totality 
to which the superstructure belongs. In Jameson’s words, the constitutive feature of its 
apprehension lies
...in the mental operation by which the apparently independent 
ideological phenomenon is forcibly linked back up with the infrastructure; 
by which the false autonomy o f the superstructure is dispelled, and with it 
the instinctive idealism which characterizes the mind when it has to do 
with nothing but spiritual facts. Thus the very concept of the 
superstructure is designed to warn us of the secondary character o f the 
object which it names.21
The American phenomenological and deconstructive critic Frank Lentricchia echoes 
another Jamesonian reservation concerning the reality which the superstructure claims 
to name. As the sign writ large, the superstructure both names and “forbids any
92research into the reality beyond it”. Lentricchia’s critique in After the New Criticism
21 Frederic Jameson, the prison-house o f  language: a critical account o f  structuralism and Russian 
formalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974, p. 103.
22 Jameson, ibid., p. 106
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expresses a greater anxiety concerning the importation of the Saussurean sign which 
“...defers from the outset the ontological question of the relationship of language and 
reality itself.”23 In Jameson’s Marxian context this translates as the “insulation of the 
superstructure from reality”. And yet this refusal to address ontology is coupled to an 
implicit conviction in the system’s “ontological participation”.24 Given the system’s 
suppression of diachrony such participation must, according to the argument, go by 
way of something both more fundamental and instantaneous than historical mediation 
(which could provide an outroute from the problem of the code’s ontological relation); 
instead one must assume it to be some kind of formative paradigm from which 
historical events, actions and intentions deviate, in much the same way that parole 
deviates from the purity of la langue.
Ricoeur echoes the critique of the structure’s autonomy with an analysis of 
Levi-Strauss’ primary analogy between the semiotic code and kinship structures. 
Whilst he largely gives credence to the formal properties of this initial correspondence, 
Ricoeur elicits the point at which Levi-Strauss hastily transforms a relatively modest 
and cautiously couched analogy into a universalised philosophical proposition. 
Transforming a formal analogy into a foundation for all linguistic (that is cultural) 
phenomena, Levi-Strauss is once again condemned for apportioning the system an 
unjustifiable philosophical priority and preliminary autonomy. By questioning the 
isotopic validity of the Levi-Straussian analogy beyond kinship, Ricoeur delimits the 
remit of structuralist epistemology, in the first instance, as a genuine homology and in 
the second, as a philosophical position. Despite this, Ricoeur does not view the 
importation of the Saussurean sign as quite the barrier to ontological clarification 
named by Lentricchia. Ricoeur proposes to demonstrate how the semiotic model is 
integral to a philosophy of language, but how it none the less constitutes just one 
regional level of intelligibility within the actual totality of human (linguistic) 
discourse. It is through an elaboration of the properties of discourse and its 
simultaneously mediating and constituting roles within the process of understanding, 
that Ricoeur projects his dialectical vision of a limited but nevertheless warranted 
structural pertinence.
For Ricoeur, the consciousness of a method’s worth is inseparable from the 
consciousness of its limitations. In the case of structuralism, one may suppose this
23 Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, ibid., p.l 18.
24 Frank Lentricchia, ibid., p. 119.
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limit to be met through an immediate objection to the projection of a synchronic 
model upon the waxing and waning of human existence. Certainly, Ricoeur believes 
the true phenomenality of language to exceed the parameters of structural linguistics, 
but then he never claims scientific structuralism to think differently. Structuralist 
epistemology does not confront diachrony with the kind of stark opposition redolent 
of literary theoretical practice; in structuralism there is not the “pure and simple 
opposition between diachrony and synchrony” claimed by some of its detractors.
Ricoeur’s Critique of Levi-Strauss.
There is ... no reason to juxtapose two ways of understanding; the 
question is rather to link them together as the objective and the existential 
(or existentiell !).26
Naturally, phenomenologists and ethicists were keen to assert the 
phenomenological and moral limitations incumbent upon a linguistically and 
rationally compromised psyche without forsaking the epistemological advances such a 
model made over rationalisms. Amongst hermeneutic philosophers at the time, 
Ricoeur’s attention to structuralist epistemology was relatively unique. To an extent 
his critique accords with that of fellow phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Both express the inherent limitation of a linguistic theory which fails to account for 
the historically asystematic and frequently incidental character of meaning, whether it 
be in terms of semantics and the common lexis or the nature of speaker’s intentions 
and ambiguity and more generally, the limitations of a philosophy which excludes 
reflective thought. But whilst Merleau-Ponty strives for a more global synthesis, 
Ricoeur accords structuralist insights an unequivocally central yet essentially more 
limited role.
From the start of his investigations, Ricoeur grants structuralism a decisive 
validity which by no means countermands the claims of a philosophical hermeneutics. 
There is no “more rigorous or more fruitful approach than the structuralist method at
25 “L6vi-Strauss, in this respect, is right to oppose to his detractors Jakobson’s great article on the 
‘Principles of Historical Phonetics’, where the author explicitly distinguishes between synchrony and 
statics.”, Ricoeur, “Structure and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, ibid., p.32.
26Ricoeur, ibid., p.30
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the level of comprehension which is its own”. It is precisely this conception of a very 
real and relatable universe of the different levels of comprehension or horizons of 
understanding—beginning from the most rudimentary division between objective 
science and the interpretive humanities—,which impels Ricoeur to define the remit of 
this region of intelligibility. Far from rejecting the validity of the linguistic code, 
Ricoeur seeks to limit and synthesise the order of semiosis within the field of 
meaningful interpretation and to corroborate its role within this universal scheme. 
Structuralism is a science which seeks
to put at a distance, to objectify, to separate out from the personal 
equation o f  the investigator the structure of an institution, a myth, a rite, 
to the same extent hermeneutics buries itself in what could be called “the 
hermeneutic circle” o f  understanding and of believing, which disqualifies 
it as science and qualifies it as meditating thought.27
As far as Ricoeur is concerned, structuralism and hermeneutics occupy polar 
extremities within the human sciences. Structuralism disqualifies itself from historical 
understanding as much as hermeneutics disqualifies itself as a science. Hermeneutics 
immerses itself within the very acts and operations which structuralism brackets. Yet 
rather than proving a barrier to further thought, the apparent discontinuity of these 
levels of intelligibility is to prove the primary clue to their continuity. In “Structure 
and Hermeneutics” Ricoeur makes it his task to demonstrate the limits of a synchronic 
priority and to affect a reversal which can thereby demonstrate structuralism’s true 
remit within philosophical hermeneutics conceived in these general terms. Whilst the 
semiotic code reflects a distinctly anti-phenomenological objectivity, it never posits 
the all-out opposition of synchrony and diachrony embedded at the heart of textualist 
and intentionalist extremes. Truly, the code relies for its intelligibility upon the 
synchronic law of differential relations, an “axis of coexistences, which is wholly 
distinct from the axis of successions”. Synchronic linguistics examines language in its 
systematic aspects; it is “a science of states in their synchronic aspects”. But this 
does not mean that the system cannot admit of change and diachrony; what it means is 
that “history is secondary and figures as an alteration of the system” and that “these
27 Ricoeur, ibid., p.30.
28 Ricoeur, ibid., p.31.
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alterations are less intelligible than the states of the system”. By the code’s own light 
“history is responsible for disorders rather than meaningful changes.”29
Contesting the opposition of synchrony and diachrony and confirming their 
hierarchical relationship in this way, it is clear that the code’s eventual delimitation 
within the hermeneutic will depend, at least in part, upon the proposed continuity of 
their temporal modes. To this end Ricoeur enters into a dialectical examination of 
their respective bonds or value-systems in the linguistic field; the synchronic traits of 
the code, as a system of simultaneous, differential arrangements, which functions 
independently of the referential or signifying function, are made to confront the 
signifier’s historical unfolding between language-users. From an epistemological 
vantage, the non-referential and purely inter-relational arrangements of syntax 
describes an act of reduction; the code is a reduced model from whence the 
equivocation of speakers’ intentions, polysemia and ambiguity have been subtracted, 
its “reading” involves a “decoding” of the structure. Semantic analysis by contrast 
entails an amplification of possible meanings; guided by the referential context, 
significance is “deciphered” or interpreted.30 Through the elaboration of their parallel 
functions, Ricoeur seeks to integrate the sign and word, synchrony and diachrony, to 
the hermeneutically expanded dialectic of structure and event. His justification for 
doing so is borne of the preceding analysis. The phenomenological amplification of 
the terms testifies to the semiotic model’s reversed priority, the contrast of synchrony 
and diachrony being limited to a purely regional pertinence within the wider historical 
horizon of hermeneutic understanding. Ricoeur seeks to demonstrate this by setting 
the binomial properties of synchrony and diachrony, syntax and semantics, decoding 
and deciphering, to work within the fabric of Levi-Strauss’ own text.
Structural consensus and justification rests upon the apprehension of a primary 
homology between Saussurean linguistic laws and the phenomena upon which it is 
projected. In Levi-Strauss’ initial work on kinship the basis for analogy, that women 
are circulated like words, that kinship functions like a language, as “an arbitrary 
system of representations” is situated in terms of an original impulse compelling men 
to exchange words, namely the “split representation that pertains to the symbolic
29 Ricoeur, ibid., p.32.
30 The structural semantics o f A.J Greimas precludes speaker’s intentionality, but in its hermeneutic 
context, semantic signification carries the full charge of inter and extra-referential meaning.
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function”. It is on the basis of the structure’s apparent surpassing of this ambiguous 
split representation, that Ricoeur can assert structuralism’s dependency upon a pre­
existent background of split representation, symbolism and essentially semantic 
understanding. “Wouldn’t the objective science of exchange be an abstract segment in 
the full understanding of the symbolic function?” 32 Ricoeur nevertheless grants the 
structural analysis an important mediating role between a naive semantic 
interpretation and a semantics which has been enhanced through the mediation of a 
semiotic decoding and re-amplification of the semantic base.
Levi-Strauss’ initial apprehension of an analogy between phonemic laws and 
kinship systems can be justified to the extent that kinship satisfies the four premises 
upon which the phonemic system is based (systems based at an unconscious level 
which operate on the level of differential relations rather than singular terms and 
which “are most readily apprehensible from a synchronic perspective).33Yet we find 
in all structurally conceived phenomena an elevation, a prioritisation of those aspects 
which best behove the generation of ever wider structural homologies between 
different “languages”. Accordingly kinship takes on the properties of language and 
phonemic distribution; it is “an arbitrary system of representations, [rather than] the 
spontaneous development of a real situation.” 34 Now Ricoeur’s reservations 
concerning the methodological bias of the phonemic model, predestined as it is, to 
disqualify explanations rooted within the order of historical consciousness and to 
overlook the potential for a plurality of heterogeneous signifying functions, are in a 
way demonstrated by the hasty ambitions of Levi-Strauss’ own pen.
Three publications after the Elementary Structures o f Kinship Levi-Strauss 
attempts to expand the scope of systematic values to encompass the far more 
ambiguous and complex phenomena of art and religion. In the process, Ricoeur 
implies, analogical justification transmutes into a covert epistemological declaration; 
similarity is no longer the basis for comparison but a form of transcendental
31 L6vi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, quoted by Ricoeur, ibid., p.34.
32 The Savage Mind, p.62, Ricoeur, ibid., p.36.
33 Ricoeur, ibid., p.34
34L6vi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, quoted by Ricoeur, ibid., p.35. L£vi-Strauss expresses the 
structural homology between kinship and semantics as follows: kinship is “...a  kind o f language , a set 
of processes permitting the establishment, between individuals and groups, o f a certain type of 
communication. That the mediating factor, in this case, should be the women o f  the group, who are 
circulated between clans, lineages, or families, in place o f the words o f  the group, which are circulated 
between individuals, does not at all change the fact that the essential aspect of the phenomenon is 
identical in both cases” (Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, Ricoeur, ibid., p.35).
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equivalence. In the passage from Structural Anthropology to The Savage Mind, the 
original analogy to phonemic structures is compromised when it is projected upon 
phenomena which are themselves already linguistically implicated or constituted. But 
when Levi-Strauss applies the linguistic analogy to deeply cultural phenomena such 
as religion, this is what he does. There is a qualitative difference between the 
projection of an extra-linguistic analogy, where something non-linguistic is likened in 
its functioning to the linguistic structure, and a comparison between language and 
what is essentially a cultural discourse. As Ricoeur puts it, when a discourse such as 
religion is
erected on the foundation o f language, considered as an instrument of 
communication...the analogy is shifted inside language and from this 
moment on refers to the structure o f this or that particular discourse in 
relation to the general structure o f a language.35
On the one hand, structuralism takes on the unexpected hue of a comparative 
discipline. But the more important issue concerns the temporal relations governing 
their assumed likeness.
It is...not certain a priori that the relation between diachrony and 
synchrony, valid in general linguistics, rules the structure o f particular 
discourses in an equally dominant fashion. The things said do not 
necessarily have an architecture similar to that of language viewed as a 
universal instrument o f speaking.36
Whilst some discourses within the humanities demonstrate a greater leaning towards 
the synchronic model of explanation, other discourses display a profoundly historical, 
interpretive mode of transmission. For this reason the model of the code is felt to 
bring its own analytical and methodical prejudices with it, directing investigations
...toward articulations which are similar to its own, that is, toward a logic 
of oppositions and correlations, that is to say, finally, toward a system o f  
differences.37
35 Ricoeur, ibid., pp.36-7.
36 Ricoeur, ibid., p.37
37 Ricoeur, ibid., p.37
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The idea that different discourses conform to different temporal modalities is a 
distinctly literary one. Literary critics have long known the intimate bond linking a 
narrative’s temporal markers and the reality it claims to name. The scholarly 
workmanship of Eric Auerbach’s Mimesis testifies to a pre-theoretical parentage 
drawn from classical German exegesis. The analysis of kinship structures names a 
reality of timeless social contracts and impersonal relations based not on blood so 
much as the archetypal forms of clan structure. If the structure were a narrative, it 
would surely be equal to those folk or fairy narratives favoured in the first stages of 
literary structuralism, where all psychological depth and contextual determinates have 
been flattened? The challenge to literary structuralism was of course to prove the 
worth of a synchronic correspondence in more sophisticated and temporally complex 
literature, where the logic of opposition and correlation is not so consistently apparent. 
To this end there is no greater triumph than Gerard Genette’s Narrative Discourse, 
which elaborates structuralist method through the unceasing vacillations of Proustian 
temporality. But the relationship which Levi-Strauss attempts to name does not 
concern the code’s role in the particular instance of this or that narrative and its 
temporal order, but the relation of the entire cultural discourse to which it belongs.
The temporal relations governing religious discourse or art cannot be assumed 
to display a unitary suppression or elevation in the diachronic or synchronic elements 
in the same way that kinship reflects the elevation of synchrony proper to the code. To 
assume as much involves an unjustifiable leap from the particular to the general which 
Ricoeur, the meticulous archivist of thought, can only view as a bold and unwarranted 
generalisation. Such a generalisation is constitutionally different from the principle of 
methodological generalisation upon which a structuralist reading of this or that text 
operates, where all questions of a diachronic nature (historical context, authorial 
intentionality, social or temporal constraints) are rejected and diachrony simply ceases 
to exist; both this and the practical application which such a total abnegation of 
history facilitates itself debars the way to any greater ontological claims concerning 
for example, structure’s priority in the nature of creativity. As Ricoeur reminds us, the 
diachronic remains a function, albeit secondary, in the systems of both Saussure and 
Trubetzkoy. As such, Levi-Strauss’ extension of the code beyond the bounds of an 
external analogy towards the relations of all cultural discourses, and one could say all 
phenomenal understanding, entails the radical ontological assertion that structure 
precedes process, or to use the terms proper to Ricoeur, that the event (of meaning in
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its widest application) is the consequence of the structure. Against such a hierarchy 
Ricoeur will assert the dialectic of structure and event informed by the code’s 
stipulated limitations; it will then become apparent how the insights of structure 
function practically within Ricoeur’s description of a mediated signification.
Culture functions not like a language, but through language. To this extent 
Levi-Strauss is not wrong to say that language “may appear as laying a kind of 
foundation for the more complex structures which correspond to the different aspects 
of culture”. No one in our post-Nietzschean landscape would reject such a claim in its 
general message, but only a belated structuralist would willingly accept the 
assumption that greater complexity necessarily corresponds to the piling-up of more 
and more complex structures. Even whilst Levi-Strauss structuralises culture, by his 
own admission greater complexities within the cultural framework ensure a 
qualitative alteration to the mode of its production; products of each other, language
and culture are also products of the human mind in a way that kinship structures
simply are not. Between the code and clan-structures an analogy is claimed to exist 
independent of the thinking subject, as such the analogy is a static identity. Conceding, 
as indeed he must, to the role of the thinking mind, the structural analogy now forces 
its way from language and culture into the mind itself. Ricoeur now confronts a 
situation in which
...linguistic laws designate an unconscious level and, in this sense, a 
nonreflective, nonhistorical level o f the mind. This unconscious is not the 
Freudian unconscious o f  instinctual, erotic drives and its power of  
symbolization; it is more a Kantian than a Freudian unconscious, a
categorical and combinative unconscious. It is a finite order or the
finitude o f order, but such that it is unaware of itself. I call it a Kantian 
unconscious, but only as regards its organization, since we are here 
concerned with a categorical system without reference to a thinking 
subject.
This is why structuralism as philosophy will develop into a kind of  
intellectualism which is fundamentally antireflective, anti-idealist, and 
anti-phenomenological.38
38 Ricoeur, ibid., pp.32-33.
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The idea that the pattern of the code designates the unconscious mind at a pre- 
subjective level exceeds the claims of any formal analogy; it supposes an identity in 
which the unconscious mind “can be said to be homologous to nature; perhaps it even 
is nature”. This identity relationship, whose sanction exceeds the claims of the 
explanatory, is entirely non-historical. The path to this “bold generalisation” goes by 
way of The Savage Mind, a work that claims to name “an entire level of thought, 
considered globally”. Structurally constituted, savage thought will come to name the 
foundation, or rather the structural sedimentation from whence all subsequent modes 
of thought are seen to emerge anthropologically. Levi-Strauss’ name for it is totemic 
thought. But totemic thought is not to be considered a pre-logical antecedent to 
modem thought. It is in fact homologous to logical thought “in the strong sense” that 
“the ramifications of its classifications, the refinement of its nomenclatures, are 
classifying thought itself.” 40 It is therefore granted an undeniable evolutionary 
precedence in civilisation and the development of the human intellect. Most 
significantly, this is archaeology of unconscious developments, where a nascent 
structurally orders itself in response to sensory stimuli. The origin of meaningful 
thought is thus located in an unconscious consolidation of structural categories:
Intelligibility is attributed to the code of transformations which assure 
correspondences and homology between arrangements belonging to 
different levels o f social reality...it is the choice o f  syntax over 
semantics,41
By deploying the essentially linguistic terms of syntax (the formal arrangement of 
components within a given order) and semantics (the content of these components), 
Ricoeur is able to challenge the elevation of totemic thought whilst remaining true to 
the essential premise that thought and culture are linguistically mediated. As far as 
Ricoeur is concerned, totemic culture represents an “an extreme example much more 
than a canonical form”. At the other end of this spectrum lies the converse model of 
Kergymatic thought, where culture is primarily governed by content (or semantics). 
Ricoeur’s model is the early Hebraic world, a tradition founded through interpretation 
and re-articulation of an original mythic base. It is a culture where “semantic richness
39 Ricoeur, ibid., p.38
40 Ricoeur, ibid., p.38
41 Ricoeur, ibid., p.39. Emphasis added.
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allows an indefinite number of historical recoveries” and in which the process of
recovery itself constitutes a defining part of one’s cultural membership. In their
greater prevalence to totemic cultures, kerygmatic societies severely limit Levi- 
Strauss’ claims to have located a universal model.
Whilst the structuralist explanation seems to encompass almost 
everything when synchrony takes the lead over diachrony, it provides us 
[with] only a kind o f skeleton, whose abstract character is apparent, when
we are faced with an overdetermined content, a content which does not
cease to set us thinking and which is made explicit only through the series 
of recoveries by which it is interpreted and renewed.42
Perhaps more importantly for Ricoeur, the contrary cultures of totem and kerygma 
help to demonstrate structuralism’s epistemological limits within the human sciences 
and how, as reading practices, structural semiotics and the hermeneutical theory of 
interpretation comprise complimentary opposites on the social-scientific scale from 
codification to amplification.
Roman Jakobson
If Levi-Strauss over-formalised the structural affinities of code and culture, if, 
in doing so, code and culture were in one way or another hypostasized or conflated, 
this was not Jakobson’s basic intention in formulating the phonemic system.
To follow the brilliant and itinerant career-path of Jakobson is to re-illuminate 
structuralism’s socio-political and intellectual histories upon a single map. Forced into 
exile not one but five times, the frontiers of Jakobson’s journey were never chosen for 
their political climate alone. Following Soviet rule in Russia, Jakobson was forced to 
abandon the Linguistic Circle of Moscow and de-camp to Czechoslovakia, where, 
along with Czech and fellow Russian linguists Jakobson contributed to the formation 
of the Prague Linguistic Circle. This skill for sourcing and fomenting intellectual 
alliances provides something of a motif for Jakobson’s career. With close relations to 
both the Gestalt Vienna Circle and the Copenhagen Circle of linguists, it was no
42 Ricoeur, ibid., p.48.
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accident that Jakobson’s eventual move to America—following time in Copenhagen, 
Oslo, Stockholm and Uppsala—coincided with the receptive environment of New 
York’s own linguistic circle.
In life and work Jakobson was the walking embodiment of structuralist 
conventions. In the precocity of his early Moscow days, he formulated the linguist’s 
task in terms of little less than a general theory. His ambition, for a set of universal 
linguistic laws, and for a linguistics firmly anchored within the hard sciences, was to 
build the elusive bridge between scientific method and the creative artistic arena in 
which he himself was so articulately immersed.43 By Jakobson’s own account the 
birth of phonology, of the science of sound in its formal linguistic distribution, was an 
accident of history and poetry, borne of his own rather unserious translations of 
Russian poetry into Czech. But throughout his career, with every new development, 
Jakobson’s work confirmed two fundamental precepts, that language is regulated by 
universal laws and that the production of all meaning is founded by oppositional traits. 
In accordance with the Saussurean model, phonemes, like signs, only distinguish 
themselves differentially, oppositionally, by virtue of their relationships with other 
phonemes. In phonetics the binary rule is a function of sonorous matter at the sub- 
linguistic level of the phoneme.
But whilst Saussure provided the basic mechanism of the phonematic code and 
continued to dictate the over-ruling research paradigm—the location and study of 
language in its compositional units— ,Jakobson and his fellow Prague linguists were 
in fact developing a critical distance from Saussurean linguistics. In its wide-ranging 
application, and in hands others than Jakobson’s, phonology almost certainly helped 
promote a kind of over-stretched and radicalised Saussureanism. As with structural 
anthropology however, this was not the product of its inception so much as its 
extension. The tendency for which Ricoeur condemns Levi-Strauss for example, for 
the suppression verging on negation of diachronic traits, is not a Jakobsonian principle 
so much as a consequence of phonology’s application. Whilst diachrony and 
synchrony were not continuous for the Prague School, they were not deemed 
irreconcilable. On the contrary, against the static conception of synchronicity, 
Jakobson frequently asserted a condition of “dynamic synchrony”, something to
43 Jakobson was reading the French Symbolist poets by the age o f twelve. A little later he participated 
in the readings of futurist poets such as Mayakovski. This led to an unlikely dialogue between Russian 
Formalism and the principles o f Futurism.
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which Ricoeur himself frequently alludes in his critical treatments of semiotics and 
the human sciences. Similarly, against the stark radicalism of his Copenhagen 
colleague, Jakobson admonished Hjelmslev for wishing to go too far in the direction 
of a mathematised binary logic, from which Hjelmslev wished to excise both the 
semic and phonemic elements altogether.
Always dichotomising in its fundamental arrangements, Jakobsonian 
linguistics nevertheless testified to an altogether more complex and interactive 
relation between terms. Whilst Jakobson’s celebrated work on aphasic disturbance 
utilised the Saussurean opposition between syntagma (the grammatical chain of noun, 
verb and pronoun say) and association (the selection of one term from within a group 
of associated or paradigmatic terms within the code), it also testified to the 
fundamental interaction upon which successful language usage depends; aphasic 
selection deficiency and association deficiency being predicated upon the incapacity 
of one or other of these famous poles.44 From our own perspective, the work on 
aphasic disturbance and the subsequent distinction of the metaphoric and metonymic 
poles had two enormously influential consequences for the relationship between 
literary studies and the social sciences. The first of these was to imbue poetic diction 
and literary creativity with an explanatory model; now the mystique of the poet, the 
beauty, prescience or profundity to emerge from his form, could be explained in terms 
of objective operations. The poetic was an artful derangement of standard usage; a 
technical unbalancing of the selective pole and the substitution pole. In literary terms 
this signified the elevation of technique and talent, albeit perhaps obliquely practised, 
over and above inspiration and the velleities of the muse. But perhaps more important 
was the effect which would one day permeate this relation in the other direction, in 
terms not of what the social sciences could say of literature, but of what literature 
could, and indeed would go on to say about them.
Jakobson’s own career as a linguist was in fact inseparable from his life-long 
attachment to poetry. Linguistics’ renewal at the hands of structural phonology was 
itself the chance genesis of Jakobson’s poetic translations.45 In all his early poetic
44 See Jakobson’s celebrated paper, “Two Aspects o f Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbance”, Fundamentals o f  Language, Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Mouton de Gruyter, The 
Hague, 2002, pp.69-90.
45 Noticing that Russian and Czech are lexically very similar but tonally disparate, Jakobson realized 
that these different phonological choices were “nonetheless similar enough that a listener could grasp 
the fact that only very slight changes would suffice for the pertinent difference to change.” Quoted by 
Dosse, History o f  Structuralism, V ol.l, p.55.
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engagements it was poetry’s linguistic aspect, and the need to treat the literary text 
internally, as a sealed-off coherent unity, which he emphasised. And it was this 
formal emphasis which led to the defining opposition of standard language and poetry. 
Whilst the opposition was not itself new, the scientific and law-bound justification for 
it was. Whilst the work on aphasia and the distinction of the metaphoric and 
metonymic poles led to the generalisation of heretofore uniquely literary operations, 
consolidating linguistic conceptions of consciousness, Jakobson’s definition of the 
poetic function nevertheless consolidated the literary work’s irreducible standing 
within the aesthetic tradition. For Jakobson, poetry was intrinsically different from 
other discourses. Jakobson’s classical formula opposes the poetic and the referential 
in full contrariety; reference pertains to the language of description, to instances of 
scientific precision and everyday communication, where language is absorbed by the 
message it carries. With poetic language it is the medium itself which is elevated; 
here Jakobson asserts a “stress on the palpable side of the signs” which “underscores 
the message for its own sake and deepens the fundamental dichotomy between signs 
and objects.”46 Such an elevation works to subvert or short-circuit the referential 
function; now, instead of reaching outwards to the reality it purportedly names, it 
deflects inwards.
However, and this is critical to the development of postructuralism, poetry’s 
distinction was not predicated upon a pure and simple negation of the referential 
function. As Ricoeur points out, the poetic function testifies to a deviant form of 
reference, not an absence of reference. Where standard descriptive discourse refers 
outwards to a non-linguistic reality, poetic discourse bypasses this detour, instead 
referring directly to its own sensible manifestation, as textual or audible signs. 
Language either “has a communicative function, which is to say that it is directed 
toward a signified, or a poetic function, which is to say that it is directed toward the 
sign itself.”47 But even whilst Jakobson asserts the autotelic function of poetry, he 
never postulates the kind of intellectual idealism for which formalist poetics are 
sometimes confused. To be sure, the very premise of phonology, as a science of 
auditory signification, contradicts the possibility from the start. The binarity of the 
phonological system corresponds to the dualism of the sign, with its sensible and
46 Jakobson, Selected Writings, Vol. 2, The Hague, 1962, p.356, quoted by Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical 
Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5, N o.l, Autumn 1978, pp. 
143-159, p.152.
47 Dosse, ibid., p.56, FN. 14.
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intelligible aspects and its dual reference to the signifier and the signified. The 
difference with poetry of course is that the signifier in many ways is the signified.
For Jakobson the strict distinction between internal and manifest features of 
language did not amount to an all-out exclusion of the latter’s function. On the 
contrary, this distinction was predicated upon the basis that one could measure their 
interaction. Poetry’s intrinsic distinction rests upon the co-existence of two 
empirically verifiable structural patterns, one being the formal arrangement of the line, 
the other, the grammatical construction of the sentence. “Measure of sequences is a 
device that, outside the poetic function, finds no application in language.”48 But this 
claim for the referential and formal discontinuity of the poetic function, and for the 
precise modalities of interaction between language’s internal and manifest features 
was soon to be challenged by the new generation of poststructuralists.
In the golden age of literary formalism, the Anglo-American and structuralist 
traditions had co-existed in unmediated parallel. When Jakobson came to formulate 
the principles of structuralist poetics at a conference in Indiana in 1958, the promise 
of a powerful new synthesis must have looked tantalisingly near. In reality however 
the chance had been missed; the convergence of Continental linguistics and Anglo- 
American poetics would come to fruition at the expense rather than the profit of 
Jakobsonian principles. As with all dissent-based alliances, it was to forge a complex, 
volatile, and in this instance wholly iconoclastic compound.
For a generation of post-New Critical thinkers, the argument for poetry’s 
intrinsic linguistic features, whilst not necessarily false, belied the role played by 
normative contextual features. The poem’s unique dual structural distribution between 
line and sentence for example, was according to Samuel Levin, not in fact an intrinsic 
cognitive feature of the poem but rather a convention, a feature of the poem’s context 
rather than a textual matter. With the growth of reader-response criticism as well, the 
return to context was granted an unheralded technical sophistication thanks to the 
likes of Stanley Fish and Michael Riffaterre. But it was poststructuralism in its 
strongly continental guise that would come to dominate the field of literary studies in 
both locations. The cloistered world of the semiological system, with its unique 
ordination of the poetic, would be broached as new figures sought to re-introduce the 
silenced questions of genesis, of historicity, of the subject even. Structuralism in this
48 Jakobson, Language in Literature, ed. K. Pomorska and S. Rudy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1987, p.72.
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light takes on the form of a necessary heuristic device, an epistemological necessity 
which, through the potent refusal of such themes enabled their return within the new 
paradigm. Structuralism cleared the way to reconsider these issues free from the taint 
of much that was wrong in them; freeing the sign from its naive correspondence, to 
either the mental image or empirical reality, distinguishing the internal difference 
between the signifier and the signified, structuralism managed to disambiguate the 
interplay of intention and signification. But having done so, the time to re-consider 
their interplay arose once more; just as the French institution had eventually submitted 
to the sign, so the protective seals of both enclosures were rent by the pressures and 
demands of a thoroughly contingent history. Now the resources that had once fuelled 
the consolidation of the poetic function would themselves become the target of an 
increasingly open-ended literariness. On the one hand this manoeuvre evinced the 
claims of a “super-structuralism”, a radicalisation through which the sign accedes to 
its logical or mechanical function within the theory of signification to attain a quasi- 
transcendental status within the philosophical order. But on the other hand, this same 
promotion of the sign beyond its semiological confines works to disrupt the very 
logico-technical premise upon which the semiological distinction, and indeed the 
categorical distinction of other discourses, operates.
In this period,
The energies and motivating forces o f critical writing shifted from a 
centripetal emphasis upon the construction o f the literary text to the 
centrifugal forces that sweep such artefacts into the diffuse and untidy 
world o f deconstruction, gender studies, psychoanalysis and historicism.49
What these new critiques attested to was a return to the hermeneutical issue of 
interpretation, to a perspective from which the question of value could no longer be 
exiled to the projections of an outlying context. With its re-introduction, the 
signified’s standard relation to the sign is transformed. In its pre-eminence, it is the 
sign alone which provides the condition for the perception of its distinction from the 
signified. In this way the sign is transformed from a representation of the signified, to 
a qualifying condition for the signified.50 Now the excavation of hidden premises or
49 Richard Bradford, Roman Jakobson; Life, Language, Art, Routledge, London, p.76.
50 The signified here referring to the relation between the sign and its referent rather than the referent 
alone.
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depth meanings must extend beyond the motivating forces of the subject and its 
history to the pre-condition of a sign now thoroughly imbricated within the weave of 
consciousness. As a system of signs, the text, or rather the universal nexus of Text, 
becomes the substance of motivating forces. With this radicalised and tangential 
move it is not only the traditional binary of structure and event which collapses, but 
also the continuity of genesis and production. The forking paths of the poststructural 
paradigm, of textualism at one end, and poststructural hermeneutics at the other, attest 
to their varying degrees of separation.
1 .4
T ex tu a lism
Being at once radicalised and subverted, the sign’s transition from 
structuralism to poststructuralism was an ambiguous affair. From within this 
ambiguity arose two distinct but disproportionately propagated modes of post­
structuralism; deconstruction and poststructural hermeneutics.
For the school of super-structuralists or proto-deconstructionists, the sign’s 
radicalisation invited the opportunity to reconsider diachronic categories without 
succumbing to the dangers of a sovereign subject. And so the overt polemic of Roland 
Barthes’ earlier work, with its iconoclastic death-knell for the author, for creative 
intentionality and the mimetic function, passes into its own sly reconstitution of the 
author. The author’s former hypostasis, with an absolute authority, with presence, 
origin, omniscience, and finally with Nietzschean deicide, gives way to the author’s 
textual re-birth. Without its master-puppeteer, the unifying strictures of the work, the 
univocal message of its maker, dissolve. Polysemia and indeterminacy are unleashed. 
Where the death of the author releases the text from the “work” and its unitary 
“theological” message, heralding “a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of 
writings, none of them original, blend and clash”, the author’s return—by the back 
door so to speak—works to consolidate a textually generated mythology of presence 
and unity.51 Subverting the presumed hierarchy, the author now returns as the second-
51 Roland Barthes, “The Death o f the Author”, Image Music Text, trans. and ed. Stephen Heath, 
Fontana, London, 1971, p. 146.
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order effect or illusion of the text. In the most literal of senses the author is now the 
God of His work, but the work as such has been eradicated. If we may speak of a 
work, then it is the work of a thoroughly non-dyadic inter-textuality. And because the 
text constitutes an indeterminate and wholly open “space”, a force-field of 
overlapping significations, the author’s fabulous reversion extends well beyond the 
reading-space of the text. Not only does the author return “as a ‘guest’”, now “his life 
is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction contributing to his work; there is a 
reversion of the work on to the life.52 As Sean Burke has pointed out in his critique of 
the matter, whilst the author’s diversion disrupts the mimetic pattern from author to 
work, from signifier to signified, the primary interconnectedness of life and work 
remains undisturbed. If the death of the author represents a kind of apex for anti- 
humanism, the author’s return as textual production heralds the dawn of a new textual 
dynamism. The critic, reduced by Barthes’ author-God to the impotent status of 
redactor, now acquires something approaching his former productivity. In fact in its 
antecedence, the influencing factor behind this change confirmed the hypostasis of his 
initial characterisation.
Influenced by his student Julia Kristeva, Barthes began to apply the categories 
of Bakhtinian dialogism to the field of the text. In Bakhtin, Kristeva had found a mode 
of reading consciously averse to the unities redressed in Barthes’ critique of the 
theocentric author. Bakhtin had studied the large-scale complex narratives of authors 
such as Rabelais and Dostoyevsky, and theorised the existence of an essential 
polyphony or dialogism at the heart of the text. Beneath and beyond the dialogues of 
characters, the work engaged a dialogue with its textual predecessors. But this was 
more than the canonical influence expounded by the New Criticism; it was a 
specifically situated dialogue, and one which threatened to de-stabilise the very unity 
upon which the work itself was premised. Against the pervasive instability of the 
BakMnian model, the dialogism of the New Critics looks less like a dialogue and 
more like a one-way exchange between the author and the monolithic edifice of a 
more or less linear tradition. Here the energy of exchange remains an extrinsic texture. 
Where the New Critics had expounded intrinsic criticism and a distinctly extrinsic 
mode of authorial influence, dialogism asserted a thoroughly constitutive and intrinsic
52 Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text”, ibid., p. 161.
53 Sean Burke, The Death and Return o f  the Author, Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault 
and Derrida, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998, pp.31-33.
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mode of interference within the text’s very fabric. The dialogic text is a thoroughly 
situated and historical phenomenon. For Kristeva, Bakhtinian polyphony promised a 
means of return to the question of the exculpated subject. Recognising the climate as 
an intemperate one however, she held back the theme of subjectivity, or rather inter­
subjectivity, in favour of the more conducive proposition of intertextuality. In this 
way Kristeva remained true to the intrinsic character of structure whilst departing 
from the projected isotopy of code and work. Whilst the notion of an inter-text 
corroborates the fundamental principle of difference, of the text as relation rather than 
unity or identity, it does not replicate the rectilinear synchronicity upon which every 
alteration to the semiotic code is premised. On the contrary, the multiformity of the 
inter-textual body represents a thoroughly panchronic and multi-directional form of 
interference. Every bit as much as the all-powerful author, intertextualism disarms the 
uniformity of the code in its isotopic projection.
The philosophical implications of intertextuality would soon be felt within 
Derrida’s unprecedented mode of performative writing. More than mere style or 
rhetoric, Derrida’s discourse demonstrated the fundamental heterogeneity of 
signification and intertextuality with painstaking rigor. Like the poet, Derrida worked 
by means of the most self-conscious rhetoric, to subvert the presuppositions of 
classical philosophy by activating and exposing the multiple layers of polysemia 
within philosophy’s most cherished concepts. The critical difference from the poet 
being that this highly idiosyncratic mode of writing was also a form a scrupulous self­
evasion. One may recognise Derrida’s signature easily enough, in the endless games 
of etymology, neologism, archaism, parataxis and so forth, but finding Derrida’s voice 
is a different matter altogether, and consciously so of course. For what Derrida is 
demonstrating is the very dynamism and slippage between the sign’s technical and 
metaphysical unity within the code, within intention, and the actuality of the sign’s 
dissemination within the text or inter-text. Once more, the unitary signification of the 
author, of the self-certifying subject, is put in abeyance. By extension the presumed 
lucidity of the critic and the philosopher, and the presumed clarity of their disciplinary 
parameters are demonstrably revoked. Writing from “within” the text, following the 
commands of the text, the critical distance upon which all standard commentary, all 
meta-discourse depends, whether literary-critical or philosophical, disappears. The 
effects of Derrida’s discourse upon departments of literature, particularly in terms of
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their disciplinary self-perceptions and their relations to the traditionally conceived 
parent discipline of philosophy, would be profound.
Before affecting the full force of this technique, Derrida’s philosophy had 
conformed rather more to the standard expectations of philosophical analysis. 
Nevertheless the theme of writing, of ecriture, in which the sign—be it Derrida’s 
signature or any other name—is liberated from the signifier and made to “play”, is 
thematised from the start. From as far back as the early 1960s Derrida had devised a 
mode of critique which worked to disrupt the structuralist epistemology from the 
inside out. Utilising the notion of semiological difference, of transitive as opposed to 
constitutive values, Derrida projected a philosophical, some would even say 
transcendental significance to the mechanism of the linguistic system. On the surface 
such a radicalisation appeared to entrench the universalist aspirations of his 
structuralist peers. But radicalisation was not the same as entrenchment; indeed it was 
a veritable inversion of structuralism’s founding suppositions. In the seminal debut 
text O f Grammatology (1967), Derrida seeks, against the professed departure of 
semiotics, to expose structuralism’s latent replication of metaphysical prejudices. 
Within Saussurean linguistics, within Jakobsonian phonology, the structural system is 
designed in such a way as to confirm the traditional metaphysical relation of meaning, 
of significance and being, with the self-constituting conditions of an absolute presence, 
which he identifies with speech. Derrida was certainly not the first to expose this 
metaphysics of presence within the Western tradition, nor was he the first to proffer 
literature as a kind of remedy to this malaise. Sure enough this accolade sits more 
comfortably with Nietzsche and Heidegger. But like Ricoeur, Derrida is one of the 
first to develop the Heideggerian destruktion of metaphysics along semiological lines, 
and to reject Saussureanism’s latter-day prejudices without abandoning the sign 
altogether.
For Heidegger, the metaphysical privileging of presence and identity belies the 
more essential difference upon which any preference at all must be predicated. 
Heidegger’s name for this differential relation is ontological difference. Accordingly 
for Heidegger ontological difference—between Being and beings—names the more 
original condition from whence the thought of presence and the conditions for the 
metaphysical episteme derive. The metaphysics of presence is the subsequent 
possibility of a more primordial difference. It is clear to see how Derrida’s binarism of 
speech (the phone) and writing {gramme) could fit within the destruktive paradigm, as
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one more opposition within the metaphorical chain of presence and absence. But for 
Derrida, the repercussive preference for speech over writing, for the self-certifying 
presence of enunciation over inscription, is much more than a mere effect of the 
metaphysical episteme. Indeed Derrida’s O f Grammatology makes the unheralded 
assertion that the metaphysical determination of being as presence was itself the effect 
of speech’s privilege. “The formal essence of the signified is presence, and the 
privilege of its proximity to the logos as phone is the privilege of presence .”54 Before 
metaphysics could activate the privileging metaphors of essential presence, of voice 
and breath and spirit, there must have been a prior suppression of writing from 
whence the sign’s determination as presence, as speech, was fixed. The claim being 
made here is a professed gain upon the Heideggerian postulate of ontological 
difference as the necessary, originary condition for signification.55 By Derrida’a 
account the forgetfulness of Being, as the primary un-thought of metaphysics, must 
itself be conditioned by what Derrida terms logocentrism; the logos of an unmediated 
and manifest divinity, of logic, science and the entire epistemic order of Western 
conceptuality. Before onto-theology, before metaphysics, there is this virtual privilege 
of speech, the suppression of an as-of-yet unrealised writing.
The prioritisation of speech and writing over presence and absence garners 
little or no textual support from within the philosophical tradition it serves to qualify; 
something Derrida’s critics certainly emphasised. From the Derridean perspective 
however, such objections only work to reinforce the claim for a suppressed writing. In 
a way, the validity of Derrida’s argument lay in the radicality of its demand; to 
understand the apparently unwarranted and illogical claim for grammatology, for 
speech and writing, one must first renounce the security of one’s basic conceptual 
convictions. And if the postulate of ontological difference is easier to grasp, this is 
because the difference of Being and beings already predicates the priority of the logos 
in the unity of Being. The difference of Being and beings assumes a stable relation 
between identity and difference, univocity and multivocity. Heidegger exposes a 
transcendental difference behind the assumed originality of pure Being, but he doesn’t 
renounce the thought of pure Being. The proposition of differance or the arche-trace 
of writing works to shut this thought down.
54 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, John Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 1976, p. 18.
55 I elaborate further on this point in Chapter 4, following a fuller account of the Heideggerian 
destruktion.
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Derrida’s refusal of the concept had stark consequences for the presumed 
authority of philosophical discourse, provoking antinomy amongst philosophy’s 
vanguard establishment. In departments of literature, Derrida’s refusal of the concept 
and the unprecedented lyricism of his style appeared to represent an out-and-out 
riposte to the philosophical hegemony. Coupled with the distinctly literary themes of 
Barthes and Kristeva, the assertion of the text, of textualism, became an 
overwhelmingly literary concern, celebrated by writers and theorists alike. The claim 
for an autonomous literary-theory, detached from the essentially metaphysical 
conceits of traditional criticism was bom. In literature as in the other human sciences, 
theory emerged to castigate the presumed autonomy of the subject. For a theory of 
signification rooted in the intentionality of the speaking subject, it would prove hostile 
ground indeed.
1 .5
“R etu rn ing  t h e  S ig n  to  th e  U n iv er se” ; B en v en iste  and  the  
R ic o e u r ia n  D epa r t u r e .56
Whatever the moment or circumstance o f its appearance in some stage of 
animal life, language could only have come into being instantaneously.
Things could not have come to be meaningful little by little...; this 
radical change has no counterpart within the domain o f knowledge, which 
is developed slowly and progressively.57
For all its intrinsic formal properties, the transfer of the semiological model did 
not affect a universal and synchronic alteration to the disciplines it fed. The 
contingencies of the literary-critical climate ensured a more belated reception there 
than in the social sciences for instance. Indeed the realisation of literary theory, as a 
discipline within the social sciences, was somewhat akin to the trickle-down effect of 
a river, dried at source but only recently received at its outer reaches. As the sign was
56 “Returning the sign to the universe” is a phrase Ricoeur borrows from the French linguist Gustave 
Guillame. See “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.87.
57 L6vi-Strauss, “Introduction to the Work o f Marcel Mauss”, quoted by Ricoeur, “The Question of the 
Subject and the Challenge o f Semiology”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 252.
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reabsorbed within philosophy, so linguistics ventured its own modified pertinences, 
forging new links with the previously excluded tradition of language philosophy in 
America and Britain. Pre-eminent amongst this new class of post-structural linguists 
was the former Saussurean and comparatist Emile Benveniste. His influence upon this 
new era and upon Ricoeur especially has been profound.
Like Ricoeur, Benveniste’s precocious scepticism towards semiology had 
placed him in a position of marginal influence during structuralism’s heyday. Whilst 
structural linguists studiously ignored the theories of their Anglo-American 
counterparts, whilst A.J Greimas asserted the need for an absolute divorce between 
the speaking subject and its language, Benveniste was busy propounding a theory 
based upon speech utterance closely akin to the analytic theory of speech-acts devised 
by the Anglo-American philosophers John Austin and John Searle. For a long time 
ignored by his fellow linguists, Benveniste’s impact upon linguistics was made via the 
detours of philosophy and psychoanalysis. Ricoeur himself played a significant role in 
popularising Benveniste’s work in the philosophical arena. By the same token, 
Ricoeur’s debt to Benveniste is writ large almost every time he seeks to limit 
semiology’s philosophical remit.
Benveniste’s departure from Saussurean linguistics did not lead him to an all- 
out renunciation of formal categories but to the proposition of an extended field to 
which semiology belongs as just one half of the picture. Whilst semiology is granted a 
much more limited pertinence within the totality of discourse, it is nonetheless a 
limitation borne of formal linguistic properties. As Saussure decreed, the science of 
semiology deals with the internal properties of la langue; all external properties are 
bracketed within the domain of parole. It is language and speech in their presumed 
totality and their classical segregation to which Benveniste’s theory of discourse 
applies. For Benveniste, this totality commands the existence of two distinct fields of 
analysis; structural semiotics, which relates to the code, and structural semantics, 
which deals with speech or utterance. But rather than polarise semiotics and semantics 
as competing models, Benveniste asserts their parallel competencies. The premises 
upon which the semiotic code operates—as an object for empirical science, as a 
synchronic and closed system comprised of mutual relations and as a purely internal 
or immanent system of difference—are not to be rejected. The important task is to 
recognise the self-sustaining limits within which semiology operates as a science. 
“The triumph of the linguistic view” Ricoeur writes, “is at the same time a triumph of
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the scientific enterprise.” But every gain for the science of states is also a loss for the 
speaking subject;
The act o f  speaking is excluded not only as exterior execution, as 
individual performance, but as free combination, as producing new 
utterances. Now this is the essential aspect of language—properly 
speaking, its goal.
At the same time, history is excluded, and not simply the change 
from one state o f  system to another but the production o f culture and of 
man in the production o f language...the generation, in its profound 
dynamism, o f  the work o f speech in each and every case.58
In its success, semiology leads to antinomial ways of thinking, about the subject, its 
acts and intentions, and about language’s genetic aspect as an historical phenomenon. 
According to Ricoeur there is nothing wrong with this so long as we “maintain the 
critical awareness that this object is entirely defined by the procedures, methods, 
presuppositions, and finally the structure of the theory which governs its constitution.”
If we lose sight o f  this subordination of object to method and to theory,
we take for an absolute what is only a phenomenon. Now the experience
which the speaker and listener have o f language comes along to limit the
59claim to absolutize this object
The problem with semiology arises when these traits are absolutized, and 
when the claims of the speaking subject are made to confront these constraints from a 
similarly antithetical perspective. Accordingly Ricoeur condemns Merleau-Ponty’s 
return to the speaking subject for being “conceived in such a way that is rushes past 
the objective science of signs and moves too quickly to speech.”60 The message from 
Ricoeur is that one ignores the lessons of structural linguistics at one’s peril; to do so 
is to risk the blind-alley of psychologism from whence structural linguistics has 
uncontroversially “rescued” us.61 What Benveniste’s theory of discourse effectively 
grants Ricoeur is a means to reconsidering the character of speech without committing
58 Ricoeur, “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.81.
59 Ricoeur, ibid., p.82.
60 Ricoeur, “The Question o f the Subject: The Challenge o f Semiology”, The Conflict o f Interpretations, 
p.242.
61 Ricoeur, “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f Interpretations, p.83.
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this overhasty return to intentionality.62 As a phenomenologist, Ricoeur would be at 
liberty to describe this link between sign and subject in terms of the experience of 
speech, but what he could not do, and what he must do as a hermeneutic 
philosopher—as a philosopher who believes all experience, all understanding to be 
linguistically mediated, but nevertheless intentionally governed—is explain the 
interaction between formal linguistic attributes and the constitution of understanding 
as meaningful speech. This process is absolutely pivotal to hermeneutics’ 
poststructural return to the thinking subject and the historicity of interpretation.
In the mid sixties Benveniste had written a paper regarding the relationship 
between subjectivity and temporality focussed upon language’s phenomenological 
aspect. “Of the linguistic forms that reveal subjective experience,” he writes, “none is 
as rich as those that express time.” With the expression of time there is what he calls 
“an organic tie to the exercise of speech.” With every enunciation of the present for 
example, the present is circumscribed by the precise instance of its naming. Likewise 
expressions of the future or the past are tied to the present by means of their relativity; 
without the present instance in which it is named, there is no meaningful relation 
through which to gauge the pastness of the past, the futurity of the future. Moreover 
an expression of temporality will by its very nature situate a speaker for whom time 
exists. Time necessarily refers to the subjectivity of the speaker. Whilst one may say 
the same about spatial indicators, about propositions or indeed pronouns, temporal 
indicators inhere uniquely within their mode of expression, namely the utterance. 
Although spatial indicators may designate a position relative to the speaker’s location, 
the actual utterance is of a temporal constitution; where speech proceeds without an 
alteration to the present location, the present is a condition of the present utterance, 
lost with every advancing clause. But rather than polarise language’s temporal and 
formal properties, Benveniste’s theory of utterance and the instance of discourse 
points towards their intrinsic coherence.
Whilst Benveniste defines semiotics and semantics against one another, their 
discontinuity is understood upon the basis of their parallel compositions within a
62 Of course in the Anglo-American tradition, where the shadow of Descartes never loomed so large, 
the false association o f speech and intention was eradicated much sooner; from this vantage French 
structuralism was every bit the rebellious progeny o f the French Enlightenment. But even in the 
English speaking world, the zealously scientific mood of the logical positivists seems to have provided 
the original means to more moderate analysis. Indeed, Austin’s subsequent theory of speech acts was 
the contemporary o f Benveniste’s theory o f the instance o f discourse.
63 Emile Benveniste, quoted by Dosse, History o f  Structuralism, Vol. 1, p.46.
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fundamentally unified paradigm. In semiotics, the sign constitutes the smallest unit of 
the code. In semantics, the sentence or utterance fulfils this role. Because the 
utterance comprises an inexponable unit within its own right, semantics is irreducible 
to semiotics. Accordingly their discontinuity is premised upon a change in level 
within the one system. Where structural linguistics projects an essential homology 
between the distribution of signs and the larger unit of the text, Benveniste’s theory of 
discourse asserts an alteration of quality as well as scale. “By changing the unit” 
Ricoeur writes, “one also changes the function, or rather, one passes from structure to 
function”.64 The semantic unit, the utterance, is thus rendered irreducible to the 
internal relations of the semiotic code. But the scientific triumph of structural 
linguistics, which as we know is also the cause of its hermeneutical weakness, does 
not simply delineate the point of its own surpassing within some extrinsic taxonomy 
of methods. Semiotics and semantics do not exist side by side as explanatory 
alternatives to be picked up or disregarded within the theory of signification. Rather, 
the discontinuity of the semiological and the semantic is deemed to reflect an essential 
dualism at the heart of language’s very functioning.
In numerous works from this period one finds Ricoeur juxtaposing the 
properties of semiotic and semantic signification in order to demonstrate the acute 
oppositional symmetry between the traits of code and discourse.65 What is more, these 
traits are shown to posess a mutual dependency which reflects the experience of 
speaking subjects. In the first instance the code, as a formal construct, comprises only 
a virtual mode of existence. As a mere potentiality of meaning, this virtuality is both 
atemporal and permanent. Such potential is only actualised through the instance of 
discourse, through the “transitory, vanishing act” of speech.66 Furthermore in the 
semiotic system, where signification is immanent and alteration to the code 
synchronic, meaningfulness depends upon restrictive combinations. But in the event 
of discourse, where the construction of utterances depends upon the selection of 
components, the law of constraint is counteracted. It follows that the creation of new 
utterances depends upon new combinations. Such combinations, when compared to 
the theoretically finite system of the code, are as good as infinite. Finally it is only
64 Ricoeur, ibid., p.84.
65 In the Conflict essay “Structure, Word, Event,” in the American publication Interpretation Theory; 
Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, and when treating o f metaphor as a sentential structure in The 
Rule o f Metaphor.
66 Ricoeur, ibid., p.84.
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within the instance of discourse that language has a reference, and what is more, a 
reference to the speaking subject. The contrary paths of so-called Continental and 
analytical philosophy can and indeed very often are distinguished upon the basis of 
this one trait; where Saussure excised the question of reference altogether, Frege 
distinguished the twin orientations of sense and reference. Where sense deals with 
meaning in its ideality, as a pure object of thought, reference marks the point at which 
an imminent potentiality of meaning—like the code’s in this respect—is transcended 
in the instance of speech; when language actually speaks and in doing so grasps the 
real. This moment of transcendence is of course dependent upon the subject, who in 
speaking performs the actualization through which the code is broached. As Ricoeur 
reminds us, it is not languages which speak but people.67 “For us who speak” Ricoeur 
writes,
Language is that through which, by means of which, we express ourselves 
and express things. Speaking is the act by which the speaker overcomes
the closure o f  the universe o f signs, in the intention of saying something
about something to someone; speaking is the act by which language 
moves beyond itself as sign toward its reference and toward what it 
encounters. Language seeks to disappear; it seeks to die as an object.68
Only in speech can the formally expunged themes of speech, reference and the 
speaking “I” be encountered. Such are the sacrifices made by a science of signs. But, 
as a “vanishing act”, as an event, speech alone cannot satisfy language’s basic
philosophical exigency to persist, to endure, and to “fix” meaning within the world.
We are not here talking about strict definitions or concepts, only the simple notion of 
consensus, of the shared meanings and ideas which together comprise cultures, 
traditions, epistemes and ethics. Strictly speaking, there could be no significance 
without consensus, and this is something to which the code, as a system of mutual 
dependencies, testifies. In the code there are no essential identities only formal 
relations, but in order for these relations to signify, there must be mutual consensus 
regarding the relationships between signs. Because consensus is predicated upon the 
capacity for meanings to be repeatable, the moment of transcendence in which
67 See “Language as Discourse”, Interpretation Theory; Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, Texas 
Christian University Press, Fort Worth, 1976, p. 13.
68 Ricoeur, “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 82.
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language dies as an object, when speech takes hold of its singular meaning within the 
given context, must itself be conditioned by some principle of regularity or identity. It 
is this capacity for language to mean, again and again, and yet to still create singular 
instances of discourse, which informs Ricoeur’s attempt to move beyond the 
antinomy of structure and event and to posit the word as a third term within this 
dialectic.
The Dialectic of Structure and Event
In the first stage of this dialectic, Saussure and Benveniste furnish the 
antinomy between code and utterance, between a systematic, closed, anonymous 
realm of potential meaning, and the historical event of allocution and reference. To 
speak of speech is to speak of usage, and it is quite clear to see what Benveniste and 
Ricoeur mean when writing of the instance of discourse as a moment of transcendence, 
as an event in which language is made to come alive. In speech we take possession of 
language, of our words, and responsibility for their effects. Yet this description 
remains just that, an extrinsic description. It does not show the mechanisms through 
which the transition from language to unique speech is achieved. For all our sense of 
an intimate exchange, speech and language remain as distinct from one another as the 
poet and the pre-formulated expressions of a robot. And were the orders of language 
and speech to remain opposed in this way, hermeneutics could make very little 
advance upon structuralism or indeed its challenge to traditional phenomenology. 
Semiology poses a serious challenge to phenomenology, and a wholly valid one as far 
as Ricoeur is concerned. It ensures phenomenology can no longer sideline language as 
a subsequent formulary of meaning; that consciousness and language be treated in 
terms of an inexponable unity. But likewise, phenomenology teaches semiology that 
utterance is far more than an appropriation, and that linguistic mediation, far from 
condemning the claims for an autonomous thinking subject, constitutes a movement 
of self-affection, in which the self becomes a self through its own self-positing.69 The 
task of poststructural hermeneutics for Ricoeur therefore, is
69 See “The Question o f the Subject: The Challenge o f Semiology”, The Conflict o f Interpretations 
pp.250-254.
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To think correctly the antinomy between language and speech...to 
produce the act o f speech in the very midst of language, in the fashion of 
a setting-forth o f meaning, o f a dialectical production, which makes the 
system occur as an act and the structure as an event.70
In order to broach the divorce between language and speech, intentionality and 
systematicity, it is necessary to consider the means through which language facilitates 
both regularity and innovation within the singular instance.71 Now the issue moves 
from structure and production to the theme of construction, to the syntactical and 
grammatical arrangements which underpin our every utterance. To this end 
Chomsky’s theory of “generative grammar” proves exemplary. For Chomsky it is the 
“‘creative’ aspect” of language, our ability to generate and to interpret a virtually 
infinite variety of sentence structures within a given language without the slightest 
hesitation, which constitutes the focal issue within language analysis. Ricoeur’s name 
for this advance upon the taxonomies of the structuralist enterprise is “regulated 
dynamism”; a mode of production capable of infinite variety and yet regulated by the
noorder of the underlying system. As Chomsky’s theory demonstrates, it is in usage 
that the borders between language and speech, systematic regularity and creative 
innovation are breached. It is here that the sign ceases to be a sign—a pure difference 
within a system—and becomes singularly meaningful within the context of the 
utterance. Having stipulated the irreducible nature of sign and utterance, Ricoeur now 
introduces the notion of the word as an intermediary term.
Classically of course, words denote units of meaning within the sentence, 
lexical entities such as one finds in the dictionary. It would appear that Ricoeur is 
therefore making something of an about-turn here. After all, if the utterance comprises 
the irreducible unit of discourse, how can one then speak of words within the sentence? 
His justification depends very much upon the kind of division which Austin makes 
between the locutionary and the illocutionary within speech acts, or which Frege 
names when he delineates sense from reference, and the very precise definition the 
word thereby acquires for Ricoeur. Whilst the utterance is an indissoluble unit it has 
two functions, the one is to say something about something, the other is to name 
something. In the code there are no names, only differential values. To this extent
70 Ricoeur, “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 83.
71 Ricoeur, ibid., p.86.
72 Ricoeur, ibid., p.87.
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signs comprise potential words. It is in speech alone that the word can be actualised as 
a name. Hence Ricoeur’s singular definition of the word as “a trader between system 
and the act, between the structure and the event.”73 As a trader, the word constitutes a 
principle of motility between the code’s immanent potentiality and the actuality of 
speech. But to what purpose? Nothing so far recommends this relation as anything 
more than a rather abstract solution to the antinomy of structure and event. But 
beyond this academic relation, the word demonstrates a more tangible and satisfying 
relation to the sentence.
Just as the word depends upon the utterance, so the utterance proves its own 
dependency upon the word. The reason why this relation provides a more satisfying 
explanation is because it concerns a process for which there is a great deal of 
consensus within common experience, namely the process of lexicalisation and the 
growth of polysemia. Whilst the sentence constitutes an ephemeral act, the word, 
being a “displaceable entity”, survives the passing of the sentence; “it survives the 
transitory instance of discourse and holds itself available for new uses”.74 As the 
sentence dies, the word draws back, returning to the system from whence the sentence 
raised it. However the word is not unaltered, for with every return the word takes with 
it the singular values of its last usage. Strictly speaking, polysemy is a synchronic 
attribute, describing the co-existence of multiple meanings within the one word at a 
given time. But what the word’s determination within the sentence demonstrates is the 
historical movement through which these new connotations accrue within the instance 
of discourse. Just as the sentence depends upon a certain stability of meaning within 
the code, just as its capacity to deviate, to particularise within the given context is 
code dependent, so the code’s synchronicity and its capacity to support a state of 
multiple meanings, shows itself dependent upon the word’s deployment within the 
historicity of naming. Entering once more into the code, the code harbours these 
variations, holding the sign open for new deployments within discourse.
For Ricoeur, the theory of discourse is much more than a mere theory of 
speech or communication, it is the absolute anchor to his philosophical position; the 
means by which to justify—against the polemics of anti-humanism and literary 
textualism—the claim for intentional meaning and rational consensus amongst
73 Ricoeur, ibid., p.89.
74 Ricoeur, ibid., p.90.
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language communities. Implicitly, such a claim is also a claim for philosophical 
knowledge and knowledge of the literary text. Like Derrida, Ricoeur renounces the 
claim for a universal semiotics and with it the naive polarities borne of a history / 
structure opposition. For both thinkers, signification takes on the form of a dynamic 
structure; a kind of transcendental de-regulation of the code for Derrida, and a highly 
ordered mode of epistemological limitation for Ricoeur. Although the theory of 
discourse imposes a distinct limitation upon structuralism and the conquering 
ambitions of its founders, it does nonetheless accord the code a universal pertinence 
of a rather different kind. Where deconstruction evinces the return to diachrony by 
means of the transcendentalised and eternally mobilised sign, where Derrida inscribes 
the sign’s trace at the very origin of consciousness, Ricoeur articulates a vision of 
dialectical progression to which the sign corresponds as a unique and limited stratum 
of intellection. In one sense, this semiological stratum testifies to the absolute triumph 
of scientific reason; because it manages to excise the former complications of history 
and interpretation, structural linguistics represents a pinnacle of sophistication within 
the explanatory sciences. The success of semiology entails the elimination of “any 
understanding of the acts, operations, and processes that constitute discourse.” But in 
a philosophical sense, these same scientific strengths render the sign little more than a 
rudimentary tool. By design, it “leads to thinking in an antinomic way about the 
relation between language and speech.”75 The sign comprises a minimal order from 
which to construct a theory of language in its living breathing totality. For this reason, 
Ricoeur chooses to contain rather than subvert the logic of the semiological system.
Within the radicalised context of French theory, Ricoeur’s dialectical 
treatment of the sign is a resonant symbol of his mediate position between the 
extremes of subject and text; a rejection of the anti-cogito, the sign’s dialectical 
transcendence within the theory of discourse is an equal correction to the 
phenomenological assumption of the epoche, with its postulate of a pure 
unadulterated intentionality, purged of language and all its historico-cultural 
inflections. It is through language alone that experience takes a hold of itself. And it is 
in the act of speech, in discourse, where language moves beyond itself as sign toward 
its reference and toward what it encounters, that this hold takes place.
75 Ricoeur, ib id , pp.77 and 78.
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C h a pter  T wo 
H er m e n e u t ic s  a n d  th e  R om antic  Prejudice
As a discipline which has frequently been misunderstood, both in France and 
the English speaking world, at times as a sort of uncommitted irenicism, as a kind of 
relativism or quite differently, as a retrograde outgrowth of romanticism, the question 
of translation, of cultural inflection and the refractory movements through which 
French theory appropriated and countenanced the German philosophical tradition, are 
of particular importance to an understanding of contemporary hermeneutics and the 
peripheral status it has now exceeded.
Hostile assessments of hermeneutics invariably involve an objection to 
romanticism in some form. Quite what form this objection takes shapes the judgement 
by which hermeneutics is condemned, as retrograde, or overly psychologistic, 
subjectivist, as relativistic or merely ineffectual. Of course there is no one definitive 
text or figure of romanticism. The unified efforts of an egalitarian, cosmopolitan and 
international class of artist-philosophers, committed to political as well as imaginative 
freedom is but the simplified, post factum  generalisation of the epoch-making 
historian. As a posthumous event, romanticism was not a singular movement at all; 
there was no common manifesto uniting Schiller and Wordsworth, they did not 
participate, Pound and Joyce-like, in a self-consciously international community, 
intellectually and ideologically homogeneous. Indeed, high modernism’s return to the 
Classical world is at one and the same time a reaction against and a continuation of 
romantic concerns. The postmodernist paradigm of literary textualism and cultural 
relativism can be seen to perpetuate this double relation, rejecting the foundational 
conditions of the romantic subjectivity (as the self-creating imagination, as an agent 
of self-determination and historical freedom) whilst at the same time running away 
with its affects. In the absence of the self-certifying subject, the postulate of an almost 
limitless freedom becomes its own ironic subversion, a kind of euphoric paralysis. 
This paradoxical relation and the opacity in which the romantic period is related to 
beyond conventional caricature is held, in the present argument at least, to be the 
source of a general conflict of opinion regarding contemporary hermeneutics, and one
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which provides a certain unity to the pattern of its exclusion from Anglo-American 
literary theory.
As a European movement, the impetus to romantic developments varied 
between its parent nations; the catalysts in France and Germany could not have been 
more opposed. And as Marilyn Butler makes plain, there were no politically 
transcendent artistic loyalties either;
The German writers who first called themselves Romantics were not 
supporters o f the French Revolution at all. They were, on the whole,
German patriots, who increasingly came to approve of the involvement of  
the various German states in the war against republican France. Their 
opposition to eighteenth-century classicism might even be read as 
opposition to a style they associated with France, the home of a 
revolution that had turned expansive and aggressive. For the first two 
decades o f  the nineteenth century, German Romanticism remained 
Catholic and counter-revolutionary. In both France and England during 
these decades, it was classical or antique style that was commonly linked 
with republicanism. When the Gothic or medieval or avowedly Romantic 
taste began to gain ground in England after the peace came in 1815, it 
was at first identified with the anciens regimes which had triumphed over 
France, and with their extreme political conservatism.1
Following Butler’s distinction of an ideological divide between a Northern, 
that is to say a Germanic, gothic, romanticism, characterised by the revivification of 
indigenous folklore, of ghosts, gloom and introspection, and an altogether more 
Southern iconoclasm which served to unify French neo-classicism with revolutionary 
sentiment, the conservative prejudice against hermeneutics finds its historical 
precedent. If 1960s Paris signalled a petite retourne for revolutionary optimism, for 
social and intellectual renewal, it would seem at a glance, that Germany remained true 
to the model of its former glory. A model that is, drawn from Kantian idealisms, in 
turn revolutionary and eschatological but never really equipped for social praxis, and 
a linguistic turn against the subject still very much based within the philological 
tradition of its romantic forebears. Whilst in France the dispossession of the subject 
led to structuralism, to psychoanalytical scrutiny and a deeply sceptical mode of
1 Marilyn Butler, Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries; English Literature and its Background 1760- 
1830, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. p.5.
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reading united by a left-wing ideology, the overturning of rationalist certitudes in 
Germany had fostered the staggered paths of the Frankfurt School and Heidegger. 
That these contrary discourses should one day converge to produce an ontologically 
based mode of social critique—in the likes of Hannah Arendt, in the dialogue of 
Gadamer and Habermas, and in Ricoeur himself—is, I think, testament to the 
developing powers of philosophical hermeneutics.
The delayed response to philosophical hermeneutics in France (and indeed 
Britain) and the continuation of the romantic prejudice against it can be attributed to 
three overwhelming contexts. The first relates to the stronghold of French rationalism 
in the years prior to the theoretical revolution, and to the reflexive militancy of its 
over-turning. As Butler clarifies, the seeds of French romanticism were rooted in the 
essentially rationalist discourse of liberation. The acceleration of theoretical 
formalisms in France could certainly be read as a jubilant repetition of this staunch 
anti-authoritarianism, were it not that this more recent rejection of the intellectual 
establishment extended to the very tradition it emulated. As was concluded in the 
preceding chapter, there was little room for a philosophy of consciousness which 
threatened to tarnish the new paradigm with a residual subjectivity. Ricoeur’s onto- 
hermeneutical thesis, that language could depose subjective sovereignty whilst 
positively recomposing the powers of self-articulation—in the manner of a speech act 
for instance—was no more welcome than the discredited humanism of Sartrean 
becoming.
A somewhat more ambiguous context relates to Heidegger’s complex 
reception in France. As hermeneutics’ singularly most important precursor, modem 
hermeneutics without him is virtually inconceivable. Whilst Ricoeur’s relation to 
Heidegger is by no means uncritical, it would be impossible to do justice to the 
Ricoeurian perspective without appreciating hermeneutics’ radical transformation in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time. To miss the triumph of this text is to forever misread 
hermeneutics as an outgrowth of romanticism and to repeatedly mischaracterise 
hermeneutical consciousness in terms of subjectivity. It was not until certain 
anthropological misreadings of Heidegger had been rectified that this break could be 
truly appreciated in France. Coincidentally or not, this realisation was 
contemporaneous to the gradual exhaustion of formalist categories within French 
academe, and with Ricoeur’s ascendancy amongst a new generation of post­
structuralist thinkers. And yet whilst Heidegger achieved this dramatic departure for
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hermeneutics, his influence in many respects appears to have entrenched the old 
romantic prejudice against it. For one thing, Heidegger was only partially successful 
when it came to covering-up his own debts to his romantic predecessors. But far more 
unsettling and destabilising was the political dissemblance of his professional debt to 
National Socialism in wartime Germany; a secret known to France’s intellectual elite 
for a very long time. There is certainly no direct, logical relation between Heidegger’s 
hidden Nazism and his disguised romanticism. To suggest that this political revelation 
compounded Butler’s ideological divide within the French popular imagination would 
even be going too far I think. But in Chapter Three I will say more about this 
unpleasant association, and the decisions which some post-Heideggerians felt it 
incumbent upon them to make in light of this secret knowledge. In their way, these 
delicate manoeuvres have influenced the tandem trajectories of postructural 
hermeneutics and deconstruction. The disparity of their affect within literary 
theoretical discourse follows on as a related matter.
Because Heidegger’s link to deconstruction is just as important as his link to 
hermeneutics, he also presents the common link with which to refute the simplicity of 
mono-culturally and mono-causally evinced explanations of a perpetuated ideological 
divide. Whilst adherents of such a framework may wish to cite a national and 
ideological division of interpretation, in which Heidegger leads Derrida to Being’s 
openness, its indetermination and linguisticality—a mediation of ontology and 
semiotics—, where he leads Gadamer to the insight of an understanding grounded in 
the horizons of tradition, consolidated by the texts of pre-ontological hermeneutics, to 
do so would be wrong on at least three counts. Firstly it would entail the wilful 
neglect of French existentialism, where the subject returns with a romantically 
individualistic force like nothing in the Husserlian original, and a subjective charge 
unparalleled by anything the hermeneutic determination of experience has to offer.2 
Although an unexamined conception of romanticism subsumes these contemporary 
tensions within the all-encompassing figure of poet-revolutionary (a tendency perhaps 
more common to the inheritors of its English manifestation, where political 
sympathies proved more indecisive and the movement more malleable), the same
2 The fact that France has provided some o f the most vocal renunciations o f subject-centred 
epistemology may in fact signal the site o f its greatest stronghold. As a literary-theoretical concept, 
nothing brought the subject into such central and sharp distinction as the discourses of its demise; in 
Barthes, Foucault and early Derrida. No doubt something in the disjunctive and rapid consolidation of 
an autonomous “literary theory” played its part in reducing the subject to the straw-man limitations of 
the “romantic ego”.
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tensions still operate, themselves unexamined. The prejudice involves a double 
indiscretion therefore. The “romantic” charge against hermeneutics imports the 
prejudice against reactionary romanticism, whilst assimilating it to the unscrupulous 
equation of romanticism and the unfettered ego, an equation firmly rooted in French 
libertarianism, and evidently still manifest in the intellectual currents of existentialism 
and the political activities of 1968-9. The second problem is that such a reading 
would require a total disregard for the proximities uniting hermeneutics and 
deconstruction within the general discourse of poststructuralism (a theme within my 
final chapter). Finally, and this presents the third context for hermeneutics’ belated 
French repute, a presumed division of interpretation would involve the necessary 
elision of hermeneutics’ own very critical relationship towards philosophical 
romanticism, before Heidegger as well as after. In this instance hermeneutics’ 
proximity to certain problems is taken for the very problem itself. The forgetfulness 
of these moves begins to look suspiciously convenient from a polemical angle; an 
alliance of subject-centred epistemology and conservative ideology on the one hand, 
formalism and progressive thinking on the other. It is this forgetfulness with regards 
hermeneutics’ own critical relation to romanticism, and to the subjective idealism of 
the eighteenth century, which the following section seeks to redress.
2.2
A “m isg u id ed  K a n t ia n is m ” a n d  th e  H erm en eu tica l  C ritiq ue
Kantian Ambiguities
Hermeneutics’ development from a classical discipline of scholarly exegesis 
into a thoroughgoing philosophy could not have occurred without the remarkable 
proliferation of thought and creativity centred upon Germany in the late 1700s and 
early 1800s. There were two revolutions of thought which contributed to this unique 
epoch, both themselves being responses to the revolution of Kantian epistemology. 
One was the development of historical research conducted by the likes of Ranke and 
Droysen, who sought the development of a progressive historical science with an 
adequate consciousness of its own method and scope, the other was romanticism. It is
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really the possibility of these extremes and not the intricacies of their systems that is 
of interest to us, for then as now, hermeneutical theory sought to tread the delicate 
path between both points, risking the opprobrium of moderation in a time of 
innovation, and a listing dependency upon parent texts. But now as then, the 
hermeneutic interpretation of Kant’s text remains pivotal to the clarification of an 
autonomous “third way”, between historical and theoretical objectivism and the 
“radical subjectivisation” of the romantics.3
Kant’s attempts to square epistemological foundations with moral freedom in 
the three critiques, and the repercussions which followed, are well known. David 
Hume had asserted the falsity of fixed causal laws independent of human observation, 
thereby opposing the theological picture of a divinely determined, law-bound universe 
with a vision of contingency. The upshot of Hume’s position was a deep scepticism 
regarding the possibility of certain knowledge; there can be no certain knowledge of 
the world if observation depends upon empirical contingencies alone. With his 
famous “Copemican turn”, Kant sought to overcome Humean scepticism by 
implanting certain laws of observation within the mind itself. By claiming that objects 
follow cognition, rather than vice versa, Kant could assert the validity of a priori 
foundations for knowledge within the mind, not the world, and bypass Hume’s 
scepticism regarding the knowledge of empirical perception. But at the same time, 
Kant needed to square these laws with the claim for moral freedom; after all, if the 
human mind was entirely law bound and determined, there would be no space for the 
kind of individual choice upon which morality is founded. The ambiguous turns and 
counter-tums to which this dual demand led Kant over the course of the three 
critiques were a source of contention amongst his immediate readers, and proved 
determinative for an era of widening epistemological disagreement. It was with the 
publication of Kant’s third critique, the Critique o f  Judgement, that two clearly 
opposing interpretations emerged, and it was the implications of this ultimate work 
which eventually fostered the tenor and themes of literary theory.
The division in Kantian interpretation rests largely upon the apparent disparity 
of Kant’s first critique, the Critique o f  Pure Reason (1781), which deals with the law- 
bound realm of appearances, with the a priori conditions of natural experience, the 
“forms” that knowledge is necessarily subject to, and the final Critique o f  Judgement
3 Gadamer uses this phrase in The Relevance o f  the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. Robert Bemasconi, 
trans. Nicholas Walker, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.36.
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(1790), which deals more directly with the question of self-knowledge. Here the 
theme of reflective judgement, in which human beings recognise themselves for what 
they are, and Kant’s reflection upon the validity of his own system, are treated 
through a consideration of natural and artistic beauty. The source of historical 
contention arises most prominently when Kant moves from the treatment of rule- 
bound aesthetic judgements of taste, judgements aroused through a certain feeling of 
accord between the structures of cognition and its objects, and Kant’s explanation of 
genius, for which no prior rules are said to exist. For advocates of the first critique, the 
objective idealists and the later neo-Kantians, Kant’s triumph was to subvert the usual 
primacy of the knowing subject, and to demonstrate how the forms of understanding 
belonged not within the individual’s psychological faculties, but within an 
intersubjective order of a priori concepts. In this way, the knowing subject arises as 
one more element within experience, rather than the primary basis for knowledge and 
experience. In short the “forms” of knowledge testify to a non-psychological mode of 
understanding.4 The subjective idealists of romanticism, who drew on the implications 
of Kantian genius in the third critique, held the opposing view. By this account man is 
at liberty to create his own rules, free from the constraints of a fixed empirical world.
For Kant of course, empirical truths are no less objective for being mediated 
by the mechanisms of sensory experience, it is just that objectivity takes on a very 
different sense to the objective identity of idea and object in the natural sciences. If 
objects follow cognition, then the object itself changes its definition. Losing its 
independent validity, the object is now dependent upon its appearance before the 
subject: an object for Kant “is that concerning which a subject can make a true 
judgement.”5 The world and its truths present the unceasing articulations of synthetic 
judgements, whereby the subject brings together two or more ideas drawn from 
experience, and judges them to be in some way the same. Contra Hume and the 
empiricists, a priori knowledge is to be grounded in the cognitive conditions of 
human judgement. As such, truth is a dependent of the judging subject. The 
repercussions for human history, for morality and theology are immense. Against 
naturalistic or deistic determinisms of human action, man is now, at the very least, a 
co-author in his own history. It is easy to recognise the wholly familiar model of
4 This description is indebted to Frederick C. Beiser. See Beiser, German Idealism: the Struggle 
Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA., 2002, p. 18.
5 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory", the Philosophy o f  German Literary Theory, 
Routledge, London, 1997, p.32.
68
romanticism, wherein man acquires absolute sovereignty, in all of this. But by Kant’s 
own account, he was no heretic of the faith; the implicit moral freedom of the subject 
was still to be implicated within a divine sense of the right, the good and the true, 
rooted within natural phenomena.
In the Critique o f  Judgement, the desire to balance agency with a sense of 
higher purpose (the free world of the inner “intelligible” self and the law-bound realm 
of natural phenomena) leads Kant to the consideration of aesthetic judgements, where 
the determinations of argument and proof are absent, but a certain sense of qualifying 
knowledge is not. Thus Kant is led to the question of aesthetic judgement, not from 
the perspective of art itself, but from the critical need to qualify the co-existence of a 
priori universals within nature, with the non-universality of subjective experience. 
Never the less in doing so, Kant foments the primary themes of aesthetic discourse 
and literary theory, where the questions of a priori universals and independent 
judgement are understood in terms of representation and the art work’s claim to truth.
“Misguided Kantianism”: Gadamer’s Critique
For Gadamer, as for Ricoeur and Heidegger, the work of art is pivotal to the 
apprehension of human understanding. Doubtless, the romantic prejudice against 
hermeneutics endured for this very reason, and yet it is for romanticism that Gadamer 
reserves the full force of his critique in the opening movements of Truth and Method. 
As the title of Gadamer’s magnum opus attests, the task for philosophical 
hermeneutics involves the substantiation of truth claims within the sphere of human 
interpretation, over and against both the relativism of latter-day sceptics, and the 
misplaced methodologism of an imported scientism. In their full contrariety, Gadamer 
in fact locates the origins of both perspectives in the misguided idealism of Kant’s 
romantic interpretation. In both instances, knowledge or truth is deemed to involve the 
transcendence of historical interpretation. What emerges from Gadamer’ critique is an 
argument in which scientific objectivism and subjective idealism are merely two 
facets of the same misguided Kantianism. From the hermeneutical perspective, the 
epistemological conflict of the immediate post-Kantian decades obscured the question 
of historical understanding, denying the chance for a credible (hermeneutical) 
alternative to really flourish. It is against the misguided Kantianism of the idealists
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(objective and subjective), that Gadamer, like Heidegger, and with certain 
modifications Ricoeur, elevates the work of art, and the work of literature especially, 
as the means to a self-constitutive mode of historical understanding.
From Gadamer’s hermeneutical perspective, the consolidation of aesthetics 
after Kant went hand in hand with its gradual withdrawal from the spheres of reason 
and moral judgement. In the elevation of a distinct aesthetic realm, the work of art 
was increasingly divorced from the historical totality of everyday experience. This 
gave birth to an attitude of aestheticwm, wherein the work of art was held aloft as a 
beacon of transcendence, but one from which the observer must return essentially 
unchanged. Gadamer calls this attitude one of “aesthetic differentiation”, from 
whence the work of art is abstracted from the living, breathing totality of our own 
reckoning and from the conditions of its own “accessibility”.6 This kind of aesthetic 
experience (Erlebnis)
is directed towards what is supposed to be the work proper—what it ignores 
are the extra-aesthetic elements that cling to it, such as purpose, function, 
the significance o f its content. These elements may be significant enough 
inasmuch as they situate the work in its world and thus determine the whole 
meaningfulness that it originally possessed.7
The possibility of the work of art having any effective historical power, or purchase 
upon the world, is renounced in favour of the pure aesthetic intention. The work’s 
dominion resides in the purity of this distinction and in the redoubling extraction by 
which the work becomes an object for itself. By rights the work communicates no 
truth other than its own aesthetic status (a familiar enough motif of postmodernist 
poetics). As Gadamer makes plain, aesthetic consciousness derives its own historical 
justification in the continuity of its own objects, in the meticulous order of archive and 
catalogue. Sheltered from the chaos of the extra-aesthetic, the only concession which 
the aesthetic consciousness makes to history is a kind of scholarly historicism relating 
to the continuity of its own aesthetic objects. Availed of its historical elements, the 
aesthetic experience belongs within the confines of the gallery, in the narrow space
6 Gadamer uses the term “aesthetic differentiation” frequently within Truth and Method. It denotes the 
way in which art is excised from the continuity o f ordinary life.
7 Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. revised Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Continuum, 
London, 2006, p.74. I expand upon the hermeneutic attitude towards the work of art in the subsequent 
chapter.
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through which we peer at artworks; a cloistered, out-of-time experience from which 
we emerge unchanged.
The emergence of aestheticism came to full fruition in the Kantian 
extrapolations of the romantic philosophers, for whom history was always more of a 
secondary attribute of subjectivity rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, it is in Kant’s 
text itself, in the transcendental critique of aesthetic judgement, that Gadamer charts 
the possibility of romanticism’s claims and the consequent devaluation of the 
artwork’s claim to truth. Where the concept of taste had once been grounded in the 
socio-historical context of a sensus communis, a humanistic concept of communal 
knowledge, fostered not through abstract reason or theory, but through the 
universality of a given community, taste within the Third Critique becomes 
necessarily detached from this classical doctrine. It is Kant’s transcendental objective, 
the need to ground aesthetic judgement within an a priori rather than an empirical 
claim to universality, which impels this necessity. For Kant, the philosophical 
profundity of taste resides in the dual character of its claims. On the one hand taste is 
meant to constitute an independent judgement on the part of the individual, but at the 
same time taste is by definition a quality conferred by agreement. Since taste is a 
quality that cannot be taught, since it depends upon the innate propensity of the 
individual, the universal “correctness” by which taste is distinguished from other 
individual judgements thereby suggests the existence of an a priori universal rooted 
within cognition itself. This “supra-empirical norm” as Gadamer calls it, is to do 
justice to both the empirical non-universality of aesthetic judgements and the claim to 
objective validity in the realm of aesthetic judgement. By extension, the co-existence 
of these features is intended to furnish Kant’s claim for the co-existence of the natural 
and law-bound and the moral freedom of the individual agent. Taste in Kant’s hands 
is a means to interpolating the realms of history and nature. By Gadamer’s account, 
however, this balancing act comes at an all too heavy price and one which would 
eventually seal aesthetics’ philosophical segregation from substantive knowledge.
Effectively, Kant transforms aesthetic judgement into a highly specialised and 
singular type of judgement distinct from all other forms of knowledge. The 
transcendental validity of aesthetic judgement rests in its distinction from other kinds 
of judgement after all. Within the inter-subjective and historical framework of the 
sensus communis, taste had once involved judgements of a moral and legal, as well as 
an aesthetic nature. Kant however “denies taste any significance as knowledge”
71
reducing “sensus communis to a subjective principle.”8 In this way the concept of 
aesthetic judgement is made to serve Kant’s overriding concern to justify the 
transcendental principle of a subjective universal judgement which could connect the 
realms of inner freedom and natural law. Granting taste conceptual knowledge would 
have endangered Kant’s system with one of the very things it was designed to repel, 
namely the existence of a “ready-made”, deterministic world. After all, if aesthetic 
judgement was objective, it would be empirically universal. The whole point of taste 
of course is that it is empirically non-universal and subjectively universal. In ordinary 
cognition knowledge is grounded by concepts, but in the instance of aesthetic 
judgement, no such conceptual determination exists. Lacking the determination of 
conceptual understanding, taste constitutes a reflective knowledge grounded in the 
feeling of pleasure aroused in the subject. Taste involves the spontaneous harmony of 
intuitions free from concepts. Taste therefore
imparts no knowledge o f the object, but neither is it simply a question of 
a subjective reaction, as produced by what is pleasant to the senses. Taste 
is “reflective”.9
Gadamer makes it quite plain that Kant’s transformation of taste into an 
exclusively aesthetic and subjective property does not follow from a desire to 
establish an exclusive philosophy of art. Perversely, it is the Critique o f Judgement's 
global importance for the coherence of Kant’s entire philosophy, which leads to 
taste’s singularly aesthetic connotations and to the singularly subjectivistic nature of 
future aesthetics. By making Kant’s motivations plain in this way, Gadamer not only 
reveals the causal constraints leading to the subjectivisation of aesthetic judgement, he 
also points towards the essential misreading at work in aesthetics’ romantic elevation, 
where one finds the work of art centralised in its exclusivity. Conditioned by the 
transcendental goal it serves, it should not be disconcerting to find Kantian taste 
restricted to the merely subjective and extraneous principle claimed by Gadamer. To 
put it a different way, aesthetic judgement is only central to Kant in the formal sense 
that it unifies his overall metaphysical system. But within this system aesthetic 
judgement possesses no direct epistemological validity; central at the meta-
8 Gadamer, ibid., p.38.
9 Gadamer, ibid., p.38.
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epistemological or transcendental level, aesthetic judgement becomes increasingly 
peripheral in real epistemological terms. Gadamer writes that
The limited phenomenon o f judgement restricted to the beautiful (and 
sublime), was sufficient for [Kant’s] transcendental purpose; but it shifted 
the more general experience o f taste, and the activity of aesthetic 
judgement in law and morality, out o f the center of philosophy.10
By denying the work of art truth claims beyond the reflective knowledge of 
aesthetic judgement, Kant precipitated the divide between aesthetics and other 
philosophical discourses. With the rise of romantic aesthetics the divide approached 
the insurpassable polemics of objectivism and subjectivism, to which the historical 
school of Ranke and Droysen, and the romantic school of Schelling and Fichte 
belonged as opposites. The claim for an historical understanding of the work of art in 
which the work’s claim to truth could be treated substantively, as a genuine conduit of 
knowledge, but also non-subjectivistically, was all but lost from sight. It is this 
fundamental split between aesthetics and the philosophical search for truth, between 
romantic subjectivism and the purported rationalism of “objective” methodologies, 
which modem hermeneutics holds responsible for the suppression of historical 
understanding. But the radical subjectivisation of aesthetics did not follow from the 
aesthetic judgement of taste alone. Whilst Kant’s transcendental treatment of taste 
helped to divorce aesthetic judgement from the realm of substantive knowledge, it 
was Kant’s development of the concept of genius which enabled a fully-fledged 
subjective idealism, in which the logical priority of history and subjectivity were fully 
reversed.
Taste for Kant is a universal faculty of judgement, it is reflective, and what it 
reflects is a certain state of mind which confirms accord between the structures of the 
mind and the beauty it perceives. In this way taste confirms beauty as an “expression 
of the moral”. Such is the transcendental function of taste.
* v
Thus the critique o f taste— i.e, aesthetics— is a preparation for teleology.
Kant’s philosophical intention is to legitimate teleology...The intelligible 
towards which taste points, the supersensible substrate in man, contains at
10 Gadamer, ibid., p.36.
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the same time the mediation between the concepts of nature and of 
freedom.11
Although the concept of taste is directed towards natural and artistic beauty, it is the 
judgement of natural beauty which fulfils Kant’s philosophical objective: “Natural
beauty alone, not art, can assist in legitimating the concept of purpose in judging
12nature.” And yet, as the history of German aesthetics attests, and as Gadamer goes 
on to explain, the progression of the Third Critique can be seen to lead Kant further 
and further away from the original grounding of nature’s moral purpose. In the 
development of the concept of genius Kant seeks to demonstrate the relation between 
natural beauty and its artistic equivalent, to show how “nature gives art its rules.”13 
Through the invention of aesthetic ideas, genius communicates the ffee-play of the 
mental faculties, the “vitalisation” through which the reflective judgement recognises 
itself. In this sense genius was really only ever intended as a compliment to the 
transcendental function of taste. Yet in the course of Kant’s demonstration, the 
philosophical weighting between aesthetic judgement and genius becomes reversed, 
and what begins as a principle for art’s natural dependency transforms into something 
implicitly different, providing the openings for a more potent conception of aesthetic 
genius in Kant’s successors. From the mediating device of a natural teleology, genius 
in the hands of the romantic idealists will become the very principle with which to 
refute extrinsic determinations.
Paradoxically, this fate can be traced to the very philosophical priority 
accorded natural beauty in the Critique o f  Judgement. The demand for the concept of 
genius derives from the teleological demand to link artistic beauty to its natural 
counterpart. This means that the Critique moves ever increasingly into a discussion of 
an exclusively artistic beauty; a transition from the standpoint of taste and natural 
beauty to the standpoint of genius and artistic beauty. Kant’s moral interest in natural 
beauty does not waver, but Gadamer seems to suggest that the intellectual force of 
genius is such, that even Kant’s own argumentation is caught unawares and swept 
along by its as of yet unrecognised logic. Genius gets ahead of itself in this way when 
Kant “himself points beyond the standpoint of taste and speaks of a perfection o f
11 Gadamer, ibid., p.48.
12 Gadamer, ibid., p.48.
13 Gadamer, ibid., p.49.
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taste”14 The prospect of a perfected, absolute and unchanging taste sounds absurd 
even if it is “quite logical”. Perfect taste testifies to the powers of aesthetic judgement 
over and against the relativism of aesthetic sceptics. It is not a singular or 
homogenising principle but one which encompasses all that can genuinely be called 
art. Since art is the production of genius, Gadamer claims the perfectibility of taste 
“would be more appropriately defined by the concept of genius.” 15 So Kant is treating 
of genius even whilst he speaks of taste. The problem with taste is that it is “if 
anything, a testimony to the mutability of all human things and the relativity of human 
values.” For Kant, who seeks a transcendental justification for beauty, taste is not 
really adequate to the task after all. The concept of genius on the other hand, “seems 
much better suited to be a universal principle.”16 And so genius, originally intended to 
convey the judgement of taste through ideas, becomes a superior means to expressing 
the universally valid perfection of artistic beauty. Genius is perfection and all true art 
is perfection; for Kant “[f]ine art” becomes “the art of genius.” 17 The stage was 
thereby set for a philosophy of art detached from the moral consideration of natural 
beauty and the teleological implications of aesthetic judgement. By many an account, 
including Gadamer’s, romanticism was a hugely productive form of deviation from 
the Kantian aesthetic. Whilst the Kantian genius demonstrates a transcendence of the 
rule-bound, art itself is not transcendent of nature; the beautiful in art emerges as a 
question in pursuance of the beautiful in nature. The “disinterested delight” 
experienced in the apprehension of beauty is for Kant an expression of moral accord 
between man and the natural telos:
In Kant a creationist theology stands behind th[e] unique capacity to 
encounter natural beauty, and forms the self-evident basis from which he 
represents the production o f the genius and the artist as an extreme 
intensification o f the power that nature, as divinely created, possesses.18
What for Kant could be called the formal primacy of the aesthetic (its demonstrative 
worth) becomes in romanticism a substantive primacy. With the elevation of genius in 
artistic beauty and the sidelining of natural beauty, aesthetics grew in strength,
14 Gadamer, ibid., p.50.
15 Gadamer, ibid., p.50.
16 Gadamer, ibid., p .51.
17 Kant, quoted by Gadamer, ibid., p .51.
18 Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful and Other Essays, ibid.,p.30.
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subsuming the realms of nature and history to the standpoint of an aesthetic subject. In 
Schelling for example, the problem of moral freedom and natural determinism is 
resolved in the synthesising powers of aesthetic intuition, for Fichte similarly, nature 
is understood as “a product of spirit”, and in the absolute idealism of Hegel’s 
Aesthetics “natural beauty exists only as a ‘reflection of spirit.’”
The moral interest in natural beauty that Kant had portrayed so 
enthusiastically now retreats behind the self-encounter o f man in works of 
art...There is in fact no longer any independent element in the systematic 
whole o f  aesthetics.19
Kant’s transcendental imagination and the elevation of genius enabled man to 
become his own teleological cause in the treatises of romantic idealism. Here, the 
notion of creative genius would eventually transcend the confines of art to become a 
universal governing principle to which the operations of political history, and even 
man’s sublunary limitation were subject. Kant’s Third Critique provided the 
axiological basis for a revolutionary metaphysics based upon the notion of aesthetic 
transformation. The problem with this from the hermeneutical perspective however, is 
that these transformative powers, whilst extended beyond the artistic compass, were 
never the less divorced from the realm of determinate knowledge. To be original and 
hence transformative, the knowledge constitutive of the aesthetic has to be intuitive. 
The productivity of the Kantian imagination resides in the originality of intuition, in 
the novel syntheses of images within the imagination. Whilst Kant rightly recognised 
the constitutive or productive powers of imagination and aesthetic experience, he 
nevertheless instituted a system wherein the knowledge of art was fated to remain in 
formal opposition to the more substantive knowledge of concepts according to 
Gadamer.
The price Kant paid for the assertion of an original imagination, the 
apprehension of intuitions free from concepts, was a culture which reduced artistic 
truth to the “merely” intuitive. To Gadamer therefore, the erosion of historical 
knowledge and the rise of an unwarranted scientific prestige emerge as the 
consequences of an incrementally singularised and radically subjectivised aesthetic 
realm. Beginning with the restriction of taste and the subjectivisation of aesthetic
19 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p .51.
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judgement, and culminating in the concept of genius, Kant’s grounding for an 
autonomous aesthetic consciousness foreclosed the potential for determinate 
knowledge within the aesthetic realm, divorcing it from the practices of historical 
interpretation. Because the artwork’s intelligibility was restricted to the productivity 
of intuition, “Kant’s transcendental analysis made it impossible to acknowledge the 
truth claim of traditionary materials” which would otherwise endanger the claim for
90pure originality. Gadamer thereby attributes the erosion of historical knowledge to 
Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, claiming that it discredited “any kind of theoretical 
knowledge except that of natural science”—presumably, one must assume, because 
the theory of natural science posed no threat to the autonomy of aesthetic 
understanding—, and that it “compelled the human sciences to rely on the
91methodology of the natural sciences in conceptualizing themselves.” The 
implications of this claim are clearly very significant for hermeneutics, both in the 
romantic period and the theoretical revolution of the mid-twentieth century; it is 
aestheticism rather than the development of scientific procedure and technology, 
which must be held accountable for the trespass of scientific attitudes and the 
suppression of historical insight within the humanistic disciplines.
Following Kant’s doctrine of free beauty and reflective judgement, the concept 
of intuition underwent an implicit diminution in contrast to the determinate 
judgements of concepts. In their way, the growth of subjectivism and psychologism 
in the nineteenth century testified to this transformation. Hermeneutics’ awkward 
association with these trends is also attributable to the re-evaluation of intuitive 
knowledge. With the erosion of historical understanding, the hermeneutical concepts 
of pre-understanding, of prejudice, and of the historical “horizon” which shapes them, 
were forced to fit the epistemological pressures of the day. Thanks to the erosion of 
intuitive knowledge and the suppression of historical understanding, the intuitive 
“leap” of hermeneutical pre-understanding was to be misread, either as the expression 
of our innate irrationality, or as testament to our essential determinism.
Because aestheticism—the denial of truth in art and the absence of an 
aesthetically independent truth—is only the negative counterpart of romantic idealism, 
because both positions deny the work of art a claim to truth beyond the aesthetic, 
Gadamer’s critique of romantic aesthetics should also be read as a direct indictment of
20 Gadamer, ibid., p.36.
21 Gadamer, ibid., p.36.
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postmodern scepticism and literary textualism. Contrary to the prejudicial claims 
against hermeneutics, it is the irrationalism of latter-day aestheticism which must bear 
the romantic burden. In hermeneutics, the work of art is certainly traduced in terms of 
its originality, as a presentation and not as a copy, and for this reason—against 
subjectivism—as a force for knowledge rather than mere feeling. But whilst the 
knowledge of the work of art is central to self-understanding, it does not found other 
modes of understanding. History and art exist in distinction and continuity within 
hermeneutical understanding. This is precisely the balance which Gadamer, 
Heidegger and Ricoeur all seek to renegotiate. Disciples of modem hermeneutics 
would have to wait twenty years for Gadamer’s explicit “recovery of the horizon of 
Kant’s critiques”. In this critical re-appropriation, Gadamer seeks to redress the 
opposition of intuitions and concepts, and justify the determinate knowledge of 
aesthetic objects. Yet under different names, and in rather different ways, the 
hermeneutical re-appropriation of the Kantian imagination was already well­
underway. It is this project which links the paths of Gadamer, Heidegger and Ricoeur, 
and which, in the context of the present study, links the Ricoeurian advocacy of 
discourse and speech acts examined in the first chapter, with a critique of 
Heideggerian ontology in the next.24
22 Gadamer, ibid., p .51.
23 My understanding o f this comes by way o f  a paper by Daniel L. Tate; “Art as Cognitio Imaginativa: 
Gadamer on Intuition and Imagination in Kant’s Aesthetic Theory”, presented at the British 
Phenomenology Society annual conference, St. Hilda’s College Oxford, 2008. It can be accessed from 
the society’s website at britishphenomenology.com/208Papers6.aspx.
24 Hermeneutics’ critical relation to romanticism can in fact be traced further back, to the so-called 
romantic hermeneutics o f Schleiermacher and Dilthey. What the projects o f Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey serve to demonstrate, is the under-acknowledged role which hermeneutics had to play in the 
formation of twentieth century post-Kantian epistemology. What their stories also serve to corroborate 
is the overwhelming context which they sought, quite presciently, if  not successfully, to surpass. 
Writing on the cusp o f the eighteen hundreds, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics was a critical response to 
the extremes o f historical objectivism and subjective idealism. Divided and yet similarly hubristic, both 
assumed a theoretical hold over truth which devalued the historical nature of understanding. The task 
of hermeneutics was to gain access to an understanding which exceeded the regimented categories of 
metaphysics and the natural sciences. Whilst the “life philosophy” he sought had been anticipated by 
eighteenth century idealists such as Fichte and Schelling, the aim for Schleiermacher (and Dilthey after 
him), was to turn the concept o f “life” away from the metaphysical and the moral foundations of the 
previous century towards what would eventually be recognised as the understanding’s 
phenomenological character. According to Richard Palmer, the word “life” signified “a battle cry 
against the fixedness and determinations o f convention (Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics', 
Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston, 1969, p. 101). The ambition o f a “general hermeneutics” was directed specifically 
towards the universal particularity o f inter-subjective understanding, something which neither science 
nor metaphysics could properly account for. For the first time therefore, the task of hermeneutics was 
directed away from the claims o f historical authority and away from the conception o f understanding as 
a mode of linear and monologically coherent transmission, towards the uncertainty o f the dialogical 
encounter, to a distinctly post-Kantian realm o f  inter-subjective meaning. In Gadamer’s words,
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“Schleiermacher’s idea o f a universal hermeneutics starts from this: that the experience of the alien and 
the possibility o f misunderstanding is universal” (Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 179). Defining 
hermeneutical interpretation as the “art o f avoiding misunderstanding”, Schleiermacher effected a 
decisive— albeit impermanent— shift within the hermeneutic conception of understanding. Insofar as 
the life-sciences represented a “battle cry” against convention, the assertion of misunderstanding 
should be read as its own battle cry against the reigning paradigm o f identity philosophy.
Where the twin origins o f literary and scriptural hermeneutics had once looked upon 
understanding as a normative assumption guided by the “special exemplariness of tradition” and as the 
basis from whence theoretical and historical reflection could begin, Schleiermacher posited the 
requirement o f a universal hermeneutics grounded not by the unity of tradition but the dis-consensus of 
individual minds interacting through a shared language. What he sought to understand was “not only 
the exact words and their objective meaning, but also the individuality o f the speaker or author” 
(Gadamer, ibid., p. 186). In the perception o f this potential dehiscence—between individual subject and 
a presumed objectivity o f  language, between intention and meaning, between sense and reference 
even— Schleiermacher can be seen to have made a precursory departure from the totalising paradigms 
of objectivism and idealism and yet, from our own belated perspective it is clear to see how 
Schleiermacher, for all his critical energies, repeats many o f the tendencies he sought to escape.
By emphasising the internal aspect o f understanding, and the external aspect of language and 
explanation, Schleiermacher effectively sought to bridge “the innemess of transcendental speculative 
philosophy and the extemalness o f positive, empirical science” (Gadamer, ibid., p. 92). What he sought 
was a theoretical means to elucidating what he saw as a very direct transmission from one mind to 
another. Hermeneutics was thus intended as a mediating discipline between psychology and 
representational forms o f  knowledge. The paradigm for this mediating art was the dialogical relation of 
speaker and listener, but unlike in contemporary hermeneutics, where understanding takes the form o f a 
dialectical exchange between interlocutors, interpretation for Schleiermacher rested solely on the side 
of the listener. The art o f understanding was also the art o f listening or hearing. Meaningful listening—  
to which Heidegger and Gadamer will return— involved two simultaneous moments of “grammatical” 
and “psychological” clarity, in which the auditor reconstructed the language and thence the thoughts of 
the speaker. So although Schleiermacher shifted the locus o f meaning away from the reduplicative 
linearity of tradition, it was still reconstruction, the reduplication o f a pre-existent content in the mind 
of the speaker, which informed his philosophical ideal. By situating the problem of alienation and 
misunderstanding spatially, in terms o f  an exterior gulf and the inaccessible interiority of other minds, 
Schleiermacher’s work can be seen to organise itself according to a logic of internal and external, 
thought and action, which in fact belongs very much to the metaphysics he sought to escape.
Whilst the recognition o f  the grammatical /  psychological distinction could be seen to place 
certain limitations upon more speculative accounts o f meaning, Schleiermacher’s own agenda remained 
true to the age o f speculative metaphysics in so far as he proposed a universal theory of understanding 
adequate to a total recuperation o f meaning between one mind and another. To this extent the 
conception of a productive difference or an intransigent, productive distance (historical, psychological, 
linguistic) is beyond the philosophical paradigm to which his thought belongs; Schleiermacher’s was 
an ultimately totalising aspiration in keeping with his age.
In hindsight Schleiermacher’s emphasis upon the alien and external particularity of 
language—as a phenomenon which to some extent always resists the appropriating intentions of the 
speaker—is a fatefully premature precursor to the linguistic turn a century later. Whilst the move away 
from the absolutisms o f science and metaphysics towards the critical treatment of language and thought 
would eventually prove decisive for the course o f philosophy and hermeneutics, Schleiermacher’s own 
recognition o f the distance o f thought and language, author and text, encouraged him to eventually 
abandon the study o f “grammar” in favour o f a systematic theory of psychological recreation. Where 
the text’s autonomy and facticity would one day be looked upon as a productive insight within the 
philosophy o f understanding, the fact that a text could not be read as a direct manifestation of an 
author’s thoughts and that language was not a transparent medium, suggested for Schleiermacher that 
the theory o f understanding must go by way o f psychological re-enactment rather than grammatical 
analysis.
Because Schleiermacher perceived the distinction of language and thought through the same 
dualistic lens as his contemporaries, because he deemed language an external and objective 
manifestation and thought a thoroughly internal and subjective phenomenon, Schleiermacher ultimately 
compounded the epistemological distinctions which he sought to mediate. In capitulation to the age, 
Schleiermacher’s increasing commitment to psychological reconstruction echoed the wider 
philosophical turn towards the subject. And where hermeneutics had traditionally linked the roles of
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explanation and understanding within a model o f circularity or dialectical reciprocity, Schleiermacher 
abandoned the role o f explanation as a distinctly scientific faculty. Although the ambition of a “general 
hermeneutics” was directed specifically towards the universal particularity of inter-subjective 
understanding, as something which neither science nor metaphysics could properly account for, in 
overturning the traditional hermeneutic association o f explanation and understanding, and arguing that 
the verbalisation involved in explanation belonged more properly to the external plane of rhetoric, 
Schleiermacher led hermeneutics into the problematic territory of psychologism, wherein 
understanding takes the form o f a direct recuperation between one psychic life and another. Such a 
formulation not only repeated the romantic prioritisation of the subject, but also promoted a contrarily 
conservative re-working o f  that subject insofar as a “depth hermeneutics” centred upon recuperation 
countermands the dynamic productivity o f interpretation and the libertarian potentials o f the 
imagination invested by the romantics. Finally, in seeking to elaborate the course of human 
understanding in terms o f  a universal model, universally relevant to the individual, Schleiermacher 
ultimately conflicted with his own dissenting claim for “life” rather than metaphysics.
Dilthey’s hermeneutics in the next century developed out of a similarly critical attitude 
towards the scope o f  the humanities at the present time. The methods o f scientific positivism, guided by 
Newtonian principles o f an unchanging universe, were ill-matched to the study of human experience in 
all its multiplicity. Likewise the claims to objectivity vaunted by the German historical school 
amounted to little more than the confused practices o f an uncritical realism, propelled by an equally 
uncritical objective idealism. Both failed to grasp the true complexity of historical relations and living 
action to which Dilthey, as a literary-critic strongly influenced by romanticism, was himself attuned 
(Dilthey published numerous studies on the German Strurm und Drang movement; works deeply 
involved with the complexities o f the inner life). But Dilthey’s emphasis upon the inner life did not 
follow Schleiermacher’s demand for psychological transference between one psychic life and another. 
Like the neo-Kantians, Dilthey sought a return to Kant focussed upon the validation of phenomenal 
categories. But as a proponent o f the Geisteswissenschaften, the life-sciences, Dilthey’s prime concern 
was that the study o f  meaningful life and understanding should begin and end within the concrete 
realities of lived experience. By placing the question o f man and knowledge within the context of a 
shared horizon o f historical experience, he sought the grounds for a science of life in which the 
“expressions of inner life” could be objectively interpreted. Indeed it was Dilthey’s ambition to 
establish an epistemology o f  the human sciences as respectable and secure in foundation as the natural 
sciences.
Unlike Schleiermacher, for whom understanding was primarily a matter of psychological 
recreation between interlocuters, Dilthey believed interpretation to require a more profound sense of 
our own historicality. His method o f  practice was to be a continuation o f the Kantian critique but 
addressed this time to the category o f historical reason. The experiences of living, and the meaningful 
moments of particular experiences, were for Dilthey the key to clarifying human understanding. To this 
end he developed the notion o f  historical consciousness—awareness o f our past experiences and future 
expectations, and most importantly an awareness of how these temporal modalities interact within the 
constitution of our present interpretations— and sought to temporalise the dynamics o f the Kantian 
synthesis for the purposes o f an objective science o f self-understanding distinct from the Kantian 
theory of knowledge. In Dilthey, we find the origins of hermeneutics’ modem manifestation as a 
properly philosophical discourse, in which meaning is construed phenomenally, and phenomenal 
experience historically.
Naturally Dilthey was influenced by more than just Kant. And the transition from the 
Diltheyan conception o f hermeneutics to its most radical phenomenological expansion in Heidegger 
was not as straightforward as this account may suggest. Even whilst Dilthey sought a solid scientific 
foundation for his study, the intellectual cross-currents of German romanticism also played their part. 
Like Schleiermacher before him and Heidegger after him, the critical energies which impelled 
Dilthey’s life-philosophy stemmed from the impassioned anti-rationalism o f eighteenth century 
romanticists such as Rousseau, Fichte and Schelling. Different to them he may have been, none the less 
it is no easier to disentangle Dilthey from this cultural milieu than it is Bergson or Nietzsche, also life- 
philosopher’s o f the nineteenth century. And the same radical energies which compelled Fichtean 
individualism and Nietzschean irrationalism also consolidated Dilthey’s desire for complete 
epistemological independence from the scientific and the metaphysical traditions. Dilthey wrote that 
“in the veins o f the ‘knowing subject’ constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, runs no real blood” 
(Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften V, 4, quoted by Palmer, Hermeneutics', Interpretation Theory in 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, ibid., p. 102). By their accounts, the knowing 
subject tends towards a detachment from experiential determinations, but for Dilthey, the historical
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2 .3
T h e  N e w  C ritica l  H erita ge .
Just as French academic and political developments of the early to mid 
nineteen hundreds were decisive for Ricoeur’s influence in France, a more attenuated 
history on British soil has influenced his reputation here. Once more it is a distrust of 
German romanticism which informs this history. It is no coincidence that it begins at 
the canonical start o f literary theory in this country, with the irredoubtable 
persuasions of T.S Eliot. The New Critical tradition has leant its own cast to 
deconstruction in Britain and America, and likewise, its own particular inflection to 
the dialogue between deconstruction and poststructural hermeneutics. For this reason, 
hermeneutics as a literary theoretical possibility cannot avoid the decisive opening 
through which this theoretical construct presents itself. New Criticism and “new 
classicism” I contend, persist as fragments and distortions and certainly as points of 
maximum tension within the ongoing debate of literary theory. Construed in this way, 
literary theory represents the site of an ongoing battle against aesthetics; veiled in the 
artistry of its most prodigious and ambiguous voice (Derrida), we find the ambiguities 
of this aesthetic past newly expressed. But in the confusion of this ambiguity, there 
also persist the same forms of dichotomising and prejudice with which the New 
Critics’ first sought to clarify the matter.
For at least two generations criticism was dominated by the social and 
intellectual values of the New Critics, amongst whom T.S Eliot reigned supreme. The 
New Critics judgements extended far beyond the remit of their favoured genre of 
poetry. It encompassed what was in fact a comprehensive ideologue in which the 
critic’s role was purportedly curtailed on the intellectual level but palpably enhanced 
at the social level where the critic assumed a role of socio-cultural guardian, keeper
character o f man’s inner life, with its memories and desires, is integral to the condition of self- 
understanding.
Where hermeneutics had traditionally conceived understanding to be a dialectical process of 
(subjective) interpretation and (objective) explanation, Dilthey asserted their opposition to one another, 
aligning explanation with the exiled principles o f scientific reason whilst claiming interpretation for 
hermeneutic understanding alone. By exiling the role o f explanation from the hermeneutic circle, 
Dilthey consolidated the primary ambiguity o f the human sciences’ methodology and the uncertainty 
with which the subject o f  its appraisal was conceived. It is this fateful opposition which tarnished 
hermeneutics reputation as an unrigorous outgrowth o f romanticism. No one does more to undermine 
this perception than Ricoeur himself, who rejects all such antinomies. The dialectical treatment of 
semiotics within the theory o f discourse confirms this most thoroughly.
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and director of a culture’s tradition. Arguably almost every nuance of the New 
Critical paradigm, every preference, prejudice and bias—for poetry not prose, reality 
not fantasy, for referential diction, for the non-metaphysical poetic traditions, for a 
limited and wholly distinct sphere of critical practice divorced from philosophical 
discourse, one devoted not to speculative trajectories but to an assiduous reading 
closed-off from the contingencies of writing, to a formal method that is, but one 
which was nevertheless accompanied by a most resolute theory of cultural history and 
creative development— every one of these values can be negatively accounted for in 
terms of a wholesale rejection of romantic literary epistemology. Eliotean choices 
align themselves according to an historical distinction of romantic and classical mores. 
As a rejoinder to the entire romantic tradition, the New Critical stance is wholly 
conservative with regards to history, artistic creation and art’s role within history.
T.E Hulme, co-founder of the Imagist movement in poetry and a formative 
influence on Eliot, was responsible for the most decisive expression of the New 
Critics’ classical, anti-romantic agenda. Hulme made no contrivance of his role as 
canon-guardian, casting-out the etiolated fragments of romantic vagueness for a 
revival of classical “hardness”. In the essay “Romanticism and Classicism” he sought 
to disambiguate the two terms in just about all ways; philosophically and politically,
Of tnationally, religiously and artistically. Diagnosing the revolutionary fervour of 1889 
he writes;
Here is the root o f all romanticism: that man, the individual, is an infinite 
reservoir o f  possibilities; and if you can so rearrange society by the 
destruction o f oppressive order then these possibilities will have a chance 
and you will get Progress.
One can define the classical quite clearly as the exact opposite to 
this. Man is an extraordinarily fixed and limited animal whose nature is
25 Its other founder was the poet Ezra Pound. Both Pound and Hulme were influenced by arguments of 
the far-right, most notably a fascist group o f French intellectuals called VAction Frangaise to whom 
Hulme makes approbatory reference (for their admiration o f classical French literature and their 
hostility to literature o f  the Revolution).
26In so doing Hulme can be seen to essentialise history in terms o f a classical-romantic dialectic. But in 
attaching universal and ahistorical qualities to the terms, it is unclear whether Hulme remains true to 
his professed stance, since an ahistorical outlook upon the two temperaments would seem to suggest an 
archetypal interpretation redolent o f aestheticism.
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absolutely constant. It is only by tradition and organization that anything 
decent can be got out o f him.. ,27
Whilst rationalism and romanticism both pervert the natural course of man’s faith, 
making a paradise of earth and a god of man, the classical apprehension of man’s 
limitations gains religious support from the “sane classical dogma of original sin”. 
The distinction serves to convey literary style and critical conviction with as much 
continuity as if he were suggesting a naturalised priority, or that style and 
interpretation could themselves be righteous or of the Devil’s party. But Hulme’s 
literary-critical distinction is not the commonly assumed difference between the staid 
and the energetic, between Milton’s God and the more exuberant Satan, nor is it 
simply the contrast of sublunary cares with supernatural imaginings. True literary 
sensibility involves a sensitivity to certain limits, and by Hulme’s own description, a 
general preference for Fancy over Imagination. The classical poet will always remain 
“faithful to the conception of a limit” he writes. Whilst fancy permits the poet to 
“exceed man’s limit” it does so only to the extent that the unbounded will be framed 
by a knowing disbelief or a self-conscious “flourish”; “You never go blindly into an 
atmosphere more than the truth, an atmosphere too rarefied for man to breathe for 
long”.28 Romanticism’s imaginative counterpart by contrast does. The imagination’s 
eventual return to lower climbs—to the days of old age, or the foothills of Shelley’s 
“Mont Blanc”—does not compromise the sanctity of its flight, the pertinence of its 
vision. The characteristic limit of fancy finds its critical counterpart in our 
historicality, which not only refutes the possibility of a transcendent knowledge (or 
vision) but also the claim to absolute originality. Tradition—and here we see Hulme’s 
influence on Eliot at its most obvious—cannot be avoided, its consequences cannot be 
fully controlled either. “Your opinion” writes Hulme,
is almost entirely o f  the literary history that came just before you, and you 
are governed by that whatever you may think.29
27T.E Hulme, “Romanticism and Classicism”, first published in Speculations (1924), a collection of 
critical essays edited by Herbert Read. Reproduced in 20th Century Literary Criticism; A Reader, ed. 
David Lodge, Longman, London, 1972, pp.94-5. The editor tells us that the essay was probably written 
in 1913 or 1914.
28 T.E Hulme, ibid., p.96.
29 T.E Hulme, ibid., p.97.
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Holy writ, God, original sin, these are the relatively superfluous additions of 
Hulme’s own faith. His genuine impetus is an attack upon the aesthetic illusion of 
human freedom. Taking what he claims to represent the aesthetic imagination—total 
historical transcendence—and opposing it to the more constrained condition of human 
fancy, Hulme establishes a pattern of opposition in which an altogether decadent and 
wishful aesthetics is opposed to the reality of a much more fleeting form of artistic 
consciousness, utterly time-bound and ephemeral.
Particularly in Germany, the land where theories o f aesthetics were first 
created, the romantic aesthetics collated beauty to an impression of the 
infinite involved in the identification o f our being in absolute spirit. In the 
least element o f  beauty we have a total intuition of the whole world.
Every artist is a kind o f  pantheist.30
Now the distinction between imagination and fancy, and the elevation of the former 
over the latter, by right belongs to Kant. Human limitation, the ephemeral nature of 
fancy and the determining confines of tradition are the literary-critical analogues to 
what is essentially an epistemological argument against philosophies of the Third 
Critique. Invoking this opposition therefore, Hulme implicitly summons Kant. And 
yet within this essay, Kant’s name is altogether passed over.
In the suppression of Kant’s name, Hulme can be seen to attack the German 
tradition with a rather blunt instrument, one which fails to represent the import of 
Kant’s epistemological advance over dualist paradigms, and which refuses to 
acknowledge the theological telos which subtends the Kantian imagination. Collating 
“beauty to an impression of the infinite involved in the identification of our being in 
absolute spirit” could only ever look like a form of pantheism if one suppresses the 
cognitive validity of beauty and imagination within Kantian epistemology. The moral 
importance attached to the experience of beauty in nature, its capacity to elicit the 
“moral side of our being” is not the condition for a total intuition by any means. Far 
from pointing to an eventual identification of man and nature, natural beauty’s 
schematic distinction from artistic, humanly produced beauty, ensures its relative 
independence within the Kantian scheme. Indeed it is Kant’s contrast between natural 
beauty and artistic beauty which occasions the analysis of beauty’s cognitive validity
30 T.E Hulme, ibid., p.96.
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in the first place. It is through this contrast that art’s capacity for both the 
representation of objects and the presentation of aesthetic ideas emerges. The 
distinction between genius and mere taste arises from here also. So indeed, if by 
infinite Hulme in fact means the form of indeterminate solicitude which he so 
frequently mentions, then one can say that it is precisely the impression of the infinite 
within nature that leads Kant to claim an epistemological superiority for artistic 
beauty. Literary epistemology can make little of a tradition purportedly founded on 
the absolute identification of nature and freedom. Kant himself made little of it but 
unmistakably laid the way for his romantic successors. Like Hulme, Eliot chooses to 
focus upon them.
I have read some Hegel and Fichte...and forgotten it; o f Schelling I am 
entirely ignorant at first hand, and he is one of those numerous authors 
whom, the longer you leave them unread, the less you desire to read.31
As with Hulme, it is hard to take Eliot completely at his word and not interpret 
the professed admission as a form of knowing ebullience, not least because it arises 
within the context of Coleridgean aesthetics and a quote from Coleridge which makes 
its obligation to Kant very plain. Hulme’s reference to the concept of “total intuition” 
and pantheism reverberates with a similarly subsumed knowledge of this history. This 
is a history in which Hulme’s contentions regarding romantic aesthetics, regarding 
agency and historical limitation, had already been voiced, and precisely in terms of 
what was then known as the “Pantheism Controversy”. As Hulme well knows, Kant’s 
Copemican revolution was a response against Cartesian arguments for the self- 
affecting subject. What Hulme’s familiarity with the Pantheism Controversy further 
exposes is his knowledge of the counter-forces which opposed Kantianism to 
romantic idealism in its day. At the centre of the Pantheism Controversy was F.H 
Jacobi, a figure who by rights stands at the very forefront of literary theory. Having 
driven a decisive wedge between Kant and the romantic idealists who claimed him, 
Jacobi was central to literary theory’s inaugural distinction from aesthetics. But 
Hulme’s either/or mentality, his idiom of classicism versus romanticism, obscures the 
debt that his own references to pantheism and intuition owe to “the land where
31 T.S Eliot, “Wordsworth and Coleridge”, The Use o f  Poetry and the Use o f  Criticism, Faber and Faber, 
London, 1964, p.11.
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theories of aesthetics were first created”, namely Kant’s Germany. The connotations 
which we are invited to read in Hulme’s evocation of pantheism did not in fact 
emerge until much later. The critiques to which Kant and Jacobi were prompted were 
above all else attacks on the totalisation of the total intuition promoted by romantic 
philosophers such as Fichte.32 Together, Kant and Jacobi helped to introduce modem 
philosophy to the fateful themes of mediation, circularity and uncertainty which have 
continued to resonate almost seamlessly ever since. But the New Critics chose to steer 
clear of such details. Consequently the emergence of such themes within the Anglo- 
American literary arena occurred somewhat belatedly, circuitously and with a 
characteristically altered bearing. So it is that we can only wonder where the 
canonical or rather the pedagogical opening to the field of literary theory would have 
fallen had Eliot read more of the German aestheticians.
By rejecting the German metaphysical tradition in such a wholesale manner, 
there is no doubting the New Critics’ progressive drive to innovate, and to forge a 
more analytical approach to literature. The proliferation of a new vocabulary testifies 
to this stance of independence, not just from the romantics, but from the metaphysical 
tradition as a whole. The demand for a more precise and analytical methodology 
could even be seen to represent the more populist face of Britain’s philosophical 
renaissance at the hands of the logical positivists. This link to Britain’s philosophical 
heritage, to a tradition once quashed in the melee of revolutionary idealism, and 
recently re-awakened, would certainly have enhanced any imperialist desires for a 
new criticism of the native tongue. Certainly this relation helped to consolidate the 
enduringly reticent, if  not downright hostile attitude of many British critics towards 
their European counterparts, the work of whom was all too readily dismissed as 
trifling esotericism. For the New Critics, criticism was a task and a pedagogical tool 
with clear social utility. Insofar as it provided a formal method—close reading—it 
still remained firmly rooted within the ideological framework of the humanist 
education. This idiosyncratic blend of intellectual progressivism and cultural 
conservatism was to prove determinative for the consolidation of Anglo-American 
literary theory.
32 For a lucid account o f  this history see Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory, 
Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 1-52. Bowie’s polemical slant substantiates my own claim that the 
German aesthetic tradition has been subject to selective readings within Anglo-American literary and 
critical theory.
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Whilst claiming pragmatic concern for universally valid criteria divorced from 
the plane of speculation, the New Critics could not fail to make the kind of 
epistemological and ideological judgements which a close-reading edict would seem 
to condemn. This is no secret. New Criticism’s dual reputation as both a praiseworthy 
departure from aesthetic ambiguity and a peculiarly dogmatic, narrowly parochial 
interregnum within the court of European intellectualism confirms as much. What it 
attests to is the fact that the school’s technical innovation depended upon a theoretical 
suspension of the extra-textual which, in the absence of semiotic insights, only the 
paradoxical assertion of historical limitation and a strong objection to romantic 
aesthetic ideology could support. If critical analysis is to be precise, if close reading is 
to provide substantially fixed and determinate structures of meaning, one must 
presume—like the logical positivists—that signification exceeds the ambiguity of 
subjective judgement and that a “correct” reading implicitly exists. Where the 
Russian formalists asserted the limiting criteria of form, the New Critical assertion of 
the closed text in fact bequeathed form its own history and the individual his own 
historical form. Detached from the psychological intentionality of the author, the 
justification for right and wrong readings in poetry, where the criterion of logical 
sense does not hold, must draw succour from the historical precedence of the canon. 
Right readings and wrong readings do exist, and they should be drawn solely from the 
poem itself. But at the same time, the theoretical possibility of such a claim must 
inevitably draw upon a sense of historical continuity, and the continuity of 
signification to which the concept of tradition attests. In the absence of semiotics, it is 
the impersonal continuity of tradition which justifies determinate knowledge of 
literary texts for the New Critics.
It is quite remarkable to consider the similarity one finds here between the 
New Critical perspective and that of hermeneutics. In both cases one finds the forces 
of history being cast in a thoroughly impersonal light. We never have our meaning 
alone, it is “almost entirely of the literary history that came before you” Hulme writes. 
Hulme was clearly no less attached to the principle of a living tradition than 
Gadamer.33 Nevertheless, hermeneutics’ false association with romanticism assured 
hermeneutics’ exclusion from the realm of criticism proper for years to come.
33 Of course the most compelling affinity between hermeneutical exegesis and New Critical 
interpretation is the emphasis upon the text as it stands, in and of itself. In neither instance does the 
edict of close reading pose a challenge to the claim for historical understanding. To read the work in
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Even if one ignores the politics—the fact that New Criticism began roughly in 
1919 (with Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent”) and ended even more 
approximately in 1949 (with Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay “The Affective Fallacy”), 
that it spanned three decades of elevated nationalism, insularity and suspicion, that its 
most esteemed practitioners occupied the centre Right and in some cases the extreme 
Right-then the intellectual success of close reading coupled with its strong 
pedagogical and dogmatic traits were reason enough to deprive Continental trends of 
a receptive audience in Britain and America. When European theory finally set alight 
the English-speaking world, a radical shift was most certainly encountered. And yet 
the radicality of this transition belied the continuation of certain cultural precedents; 
with its translation at Yale, deconstruction acquired a decisively Anglophile inflection, 
so much so, that it would not be inapposite to be speak of “New Criticism at Yale”, 
and with it, the perpetuation of a romantic prejudice against hermeneutics. Nowhere is 
this attitude more apparent than in the de Manian deconstruction of the romantic 
symbol and the romantic ideology of transcendence.
Within the culture of literary theory, philosophical hermeneutics has suffered 
the false repute of romanticism. In the stark polemic of subject and text, the claim for 
hermeneutical truths within the work of literature was read in terms of an essential 
naivety, a failure to comprehend the reality of our verbal intransigence, our thorough 
immersion within the global text. But in Ricoeur’s poststructural hermeneutics, 
linguistic mediation presents the fundamental pre-requisite of philosophical 
knowledge. In order to understand this possibility it is necessary to turn to Heidegger, 
to the ontological transformation of hermeneutical understanding in Being and Time, 
and to the reconfiguration of poetic truth in his later writings. As we have said, 
modem hermeneutics without Heidegger is virtually unthinkable, but his influence 
upon deconstruction is no less important. In order to understand this common 
heritage and the divergences to which it led, it is necessary to consider both Ricoeur’s 
critical relation to Heidegger and the wider cultural debate provoked by his name.
isolation, free from the contextual details o f historicist criticism, does not discredit the claim for the 
work’s continuity within an historical continuum. The fact is that the work is so thoroughly a part of 
this continuum, that with the projection o f extra-textual details, concerning the author or the socio­
political environment o f  the day, one risks distorting the impersonal or unconscious historical forces at 
work within the text. In this respect, the projection o f a conscious historical logic is rather like the self­
illusions o f the ego in psychoanalysis. In this context, the prescience o f Gadamer’s critique of a 
“misguided Kantianism” is that it locates the historical accident which ensured the segregation of two 
relatively sympathetic modes o f reading.
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C h a pt e r  Three  
R ic o e u r  a n d  O nto logy
Push the rock o f Sisyphus up again, restore the ontological ground that 
methodology has eroded away.1
Whilst Ricoeur’s detour away from a purist phenomenology echoed the wider 
trend away from Husserl’s totalising idealism and the problems inherent to an 
existential praxis, his formulation of a decisively syncretic, dialectical hermeneutics 
was in marked contrast to the attitude of radical questioning and partisanship more 
commonly associated with the age of a social and intellectual “legitimation crisis”. In 
a time of apocalyptic proclamations concerning the “end of philosophy” and the dawn 
of “posthumanisms”, the less assiduous reader could have been forgiven for mistaking 
the smooth idiom of Ricoeurian mediation for the painstakingly protracted acquittal of 
the old rational-humanist foundations. Although Ricoeur’s collection of essays does 
reflect the period’s preoccupations both in title and content, The Conflict o f 
Interpretations is in many ways an indictment of prevailing attitudes vis a vis 
philosophy. On the one hand, Ricoeur acknowledges the indubitable constraints under 
which a post-Freudian, post-Marxist and post-semiotic hermeneutics must operate. 
But contrary to the scepticism of the day he seeks, through the operations of 
Heideggerian ontology, phenomenology and hermeneutics, to translate these 
epistemological constraints into a series of onto-phenomenological assertions which 
ultimately honour the tradition of reflective philosophy. In the essays devoted to 
semiology, to ontology and to Freudian interpretation therefore, what we appear to 
find is not so much a conflict in the model of a partisan attack or defence, but rather 
an earnest attempt at synthesis, in which the undeniable blows of modem thought and 
modem history serve to transform, not transgress philosophical parameters. Thanks to 
his transformative appropriations—of the Freudian ego and Heidegger’s analytic of
1 Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique o f Ideology”, The Hermeneutic Tradition; From Ast to 
Ricoeur, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, State University o f New York Press, State 
University of New York, 1990, p .311.
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Dasein—“Ricoeur’s contribution is, in effect, to have “‘desubjectivised’ 
subjectivity”. Writing retrospectively on this work, Ricoeur would state that
The tone is polemical, to be sure, but the conflicts are so completely 
internalized that I can say that the figure that emerges from them is that of 
a militant and wounded Cogito?
This degree of “internalization”, like the hermeneutic reputation as a whole, is 
frequently condemned for being overly irenic, for seeking to incorporate and 
synthesise too much, with the effect that it ultimately says too little. Given the gulf 
between Ricoeur’s hermeneutic inheritance (German idealism, Diltheyesque 
psychologism) and the theoretical anti-humanism surrounding him, one may be 
forgiven for expecting the figure of the wounded cogito to represent a kind of 
relativistic and vague gesture towards a minimal consciousness. But the wounded 
cogito, whilst it might sound like a form of compromise in the context of anti­
humanism and structural determinism, is in fact nothing of the sort. Ricoeur is no 
“survivor” of subjectivity, and nor does his path through the philosophical landscape 
constitute a form of compromise, haphazard analogy or dialectical straining.
In order to understand the justification for this mode of “internalised conflict” 
and the possibility of the “wounded cogito”, it is necessary to chart Ricoeur’s relation 
to Heidegger over and against the latter’s dominant characterisations at that time. In 
“Existence and Hermeneutics”, the introductory essay to The Conflict and its general 
statement of intent, Ricoeur projects the methodology of his procedure. To all intents 
and purposes it appears to be a highly programmatic affair. Within the Ricoeurian 
hermeneutic one moves through discemable phases of analysis. Starting from a 
consideration of semantic concerns (relating to the production of meaning within 
human discourse, within competing discourses), one moves to what he terms a 
reflective level (a level of self-awareness regarding our implication within their 
discourses) and finally an existential level (where we may assess the nature of our 
existence). As a pre-formulated system, a projection from above as it were, nothing 
could be more anachronistic within the dominant context of anti-foundationalism. To
2 G.B Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics o f the Subject”, The Philosophy o f  Paul Ricoeur, The 
Library o f Living Philosophers, Volume XXII, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Open Court, Chicago, 1995, 
o . l l .
Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, The Philosophy o f  Paul Ricoeur, ibid. p.23.
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presuppose such a method is surely to presuppose the kind of self-certifying clarity 
against which hermeneutics, and the entire paradigm of hermeneutical “suspicion”— 
in Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, in Lacan and the textualist inversions of structural 
semiotics—operates? The idea that we may disambiguate discursive traits and 
reflective traits, in the manner assumed by Schleiermacher (grammar and psychology) 
is simply wrong-headed within the context of anti-intentionalism. Moreover, it is the 
kind of analysis one would least expect from a self-professed Heideggerian.
3 .2
B e in g  a n d  Tim e ; H e rm e n e u t ic  P h e n o m e n o lo g y
For the “romantic” hermeneuts Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the path to 
hermeneutical knowledge was premised upon an opposition between understanding 
and explanation; for both thinkers, hermeneutical understanding was opposed to the 
methodological formulations of the explanatory sciences. This led to the rejection of 
historical method and linguistic analysis and the elevation of psychological 
determinates. Had it not been for Heidegger, hermeneutics may very well have lost its 
distinction as an independent discipline, disappearing somewhere in the gulf between 
historicism and Husserlian phenomenology. Of course the ontological project of 
Being and Time aimed at refuting both of these positions as the product of a 
misguided metaphysics. The mistake of metaphysics was to position humanity at the 
centre of all meaning, at the centre of an entirely neutral world, significant solely 
through the prism of human judgement (Kant) or equally, through the innate capacity 
to reflect this world steadily within the mind’s eye (Descartes). In the forgetfulness of 
the question of Being and ontology, epistemology founds itself upon the assumption 
that we know what Being is, constructing its methodologies upon the assumed 
identity of this entity. The point for Heidegger of course is that Being is not an entity 
but rather the precondition for any thinking of entities whatsoever. Both historicism 
and Husserlianism reflect this anthropocentric attitude towards the world. Historicism 
obscures the question of historical existence in the projection of an all too static 
relationship between the investigator and the past. The past is treated as a fixed
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determination within the present, something which the investigator, in his presumed 
identity, may turn in his hand with the detachment proper to natural objects. The 
naivety of this position is what romantic hermeneutics sought—and failed—to 
satisfactorily redress. The Husserlian method of bracketing is an attempt to move 
beyond the falsity of this view, to recognise the co-implication of history and human 
historicity, and from there on transcend the distortions of subjective judgement. In the 
process of bracketing Husserl presumes to strip away the veils of habituated prejudice, 
the velleities of the subject and the blindnesses of our historical location, to reveal a 
more “original” stratum of impersonal consciousness, in essence, a transcendental 
condition for historical consciousness. From a Heideggerian and a hermeneutical 
perspective, transcendental phenomenology repeats the central mistake of idealism; 
by stripping away all historical determinations, the Husserlian epoche presumes to 
treat consciousness as an absolute, as a principle over and above the world and the 
objects it houses. After reduction, Ricoeur writes,
...every being is a meaning for consciousness and, as such, is relative to 
consciousness. The reduction thus places the Husserlian cogito at the 
heart o f the idealistic tradition by extending the Cartesian cogito, the 
Kantian cogito, the Fichtean cogito.4
What Heidegger and his hermeneutical allies recognised in Husserl was the 
imperceptible transformation by which the desire to access the originality and purity 
of experience transforms the neutrality of the existent into a self-reflexive foundation.
In the naming of Dasein, of our being-there, Heidegger rejected the claim for any 
pre-historical transcendental principle of consciousness and the aspiration for an 
objective science of man. Both of these aspirations according to Heidegger, belong to 
an epoch of forgetfulness (metaphysics), in which the ontological question of Being has 
been subsumed by an epistemological desire to make man transparent to himself. This 
drive for self-mastery feeds and is in turn fed by the determination of philosophical 
truth as an essential and self-present identity (veritas). Within all dualist epistemologies, 
truth constitutes an identity between subject and object, between thought and its 
representations. Like the transcendental consciousness, the truth of veritas stands before
4 Ricoeur, “The Question o f the Subject: The Challenge o f Semiology”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, 
ed. Don Ihde, Continuum, London, 2004, p.251.
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and outside of time. It is this atemporal conception of truth which leads Husserl to 
associate the postulate of a pre-subjective consciousness with a prQ-historical horizon 
of intelligibility and to thereby attempt to treat consciousness as if it stood outside of 
time, like any other object free for scientific analysis.
But of course consciousness is not an object like any other, indeed it is not an 
object at all, and this is where Dilthey got it correct. Consciousness is ineluctably 
caught-up within the historical movements it seeks to capture. In many ways they are 
one and the same phenomenon. Anthropocentric or instrumental attitudes towards the 
world disguise Dasein’s temporal character, fixing being as the self-evident core of 
human consciousness. For Dilthey, unable to escape the dualisms of his day, the claim 
for historical understanding involved a necessary opposition to objective science and to 
the entrenchment of an unsatisfactory psychologism.5 But for Heidegger historicality is 
by no means an appeal to the subject, nor does it imply that historical knowledge should 
be in anyway relativistic. On the contrary, like the Husserlian transcendental 
consciousness, the proposition of Dasein, is pre-subjective.6 The critical difference of 
course is that this pre-subjective level of consciousness is innately historical, and that 
whilst it assumes a formal precedence over subjectivity, there exists between the two an 
ever-constant exchange, an historical process of exhange which prevents Dasein from 
constituting anything like a definitive foundation.
For Heidegger consciousness can never be fully present to itself precisely because 
it is historically constituted and because these profound temporal relations constitute 
the very fabric of what it is to know and feel as Dasein. The word Dasein (da-sein) 
describes the being-there or the “throwness” of human being. Ricoeur writes that
In speaking o f  “Dasein ” Heidegger did not only replace the concepts of  
subjectivity, self-awareness and the transcendental ego by a new word of 
striking force; by elevating the time-horizon o f human existence, an 
existence that knows itself to be finite (i.e., is certain o f its end), to the
5 The much maligned premise o f psychologism, that epistemological questions can be answered 
through empirical analysis o f  cognitive processes, was not Dilthey’s alone. Moreover, whilst Dilthey 
did at times veer towards this position, it did so as a consequence of his wider commitment to the 
Kantian division o f pure and practical reason, to the belief that only some aspects o f human 
understanding are accessible to scientific reason. Gadamer attributes Dilthey’s tendency towards 
psychologism to the fact that he “was never really reconciled with his firmly held Cartesian conception 
of science”. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Continuum, 
London, 2004, p.249.
6 Husserl’s transcendental consciousness and Heidegger’s Dasein are both names for a universal 
condition for consciousness.
93
rank o f philosophical concept, he transcended the understanding of Being 
that was the basis o f Greek metaphysics.7
Metaphysics agrees that history fields the constraints of our intellectual and 
mortal fmitude. Yet by transforming these constraints into a defining characteristic of 
Dasein''s ontological structure, Heidegger transforms the “problem” of historical 
knowledge into something constitutive of knowledge. Without historical parameters 
there is no consciousness, ergo consciousness cannot be treated as some historically 
independent or static entity. Both knowledge of our death in the future and knowledge 
of the past exert their pressure, circumscribing the experience of Dasein as a being- 
there rather than any fulsome self-presence. Dasein is rather the point at which these 
multiple trajectories converge.
In Being and Time Heidegger introduces the project of fundamental ontology as a 
hermeneutics of facticity, and as a hermeneutic phenomenology. The critical distinction 
which hermeneutics brings to phenomenology is clear to see; phenomenology entails a 
“reading” and an interpretation of the historical movements of consciousness, 
furthermore it is to be an exegesis of facticity, of life itself, not a science devoted to the 
projection of some inexponable and distant essence. Moreover the constitution of 
historical understanding follows the path laid out in the classical template of the 
hermeneutical circle. Just as textual interpretation entails the progressive to-ing and fro- 
ing between part and whole, so in Heidegger the pattern of interpretation becomes the 
template for self-understanding between the horizons of one’s birth and death.
Dasein Heidegger tells us, is that being for which being—and indeed Being—is 
an issue for it. Only humans, with their capacity to reflect upon their situation, question 
the conditions of their existence. Dasein’s fundamental constitution is thereby governed 
by its questioning relationship with Being, its fundamental character by the aspect of its 
temporal relations and the uniquely human concern or “Care” which these relations 
solicit. By linking this concern to the question of our death, and to Dasein’s perceived 
anticipation of totality or self-completion, Heidegger ensured Care be understood 
primarily in terms of a temporal movement, a “productive” to-ing and fro-ing, a circular 
enlargement of the understanding, but one which is necessarily confined to the 
historically mediated remit of mortal finitude and historical situation. Thus Dasein’s
7 Gadamer, H eidegger’s Ways, trans. John W. Stanley, State University of New York Press, New York, 
1994, p. 124.
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unique concern is a concomitant trait of its temporal character. By transforming the 
Kantian principle of phenomenality into the historico-ontological proposition of 
Dasein's inability to “step outside” and grasp the totality of its existence, Dasein’s 
historicality refutes the possibility of a transcendental principle. In the characterisation 
of Care’s reflective aspect—its looking forwards and backwards, which Heidegger calls 
the Riickbezogenheit, the “relatedness backward” which determines the historical 
movement and relational structure of Dasein's “thrown” existence—the hermeneutic 
model of circular understanding was transformed into an ontological trait, uniting 
Dasein’s ontology in the historical process of understanding.
Now the truth of Dasein is its historical constitution. Because this truth can only 
account for itself from within the movements of its own historical relation, Heidegger is 
moved to call upon an alternative concept of truth to the one presumed by science. This 
is the older truth of Aletheia, of disclosure or unconcealment named by the Ancient 
Greeks. What the notions of unconcealment and disclosure convey is the fundamentally 
hermeneutical characterisation of understanding as a process or an event. Because 
Dasein is historically constituted, truth’s disclosure must necessarily take the form of a 
simultaneous revealment and concealment, a kind of vacillating movement within 
which the constraining factors of one’s historicality—the limited range of one’s 
perceptions, the prejudices and traditions to which one is blind, the “horizon” as 
Gadamer calls it, of one’s interpretation—also provide the means to glimpsing 
something of the ontological nature of being. In this way, human understanding follows 
the golden template outlined in the traditions of legal and scriptural exegesis.
3 .3
H e id e g g e r ’s F r en c h  R ec eptio n s
Consigning hermeneutics the task of a fundamental ontology, Heidegger 
provided the discipline a more resolute philosophical theme, and a radical departure 
from the vexed and increasingly narrow issue of method in the human sciences. In its 
rejection of metaphysics (defined in a uniquely Heideggerian way) Being and Time 
could be seen to chime in accord with the anti-foundationalist, even anti-philosophical
sentiments of early twentieth century France. But in another very real sense, Being and 
Time represented the rally-cry for a philosophical renaissance, a return to philosophy’s 
long-lost dominion over other disciplines and a staunch rejection of scientific 
methodology within the humanities. Indeed, against the Heideggerian backdrop, 
scientific objectivity arises as something of a special case, an exception not an exemplar:
Science is anything but a fact from which to start. Rather, the constitution 
of the scientific world presents a special task, namely o f clarifying the 
idealization that is endemic to science.8
For the first readers of Etre et temps its immediate prescience resided in the 
themes of authenticity and Dasein's comportment towards the world, in passages 
which clearly evoked the themes of existentialism, such as Heidegger’s 
pronouncement that “the question of existence never gets straightened out except 
through existing itself.”9 In Gadamer’s words, initial readers were
seized by the vehemence o f its passionate protest against the secured 
cultural world o f the older generation and the levelling o f all individual 
forms o f  life by industrial society.10
Such approbation was essentially misguided however and the French response 
exacerbated Heidegger’s own sense that Being and Time had failed in its attempts to 
uproot the sovereignty of the subject. Where the French had failed to appreciate the pre- 
subjective and impersonal nature of Dasein, Heidegger himself admitted to placing 
Dasein in a position all too easily assimilable to the subjectivity of anthropocentric 
epistemology. Whilst Dasein undercut the supposition of an essentialist foundation 
within consciousness, its position at the very centre of Being and Time allowed it to 
operate as a mechanism of self-reflection, as if pre-understanding (the groundless fore­
knowledge which shapes Dasein" s historical movement) were itself a stratum of
8 Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Continuum, London, 
2004, p.249.
9 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell, London, 2005, 
p.33.
10 Gadamer, “The Truth o f  the Work o f Art”, Heidegger’s Ways, trans. John W. Stanley, State 
University of New York Press, State University o f New York, 1994, p.96.
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subjectivity to be self-consciously evoked, in the manner of Sartrean existence or 
authenticity.
...Heidegger’s critique o f the concept o f consciousness, which, through a 
radical ontological Destruktion showed that idealism of consciousness in 
its totality was really an alienated form o f Greek thinking, and which 
boldly confronted the overtly formal, neo-Kantian element in Husserl’s 
phenomenology, was not a complete breakthrough. For what he called the 
“fundamental ontology o f  Dasein” could not— despite all the temporal 
analyses o f  how Dasein is constitutes as Sorge [“Care”]— overcome its 
own self-reference and hence a fundamental positing o f self- 
consciousness.11
When Sartre himself claimed solidarity with the project of fundamental ontology, 
Heidegger was moved to renounce the affiliation in no uncertain terms and to drop the 
nomenclature of Dasein altogether. Whilst Sartrean philosophy accords with 
Heidegger’s conception of Dasein's  temporal constitution, with the becoming of Being, 
against a transcendental or essentialist view of human being, there is for Sartre “no 
other universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity.” 12 
According consciousness this foundational role, Sartre repeats a form of Cartesianism 
whereby human being evinces its own realisation through decisive action. Upon this 
teleological view, of agency and causality, the world becomes a kind of blank canvas 
for the activities of a subject-creator. Such a view is naturally antipathetic to Heidegger. 
In the “Letter on Humanism” the mistake of humanism was forcefully clarified, Sartre’s 
outstretched palm resolutely rejected. And with this clarification came a more overt 
attack upon instrumentalist attitudes. Mistakenly, “[W]e view action only as causing an 
effect. The actuality of the effect is valued according to its utility.”
But the essence o f action is accomplishment. To accomplish means to 
unfold something into the fullness o f its essence, to lead it forth in this
11 Gadamer, “Destruktion and Deconstruction”, trans. Geoff White and Richard Palmer, Heidegger 
Reexamined, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, Routledge, 2002, p.74. Paper originally presented 
in Rome, 1985.
12 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”, originally delivered by lecture in 1946, 
reproduced in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman, trans. Philip Mairet, 
Penguin, New York, 1989. p.368.
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fullness-producere. Therefore only what already is can really be 
accomplished. But what “is” above all is Being.13
From the perspective of fundamental ontology, Sartrean anthropocentrism is 
really no less detrimental to the question of Being than the kind of theoretical 
scepticism, structural and scientific determinism to which it was so obviously opposed. 
All such attitudes emerge from the same epochal fall into forgetfulness, where onto- 
theology gives way to the categories of technocratic thought. The fact that humanism 
and theoreticism should represent antithetical modes of forgetfulness and obfuscation 
only points to their unity within the binary logic of this subsequent realm.
If we relinquish the causal view of activity as something that affects human 
identity, and consider its designation as accomplishment, we realise that as 
accomplishment, or unfolding, action is a form of disclosure or completion. Since 
unfolding presupposes something, and this something cannot yet be called subjectivity 
since its achievement depends upon the fulfilment of the unfolding, this something 
must simply be called Being. Subjectivity is constituted through its relation to Being; 
its cause is anterior and extraneous therefore. Human freedom stems from an already 
existing possibility which action discloses in its fulfilment.
In a move which echoes the emphasis on Dasein as our particular relation to 
Being, Heidegger proceeds to single out thinking as the specific action or 
accomplishment relating human consciousness to Being. Thinking is the action, over 
and above those forms implicated in Existentialism—where actions proceed to define 
identities and to confirm consciousness as the foundation of being—which 
“accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of Man”. Unlike Existential 
activity, thinking is not causally productive. Rather than cause or define the subject’s 
relation to Being, thinking exposes what is already there, as it unfolds in the process. 
To refer back to the lived experience of Being and Time, thinking is just such a lived 
experience in that it is a form of immersion over and above the productive activity of 
habituated, technological attitudes. The relation to Being is realised in its character 
through thinking. Therefore thinking relates us to Being, expressing something 
essential concerning this relationship. Since thought cannot accomplish itself without 
language, language must play a decisive role in our relation to Being. Crucially,
13 Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, trans. Edgar Lohner, reproduced in European Existentialism, ed. 
Nino Langiulli, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1997, pp. 204-245.
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Man’s linguistic relation to Being should not be thought of in terms of mediation. 
Language does not mediate like some conveyor of messages, it does not represent 
Being or relay Being into human understanding, and it is not a substituted 
representative of Being. Rather, it presences Being, it is the enabling condition for the 
relation between Being and subjectivity, the possibility of Being’s disclosure to 
human consciousness and the possibility for human understanding in terms of its 
relation to Being. It is not merely the case that language carries meaning, that Being is 
presented to our understanding through language, it is the fact that Being presents 
itself as language; “Being comes to language” in the activity of thinking. Language is 
principle to human being since it expresses our relation to Being such as it discloses 
itself in thought therefore. When Heidegger comes to characterise his work not as 
phenomenological hermeneutics, not as philosophy even, but as “thinking”, it is 
because thinking is the pre-eminent action through which Being is said to disclose 
itself. Being’s significance cannot be understood unless it is understood to be 
presented as language, consequently, the turn to language is simultaneous with the 
revised idiom of thinking.
The Kehre
By popular French consensus, Heidegger’s self-professed turn or Kehre, 
with its idiomatic shift to “thinking” and “being”, and eventually to philosophy’s 
poetic margins, testified to a renewed but essentially different kind of coup on 
Descartes. For the second wave of French Heideggerians, who read Being and Time in 
the context of “The Letter on Humanism” and the wider theoretical landscape 
therefore, Heidegger was a consummate post-humanist; Dasein"s failure to surpass the 
scourge of metaphysics was squarely equated with a failure to uproot the Cartesian 
cogito.
In the context of France’s own preoccupations it makes a great deal of sense 
to interpret the Kehre predominantly in terms of this discontinuity. French philosophy 
is built upon Teutonic pillars, but it has never failed to assimilate these giants—Hegel, 
Kant, Husserl, Nietzsche— in accordance with its own preferences and preoccupations 
(Cartesianism, Marxism), dictating the terms upon which these master-philosophers 
are met. And in the period of Heidegger’s French receptions the pendulum of
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intellectual persuasion swung from one decisive extreme to another. Tom Rockmore’s 
analysis of the French Heidegger quite rightly situates the humanist debate within the 
context of France’s rationalist tradition. “In French circles”,
Descartes is understood less as an epistemologist than as a humanist 
whose idea o f reason dominates the later Enlightenment debate 
culminating in Kant’s critical philosophy and continuing in our own 
time.14
Such a context certainly helps to explain the perception of radical discontinuity 
between the early and later Heidegger and also the deceptive complexity of a 
humanist/post-humanist debate. By this logic a renewed flight from the cogito 
signifies the dawn of new poststructuralist energies, filtered through Nietzsche, 
extracted by Derrida. Yet even as the self-profession of Dasein's failure seemed to 
reflect a distinctively French tendency for drastic revision, easily explicable within a 
narrative of growing radicality and postmodern irrationality, Heidegger’s significance 
to French thought today is not and cannot be partitioned into separate spheres of 
influence, as if the Destruktion of the metaphysical framework was not, in its 
originality and ultimate failure, the most important precursor to the dominant themes 
of deconstruction. Derrida’s literary idiom may speak more immediately to the later 
Heidegger, but is it not true that the founding aporia of deconstruction—the infinite 
deferral of differ ance, the fateful entrapment of metaphysics—are themes which 
Heidegger himself could only presage through the failure of Dasein?
Such questions cannot be answered here with any degree of satisfaction, but 
nor can they be forgotten in the context of the present analysis. This is because 
Derrida’s validation of the later Heidegger, and his renunciation of “metaphysical 
Nazism”, cannot fail to be significant in his popular representation as a post-humanist 
and an anti-realist, and as a consequence, in the propagation of a false polarity 
between hermeneutic and deconstructive interpretation within a post-Heideggerian 
age.
14 Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism, and Being, 
Routledge, London, p.66.
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3 .4
F r a n c e  a n d  t h e  “H eid eg g er  Q u estio n”
Forty nine years after Sein und Zeit’s French publication in 1938, the 
floodgates were publicly opened on the question of Heidegger’s war-time sympathies 
with the publication of Victor Farias’ book Heidegger et le Nazisme. In Germany 
Heidegger’s Nazi complicity was evident almost from the start, but still in France it 
was far from a new discovery either. Within academe the ‘‘Heidegger question” had 
rumbled quietly and consistently for many years, but speculation within the ivory 
tower proved no match for the populist outrage ignited by Farias.15 Philosophers were 
ushered forward to explain, not only how—two years before occupation—France 
could have welcomed the pronouncements of a Nazi, but also how philosophy—as the 
discourse of intellectual scrutiny and conceptual purity—could have missed, 
apparently for so long, the ideological stain at the heart of this abiding enthusiasm. 
The “Heidegger question” in France as it arose in the 1980s was thus closely bound to 
the issue of philosophy’s status within the Enlightenment tradition which Heidegger 
had himself condemned.
The details of Heidegger’s French reception perhaps made the 
acknowledgement of his guilt more painful in France than in Germany, and not only 
because war retards the flow and translation of evidence between nations. Heidegger’s 
war-time pronouncements as Direktor-Fuhrer at Freiburg University were 
unequivocal acts of Nazi participation. But Heidegger in post-war Germany was one 
more—albeit high profile—criminal in a nation swathed by guilt: recrimination and 
punishment, the divestment of office and exile from public-life, formed part of a 
systematic process of de-Nazification. In France, where Heidegger’s rectoral 
pronouncements were known only later, Nazi guilt was a rumour speculated upon 
solely amongst the most engaged Heideggerians. But it was not this late disclosure in 
itself which pained French philosophy as much as the fact that in its absence, France 
had adopted Heidegger as the father of its philosophical future, not once, but twice 
(once as existentialist and a second time as proto-deconstructionist). It is no small 
paradox—and no small failure for “philosophy”— that France first embraced
15 Farias’ book has been widely criticised as a piece o f  poor scholarship, sometimes through genuine 
concern but frequently as a means o f deflecting the question it raises.
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Heidegger in the spirit of Sartrean existentialism, interpreting Dasein through the lens 
of a socialist-humanist praxis. Retrospectively naive and horribly mistaken, there was 
none the less apparent and considerable justification for it at the time.
For the contemporary reader of Etre et temps its immediate prescience 
resided in the themes of authenticity and Dasein9s comportment towards the world 
and others, in passages where, for example, Heidegger writes that “the question of 
existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself’, and not in 
passages where say, the inhumanity of Dasein rises to challenge the flawed 
epistemology of the Subject, and the critique of existence extends beyond the 
existentialist critique of rationalism to assert the radical premise of an ontological 
“destruction”. 16
French readers specifically, could not be expected to recognise a fascistic 
undertone in the character of Heideggerian individualism, authenticity or fate, when 
such themes appeared to cohere so fluently with the home-grown vocabulary of 
existentialism, the avant-garde and the intellectual Left. Given the details of the 
French context at that time, it is possible to see how Heidegger’s rejection of the 
“secure” cultural and industrial world of his forebears, could be misconstrued as a 
version of Sartrean authenticity, where the individual rallies against the constraints of 
the liberalist institution, and not in terms of its reality, as a form of Nietzschean 
assertion, compounded by National Socialism’s intellectualist currents. Against the 
biological ideologues, the Nazi’s Rohm faction, sought, like Heidegger, to promote 
Nazism as a philosophically venerable agenda. Strongly influenced by a bowdlerised 
version of the thought of Nietzsche, they proscribed the mythical confection of the 
Hellenic Fatherland, based upon a supremacy of culture, eschatologically 
underwritten in terms of an exclusive Greek destiny reserved only for the most 
powerful and the most Germanic. Sartre himself perceived an affinity with Heidegger 
where in reality there were merely common foes (liberal Man with his rationalist 
foundations, his ideology of progress, his inauthenticity) and assumed the humanist 
agenda as Heidegger’s own. Doubtless, France’s recent liberations from the great 
Cartesian bogeyman, most notably in the fields of anthropology and psychoanalysis, 
would have had a significant impact upon the way in which Dasein was interpreted 
there. The radicality of these disciplines lay in their departure from reflective
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford, 2005, p.33
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philosophy and their promises of a more rigorous science of man. Their radicality lay 
in replacing the stable rationality of the cogito with a plenum of unstable, irrational 
socio-cultural, socio-institutional, tribal and historical interferences which could none 
the less be predicated and observed according to scientific procedure. Fundamentally, 
they still supposed the originality of the subjective stratum of experience, which the 
analytic of Dasein intended to dissolve. Given Dasein’s historical structure it would 
be all too easy to assume an identity between it and the subject of an anthropological 
paradigm.
However, France’s humiliation at the hands of Heidegger lies not in the 
misunderstanding of Dasein’s originality, but in its acquiescence to Heidegger’s 
calculated encroachment after this point, when certain French philosophers, most 
notably the purported addressee of the “Letter on Humanism”, Jean Beaufret, 
discipled themselves—unquestioningly in Beaufret’s case—to a newly assumed post­
humanism.17 On the one hand Heidegger claimed Sartre to have misinterpreted Being 
and Time and to have failed to recognise the true radicality of the metaphysical 
Destruktion, but on the other, Heidegger asserted Dasein’s failure to access this very 
radicality; in comparison to Sartrean existence Dasein was radical, and yet it was not 
radical enough.
In recent years a good deal of scholarship has focussed upon Heidegger’s 
pragmatic manipulation of the French intelligentsia, both in the “Letter” and 
elsewhere. Buoyed in the up-draft of Sartre’s descent, Heidegger’s “Letter” was an 
intellectual reproof communicating sincere convictions but it was also a conscious 
political act intended to increase his visibility in France and prepare the way for his 
political exoneration there. Anson Rabinbach writes that “The Letter exemplifies 
Heidegger’s characteristic ability to assume a position of the highest philosophical
1 firigor while positioning himself in the most opportune political light”. This of course 
was the light of philosophical purity, designed specifically with France, and the recent 
existential controversy in mind. In the 1940s, when Heidegger’s politics were not 
widely known abroad, the damning documentary evidence not yet unearthed, France’s
17 Richard Wolin suggests Beaufret’s success in defending Heidegger against detractors’ suspicions lay 
less in his intellectual force and more in his unimpeachable example as a former conscientious objector. 
The argument going that a man o f such rectitude would not support a man of such moral turpitude. See 
Richard Wolin, “The French Heidegger Debate”, New German Critique, No. 45, Autumn 1988, 
pp.135-161.
18 Anson Rabinbach, “Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism as Text and Event”, New German Critique, No. 
62, Spring-Summer, 1994, p. 6.
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misread enthusiasm provided the perfect foothold for a man increasingly unwelcome 
in his own land looking for reprieve elsewhere.19 Sartre’s mistake, and Beaufret’s 
repetition of it, provided Heidegger the opportune platform from whence to “revise” 
(some might say “distort”) the ideological implications of his philosophy on the basis 
of an intellectual correction.
The complicity of personal politics and Politics, politics and intellectual 
precision are the hallmarks of the “Letter”. This complicity not only stands at the 
heart of the “Heidegger question” and the issue of Heidegger’s philosophical worth, 
but also the very question to which all philosopher’s have since been compelled, 
namely the very possibility of philosophy after Auschwitz. And it remains especially 
significant within the context of French poststructuralism, where Heidegger represents 
both a hateful nadir and the hopeful scion of its overcoming. The complicity of 
intellectual clarification, the continuation of thinking in its highest order, with 
degenerate madness and murderous perversion, is inexcusably vile. Interpretation of 
the “Letter” remains pivotal to Heidegger’s repute, but for this insurmountable reason 
it must also remain important wherever thought shows a dependency on his influence.
France’s leading Heideggerians did not wait to be called to justify 
Heidegger’s intellectual validity. Before the Farias furore of the 1980s Derrida and 
Lacoue-Labarthe had both authored premonitory responses to the issue of 
Heideggerian complicity. Both deploy what sceptics may call a strategy of 
containment. In “The Ends of Man” Derrida’s strategy is to exonerate the influence of 
Heidegger’s later work by asserting the discontinuity of his earlier thought. 
Heidegger’s Nazism could not be denied and nor could it be disentangled from the 
project of Being and Time. Containment of the political Heidegger relies upon an 
anthropological rendering of Dasein. Heidegger’s failure to transcend man’s end with 
the closure of metaphysics, his inability to exceed metaphysical thinking is linked 
directly to his Nazism. Given his absolute centrality within French poststructuralism, 
we can only speculate the extent to which French philosophers needed, for their own 
pride, to exonerate the later Heidegger. Whilst Heidegger’s Nazism could not be 
separated from the project of Being and Time, it was possible to exonerate the 
influence of the later Heidegger by asserting the discontinuity of his earlier thought.
19 Ironically enough, in its capitulation to Heidegger, France can be seen to have embraced the less 
progressive option within German intellectualism. In Germany itself, critical theorists such as Adorno 
reviled Heidegger for the dangerously “anesthetizing” effect o f his language. See Rabinbach, p.5.
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Arguing for the validation of his post-war thought in this way is, as Rabinbach points 
out, remarkably orthodox to Heidegger’s own intentions. In Derrida’s “The Ends of 
Man” containment of the political Heidegger relies upon the very anthropological 
rendering of Dasein which Heidegger reproves (both himself and Sartre for) in the 
“Letter”. Heidegger’s Nazism is thus directly linked to the philosophical failure of the 
analytic of Dasein to overcome the anthropos of the metaphysical age. Perversely 
therefore, it is Dasein's residual subjectivity—in its proximity to Being, in the 
unavoidable self-reference—and Heidegger’s residual humanism which is claimed to 
lead him to Nazism.
3 .5
P o e t ic  F r e e d o m  o f  A n o th er  K ind
As a continuation of the ontological project, Heidegger’s work on poetry was 
never intended as a “mere” poetics to stand alongside other such works. Its ambitions 
were every bit as grandiose as those of Being and Time; not a dialogue with the literary 
critical tradition but a gesture of utter dissolution, intended to sweep away the entire 
edifice upon which this tradition rested. Thus it was the conditions that fostered critical 
practice, shaping the questions it asked and the self-perceptions of its task, which 
Heidegger attacked. To this extent literary criticism was just one misguided symptom of 
the totality he sought to undo.
In my introduction I expressed reservations regarding the self-perceptions of 
Anglo-American literary theory (conceived as a pedagogic unity) and the ideological 
prejudices it presumes to have overcome. In its propagation as a coherent narrative 
(albeit one which readily concedes to the mixed character of its discourse) I suggest, the 
discipline of Literary Theory projects the same kind of teleocratic aspirations for which 
it condemns the prejudices of Enlightenment values.20 As a narrative of increasing 
liberation, from the illusions of rationalism (of the self-certifying or self-creating ego), 
from the inconsistencies of subjective critique, the contradictions of historicism and the
20 As the roots of this word suggest, “teleocractic” refers to the assumption that knowledge (in this 
context in the human sciences), can be pursued in view o f predetermined objectives, and by implication, 
that even interpretive knowledge can be made to follow a linear progression.
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limitations of formalism, literary theory posits the unveiling of the final illusion, namely 
the impossibility of ever actually doing away with illusion. In its final claim for 
openness, for indeterminacy and linguisticality, literary theory betrays a strong debt to 
Heidegger, but it also manages in the process to contradict virtually everything 
Heidegger himself decreed. What follows is not a defence of Heideggerian poetics, but 
rather an attempt to locate—from the source as it were—some of the deep-seated 
affinities which unite philosophical hermeneutics in its postructural, post-Heideggerian 
form, with the philosophical discourse of deconstruction, over and against the latent 
presuppositions of a unified literary theoretical, literary deconstructive practice.
Truth
In “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-6) Heidegger projects his well-known 
thesis against instrumental attitudes. As products of our metaphysical tradition, we in 
the West interact with the world in an essentially anthropocentric and technocratic 
manner, treating our environment as a field of potential utility. And this attitude extends 
to the work of art. Critics, historians, aestheticians, in fact all of us treat the work of art 
as if it were a commodity for our consumption. Devoid of any usefulness in the ordinary 
sense, the work of art comprises a commodity of the intellectual kind, a kind of exercise 
in interpretive dexterity intended to replicate a pre-conceived set of ideas and 
associations. Upon this basis we approach the work of art as if it were a well of fixed 
proportions awaiting our excavation, as if that is, the work of art possessed a pre­
determined and pre-existent content, ministered by the artist, consciously or 
unconsciously so, ready for our extraction as a determined message or content. In this 
way the critic replicates the prejudices of metaphysical dualism, treating the work as a 
culturally determined object, and what is more, an object in which form and content can 
be dismantled as the merely temporary union of the artist’s endeavours. Whilst the work 
is granted a certain privileged distinction as regards this union, the critic’s mode of 
interpretation ultimately works to circumscribe the artwork as just one more cultural 
artefact amongst an array of non-aesthetic objects. Like the legal document or the 
archaeological relic, the work works to confirm the logic of a cultural order of things; a 
deeply anthropocentric history of human progress and its correlate artefacts. In this 
light the critic acquires the role of cultural arbiter, piecing together the grand historical 
jigsaw of cultural conditions within which the most exemplary works of art must fit.
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Accordingly the work’s value is judged upon the basis of its conformity to this cultural 
narrative or lack thereof, the approach to the work of art predetermined by these 
incipient pressures.
Of course, this critique can be extended to the dominant strategies of literary
criticism, where the literary work is filtered through the lens of a given interpretive
context as an expression of latent drives or embedded imperialism, or the archetype of a 
21given genre. As much as these interpretations can and do expose certain truths 
regarding the production of literature or the dissimulating powers of language say, the 
overall tendency serves to neutralise those unique characteristics of the individual work 
which perhaps do not conform, or are less easily explicable in terms of the given model. 
Approached with certain ends in sight, the critic will naturally prioritise those features 
of the work which best behove the explanatory model in question and suppress or 
sideline those elements that do not. The critic thereby reflects upon the work in terms of 
its proximity to certain pre-defined criteria; the political anxieties of a turbulent decade, 
an incipient rejection of vanguard styles, or the artist’s growing confidence in his own 
abilities. Consequentially, an implicit value-system takes root within the wider cultural 
discourse. The works which rise to the top, which generate the most discussion, tend to 
be those works which best represent, or best betray the cultural assumptions of their 
predetermined context. In this sense the work is tacitly contained by the surrounding 
preoccupations of its immediate history. Accordingly, the concept of the work itself 
becomes a kind of mediating device between the socio-cultural practices and mores of
21 The novel is a case in point. As every student o f literature knows, the novel is a modem phenomenon. 
It testifies to the rise o f a new literate consumer class following the distribution o f greater wealth within 
the industrial era. More wealth for more people, the emergence o f leisure time amongst the working 
classes and liberal reform within education, these are the socio-economic factors which propelled the 
novel’s consolidation as a literary type. Accordingly all analyses of the novel undertaken within the 
framework of this socio-economic explanation will ensure the prioritisation o f certain themes—new 
wealth, class strife, the destruction o f  nature for industrial ends, even a presumed elevation in self- 
awareness within the society o f ordinary people. In this way, everything— from the worker’s misery, 
from Zola’s urban penury say, to the inner turbulence o f Hardy’s “fallen” woman, or the more fanciful 
middle-class strife o f the Austen heroine before her— can be subsumed within the logic of 
industrialisation. The evils reflected by the author thereby reflect a growing social conscience. 
Disregarding the liberal prejudice at work here, a more general prejudice exposes itself in the classical 
notion of canonical value. For whilst the canon is punctuated by works o f unheralded originality, the 
canon’s body comprises an inveterate continuity organised according to external historical criteria. In the 
case of the novel, the external criterion is history itself, but the demand for context, the tendency to 
review the work against external categories is every bit as prevalent within the canonical explanation of 
formalist and anti-representational artworks. Now the work may reflect the consistent failures o f aesthetic 
norms or the “reality” o f the work’s virtuality, its own “constructedness” and artifice, the disintegration of 
the first person illusion, the work’s failure to refer to anything beyond the parameters o f its own self­
reference. But even as they announce the failure o f aesthetic categories, such tactics are canonised for 
their conformity to postmodern conventions.
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its inception and the ideologies of its present location, a pure representation that is, 
serving recognisable and finite ends.
Against these relativising tendencies Heidegger asserts the need to approach the 
work with as few presuppositions as possible. In Being and Time Heidegger had sought 
to undercut the foundational illusions of subjectivity and clear the path to a more 
authentic perspective on Being, in order “to let that which shows itself be seen from 
itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”22 This phenomenological 
maxim—“To the things themselves!”—is also the pivot upon which the Heideggerian 
poetic turns. If in philosophy, subjectivism constitutes a kind of circular inauthenticity, 
in which man posits himself, and in so doing finds himself—exactly as he supposed— 
then the work of the critic commits a similar infidelity to the truth of the art work’s 
being. Approached with certain ends in sight, the critic legitimates the artwork as the re­
presentation of certain cultural historical truths, confirming the work’s status as the 
“reproduction of what exists.”23 For Heidegger of course, such a reproductive view of 
art misses the essential distinction of what art truly is. Not a thing like any other that is, 
but a mode of disclosure in which the truth of things and the truth of beings is 
unconcealed each time anew. “Is it our opinion that the painting draws a likeness from 
something actual and transposes it into a product of artistic-production?” Heidegger 
asks, “By no means.”24
When Heidegger supplants the artwork’s usual configuration in terms of form 
and content, with the all encompassing and purportedly more primordial relation of 
world and earth, it is not only our attitudes towards the work of art he seeks to revise 25 
For Heidegger, form and content are the aesthetic correlatives of the dominant, 
dichotomising orthodoxy shared by positivists and neo-Kantians alike, and what is more, 
the very dichotomy from which Heidegger claims art can rescue us. For Heidegger, art
22 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.58.
23 Heidegger, “The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art”, The Continental Aesthetics Reader, ed. Clive Cazeaux, 
Routledge, London, 2000, pp.80-101.
24 Heidegger, ibid., p.88.
25 In “The Origin of the Work o f Art” Heidegger seeks to undermine the basic philosophical categories 
through which the artwork is usually conceived, jettisoning the usual divisions o f form and content as 
the direct expression o f  an essentially anthropocentric and instrumentalist attitude towards the work of 
art. Upon the latter view the work’s artistic character resides in its status as formed matter; its 
distinction from other such formed objects in the artistic harmony o f its unity. Conceived in such a 
way, aesthetics betrays its metaphysical parentage, with form and content relaying— in varied 
permutations—the fundamental dualisms o f an ego-bound tradition. But just as Dasein claimed to 
name the condition o f our pre-understanding and a more primordial substrate o f consciousness, so 
Heidegger claims to locate a more original condition for the division o f form and content within the 
work of art. This is the thoroughly mutual and thoroughly dynamic relation o f world and earth.
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presages the possibility of our salvation from the false perceptions of the present 
technocratic era. Experienced in the correct manner, art is to evince our return to the 
understanding of a utopian time-before, a nostalgic sphere of pre-philosophical thinking 
where the thought of being remains unclouded by the obtrusions of subjective 
frameworks. The significance of art to thinking involves nothing less than the 
overturning of modem philosophy, with its presupposed, unanalysed conceptions of 
subjective and objective existence therefore. In order to think art correctly, in order for 
its exemplary status to shine through, it is first and foremost necessary to erase the 
aesthetic categories through which art has been predominantly understood since Kant, 
as a reflection of the artist’s creative powers; as matter formed into the representation of 
a pre-ordained content.
In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger writes of the vacillating co­
dependency through which the work of art reveals itself. Contrary to the static logic of 
representation, whereby form and content would work to consolidate the work’s 
conformity to pre-existent ideas, world and earth conspire within the fundamentally 
dynamic and open-ended experience of aletheia, that is, of truth as the unconcealment 
of beings. It is worth quoting Heidegger at some length here in order to grasp the 
transposition at work within the concept of unconcealment. He begins by writing of the 
Greek temple:
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in 
the middle o f the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of  
the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct 
through the open portico. By means o f the temple, the god is present in 
the temple. This presence o f the god is in itself the extension and 
delimitation o f  the precinct as a holy precinct.26
Such a premise recalls the notion of spatial focalisation in the Wallace Stevens poem 
“Anecdote of the Jar” : “The wilderness rose up to it/And sprawled around, no longer 
wild.” There are, however, important differences. For one thing, Heidegger’s temple- 
god model is a relationship of mutual and simultaneous re-enforcement; the temple 
makes the god a god, the god makes the temple holy; a rather different relationship to 
that of form and content, where the jar confers a relative form  and hence a relative
26 Heidegger, ibid., p.88.
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content upon the surrounding wilderness. Significance in the latter case takes the form 
of an entirely centrifugal grounding via the man-made object (the anthropocentric 
perspective), and is hence grounding relational to pre-existent terms. For Heidegger 
however, the relation of world and earth is intended to disclose an essentially un­
grounded space or horizon of possibility within which man first makes himself at home 
in the world. This is no relationship of mere spatial organisation, of form, but of 
spiritual manifestation, in this case a divine evocation. What Heidegger intends with 
this patently spiritual example is to demonstrate the artwork’s radical distinction as an 
original and self-founding phenomenon, as something essential and free, through which 
man first understands himself as man. Together temple and statue comprise the primal 
opening through which an essential spirituality is first made manifest to man. It is the 
temple-work which first makes sense of the world in human terms:
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers 
around itself the unity o f  those paths and relations in which birth and 
earth, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline 
acquire the shape o f  destiny o f human being... Standing there, the 
building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first 
makes the storm itself manifest in its violence.27
The work of art does not merely confer meaning through the formal ordering of human 
artistry, as if the “destiny of human being” were a thought in the mind’s eye of the artist 
creator. Heidegger writes that “To be a work means to set up a world”. There are two 
meanings to be read into this statement. On the one hand, the work of art, as our 
salvation from instrumentalist attitudes, can show us things about the world concealed 
by our way of being in life itself. This is why, when Heidegger writes of the peasant 
shoes in the Van Gogh painting in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, he writes of how 
“This painting spoke. In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than 
we usually tend to be.”28 Heidegger is sure to emphasise that this greater reality or 
greater truth, is not a second-order projection read back into the work from worldly 
experience, but rather a primal experience which only the work can confer. The work 
for Heidegger can show us things which life itself cannot; something which clearly 
confounds the naturalistic order of mimesis. The work sets up a world, but the origins of
27 Heidegger, ibid., p.89.
28 Heidegger, ibid., p.88.
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this world are deeply mysterious insofar as it possesses no precedent. To this extent 
Heidegger both here, and in his work on Greek tragedy especially, makes a great deal of 
the notion of the uncanny or the irreal. Heidegger gestures towards this alien aspect of 
the art work in “The Origin of the Work of Art” when he writes of the work’s proximity 
to the non-equipmental object, with its “self-contained” resilience to human projections. 
This “strange and uncommunicative” feature of the thing is precisely what Heidegger 
wishes to expose within the work of art over and against the usual predeterminations of 
our traditional responses.29 The truth of the work, and the work’s truth for being, rests in 
this capacity to break down the barriers of preconception and the derived metaphysical 
categories which support them. In order to do so, Heidegger claims that we must “keep 
at a distance all the preconceptions and assaults” of derived thinking (metaphysical 
dualism) and somehow approach the work unburdened.30 The work of art is inscrutable 
and mysterious because
The truth that opens itself in the work can never be verified or derived 
from what went before. In its exclusive reality, what went before is 
refuted by the work.31
Similarly,
The ownmost reality o f  the work...comes to bear only where the work 
is preserved in the truth that happens through itself.32
In this respect the artwork is ontogenetic, it creates itself from out of itself, without 
prior terms and without prior foundations. It follows from this that the work not only 
sets up an aesthetic world, a world removed from the world of living reality, but that it 
is in fact world-making in the strong historical sense of transforming living reality. 
Because the truth of the work of art is self-creating, because it is not a subsequent 
representation of human projections, the truth revealed within the work of art refutes the 
classical distinction whereby the work would simply reflect human conditions as the 
artist sees them. This reaches to the very heart of Heidegger’s aestheticist (not aesthetic)
29 Heidegger, ibid., p.85.
30 Heidegger, ibid., p.85.
31 Heidegger, ibid.,, p.99.
32 Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.42.
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vision of radical freedom. For Heidegger the work is radically free precisely because it 
refuses such limitations, because our attempts to “translate” the work can never really 
be exhausted by the categories of interpretation which precede it. To use the 
Heideggerian idiom, the work “sets up a world” all of its own, founding itself as a pure 
origin against which all prior categorisations are rendered inadequate. Real freedom is 
the freedom to see, or to “listen” to the work in the absence of pre-determined criteria, 
against the teleocratic, ends-related attitudes of the classical approach. Because art is 
not a second-order reflection of man’s historical perspective, because art is not distinct 
from the totality of human existence, but rather a self-creating power which alters man’s 
perspective, which has the power to change historical trajectories, the work of art, as a 
revolutionary potential, speaks of the radical freedom subtending man’s historical 
perspective. Man is not his own foundation, and whilst understanding is most certainly 
fielded by the hermeneutical horizon of our own historicity, historicality is in no way 
pre-determined by the limitations of an essentialist subjectivism. This is the truth which 
the work discloses when approached from beyond the constraints of the subjective 
aesthetic paradigm. The work sets up a world, but at the same time “The work lets the 
earth be an earth”. It is in this respect that the work of art must be conceived as an 
ontological event. The work comprises a mutual vacillation between earth and world, 
between man’s historical understanding within the world that is, and the unconcealment 
of that profound and limitless “un-worldly” freedom subtending it. In essence, earth 
constitutes the impenetrable and irreducibly alien core at the work’s heart; it is that 
element which obstinately refuses to be reduced in terms of human interpretation, 
forbidding the possibility of the work’s translation or reduction into a relationship of 
pure identity with what exists. The Italian hermeneutic philosopher Gianni Vattimo 
elucidates the hermeneutical attributes of world and earth in the following manner:
While the world is the system o f meanings which are read as they 
unfold in the work, the earth is the element of the work which comes 
forth as ever concealing itself anew, like a sort o f nucleus that is never
used up by interpretations and never exhausted by meanings.33
The transposition at stake within the Heideggerian work is an utter reversal, one which
makes of all understanding, and all representations, the secondary consequence of the
33 Gianni Vattimo, A r t’s Claim to Truth, ed. Santiago Zabala, trans. Luca D ’Isanto, Columbia 
University Press, New Y ork, 2008, p.68.
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self-originating event. Most importantly, the notion of the work as auto-genesis, as 
ontogenesis, points towards the most profound freedom at the heart of human existence. 
As a world-making origin, free from the historical constraints of representation, the 
work of art constitutes the shining exemplar of a freedom obscured by the continuist 
presuppositions of historicism and cultural relativism.
Of course, Heidegger was not the first to promote a transformative view of the 
artwork as a happening or event of truth. As much as he sought to conceal the influence 
of his immediate predecessors, to promote himself as a radically original and “epochal” 
thinker, he was not the first to espouse the work of art in terms of this radical originality. 
In an early attempt to delineate the genealogy of such a position, Stanley Rosen situates 
Heidegger’s later work within the context of Nietzsche’s “cosmogonical poetry” and the 
earlier project of Kant’s Critique o f  Judgement. The inversion—from Kant’s separation 
of the aesthetic, to a full-blown ontogeneticism such as Nietzsche’s—is mediated by the 
aesthetic-poetic sensibilities of the Jena romanticists for whom the work of art 
constituted an autonomous and self-founding absolute.34 Like Heidegger, the Jena 
romantics placed the work of art and the work of poetry in particular, at the very centre 
of their philosophies. For them, the art-work constituted a unique and irreplaceable 
happening, an entirely autonomous production free from the constraints of prior 
investigations. In this way the uniqueness of the work was deemed to affect a mode of 
transcendence whereby the indissoluble unity of the work confirmed a manner of 
absolute identification between work and interpreter. For Heidegger however, the claim 
for the work’s uniqueness and originality, its singularity, points to an altogether 
different modality of freedom from the one gestured here. Where the romantic union 
points towards the solicitude of art, nature and human understanding, to a mode of 
humanly-authored transcendence, the truth to unfold within the Heideggerian work of 
art gestures towards an essential alterity, to a region of truth in “which our knowledge 
and ‘values’ cease to apply.” 35 Where romantic freedom designates a creative 
achievement, the artistic self-transcendence of the subject to unify the usually separate 
realms of nature, history and art, Heideggerian freedom names a resolutely inhuman 
freedom from  subjectivity, a groundless motility or openness from whence the 
possibility of the Aufhebung is resolutely denied. For Heidegger there is no ultimate
34 Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969; cited by 
Alan Megill, The Prophets o f  Extremity, University o f California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p.4.
35 Timothy Clark, The Poetics o f  Singularity, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, p.46.
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assimilation to the work, for even whilst the work may itself command the absolutely 
original terms of its encounter, such an achievement would eventually signify the 
work’s closure. On the contrary, Heidegger’s ontological aesthetic is designed to 
prevent the foreclosure o f this gulf, between the work and its interpretation, so that the 
work remains a consistent opening against the foreclosures of deterministic, 
instrumental attitudes.
Poetry
The work for Heidegger of course is not so much an entity with defined 
perimeters but a space in which something is put to work. It is this putting to work 
which defines the work of art over and above its object-status. Given the universal 
import granted the truth of the work, it is not surprising to find Heidegger, towards the 
end of “The Origin of the Work of Art”, subsume artwork within the all-pervasive 
realm of Dichtung or “poetising”. Not to be confused with poetry in the limited sense, 
poetising for Heidegger designates a way of being in the world or experiencing the 
world much the same as the open experience of the work of art when approached non- 
judgmentally. But whilst paintings and sculptures, operas and poems can all disclose 
something of this mode of being, they are in fact only smaller aspects of this wider 
phenomenon. Whilst the work sets up a world in the singular, human beings in the first 
instance always already inhabit the all-pervasive world of language. For Heidegger 
language is the all-encompassing environment or medium in which we live. Language 
shapes human understanding not because it enables us to codify the world, to measure it 
and to re-identify it (like the categories of form and content, these capacities are second- 
order abstractions of an understanding which has come to view itself in terms of 
representational identities) but because language is the ultimate fabric within which 
beings emerge into themselves and within which Being shows itself: “by naming things 
for the first time” language “first brings beings to words and to appearance.”36
The mysterious origin of the work of art is but one instance of the all- 
encompassing mystery of language, in which Being speaks. For Heidegger, as for 
Ricoeur, language is thought and thought is language. To approach the mystery of 
language therefore is to approach the mystery of being-as-understanding. But whilst
36 Heidegger, The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, p.98.
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Heidegger eventually led Ricoeur to the onto-hermeneutical theme of speech and 
discourse, Heidegger himself, in the radicality of his proposition, demurs from all 
considerations of language in its formal theoretical attributes. To relate the ontological 
profundity of language to a theory of speech acts and stratified units of signification 
would be anathema to Heidegger. On the contrary, the naming power of language of 
which Heidegger writes is not a systematic capacity to correlate thought and phenomena;
...naming nominates beings to their being from out o f their being. Such 
saying is a projecting o f the clearing, in which announcement is made of 
what it is that beings come into the Open as.37
Like the work of the temple, this projective saying also brings to bear the “unsayable” 
features of the world in which a certain group of people, within their language, exist. 
These attributes are the features of its history, its mode of inhabiting the world, 
categorising reality and experiencing existence. This projective disclosure Heidegger
-3 0
calls essential poetry. “Language itself is poetry in the essential sense”.
But since language is the happening in which for man beings first 
disclose themselves to him each time as beings, poesy— or poetry in the 
narrower sense— is the most original form o f poetry in the essential sense.
Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather, poesy takes 
place in language because language preserves the original nature of 
poetry.39
To understand the relationship Heidegger names, it is worth deferring to Gadamer, 
whose own philosophical trajectory repeats the move to a profound and non­
judge mental form of poetic engagement. By no means an uncritical disciple, Gadamer’s
proximity to Heidegger no less provides one of the most thorough and lucid
amplifications of Heidegger’s progressively obscure idiom in the later works. 
“Language”, Gadamer writes,
always furnishes the fundamental articulations that guide our
understanding o f the world. It belongs to the nature o f familiarity with the
37 Heidegger, ibid.
38 Heidegger, ibid.,p.99.
39 Heidegger, ibid.
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world that whenever we exchange words with one another, we share the 
world.40
It is common sense to extend this definition to poetry as an exclusive mode of world- 
disclosure or world-sharing; in the skill of its articulation and in its capacity for 
universal relevance, the work of poetry can make us feel at home in the world in new 
and unforeseen ways. However, poetry is not simply one mode of disclosure amongst 
many, on the contrary “poetry is language in a pre-eminent sense”.41 Gadamer’s claim 
is that when we speak by means of standard language, language’s essential character is 
to a greater or lesser extent obscured by the motivating factors propelling us to speak. In 
commanding or requesting or conversing, language is always guided by the ends we 
seek to obtain. But in poetry language exists for its own sake, free from motivation. 
This is not to deny that the poet in the act of creation intends a certain affect or the 
portrayal of a certain experience, but that as a work of art, the poem will always exceed 
these intentions. Indeed, to do so is the poem’s unique competency as a genuine work of 
art; “any poem worthy of the name is quite different from all forms of motivated 
speech” Gadamer writes.42 Few people would seek to deny this, but those of us 
schooled, from a young age, to read “suspiciously”, “between the lines” of the work’s 
self-evident declarations, the claim that we “have not even begun to approach the poem 
if we try to go beyond it by asking about the author and what he intends by it”, is 
somewhat tendentious.43 In its most neutral reckoning it is a call for intrinsic criticism, 
but in the full force of its ontological import Gadamer appears to be making the wholly 
unfashionable claim for the existence of a Kantian third realm, a realm of the pure 
aesthetic—precisely the kind of other-worldly experience which Gadamer and 
Heidegger claim to disavow:
The poem does not stand before us as a thing that someone employs to 
tell us something. It stands there equally independent o f both reader and 
poet. Detached from all intending, the word is complete in itself.44
40 Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed. Robert 
Bemasconi, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.l 14.
41 Gadamer, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful and Other Essays, ibid., p. 106.
42 Gadamer, ibid., p. 107.
43 Gadamer, “On the Contribution o f Poetry to the Search for Truth”, ibid., p. 107.
44 Gadamer, ibid.
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But to interpret this insistence upon the self-sustaining independence of the poetic as 
confirming the existence of an autonomous aesthetic realm is to miss the point entirely, 
since such a view requires us to overlook poetry’s exemplary status as language “in a 
pre-eminent sense”. “Language” Gadamer writes, “is the element in which we live, as 
fish live in water”.45 The exemplary status of poetry rests in its capacity to expose what 
the language of everyday usage obscures, namely the binding force of language and 
understanding. Gadamer argues that even in the context of everyday speech, true 
language is never just a simple communication of information or of well-defined facts, 
but rather a dialogue, through which and within which we come to an understanding 
with one another. Through the pursuit of common understanding, language binds us to 
one another, by placing “our own aspiration and knowledge into a broader and richer 
horizon.”46
With poetry the hermeneutical situation is rather different since we do not 
possess any specific orientation towards a common goal beyond the work itself; in 
contrast to the motivated language of everyday speech “we are wholly directed toward 
the word as it stands.”47 The goal, insofar as there is one, is language itself. Where 
language usually surpasses itself in the completion of a message, the art of poetry rests 
precisely in the ability to make the word stand still. The arrangements of sound, rhythm, 
rhyme and assonance constitute what Gadamer calls “stabilizing factors” which serve to 
substantiate the word in its own right. The success of poetry as we know is not a 
question of subject matter, but of the unity in which the word can be seen to transcend 
itself in the signifying function. The word of poetry does not stand as the representation 
of an idea, therefore, but as the instantiation o f  its own presence. In this sense the notion 
of the word’s poetic self-identity prefigures the identity named within the illocutionary 
performance of speech act theory. Like the pledge or the promise, the poetic word is a 
simultaneous saying and doing, an indissoluble unity from which form and content 
cannot be divided. Adopting Martin Luther’s enigmatic phrase, Gadamer writes that 
“the word stands written”:
It is a saying that says so completely what it is that we do not need to add
anything beyond what is said in order to accept it in its reality as language.
The word o f the poet is self-fulfilling. The poetic word is thus a statement
45 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.438.
46 Gadamer, “On the Contribution o f  Poetry to the Search for Truth”, p. 105.
47 Gadamer, ibid., p. 107.
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in that it bears witness to itself and does not admit of anything that might 
verify it.48
When in Truth and Method Gadamer criticises the errant subjectivism of 
Kantian aesthetics, he reiterates the Heideggerian (and before that Hegelian) distinction 
between aesthetic consciousness (Erlebnis)—an attitude wherein the work of art is 
subtracted from the living breathing totality of historical life, placed, so to speak, upon 
the pedestal of an unchanging aesthetic transcendence—and the contrary 
phenomenological concept of the transformative experience (Erfahrung). In this context 
the work’s truth resides in its powers to rupture the smooth continuum of quotidian 
experience, to herald an experience perhaps best characterised as unprecedented. The 
work for Gadamer possesses “ontological vehemence”, a kind of Husserlian 
irrefutability through which we the interpreters are compelled to engage or participate 
within the work’s “binding force”. For Gadamer this is the definition of artistic beauty 
and the justification for beauty’s metaphysical proximity to the unconcealment of 
aletheic truth; not a Kantian conformity to natural laws, but a radically demanding 
experience of otherness, and of that which refuses all standard terms of reference.49 
Gadamer writes that,
The word o f  the poet does not simply continue the process o f...“making 
ourselves at home”. Instead it stands over against this process like a 
mirror held up to it. But what appears in the mirror is not the world, nor 
this or that thing in the world, but rather this nearness or familiarity itself
48 Gadamer, ibid., p. 110.
49 Between Heidegger and Gadamer there is a certain disagreement with regards the radicality o f this 
unprecedented experience. For Gadamer the experience is unprecedented with regards the sense of 
insistent alterity wrought within the experience o f beauty or autonomy. Historically speaking however, 
the work’s genesis belongs within the dialectical continuum o f tradition and innovation. Art does not 
break with the past in any dramatically precipitous sense therefore. For Heidegger however, the work is 
unprecedented in the more literal sense o f  being without historical precedent. Great art breaks with the 
continuity o f history, not because it is unreal and out-of-time (as it would be from an aesthetic 
perspective), but because it is history-making; it announces historical movement by disrupting 
continuity and presaging new truths befitting o f a new epoch. For example, in the figure o f Holderlin, 
one of Heidegger’s most cherished poets, he finds the voice o f a new beginning, in which thought 
would emerge poetically for the first time in the modem era; Holderlin is “the pre-cursor o f poets in a 
destitute time”, wherein the language o f philosophy faces exhaustion and art has deteriorated into mere 
decoration. Holderlin is thus the epochal precursor and the voice o f authentic thinking who “does not 
go off into a future; rather, he arrives out o f  that future, in such a way that the future is present only in 
the arrival o f his words.” (Heidegger, “What are Poets For?”, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter, HarperCollins, New York, 2001, p. 139).
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in which we stand for a w hile.. .the poetic word that thereby bears witness 
to our being.50
This is why for Heidegger and for Gadamer, the work of poetry presents thought 
with a fundamental philosophical task, one which requires us to approach the work free 
from the usual causal, historical representational projections of literary criticism. In its 
refusal of verifying facts, the alignment of poetic truths and “real” truths, the work of 
poetry testifies to Heidegger’s conception of radical freedom. This is the depth 
historical truth of the work’s world-making powers, the “nearness of familiarity itself’. 
And yet to encounter this freedom is no mean feat. It requires the most tenacious 
patience, an ever-constant vigilance not to fall back into the familiarity of our most 
indoctrinated habits. The benchmark of Heidegger’s later style, gnomic, tautological, 
and at times infuriatingly obscure, testifies to this desire to step outside of language’s 
usual presuppositions—the unavoidable prejudices of grammar and pronouns, of 
language deployed as a mere device— and to engage with the work of poetry as freely 
and non-prejudicially as possible.
Theory
In a sense, Heidegger’s refusal of all presumptions “simply takes to an 
audacious and arduous extreme that refusal of premature conclusiveness which is a 
basic scholarly ethic.”51 To understand a particular word within a given poem, it is not 
enough for Heidegger to simply situate the word in terms of its historical usage at the 
time of composition. One must also consider the “basic existential decisions that were at 
work in the origins of this term”, and chart this sea of potentiality in accordance with 
other such depth terms.52 But the philosophical aim of this arduous task constitutes the 
most thorough-going renunciation of this “scholarly ethic”. To listen to words in the 
singular portent of their poetic summoning, this is the task of radical poetising; its aim, 
to reveal thought’s poetic origins over and against the purported freedom of the 
sovereign subject.
The distinction between classical modes of literary exegesis and ontological 
poetics is unambiguous, their contrary claims for the realisation of historical freedom
50 Gadamer, ibid., p .l 15.
51 Timothy Clark, The Poetics o f  Singularity, ibid., p.36.
52 Clark, ibid.
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equally so. As a discourse of liberation, cultural criticism posits its own freedom to 
transcend the cultural determinates of the work’s production and reflect upon the 
conditions of historical knowledge. The freedom of the classical liberal paradigm is 
precisely the freedom to judge according to “what went before”.53 But for Heidegger 
such a notion of historical freedom is neither genuine nor really free. To situate the 
work of art, as the expression of an oeuvre, a genre, or a socio-cultural milieu, is really 
only a means to shoe-homing the work in accordance with subjectivist values. 
Accordingly the work’s fecundity, its resistance to unitary interpretation, is neatly 
reduced to the univocal model of a predetermined content, its alterity—its insistence as 
an autonomous entity “free from all intending”—lost to the residual spectre of genius or 
creative transcendence.54 Not really an index of freedom so far as Heidegger is 
concerned so much as a set of historicist constraints through which man measures his 
own self-legislated progress. In this light artistic understanding merely entails the 
capacity to parcel the work up within a circumscribed range of signification and to 
situate it within the historical continuum.
And yet it is quite clear to see why, from the rationalist perspective, the claim 
for a poetics of singularity must presage the very opposite of freedom, intellectual 
paralysis no less. To refuse the standard “way” to poetry, to reject the standard 
categories through which a work or indeed a word can be evaluated, to refuse the 
compositional logic of the artist’s intentions, or indeed the nexus of signifying relations 
which could be said to arise inadvertently, as a symptom of authorial repression or 
historical distance say, then from the literary-critical perspective, there is only really 
one freedom which remains, namely the freedom not to understand, to allow the work to 
drift and eventually disperse upon the winds of a “liberating” multivocity. Of course, 
this is precisely what literary criticism cannot allow, since to do so would be to 
undermine the entire validity of its own standing.
The incompatibility of these modes of reading exceeds all localised 
dispensations and cuts to the heart of literary criticism’s status as a dependent discourse. 
Criticism, by its very nature, serves as a mode of explanation and demonstration, rather 
than a mode of primary showing in the Heideggerian sense. Literary criticism is a 
secondary discourse given to the elucidation of primary works. Without certain basic
53 See Heidegger, “The Origin o f the Work o f Art”, p.99, ibid.
54 Gadamer writes o f the poetic word, “detached from all intending, the word is complete in itself’ 
(“On the Contribution o f  Poetry to the Search for Truth”, The Relevance o f  the Beautiful and Other 
Essays, p. 107).
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tenets—the relative discontinuity of work and world, a certain stability with regards 
signification and a sense of historical commensurability or commensurate change within 
signification—the critical enterprise would collapse. And this applies just as much to 
the more sceptical modes of psychoanalytic, Marxist or feminist critique as it does to 
classical scholarship. For in each instance, there is the presupposed backbone of a 
common language, a discourse of common consensus beyond the world of the text. 
Reflection upon a world not our own, upon a world within a world within definable 
borders, recognisable but ontologically remote, that is the reigning assumption upon 
which literary criticism supports itself as a dependent mode of intellection. Because 
criticism is not philosophy, because it is neither a free nor unified discipline, but rather 
a mixed discipline, determined each and every time by the work in question, sustained 
solely by the precedence of works in their plurality (their relative difference that is), the 
Heideggerian claim for singularity—with its dissolution of this fundamental 
parameter—could only ever serve to render criticism redundant. From within the 
literary critical episteme, where narrative takes the form of an explanation and not a 
modality of showing, a critical interpretation based solely upon the claims of singularity 
could only ever conclude in one way, regardless of the work in question. To explain 
singularity would be to demonstrate—in every single instance—the universality of 
singularity; a contradiction in terms and a complete dead-end in terms of critical 
practice. Quite simply, singularity fails to generate a critical discourse; a fact that has 
been most conscientiously observed by Heidegger’s ideological detractors.55
This moral aversion to Heideggerian poetics, or the clear critical contradiction of 
literary singularity, could be proffered as justification for Heidegger’s and indeed post- 
Heideggerian hermeneutics’ relative absence from literary theory, were it not of course 
for the fact that without Heidegger, literary theory as we know it would not exist. After 
all, in the literary theoretical journey from rationalist formalism to postmodern 
irrationalism, it is literary textualism—the direct, albeit ironic, descendent of aesthetic 
singularity—which comprises the “final” dis-illusionment of Enlightenment certainties. 
Heidegger’s vision of the work may be precisely the kind of illustrious origin refuted in 
the textualist order of simulacra, but in both instances one finds the work / text liberated
55 Theodor Adorno’s Jargon o f  Authenticity for example, whilst directed towards the ideology o f German 
existentialism as a whole, institutes the important connection between Heidegger’s refusal of the 
empirical (the empirical world o f  subjects and books), his idealism, and the inability to generate an ethic 
from beyond the bloodless proposition o f  Dasein. Heidegger’s jargon o f the Greco-German homeland, 
with all its fascistic connotations, is symptomatic o f a backwards-looking irrationalism.
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from its pragmatic enclosures and unleashed into a field of insurmountable openness. In 
textualism, as in singularity, the possibility for critical distancing, critical reflection and 
the production of critical discourse is denied thanks to the erosion of critical boundaries 
between work and world. As the reading practices of singularity and textualism both 
confirm, this primary dissolution naturally extends to the parameters of creation and 
critique. The result in both instances is the assertion of an essential and insurmountable 
complicity; a discourse which “extends” the work without ever leaving its territory. 
Because the work cannot be detached as a unitary content, because for Heidegger, the 
experience of the work is in each instance unique, literary-critical aestheticism 
distinguishes itself as an essentially anti-reflective credo. In each case, reading takes the 
form of a singular and performative engagement which refutes the pedagogue’s need to 
separate out and repeat as a transmissible technique. In this way, singularity and 
textualism both deny the possibility of a relay-able practice.
And yet, with the rise of literary theory as a semi-autonomous discipline, neatly 
tranched into distinct periods and distinct modes of specialist interpretation, unified by 
its own specific narrative progression, textualism—coming as it does at the very end of 
this progression—represents the high-point not for a mode aesthetic singularity, within 
which the work would claim absolute precedence, but for something utterly more 
offensive, technocratic or instrumental than anything in singularity’s original literary- 
critical target. With textualism, Heidegger’s critique finds re-doubled justification, for 
now the work must succumb not only to the critic’s interpretive pressures (to pin it 
down as this or that particular kind of work), but also to the discipline’s very real 
pressures to demonstrate the distinct validity of this or that methodology. To its 
opponents, literary theory betrays an all too willing tendency to subjugate the work to 
the theoretical position it seeks to deploy; indeed it could be claimed that the work’s 
logical priority over interpretation is all but inverted. Thanks to these theoretical 
pressures, we find ourselves twice removed from the kind of “authentic” relation named 
by Heidegger. What is more, because literary theory projects a narrative of increasing 
dis-illusionment, and a series of increasingly “suspicious” tactics, the work’s capacity to 
exert itself as a singular phenomenon, and to project itself as an irreducible whole 
which could deflect these theoretical incursions, is increasingly denied. In the transition 
from singularity to textualism, there is a complete reversal of attitude towards the work 
in its openness, from the work as insurmountable origin to the secondary expression of 
a theoretical indeterminism.
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The paradox of singularity’s inimical, textualist descendent cannot be 
disentangled from the distinct context in which it arose; the same context in which 
literary theory first sought an independent identity for itself, as ideologically removed 
from aesthetics and the post-Kantian German tradition as it was from the hegemony of 
Anglo-American liberal pragmatism. But what these related extremes most clearly 
demonstrate is the difficult need to honour the work as a singular and potentially 
transformative phenomenon, without rescinding its status as a distinct entity, complete 
with its own social and historical contours and its own resolute identity; to articulate the 
work’s capacity to remain the same without ever claiming to exhaust it through the 
work of concepts. This is precisely the view to which Ricoeur leads us in his Rule o f 
Metaphor, where the scrupulously hard-earned distinction of “live” metaphor works to 
consolidate the work’s ontological distinction from the critical interpretations it 
provokes. For Ricoeur, as for Heidegger, understanding always arises in language. But 
this immersion within language does not prevent us from articulating a certain critical 
hold over poetic language, from reflecting upon the literary work from a position of 
critical distance. The discontinuity of literature, or live metaphor, and non-literature, be 
it philosophical or literary-critical, is the condition for literature both as a transcendent 
experience, and as a provocation to further thinking, and further conceptualising.
Whilst Ricoeur does not himself develop an explicit poetics, it is certainly 
possible, between his critique of Heidegger in The Conflict o f  Interpretations and his 
justification for the discontinuity of literature and non-literature within The Rule o f 
Metaphor, to infer one. It is with this in sight that we turn to Ricoeur’s assertion of the 
wounded or mediated cogito as a reflective agent, over and against the radical priority 
of Heideggerian Dasein.
3 .6
R ic o e u r ’s C r it iq u e  of H eid eg g er
Against a rising tide of political sensitivity and revisionism, Ricoeur’s 
relation to Heidegger remains consistent throughout the course of his career. For more 
febrile minds, distinguishing the early Heidegger from the late was a duty of 
conscience or practical necessity for the safeguarding of their own philosophical
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integrity. From the start, however, Ricoeur reads Heidegger contra Heidegger, and in 
such a way that the critique of Dasein situated at the beginning of The Conflict relates 
directly to Dasein’s retrospective connotations in the eyes of Heideggerian apologists.
In this way Ricoeur’s philosophical critique of fundamental ontology prefigures the 
political characterisations read back into it in latter years. Furthermore, it is upon the 
basis of this critical relation that the Ricoeurian “methodology”—from semantics, to 
reflection, to existential knowledge—is ontologically vindicated against the charge of 
a programmatic and therefore derived imposition. In order to understand Ricoeur’s 
ontological justification for a “conflict of interpretations”, interpretations which, from 
the vantage of primordial understanding must be deemed derivative, it is therefore 
necessary to understand the manner in which Ricoeur develops ontological 
hermeneutics against the Heideggerian corpus.
The measure of this relation can be gauged by the deceptive approbation of 
the following line. “The ontology of understanding” writes Ricoeur,
is implied in the methodology o f interpretation, following the ineluctable 
“hermeneutic circle” which Heidegger himself taught us to delineate.56
Naturally from a hermeneutical perspective the salient word here is “ineluctable”: 
interpretation and understanding hold a mirror up to one another and like adjacent 
mirrors, what they disclose is the space of historicity inhabited by Dasein. But of course 
Ricoeur is eliding interpretation with the very thing that Heidegger (and Gadamer) 
abjure: method. For Heidegger, the ineluctable relation proper to fundamental ontology 
behoves Dasein’s pre-subjective status as the unguarded fealty of pre-understanding; 
methodology is a subsequent curtailment at the ontical level of epistemology. In Being 
and Time the understanding of Dasein is categorically discontinuous with the 
particularity of any one discourse. Or to put it another way, it is only understanding in 
its formal relationship to existence which occupies Heidegger:
This circle o f  understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of 
knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure 
o f Dasein itself... The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to the structure o f
56 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, ibid.. p. 18.
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meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential 
constitution o f  Dasein— that is, in the understanding which interprets.57
For this reason, “Heidegger has not wanted us to consider any particular problem of the 
understanding of this or that being.”58 Herein lies the basis for Ricoeur’s criticism; 
Heidegger “taught us to retrain our eye and redirect our gaze”, teaching us “to 
subordinate historical understanding to ontological understanding, as the derived form 
of a primordial form.”59 In so doing, Heidegger wished to return philosophy to the 
origins of thought. Supplanting epistemology with the question of Being, the 
hermeneutical question of understanding underwent its transmogrification from 
question to ontological trait. But within the radicality of this undertaking, there is no 
room from a consideration of the methodological “how?” through which the 
understanding of Dasein emerges. And so the questions of hermeneutical enquiry— 
“How... can an organon be given to exegesis, to the clear comprehension of texts? How 
can the historical sciences be founded in the face of the natural sciences? How can the 
conflict of rival interpretations be arbitrated?”—are lost from sight.60 By design, 
Heidegger’s fundamental hermeneutics “are intended not to resolve them but to dissolve 
them.”61 Heidegger writes that
Ontically o f  course, Dasein is not only close to us— even that which is 
closest: we are it, each o f  us, we ourselves. In spite o f this, or rather for 
just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest.62
In the naming of ontological difference—between Being and beings, existence and 
existents—Heidegger abrogates the presumed unity of the cogito ergo sum. The 
technocratic attitudes intended to reflect the cogito's assumed transparency are duly 
redressed. Epistemology is a second order derivation stemming from the primordial 
groundlessness of ontological difference, the relation which conditions the division of
57 Heidegger, Being and Time, ibid., p. 195.Emphasis added in the second instance.
58 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 10
59 Ricoeur, ibid.
50 Ricoeur, ibid., pp.9-10.
61 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 10.
62 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.36, quoted by Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question o f the Subject”, 
The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.226.
63 Heidegger only treats ontological difference explicitly in the work subsequent to Being and Time. 
Never the less, Dasein’s ontological distance from itself and its ontical locality is premised upon the 
same distinction between ontical being, existents, and the ontological relation to Being obscured in the 
metaphysics o f presence. Furthermore, Ricoeur’s critique o f  Heidegger is also an assertion o f the 
continuity between Being and Time and Heidegger’s subsequent work.
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subjects and objects in the first place. The problem as far as Ricoeur is concerned is that 
Heidegger
gives us no way to show in what sense historical understanding, properly 
speaking, is derived from this primordial understanding.64
Because Dasein is ontologically farthest from itself, because it is mediated by historical 
understanding, it is not possible to demonstrate the priority of this more primordial 
mode in any direct sense:
. . . i f  the reversal from epistemological understanding to the being who 
understands is to be possible, we must be able to describe directly—  
without prior epistemological constraints— the privileged being o f Dasein, 
such as it is constituted in itself, and thus be able to recover 
understanding as one o f  these modes o f being. The difficulty in passing 
from understanding as a mode o f knowledge to understanding as a mode 
o f  being consists in the following: the understanding which is the result of 
the Analytic o f  Dasein is precisely the understanding through which and 
in which this being understands itself as being.65
In lieu of any direct description of Dasein, there is only the immanent circularity 
within which the understanding posits its own being-as-understanding; we cannot 
supersede the understanding which alone facilitates the proposition of Dasein’s 
“privileged being”, for which understanding would be a theoretical modality distinct 
from its means. The absence of this direct means forms the basis for Ricoeur’s critical 
departure, for what he terms a “grafting” of hermeneutics and phenomenology. 
Lacking direct access to Dasein1 s ontological opening, Ricoeur asks,
Is it not better, then, to begin with the derived forms o f understanding and 
to show in them the signs o f their derivation? This implies that the point 
o f departure be taken on the same level on which understanding operates, 
that is, on the level o f language.66
64 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 10.
65 Ricoeur, ibid.
66 Ricoeur, ibid.
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Ricoeur’s proposition is a “more indirect route” towards ontology, an “ontology by 
degrees” which begins with the derivations of historical understanding and which 
seeks, through reflection, to relate these derivations to the structure of historical 
understanding itself. In this way Ricoeur’s path of mediation, which he calls a 
“grafting” of hermeneutics and phenomenology, is to entail a reading backwards 
through the documents of historical understanding, through the universe of competing 
discourses, otherwise known as the conflict of interpretations. For this reason, it is the 
universal derivation of language which determines the course of hermeneutical 
ontology. For as Heidegger himself decreed, “It is first of all and always in language 
that all ontic or ontological understanding arrives at its expression.”67 In this way, 
language is accorded a dual status as both primordial, the most primordial, and the 
most derived.
It appears paradoxical that Ricoeur’s departure from Heidegger should in fact 
fulfil one of Heidegger’s deepest wishes—to understand language not as a system of 
representation but as the all-encompassing medium or environment in which we 
dwell—whilst at the same time averring the need to consider language in its formal 
semantic attributes. In reality no such paradox exists. According to popular consensus, 
Heidegger’s transition from Being and Time to his later radical poetising confirms a 
progressive effort to uproot the vestiges of a recalcitrant self-reference. The move to 
poetising marks the moment of being’s liberation, and for Heidegger’s critics, the 
dawn of a new irrationalism. Immersion within language prevents the possibility for 
thought to take a hold of itself, to master itself and reflect freely upon the content of 
its own operations. Now reflection is precisely what Ricoeur’s semantic analysis 
claims to lead to whilst at the same time confirming the postulate of linguistic 
mediation. How, to paraphrase Ricoeur in a different context, can thought be at once 
bound and free, mediated and yet reflective? The clue lies in Ricoeur’s rejection of the 
Kehre and the critical relation which continues to govern his reading of the later 
Heidegger.
Ricoeur’s circuitous journey through the documents of understanding is 
intended to embody and to explain the “intuitive description” of mediation named in 
the postulate of ontological difference.68 For Heidegger, ontological difference was 
the means to formulating the destruktion of the cogito as self-presence. For Ricoeur,
67 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 11.
68 Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question o f  the Subject”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.225.
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however, it represents the potential for an inherently positive process of reconstitution. 
Indeed, Ricoeur’s appropriation of Heidegger entails the elevation of the very self­
reference for which Dasein was latterly condemned. Contrary to popular 
interpretation, Heidegger’s denial of the cogito “implies more than a mere rejection of 
the notion of the ego or of the se lf’.69 Ricoeur writes that,
(Heidegger’s) destruction o f the cogito, with the destruction of the age to 
which it belongs, is the condition for a justified repetition o f the question 
of the ego.70
It would be entirely wrong to assume that Ricoeur, writing this in 1966, 
worked under the same anthropological illusions that once beset his French 
compatriots, for whilst the movements traced within the hermeneutical formulation— 
of understanding and interpretation, of pre-understanding and reflection—comprise 
the basis for a reformulation of consciousness, they only do so on the basis that they 
embody the very traits of ontological difference and historical mediation which 
anthropological readings override. Since thought cannot assert itself as a radical and 
neutral opening within the field o f questioning, Heidegger can deny the self-certainty 
assumed in the opening and closure of the Cartesian self. But whilst the Heideggerian 
question of Being negates the “I think” as first truth, it also implicates the presence of 
an alternative reference within the subject of enquiry. This is the two-fold reference of 
Sein and Dasein which brings to light the circular relation of Being, as both the 
subject of enquiry and a participant feature of the enquiring existent. It is within the 
movement of this ontico-ontological relation, within the movement of inquiry itself, 
where “the meaning of Being oscillates... as the mode of being of a possible ego”, that 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the wounded cogito, of the “I am” (as opposed to the “I 
think”) operates.71 What is more, because the pattern of circularity within the Analytic 
of Dasein continues to govern the relation of Being and language within the later 
Heidegger, Ricoeur can extend his critical relation to encompass the claim for 
linguisticality.
In the analytic of Dasein the location of the self presents a problem; the ego 
is a question in that it remains hidden and other, in that what is ontically immediate is
69 Ricoeur, ibid., p.219.
70 Ricoeur, ibid., p.226.
71 Ricoeur, ibid., p.222.
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ontologically distant and obscure. The problem of the self in Dasein lies in the to-ing 
and fro-ing relationship of the one who asks and the subject being asked about; the 
self is a transient apparition most “there” in the moment of its flight. But the self­
reference which implies self-consciousness is not a problem unique to Dasein, as if 
Dasein*s grammatical structure (universal, proper noun) was somehow responsible for 
invoking a self, and obstructing the path to a more primordial relation qua Being. The 
fact is not that Dasein inhibits this relation but that even Dasein—as the very name for 
this relation—forbids such a possibility. On the contrary, therefore, the self-reference 
which prevents Dasein from its own pre-subjective neutrality is not a unique trait, it is 
the proposition of all language. Riceour writes that
...the rise o f  Dasein as se lf and the rise o f  language as speech or 
discourse (parole) are one and the same problem ?2
Accordingly,
The word represents in the later Heidegger exactly the same problem as 
the Da  o f  Dasein , since the word is the D a?2
The word is where being must rise to prominence (like the self-reference of Dasein), 
but it is also the point of a maximally perceived distance; just as the word presages a 
being’s interconnection with Being, bringing it to light in the process of naming, the 
name likewise fixes, constrains and constricts this being in the preservation of the 
name. The circle of language and being are closed off as one and the same problem at 
the moment when the fixity and so-called violence of naming give rise to the speaking 
subject; where being is brought into language through the disclosure of naming and 
the finitude of language, the “speaking existent” is bom. Man the speaking subject 
thus arises in the same structure of objectification or foreclosure of the cogito in the 
age of the world of view. Ricoeur writes that,
...naming [denomination] designates the place and role o f man into 
language, and a finite, speaking existent is bom. In forming a name, we 
have both disclosure o f  Being and enclosure in the finitude o f language.
72 Ricoeur, ibid., p.220.
73 Ricoeur, ibid., p.228.
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Just as the analytic of Dasein strove to deconstruct the conceptual system behind the 
cogito in favour of a more “authentic” historical modality, so the later Heidegger 
seeks to reinstate a more authentic relation to language than the subjective utility of 
naming, founded not in the language of demotic consensus—where the sign assumes 
the position of a “standing for”—but in the multiplicity of poetry and in the ideal of 
the poetic life (Gelassenheit), where language resists the singular coherence of 
naming to shine and tremble with the myriad potentials of being. For this reason, 
Ricoeur’s critique of the Being and Time and his hermeneutical appropriation of 
ontological difference are just as much of a critical appropriation of the later 
philosophy of language, where Heideggerian primordialism repeats itself in the 
manner of a direct “hearing” and is once more corrected by the assertion of a 
methodological detour.
Against relativism, Ricoeur confers the postulate of an “internalised” 
conflict of interpretations with ontological significance. Confirming the possibility of 
an indirect ontology which follows from the articulations of understanding in language, 
Ricoeur confirms Heidegger’s claim for a positive conception of linguistic mediation. 
Hermeneutical interpretation therefore is neither relativistic nor as the contrary critic 
would have it, dogmatic. Against Heidegger however, Ricoeur rejects the claim for a 
direct ontology, wherein the orders of epistemological explication and ontological 
understanding are collapsed. By demonstrating the fundamental continuity of the early 
and later Heidegger, Ricoeur can be seen to make a claim for explanatory method 
within the realm of poetic truth also. Moreover, Ricoeur’s critique of direct ontology 
and a direct, radical poetising behoves an appreciation of the same ethical 
inadequacies attached to Heidegger’s philosophy in the light of his political failings. 
The criticism relating to Dasein’s impersonality and essential isolation from fellow 
Dasein, to Heidegger’s failing to account for moral considerations of the ethical Other 
in Being and Time, and to the impossibility of generating a critically reflective 
discourse from within a poetics of singularity, are all problems relating to Heidegger’s 
“direct” ontology, where questions of discursivity and method are silenced. Ricoeur’s 
claim for a mediated ontology, which seeks to proceed via the realm of rational 
explication, should be read as an ideological corrective as well therefore.
74 Ricoeur, ibid., p.228.
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If it is true that many post-Heideggerians felt it incumbent upon them to 
make a break from the early Heidegger, whilst Ricoeur, due to the nature of his 
critique, did not, then Heidegger’s infamy provides a clue to the variant timbres of 
poststructural hermeneutics and deconstruction, and by extension, to the dissymmetry 
of their affect within the wider cultural discourse.
If we follow Ricoeur’s rejection of the Kehre, and confirm the continuity 
relating fundamental ontology and radical poetising, then it is clear that Ricoeur’s 
critique of Heidegger relates as much to the question of poetic disclosure as it does to 
the issue of Dasein'’s self-understanding. Ricoeur’s path to poetry must be read in 
accordance with his path towards the question of Being, in the manner of that most 
circuitous journey described in the opening movements of The Conflict o f  
Interpretations. Indeed for Ricoeur, the path to poetic truth and to self-understanding 
manifest one and the same task, for if all understanding reaches expression within 
language, and the ontological aim of hermeneutics must go by way of those derived 
expressions which testify to that understanding, then it is first of all within language, 
or rather with the question of language, that a hermeneutics of self-understanding 
must begin. Since all self-understanding takes the form of an interpretation, so it is to 
language at the level of interpretation, where the fecund potentialities of language 
give rise to both the specialist languages of competing interpretations and the 
language of everyday usage and everyday ambiguity, and not to the limited case of 
scientific precision (where all interpretive potentiality has been extracted) that 
Ricoeur must turn.
As we shall see, Ricoeur’s refusal of direct ontology and his refusal of a direct 
poetic “listening”/ “hearing” in fact work to confirm the essential structure named by 
Heidegger in terms of that “relatedness backwards” and later in terms of a 
simultaneous revealment and concealment within the work of poetry. But where 
Heidegger starts by describing the structure of understanding in terms of a 
fundamental relation between being and Being/Truth, poetry and Being/Truth, 
Ricoeur seeks access via the indirect route of its manifest productions, tracing the 
lineaments of its affectivity within the structures of interpretive discourse. As we 
know, the relation of revealment and concealment names the condition for the 
possibility of understanding for finite beings; it is another way of naming the principle
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of historical and linguistic mediation. In his deviation from the direct route of 
ontology and poetising therefore, Ricoeur’s departure from Heidegger in fact serves to 
honour this fundamental insight at the level of his own methodology.
The task in the next chapter will be to demonstrate how Ricoeur’s 
epistemological detour through the derived expressions of understanding rehabilitates 
the Heideggerian relation of being and poetry against some of its more sceptical and 
irrationalist treatments, confirming hermeneutics’ phenomenological postulate of the 
life-text (of self-interpretation and the inherently interpretive character of Dasein) as 
the postulate of Man’s poetic dwelling. And finally, how this dwelling points towards 
the possibility of the logos, o f rational consensus and self-reflection, not just the 
aleatory transcendence o f the poetic.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r
The P o etry  o f  R e a s o n : R ic o e u r  a n d  th e  T h eo retica l  Im ag in atio n
4.1
In t e r p r e t a t io n  a n d  t h e  Sem a n tic s  of D isco u rse
Is it not once again within language itself that we must seek the 
indication that understanding is a mode o f being?1
For Ricoeur, the path to a conception of Dasein’s self-understanding must go 
by way of an indirect analysis of those derived manifestations of the understanding 
which together comprise the hermeneutical horizon of our intelligibility. What 
Ricoeur seeks to find is the principle of unity within language which permits 
understanding and rational consensus in the face of a diverse range of apparently 
conflicting interpretive possibilities. Such a principle must therefore account for both 
the openness of interpretation and its regulative limits. As a philosopher who reads the 
suspicions of Freud and Nietzsche, as testaments, not only to the lie of transparency, 
but by the same token, as testaments to the lifeworld’s inherently symbolic basis, 
Ricoeur asserts that the conditions of our intelligibility and the possibility of a 
reformulation of the cogito at the level of the “I am”, must be sought indirectly, by 
way of an explanation of this shared symbolic structure, what he calls the “common 
architecture” of double meaning which accounts for both the diversity of 
interpretation and the unity of its origins within experience. Ricoeur writes that
It is first o f  all and always in language that all ontic or ontological 
understanding arrives at its expression.
The problem of multiple meanings and their relation to existence is a problem as old, 
or perhaps older than philosophy itself. On the face of it therefore this claim is 
perhaps as empty as it is true; the gift of speech is the gift of human understanding, 
the same gift of which the Christian church speaks when it speaks of thtfe lix  culpa, 
of man’s happy fall into time, equivocation and poiesis, and a trope which exceeds
1 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, Continuum, London, 2004, 
ibid.,ip AO.
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the parameters of doctrine tenfold. The spiritual link which once propelled the 
exegesis of religious texts as a holy task marks the point at which a predominantly 
allegorical Christianity encountered metaphysics (the problematic notion of the 
Logos—a term which intends only the unity of an unambiguous truth—testifies to the 
complex interferences of these traditions). Within its infancy, hermeneutics was 
inculcated within a system which Heidegger would come to characterise as the 
accumulated metaphorics of the metaphysical; the task of interpretation heavy with 
the burden of its projected transcendence. Saint Augustine recognised the multiplicity 
of historical and literal meanings within the consecrated text to form the basis for a 
“transferral” of spiritual meanings.2 A metaphysics of clarity likewise compelled 
interpreters of legal texts to pursue the spirit of justice beyond the imprecision of the 
written word. In this context, the exegete upheld the office of communicant, 
ministering to the many the inaccessible truths of a written and canonical content, a 
content largely predetermined by the institutional unity and continuity of a clerical 
tradition. But hermeneutics could not have acquired its properly philosophical 
character had it not been for the collaborative energies of humanist reform from 
whence the intercessor’s dispossession, and the path to a productive rather than 
merely reduplicative mode of understanding in the romantic period were first made 
possible. As a democratic vocation, interpretation was opened up to the problem of 
heterodoxy and the heterogeneity of historical perspectives. Modem hermeneutics as 
we know, begins at this juncture, at a point when history intersects with rhetoric. For 
Schleiermacher these paths were destined not to meet, and he forsook the 
“grammatical” approach of his early years for a mode of psychological transference 
or recreation. When Heidegger rejected the task of psychological recreation, upon the 
basis of a spurious metaphysics, the question of interpretation was at one and the 
same time pushed even further “inwards”. Interpretation was no longer a mere 
modality of consciousness but the fundamental condition of an existence forged in the 
continuum of multiple meanings, in the medium of a language which speaks Being. In 
this way he returned the question to its pre-metaphysical origins, recalling the 
Aristotelian paradox that “Being can be said in many ways”. It is to this Aristotelian 
dictum that we must relate the Ricoeurian concept of discourse and the projection of 
an indirect path towards self-understanding.
2 See Ricoeur, ibid, p.4.
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We recall from our previous discussion of discourse and semantics that the 
instance of discourse marks the point at which an immanent potentiality of meaning is 
actualised, and when an enclosed system of signs is transcended by the word and its 
syntagmatic relations. By design, the concept of discourse works to repel the 
reductive tendencies of idealist theories of truth, theories which seek, like the early 
Husserl’s, to minimise the historical particularities of interpretation and establish 
univocal meanings. Within discourse it is the free combination and generation of the 
sentence, wherein the temporal and locutionary indicators of speech refer meaning 
towards an outside reference, which constitutes the smallest unit of discourse.3 
Contrary to the formal paradigm of the structuralists, for whom the sign represents an 
eminently repeatable structure of meaning, an identity of meaning transcendent of 
historical particularities, discourse presents the creation of meaning in terms of a 
dialectical interplay between a grammatically repeatable structure and an historically 
singular event. Because the sign belongs to a different level of intelligibility to that of 
the sentence, because it finds its limits within the construction of the syntagma, 
Ricoeur can limit the sign’s epistemological remit over and against the advancing 
parameters of Levi-Strauss, of Barthes and the like. For Ricoeur as for Benveniste, 
the sentence therefore marks the point at which an ideal potentiality of meaning 
surpasses itself within the historical moment of communication. It is in speech, where 
the finite structures of an immanent system are surpassed, where reference emerges, 
and where the integration of the sentence gives rise to an almost infinite possibility of 
expression, Ricoeur tells us, that the sign dies and language is bom. For Ricoeur it is 
the interplay between language’s internal regulative properties and the singular 
properties defining the historical reference of speech, which comprise the totality of 
meaning within the given instance. Against the formal-idealist model of identity- 
truths, the Ricoeurian dialectic of structure and event, like Heidegger’s historico- 
ontological relation of revealment and concealment, corroborates the fundamental 
template of poststructuralist signification, namely the simultaneous perception of 
identity and difference, presence and absence.
Insofar as the event of discourse forbids a univocal “translation” beyond the 
frame of reference, discourse confirms the singularising operations of historical
3 Ricoeur writes, “The moment when the turning from the ideality o f meaning to the reality o f things is 
produced is the moment o f  the transcendence o f the sign. This moment is contemporaneous with the 
sentence.” “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 85.
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participation common to both Heidegger and Gadamer, presenting us with a 
linguistically conceived corollary of aesthetic singularity. The phenomenality of 
discourse, like the instantiation of the Gadamerian word, stands opposed to the 
immanent manifestation of a unitary spiritual truth which could somehow be
extracted and redeployed at the level of a meta-language. As we know however, the
\
Heideggerian vision of singularity promotes a picture of understanding and truth from 
which the fields of conceptual knowledge and methodological explanation are 
problematically excluded, thereby endangering the ontological retrieval of 
interpretation with an all out irrationalism. Where singularity points towards a 
fundamental resistance to rationalising thought, towards a distinctively aesthetic 
realm of the irrational and to the opposition of identity-truths and explanatory method, 
Ricoeur’s semantics of discourse will eventually lead to a non-oppositional 
construction of understanding and to a «o«-aestheticist elaboration of the imagination. 
Understood as such, the dialectical character of discourse, of structure and event, 
designates a condition for the possibility of productive creativity and rational 
consensus. Here the concept and the symbol, the philosophical and the poetic will 
stand unopposed, as the related potentialities of a “regulated dynamism” within the 
dialectic of structure and event.4
In order to demonstrate the continuity between the critique of aestheticism, 
Ricoeur’s theory of language, and his “indirect” semantically based path towards the 
recuperation of the “I am”, we must begin by clarifying Ricoeur’s precise definition 
of the symbol and its relation to interpretation. Once we have done this, it will be 
possible to relate the symbol’s resources for exegesis, and the conflicting modes of 
interpretation to which it gives rise, to the projection of a mediated and indirect 
ontology, and to a mode of being for which the fundamental structure of double 
meaning conditions the possibilities of rational reflection and poetic insight alike.
4 Ricoeur uses this term in “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 87. See Chapter 
One.
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4 .2
“T h e  Sy m b o l  G iv es  R ise  to  T h o u g ht” 5
First there is being-in-the-world, then understanding, then interpreting, 
then saying. The circular character o f this itinerary must not stop us. It is 
indeed true that it is from the heart o f language that we say all this; but 
language is so made that it is able to designate the ground o f  existence 
from which it proceeds and to recognize itself as a mode o f  the being o f  
which it speaks. The circularity between I speak and I am gives the 
initiative by turns to the symbolic function and to its instinctual and 
existential root. But this circle is not a vicious circle; it is the living circle 
o f expression and o f the being-expressed.6
Eschewing the possibility of a direct description of understanding (Husserlian 
reduction or Heideggerian ontology), Ricoeur’s “indirect route” must begin with the 
“derived forms of understanding” which together comprise the hermeneutical horizon 
of conflicting interpretations. It is only within the context of these absolutist claims, 
where the work of interpretation already presumes, upon the basis of its own 
interpretive logic, to have cleared the muddied waters of multivocity and to have laid 
the path to understanding, that an inductive philosophy of interpretation may seek to 
explain the conditions of their co-existence.7 Thus it is by looking backwards, from
5 “The symbol gives rise to thought” is a favoured expression of Ricoeur’s which comes to prominence 
within his work The Symbolism o f  Evil. Published two years before The Conflict o f  Interpretations 
Ricoeur’s aim in this book is to enact a phenomenology o f the primary symbols which attest to human 
fault, to defilement, sin and guilt. The classical Ricoeurian gesture o f “grafting” is here already present, 
for what he seeks to achieve is something to which neither a pure phenomenology o f fault nor a 
comparative hermeneutics o f  symbols o f  fault alone can. Where the purely reflexive approach fails to 
relate the theme o f error ontologically, to man’s situation “in the being o f the world”, a comparative 
hermeneutics evades the question o f  truth and forbids any genuine recuperation o f content at the 
phenomenological level (Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism o f  Evil, Harper and Row, New York, 1967, 
p.355). What Ricoeur seeks by contrast is a phenomenology that can account for the primordial 
experience o f error and its relation to man’s fundamental constitution by way o f symbolic 
manifestations. The particular subject o f  this analysis, error, concerns us very little, save to say that sin 
is a primordial and universal experience and that these characteristics speak o f the level o f experience 
to which the notion o f symbol adheres within the Ricoeurian hermeneutic, at a rudimentary and 
universal level.
6 Ricoeur, “The Question o f  the Subject: The Challenge o f Semiology”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, 
p.259. Emphasis added in the first instance.
I use the word “inductive” for want o f  a better one. For whilst it is true that Ricoeur’s philosophy 
begins with examples drawn from “life itse lf’, with derivations which may point to a unifying principle 
for cognition, it is also true that they are drawn forth in the conviction that there is no such thing as a
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the presuppositions of their declared intentions and stated conclusions, that Ricoeur 
aims to uncover a principle of commonality rooted within the conditions of their 
simultaneous possibilities.
In every hermeneutics, Ricoeur tells us, from Schleiermacher’s to Nietzsche’s, 
Dilthey’s to Freud’s, interpretation takes the form of a translation, wherein a hidden 
content is brought to light only by means of a preliminary objectified signification. 
This common interpretive structure, of “the shown-yet-concealed”, Ricoeur defines as 
the symbol, as a
...structure o f  signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning 
designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and 
figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first.8
The work of interpretation within every hermeneutics consists in “deciphering the 
hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied 
in the literal meaning.” 9 It is this processional, dialectical character, by which a 
hidden meaning is brought to light by means of a preceding signification, which 
primarily distinguishes the symbol from tropes where interpretation is predetermined, 
such as simile and allegory. Successful reading in these instances depends upon the 
apprehension of a resemblance; a simultaneous equivalence in which each term 
participates equally. “Allegory”, writes Ricoeur, “is a rhetorical procedure that can be 
eliminated once it has done its job”.10 By contrast
...there is no symbolic knowledge except when it is impossible to directly 
grasp the concept and when the direction towards the concept is indirectly 
indicated by the secondary signification o f a primary signification.11
strictly particular or strictly general example; such a case would contradict the governing figure of the 
hermeneutic circle, which makes the general a precondition o f the particular and the particular a 
precondition o f the general; the fundamental historicity o f  interpretation, and thus the very possibility 
of ontological disclosure (the possibility that interpretation may disclose something o f Dasein’s own 
historical constitution) depends upon it.
8 Ricoeurr, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations., p. 12.
9 Ricoeur, ibid.
10 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol”, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, 
trans. David Pellauer, Texas Christian University Press, Fort Worth, 1976, p.56.
11 Ricoeur, ibid.
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By this definition the symbol operates akin to metaphor; in each case a resemblance is 
drawn upon the basis of an initial contrast, a conflict between “some prior 
categorization of reality and a new one just being bom”.12 Double meaning in these 
instances involves the active interpretation of the recipient in such a way that they are 
participant within the figure’s success. But whilst the symbol’s profundity for thought 
can and indeed must be clarified in terms of the metaphorical process, the symbol’s 
preliminary distinction for self-understanding lies in its resistance to a purely 
linguistic account of interpretation. The symbol contains both a semantic and a non- 
semantic element. Whilst the symbol’s semantic aspect evinces the capacity for 
interpretation, for “distanciation”, the symbol’s non-semantic aspect points towards a 
pre-linguistic stratum of understanding, towards a more profound, a more primordial 
order of signification. In seeking to relate the structures of competing symbolic 
interpretations, Ricoeur’s aim is a formal and ultimately ontological reflection upon 
the symbolic-interpretative relation. Before elaborating the semantic continuity 
between double meaning and interpretation one must therefore recognise the symbol’s 
unique distinction from the purely linguistic construct of metaphor. Ricoeur’s cardinal 
examples of symbolic interpretation— in psychoanalysis, the phenomenology of 
religion, and literary interpretation—all testify to a structure of double or multiple 
meaning which is in some way “bound” to or conditioned by a non-linguistic function. 
Whilst language is the medium for all expressions of self-understanding, symbolic 
interpretation always involves the recognition of a pre-verbal mode of signification 
wherein the categorial clarity of language does not yet exist.
Thus psychoanalysis links its symbols to hidden psychic conflicts; while 
the literary critic refers to something like a vision o f the world or a desire 
to transform all language into literature; and the historian o f religion sees 
in symbols the milieu o f  manifestations o f the Sacred, or what Eliade 
calls hierophanies.13
Where the relativist would treat these conflicting modes of interpretation as little more 
than language games, Ricoeur reads a common structure of ontological import. 
Fundamentally, what these competing modes of interpretation all confirm is our 
implication within an order of pre-verbal signification. What the relationship between
12 Ricoeur, ibid.
13 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 54.
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the content and the interpreter confirms is a certain historical relation between the 
primary immediacy of this non-verbal content and its subsequent clarification within 
language. Whilst the symbol attests to the immediacy of our “belonging” within the 
pre-linguistic, pre-conscious realm of hermeneutical pre-understanding, the demand 
of rival hermeneutics also confirms the symbol’s command for linguistic 
interpretation.
Whilst the symbol is rooted within the non-semantic, it is the symbol’s 
capacity to be articulated which enables this content to be thought-out and 
externalised. Ricoeur writes,
There is no symbolism before man speaks, even if  the power of the symbol 
is grounded much deeper. It is in language that the cosmos, desire and the 
imaginary reach expression; speech is always necessary if the world is to be 
recovered and made heirophany. Likewise, dreams remain closed to us until 
they have been carried to the level o f language through narration.14
Rooted as it is within experience, dependent as it is upon the moment of interpretation, 
it is true to the say that the Ricoeurian symbol assimilates us to it. For Ricoeur as for 
Shelley, the symbol partakes of the reality it renders intelligible. But this assimilation 
or moment of belonging is always followed by the objectifying and distancing 
process of verbalisation. It is this dialectical process of belonging and distanciation, 
which enables the process of interpretation. As a correlative of interpretation, the 
Ricoeurian symbol stands in stark contrast to the principle of historical transcendence 
and ineffability beloved of the romantic poets.15 It is the task of the interpreter to
14 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 13.
15 Coleridge believed the symbol to partake o f the reality it rendered intelligible, thereby constituting a 
vital bridge between the natural world and authorial consciousness, reality and imagination. With some 
important modifications Ricoeur does too. But this participatory mode o f presentation for Ricoeur is 
not the emanation o f  a synthetic union between nature and intellect. The phrase o f which he is so fond, 
“the symbol gives rise to thought”, clearly gestures to the plenitude and dynamic productivity of its 
common honour, yet it also transgresses the metaphysical framework upon which the symbol was once 
bome aloft as a final accomplishment o f  thought, and what is more, an accomplishment that stood in 
diametrical opposition to the clarity o f  concepts. The imaginative transcendence o f everyday 
consciousness in romantic poetry is an achievement premised upon the synthetic connectivity o f spirit 
and nature within the symbol. Even when such a thing is cast into doubt, as in Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”, 
form and structure conspire to affirm this transcendent modality in abstentia; alienation falls away as 
the categories o f mind and nature disintegrate in the construction o f a highly controlled polysemia. 
Whilst the final reconciliation in “Mont Blanc” falls short o f symbolic elation, the trajectory from 
despair to tranquillity still reflects the premise o f a rhetorical hierarchy, upon an increasing 
metaphoricity which ensures the symbol’s intellectual triumph. Here the symbol sits aloft, at once 
rhetoric’s greatest achievement and the mark o f its poetic sublation within the unity o f an Absolute.
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bring these inchoate or quasi-intuitive contents into rational coherence, reducing the 
polysemic variables in accordance with the interpretive frame of reference (for 
example, repression, literary unity or revelation). Of course what the early modem 
hermeneuts and the hermeneuts of suspicion have all demonstrated is the fundamental 
impossibility of a “direct translation”; all self-reflective certainties dissipate within 
the very mechanism of articulation. Whilst the Ricoeurian symbol presents a “gift” to 
thought, it is by no means the gift of transparency or pure intellection proper to the 
symbol of the romantic idealists. The symbol, writes Ricoeur, “hesitates on the 
dividing line between bios and logos’\ 16 Rooted within the pre-semantic, the symbol 
must in fact be seen to vacillate between the immediacy of its intuitions and the 
clarity of its verbal elaboration. The symbol therefore has a dialectical structure. But 
as the reservoir o f an inchoate and over-determined content, this dialectical 
interpretative structure can never in fact complete itself. This is why, by outflanking 
the possibility for total identification, the symbol transcends the order of human 
interpretation. But this is also why, contrary to the symbol of romantic aesthetics, the 
Ricoeurian symbol never in fact synthesises the realms of bios and logos. In this way 
the symbol must not be taken as a kind of transcendent achievement or a principle of 
unity.
The symbol’s gift is not the completion of thought therefore, but rather the 
large reserve of its complex content. Operating as a kind of attraction or magnetic pull, 
the symbol over time gathers around it a series of ever-more varied and derived 
connotations. Whilst these connections find their grounding affiliations within 
abstruse sensible contexts— for example, fire as a symbol of life, of purgation and of 
damnation—,a second-order symbolic rationale nonetheless emerges. The qualities of 
life and purgation, purgation and death, now find a second-order continuity bome of 
the symbol’s powers of assimilation. Here we are reminded of what Heidegger says 
when he speaks of the work of art as a symbol;
The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests 
something other; it is an allegory. In the work o f art something other is 
brought together with the thing that is made. To bring together is, in 
Greek, sumballein. The work o f a symbol. 17
16 Ricoeur, ibid., p.56.
17 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin o f  the Work o f Art”, reproduced in The Continental Aesthetics 
Reader, ed. Clive Cazeaux, Routledge, London, 2000, pp.80-101.
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Thanks to the powers of interpretation, a new symbolic rationale emerges at the 
semantic level. For this reason, the symbol “hesitates on the dividing line of bios and 
logos For this reason too, the symbol
...testifies to the primordial rootedness o f Discourse in Life. It is bom 
where force and form coincide.18
As a pre-condition of discourse, interpretation facilitates a bringing into 
language of a content that is logically anterior but which the actuality of language can 
alone manifest. This content, strictly logical in its anteriority, emerges through 
language into the configured sense of grammatical structures, into the event of 
discourse. What Ricoeur suggests, is that this movement into language is in some way 
parallel to, constitutive even, of the dialectic of interpretation and understanding. In 
this way the symbol’s non-semantic moment is akin to the hypothetical pre­
understanding of our phenomeno-ontological orientation within the world, whilst the 
semantic moment corresponds to the mediating role played by language in the 
movement from interpretation to understanding and explanation. The non-semantic is 
to the semantic what pre-understanding is to understanding, with language in both 
instances the mediating vehicle from whence thought takes a hold of itself, distancing 
itself from the immediacy of this phenomeno-symbolic order. So whilst the symbol, 
like the order of pre-understanding, must be understood in terms of an initial 
immediacy, it is not to be opposed to the order of a subsequently mediated mode of 
thinking. With language cast in this mediating interpretive function, the symbol’s 
relationship to language is therefore rather different to those pre-eminently aesthetic 
characterisations for which the symbol constitutes a mode of ineffability, resistant to 
verbal translation. Whilst the symbol is defined in its immediacy, it does not oppose 
translation, indeed the symbol is not a counterforce to the order of language, grammar 
and conceptuality but a pre-condition. Ricoeur writes
There is no need to deny the concept in order to admit that symbols give 
rise (donne lieu) to endless exegesis. I f  no concept can exhaust the 
requirement o f  “thinking more” borne by symbols, this idea signifies only
18 Ricoeur, ibid., p.57.
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that no categorization can embrace all the semantic possibilities of a 
symbol. But it is the work o f  the concept alone that can testify to this 
surplus o f  meaning.19
Thus the structure of double meaning proper to the symbol is the correlative of 
interpretation. Without the interpretation proper to its verbalisation there is no symbol, 
without the multiplicity of the symbol’s content there is no scope for interpretation. 
Since all interpretation must go by way of language we can go further and say that the 
symbol constitutes the founding condition from whence both the form  and the content 
of the dialectical relation of interpretation and understanding emerge. Speech, or 
rather the living instance of discourse, presents the interpretive movement through 
which an immanent potentiality of meaning—the symbol’s inchoate profundity—is 
made manifest.
Yet whilst language mediates the symbolic content, admitting of its 
interpretation and thereby resisting any romantic conflation to the ineffable, the 
symbol is still determined by its resistance to any complete translation. Where a 
purely rhetorical trope such as allegory can be “contained” at the level of authorial 
design, the symbol bears within it an historical richness which neither author nor 
interpreter can fully surmount. The symbol is thus joined to interpretation in a 
movement of dialectical reciprocity which at once connects the interpreter to the field 
of inquiry and forecloses the possibility of any complete translation. Whilst a 
framework of contextual limitation such as the psychoanalyst or the poet constructs 
will reduce the symbol’s currency within that field, it cannot exhaust the symbol’s 
significance beyond it (the diverse and contradictory significances which accumulate 
around the most primitive symbols testify to this overdetermination or “surcharge”). 
To this extent it is not inaccurate to say that the symbol “lives” before and beyond 
these instances of interpretation. Its philosophical importance for Ricoeur rests in the 
relation between this unfathomable and unsurpassable fecundity and the interpretive 
process of verbalisation, between the symbol’s force, the well of potential meanings 
rooted within the non-semantic, and its form , the mode of semantic and hence 
categorial clarification one finds within the different modes of interpretation such as 
Ricoeur names. The symbol’s relevance to a hermeneutics that rejects linguistic 
determinism pivots upon this fundamental distinction of the symbol s
19 Ricoeur, ibid.
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overdetermination. By dint of its categorial ambiguity and semantic richness, the 
symbol in its non-semantic aspect persists as a well of potential meanings, and as the 
provocation to a “thinking more”. It is in this respect that the symbol can be said to 
“give rise to thought”. In so far as the formalist structure of the structuralists can be 
called a condition for univocity, the Ricoeurian symbol opposes it as transcendental 
structure for plurivocity, interpretation and the hermeneutical condition. Moreover, 
the symbol’s dual status as both a semantic and a non-semantic entity broaches 
thought’s formal linguistic parameters to expose the phenomenological link between 
experience and signification. “In this way, symbolism, taken at the level of 
manifestation in texts, marks the breakthrough of language toward something other 
than itself—what I call its opening.” This opening must be understood in terms of the 
existential:
Symbolism’s raison d ’etre is to open the multiplicity o f meaning to the
equivocalness o f  being.20
Elsewhere Ricoeur characterises the movement of symbolic interpretation as 
an assimilation to, rather than a translation of the symbol’s multiplicity. Unlike those 
uniquely semantic structures of double meaning such as metaphor and simile, the 
symbol does not necessarily depend upon a perfect “fit” between its terms. Symbolic 
relations are “not nicely articulated on a logical level.”21 This categorial confusion, 
which distinguishes the symbol’s inherent opacity when compared to metaphor, 
means that the bond to the interpretive instance is all the more pronounced. With the 
symbol we share in a latent meaning “without our being able to intellectually 
dominate the similarity” upon which it is based; it is only the interpreter’s “primary 
intentionality that gives the second meaning”.22 The symbol operates by means of an 
assimilation which forbids the kind of intellectual “containment” proper to the 
rhetorical. Where the rhetorical structure of double meaning apprehends a 
resemblance between contrary significations, interpretation in fact involves an 
assimilation to which we ourselves are subject and which, by extension, implicates us
20 Ricoeur, “The Problem o f  Double Meaning”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.65.
21 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol”, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, 
p.56.
Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics o f  Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I”, The Conflict o f  
Interpretations, p. 287.
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within the historicity of the symbol’s diverse significations. Symbolic interpretation is 
itself caught up within the movements of the symbolic content therefore. In the 
symbolic order “all the boundaries are blurred — between the things as well as 
between the things and ourselves.” 23
Whilst assimilation would once more appear to endow the symbol with a 
redolently romantic, anti-representational connotation therefore, we can say once 
more that the Ricoeurian symbol is not to be confused with the totalising syntheses of 
its romantic aesthetic import. The symbol is not ineffable, even if it is unsurpassable 
in terms of its content. In fact the symbol’s myriad currency, its “semantic surcharge” 
as Ricoeur calls it, is a consequence of its “rootedness”, its discursive historicity. As 
Leonard Lawlor writes, symbols “resist conceptualisation more than other metaphors 
because life is the basis of their increase, their augmentation, their excess.”24 In this 
way the symbol is historically implicated within the interpretations which feed it; 
whilst the symbol’s historicity transcends the historicality of individual interpretations, 
it can never be said to transcend history itself since the symbol and its interpretation 
exist in reciprocal dialogue. In the essay “Metaphor and Symbol” Ricoeur 
characterises this auto-implication in terms of sense and sensibility; the symbol 
occurs where sense and sensibility intersect. The life from which the symbol is drawn 
is also the very principle of its dissemination back into life. Thus the symbol and its 
interpretation confirm the mode o f finite transcendence integral to the hermeneutical 
critique of historical objectivism and aesthetic transcendence alike. Within the 
experience of the symbol, one encounters “the finite transgression of finitude”.25
Ricoeur’s “Indirect Path” .
Heideggerian poetics, like romantic aesthetics, begins in the recognition of the 
work’s power as a unified entity and its distinction from all others; herein lies the 
work’s truth for being. As the realization of language’s true essence, poetry for 
Heidegger is language at once at its most accomplished and primordial; poetry is the
23 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol”, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, 
p.56.
Lawlor, Imagination and Chance', The Difference Between the Thought o f  Ricoeur and Derrida, 
State University o f New York Press, Albany, 1992, p.71.
25 Lawlor, ibid. p.70.
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unity of an opening which reveals something of language’s essential relation to being. 
As we know, this relation is also one of partial concealment, never the less, or perhaps 
precisely for this reason, this originality is conditioned by a description of the work’s 
unity first and foremost.26 An analysis of double meaning focussed upon discourse 
and its constitutive levels proceeds upon the basis of an ascending order, starting with 
the smallest elements of language and building up to a consideration of structures and 
finally of systems or processes. “By going further in the same direction, one would 
meet the problems posed by Heidegger concerning the ontology of language. But 
these problems would demand not only a change of level but a change of approach.” 
For Heidegger
...follow s another order— perfectly legitimate in itself—which consists in 
beginning from spoken being, from the ontological weight o f established 
languages such as that o f  the thinker, the poet, the prophet.27
By rejecting the radicality of the Kehre, and confirming the link between self-
understanding and the interpretation of symbolic forms, Ricoeur refuses this approach.
Confirming the path towards a mediated and indirect ontology, in which “double
meaning is the means of detecting a condition of being”, Ricoeur clarifies the relation
between symbolic interpretations— in psychoanalysis, in the phenomenology of
religion or literary interpretations— and self-understanding and furthermore, the
relationship between a hermeneutics of competing symbolic interpretations and the
28hermeneutical relationship of being-as-interpretation.
In contrast to philosophies concerned with starting points, a mediation on 
symbols starts from the fullness o f language and o f meaning already there; 
it begins from within language which has already taken place and in which 
everything in a certain sense has already been said; it wants to be thought, 
not pre-suppositionless, but in and with all its presuppositions.29
261 say “never the less” because the work’s descriptive priority appears to contradict the ontological 
priority of poetry, but then I say it is perhaps precisely for this reason because such an ontological 
priority must by its very nature involve that element o f concealment to which an ontic description of 
the work conforms. In effect what I am saying is that the aesthetic mediates ontological disclosure and 
that the disclosure o f poetry is mediated by the poem.
27 Ricoeur, “Structure, Word, Event”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.92.
28 Ricoeur, “The Problem o f  Double Meaning”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.65.
29 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics o f Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I”, The Conflict o f  
Interpretations, p.285.
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This is why a clarification of the symbol and by extension Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
detour towards self-understanding must entail both semantic and non-semantic 
analyses. It is for this reason that we find the otherwise abstruse fields of symbolism, 
of structural linguistics and anthropology, psychoanalysis and the phenomenology of 
religion rise and fall between the covers of the one book. Without linguistic analyses 
there is little or no means to interpreting the unity of common structures within 
conflicting interpretations; “it is only in a conflict of rival hermeneutics that we 
perceive something of the being to be interpreted”, and this we know is Ricoeur’s 
reasoning against Heidegger’s “unified ontology”.30 But likewise, one has no means 
of accessing the being of an “implied ontology” without ultimately breaching those 
linguistic parameters:
A linguistic analysis which would treat these significations as a whole 
closed in on itself would ineluctably set up language as an absolute. This 
hypostasis language, however, repudiates the basic intention o f a sign, 
which is to hold “for”, thus transcending itself and suppressing itself in 
what it intends. Language itself, as a signifying milieu, must be referred 
to existence.31
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics thus takes wing on the back of two critiques, the one levelled 
at an ontological absolutism, the other—in “Structure and Hermeneutics” and 
“Structure,Word, Event”— at the enclosure of a formal linguistics. In “Existence and 
Hermeneutics” (the primary statement of Ricoeur’s intent at this time) he defines the 
project of an “implied ontology” of interpretation in terms of three distinct phases. 
These phases are intended to reflect procedurally the proposed relation of a 
hermeneutically conceived interpretation and self-understanding.
30 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Intepretations, p. 18.
31 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 15.
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The Semantic Phase
Rival hermeneutics conflict not over the structure of double meaning but 
over the mode o f  its opening, over the finality o f showing.32
Interpretation, we have said, is by definition an activity of the symbol. If 
interpretation is a fundamental trait of existence such as Heidegger suggests, then 
ambiguity must itself be such a trait. This means that the symbolic structure of double 
meaning must be irreducible yet at the same time not unsurpassable, for how else 
could one speak of self-knowledge in the face of ambiguity? It must, to use Ricoeur’s 
terms, be at once bound and free.33 The symbol’s irreducibility is thus the condition 
for a mediated ontology; the postulate of ontology the grounds for a non-aesthetic 
theory of the symbol. This is a theory in which the classical aesthetic conception of 
the symbol, as a synthesising image is replaced by the notion of an irreducible 
signifying content.34 As we have said, the symbol is bound by the activities of its 
non-semantic and pre-linguistic aspect; the processes of sleep, of dichten (the German 
verb for poetic composition, for versifying or lyricising) and of religious behaviours, 
attest to the need across diverse disciplines to “reveal the lines that attach the 
symbolic function to this or that non-symbolic or pre-linguistic activity.”35 A unified 
theory of symbols (thence of interpretation) for this reason is not possible. 
Nevertheless, Ricoeur claims that an analysis of the symbol’s semantic aspect will 
enable a clarification of “the structure common to these diverse modalities of 
symbolic expression” and thenceforth the relative “shape” of a symbolically mediated 
self-understanding independent of its particular manifestation.36
Such an analysis involves both an enumeration of symbolic forms (in 
psychoanalysis, in poetry and the phenomenology of religion especially) and a 
criteriology in which the symbol and its related forms, such as metaphor and allegory 
and simile, are semantically distinguished.37 Its purpose will be to establish the 
relational functions and structural similarities operating within separate hermeneutics.
32 Ricoeur, “The Problem o f  Double Meaning”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.65.
33 See Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics o f Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I”, The Conflict o f  
Interpretations, p.296.
34 The Ricoeurian symbol and its distinction from “aesthetic” conceptions I go on to explain below.
35 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol”, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, 
ibid., p.58.
36 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 13.
37 Ricoeur, ibid.
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What, for instance, is the relation between Freudian “dream work” and the symbolic 
function within the phenomenology of religion, do they attest to the same operation or 
the same semantic field? In turn, this criteriology of rhetorical structures calls for 
what Ricoeur terms “a study of the operations of interpretation”. If interpretation is a 
natural correlative of symbolic structures and symbolic structures conform to different 
operations and different regions of intelligibility, then so too must the interpretive 
activities accompanying them.38
Now the question o f symbolic structures must be related to the competing 
methodologies by which these interpretive activities are reflected. Interpretation gives 
rise to conflicting methods, such is the condition of multiple meaning. These 
methodological contrasts may measure an initial difference of interpretation as 
regards a preliminary symbolic structure, but more importantly, they testify to the 
relative operations between a specific form of interpretation, for example 
psychoanalysis, and the way it constructs its methodological procedure.
Interpretation starts from the realisation of multiple potential meanings and 
proceeds to reduce this multivocity by means of a translation according to its own 
frame of reference. Such a “reduction” is no different from that of the interpretation of 
ambiguous meanings within conversation, within the instance of discourse, except 
that the form of interpretation within the methodological context is systematically 
relative to the theoretical structure under consideration. For example, in 
psychoanalysis interpretation is governed by the overarching theme of desire. The 
content it translates, in art, dreams or religion say, will ultimately return all modes of 
symbolic expression back to this fact. What this essentially means is that the mode of 
rhetorical detour it perceives in the work of repression or transference and the mode 
of rhetorical decipherment it prescribes are both consequences of the thematic frame 
of desire. The psychoanalytic journey will always be a journey that returns thought 
and its mediations to desire; accordingly the structure of this journey is predestined by 
a certain modality of reading. Henceforth the question of explanatory models and 
methodologies, maligned by Dilthey, by Heidegger and Gadamer, loses its deductive 
neutrality and its oppositional contrast to interpretation. Method in Ricoeur’s hands is
38 The reciprocal relation o f symbol and interpretation is transcendental in so far as it designates 
necessary regions or operations o f  intelligibility. In this way the Ricoeurian symbol possesses a 
distinctly Kantian character; as in the Critique o f  Pure Reason, where the schema mediates between a 
necessary category o f thought (a non-empirical concept) and an empirical fact, so the Ricoeurian 
symbol mediates the empirical experience and its interpretation.
149
interpretation. For Ricoeur, we can say that method emerges at the interchange of 
multivocity and its projected reduction.39
If, for example, we place the Freudian economy side by side with that of 
Nietzsche, we can immediately apprehend their philosophical affinity. They are 
hermeneutically pertinent precisely because they link the impossibility of any 
complete self-identification to the duplicity of signification at the level of their 
respective fields. But in each instance the structure of double meaning is driven by a 
different affective force with consequently different implications for the philosophy of 
consciousness; between the two, the presumed symbolic content or the criterion of its 
translation does not provide an equal claim for self-consciousness. The Nietzschean 
will to power may wrap itself within the illusions of Christian rationality but the 
recognition of its lie cannot admit of any higher authenticity; all life takes the form of 
an unsurpassable but at the same time self-confirmatory self-translation. The 
repression of eros within society provides Freud a similarly universal structure of 
symbolic repression, but where Nietzsche rejects the possibility of self-recovery, 
Freud’s clinical postulate of disorder presupposes the possibility of the medically 
assisted redemption; the recovery of an original meaning based, as in classical 
exegesis, upon the intercession of a specialist decoder. Disorder is a disordering of the 
symbolic economy as it usually functions within healthy individuals.
Whilst Freud and Nietzsche provide variant philosophical positions with 
regards the possibility of self-understanding, and whilst the Freudian position 
provides the clearest affinity to the Ricoeurian projection of a symbolically mediated 
cogito, it is foremostly their structural affinities which concerns Ricoeur and not the 
philosophical implications they independently draw for consciousness. But this is not 
an admission of pluralism by any means; a structural semantic equivalence is 
altogether different from a philosophical equivalence, in which the semantic content, 
not just the semantic structure, would conform. A semantics of double meaning which 
asserted their equivalent validity as interpretations upon the basis of a common 
structure would be no more expedient than a description of a direct ontological 
relation, wherein the question of method and any subsequent arbitration of methods is 
voided, or indeed a philosophical structuralism whereby all meaning and the
39 The second phase o f the Ricoeurian hermeneutic, the “reflective phase”, will clarify the dialectical 
nature o f interpretation and (methodological) explanation. Self-knowledge emerges in the dialectic of 
consciousness and its objectifications; methodology conforms to a moment o f objectification through 
which man interprets himself.
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possibility of self-interpretation would be thoroughly pre-conditioned by the structure; 
where the one denies theoretical scrutiny the other debars the possibility of an 
autonomous judgement.
By way of a semantic analysis of the symbol however, Ricoeur proposes to 
relate the range of conflicting hermeneutical methods back to the structure of their 
corresponding theories of interpretation, to a principle of interpretation (such as 
transference) and its referential determination (desire) and in so doing, to define the 
parameters of each interpretation. A semantics of double meaning will thus lead to an 
interpretation of interpretations which has as its aim the “mapping” of interpretive 
theories relative to their cognitive and experiential domains, and relative to one 
another. With the preliminary stage of semantic analysis hermeneutics thus
...prepares itself to perform its highest task, which would be a true 
arbitration among the absolutist claims o f each o f the interpretations. By 
showing in what way each method expresses the form o f a theory, 
philosophical hermeneutics justifies each method within the limits o f its 
own theoretical circumscription.40
With an elucidation o f double meanings Ricoeur will assert the co-existence 
and in some instances the co-validity of conflicting interpretations without 
succumbing to relativism. Philosophical hermeneutics
...begins by an expanding investigation into symbolic forms and by a 
comprehensive analysis o f  symbolic structures. It proceeds by the 
confrontation o f  hermeneutic styles and by the critique o f  systems o f  
interpretation, carrying the diversity o f hermeneutic methods back to 
the structure o f  the corresponding theories.41
Such is the profoundly important epistemological role with which the Ricoeurian 
hermeneutic charges itself.
But this critical function does not yet satisfy the ontological postulate of self- 
understanding upon which Ricoeur’s sights are eventually set. The relationship 
between double meaning and self-interpretation remains a question if the structures of 
double meaning and their successive interpretations are not somehow shown to have a
40Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 14.
41 Ricoeur, ibid., emphasis added.
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validity beyond the locality of their particular methodological frameworks, and 
beyond the linguistic mechanisms they purport to demonstrate. If understanding is to 
broach the rhetorical prison-house of language then language must be shown to 
transcend itself; “Language itself, as a signifying milieu, must be referred to 
existence”.42 Likewise if  the interpretation of interpretations is to be existentially 
significant, if  it is to lead to self-understanding rather than mere plurality or relativism, 
it must be shown to somehow reflect transcendental conditions of understanding. 
Beyond the task of comparison and arbitration therefore, the multiple expressions, 
multiple theories of understanding must be made to conform to different areas, or 
different levels of intelligibility. “My hypothesis” writes Ricoeur,
is that each (interpretation) is legitimate within its own context. We 
cannot, o f  course, content ourselves with a simple juxtaposition ... it is 
necessary to set up a dialogue between them and demonstrate their 
complimentary functions.43
It is the task of Ricoeur’s second, reflective phase to establish how these 
“complimentary functions” may participate within a philosophy of consciousness and 
how they may reflect the dynamics of an implied ontology. Moving beyond the 
relatively extrinsic proposition o f the Lebenswelt, where interpretations are limited to 
the “external” conditions o f their socio-historical, socio-cultural horizons, Ricoeur 
aims to “graft” or “implant” the initial semantic analysis of interpretations within a 
reflective phenomenology. But unlike Husserl, who sought to reduce the multivocity 
of interpretation to a univocal theory of meaning, meaning for Ricoeur is to remain 
irrevocably plural.44 After all, it is this irrevocable plurality or plurivocity which first 
propels the proposition o f a phenomenological hermeneutics and a semantic analysis 
of double meaning in the first place. For Ricoeur, double meaning is both irreducible 
and constitutive; it is, he asserts, the means to detecting a condition of being. And yet 
a semantic analysis alone is not itself enough; it remains
42 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 15.
43 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics o f  Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: II”, The Conflict o f  
Interpretations, p.319.
44 This of course is the crucial difference between phenomenology and a hermeneutical phenomenology. 
In the Logical Investigations Husserl’s aim is a theory o f  signifying expressions which would 
ultimately reduce all multivocity to the ideality o f  univocal acts or intentions. What Husserl seeks 
therefore, is a metalanguage through which to translate multivocal expressions “according to ideal 
models” (Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations p. 15). For Ricoeur on 
the other hand, multivocity is utterly irreducible, utterly constitutive.
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...suspended until one shows that the understanding of multivocal or 
symbolic expressions is a moment o f  .se/^understanding; the semantic 
approach thus entails a reflective approach. 45
When Ricoeur writes that it is through language that all ontic and ontological 
understanding arrives at expression, it is upon the condition that such an 
understanding automatically involves an interpretation of Being, and that such an 
interpretation is in some way constitutive for our own being. It is at this point that 
Ricoeur’s relation to Heidegger becomes apparent. To simply state the proposition of 
self-understanding within the understanding of double meaning would be to follow 
the “direct” path of Heideggerian ontology, whereby understanding is transformed 
into an ontological trait cut off from methodological considerations and opposed to 
the self-presence of the Cartesian cogito. Such a direct statement upon interpretive 
being cannot speak directly o f the modalities of expression which testify to this being; 
it cannot specify how a particular modality of discourse, a particular structure of 
double meaning, relates to other such structures, or indeed how such structures give 
rise to the methodologies o f their interpretation. For this reason Ricoeur wishes to 
remain “in contact with methodologies as they are actually practiced”, without 
separating the hermeneutical “concept o f truth from the concept of method.” 46 It is 
for Ricoeur to demonstrate, through an elaboration of his reflective approach, how an 
understanding of the structural operations of multivocal or symbolic expression can 
facilitate the recuperation of a “wounded” cogito, and a mediated form of self- 
consciousness.
The Reflective Phase
Reflection is the appropriation o f  our effort to exist and o f our desire to be 
by means o f  the works which testify to this effort and desire.
45 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 11.
46 Ricoeur, ibid., p,14.
47 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 17.
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In the reflective” phase, Ricoeur tells us that a semantics of double meaning 
and interpretation is to be “grafted” to a phenomenology of consciousness. By 
necessity such a grafting has immediate consequences for the question of the cogito\ if 
double meaning is an irreducible and productive trait for understanding, 
consciousness itself must be irreducibly interpretive. No longer may a 
phenomenological cogito conform to the projected unity of the early Husserl. Rather, 
the self that may be recovered in a hermeneutics of self-understanding always follows 
as the secondary consequence o f an interpretation. Whilst the self in fact guides this 
interpretation in the first place, it may only collect itself in the manner of a subsequent 
recognition. The hermeneutical self finds itself in the manner of a being-interpreted; 
the self that interprets thereby self-interprets.
Ricoeur’s reflective phase thus presents an intractably mediated form of self­
recognition. Reflection is a mode of critical appropriation of the works and acts which 
testify to our own existence, which testifies to our desire to understand ourselves— 
“our effort to exist and our desire to be”—and which serves to countermand the 
principle of an internal and auto-affective self-consciousness. The cogito
...is  a vain truth; it is like a first step which cannot be followed by any 
other, so long as the ego o f  the ego cogito has not been recaptured in the 
mirror o f  its objects, o f  its works, and finally, o f its acts. Reflection is 
blind intuition i f  it is not mediated by what Dilthey called the expressions 
in which life objectifies itse lf ..Thus, reflection is a critique... in the sense 
that the cogito can be recovered only by the detour o f  a decipherment o f  
the documents o f  its life. 48
48 Ricoeur, ibid. Emphasis added. This statement also reinforces Ricoeur’s critical distance from 
Heidegger; the description o f  Dasein remains an intuitive description o f the understanding which 
requires an explanatory detour through the expressions o f understanding as they objectify themselves 
within competing interpretations. Ricoeur repeats this argument when writing directly o f symbols. In 
“The Hermeneutics o f  Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: II” he writes; “...reflection is not 
intuition... reflection is the effort to recomprehend the ego o f  the ego cogito in the mirror o f its objects, 
its works, and ultimately its acts. Now, why must the positing o f  the ego be recomprehended through 
its acts? Precisely because the ego  is not given in psychological evidence or in intellectual intuition or 
in mystical vision. A reflective philosophy is precisely the opposite o f a philosophy o f the immediate. 
The first truth—I  think, I  am— remains as abstract and empty as it is unassailable. It must be 
“mediated” by representations, actions, works, institutions, and monuments which objectify it; it is in 
these objects, in the largest sense o f  the word, that the ego must both lose itself and find itself. We can 
say that a philosophy o f  reflection is not a philosophy o f  consciousness if, by consciousness, we mean 
immediate self-consciousness.” {The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.323.)
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Reflection is therefore an “intermediary step”, between consciousness and self- 
consciousness, expression and self-understanding; in every instance consciousness 
must be mediated by the works and acts which testify to its existence. Thus an 
analysis of symbolic language and its conditions for interpretation is to be related to 
the question of the being that interprets. Between the symbol and the self there is a 
dual relation of manifest and implicit interpretation; of manifest symbolic 
interpretation and implicit self-interpretation. A semantic elucidation of the “shown 
yet concealed” within language must now be related to the illusion of the self-evident 
cogito therefore.
In proposing to relate symbolic language to self-understanding, I think I 
fulfil the deepest wish o f  hermeneutics. The purpose o f all interpretation 
is to conquer a remoteness, a distance between the past cultural epoch to 
which the text belongs and the interpreter himself. By overcoming this 
distance, by making him self contemporary with the text, the exegete can 
appropriate its meaning to himself: foreign, he makes it familiar, that is, 
he makes it his own. It is thus the growth o f his own understanding o f  
him self that he pursues through his understanding o f the other. Every 
hermeneutics is thus, explicitly or implicitly, self-understanding by means 
o f understanding others.49
The exegetical foreclosure of historical distances and psychological differences is 
now the task of the self exiled from its own significations. It is now the implacable 
distance by which our own historicity and our own linguisticality holds us from 
within ourselves that a post-structural, post-Heideggerian hermeneutics must 
overcome. Thus the cogito may be recaptured only by the decipherment of the 
documents of its life, and in full recognition of that false consciousness which would 
presume to implant itself as a precondition of thought. For this reason reflection upon 
consciousness must be “doubly indirect”, and consciousness itself, doubly mediated.
It is at this point that we find Ricoeur’s critique of formalist linguistics and his 
assertion of an existentially grounded concept of discourse converge with a critique of 
consciousness based upon the rhetorical illusions of the self-positing ego. The 
deconstruction of ideas into pre-conscious linguistic configurations need not debar the 
path to self-understanding if  the systematicity of language is shown to transcend itself
49 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p. 16.
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and suppress itself within the instance of discourse. The ontological demand to relate 
interpretation to self-understanding need not languish in the face of a pre-reflective 
grammar and a constrained articulation if they are treated, in the manner set out by 
Heidegger, as positive preconditions o f our “being-there”.
Finally, Ricoeur claims that the act of appropriation within reflection confirms 
the transcendental status o f double meaning. If self-understanding always take the 
form of a mediation, a detour through the express signs of our existence and our 
understanding in general, then double-meaning—say the work of art’s overt content 
and its indirect significance for self-understanding, its ontic and its ontological 
imports—constitutes the necessary condition from whence self-understanding alone 
proceeds. Thus it is at the reflective level alone that double meaning can be called 
transcendental, and it is for this reason that the symbol presents thought with a “gift” 
which exceeds the movements of a semantic translation. To reflect upon the double- 
meaning inherent to the symbol is to reflect upon the conditions of self-understanding 
from whence the symbol’s inter-signifying relations first emerge. To interpret these 
relations is to be caught up within the movements of “world-making” named by 
Heidegger in the context o f the work of art; it is to find ourselves—always already— 
standing within the contours of our own horizon of intelligibility.
The Existential Phase
It is behind itself that the cogito discovers, through the work o f  
interpretation, something like an archaeology o f  the subject. Existence is 
glimpsed in this archaeology, but it remains entangled in the movement o f  
deciphering to which it gives rise.50
The symbol, we know, gives rise to interpretation, what is more the 
interpretive methodology o f every hermeneutic is determined through the referential 
frame of each interpretation. This is what a semantic analysis of symbols shows us. 
To reflect upon the knowledge of symbolic interpretation is to recognise the double­
50 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 20.
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movement of interpretation and self-understanding within symbolic knowledge. This 
is the circular movement o f Dasein’s being-there. And yet this relation remains an 
intuitive sketch if  it is not shown how, “in every instance, each hermeneutics 
discovers the aspect of existence (the frame of reference) which founds it as 
method.”51 This is the demand Ricoeur puts to himself in the refusal of a direct 
ontology; “The ontology o f understanding is implied in the methodology of 
interpretation”, but because ontology must take its indirect route via the competing 
claims of rival hermeneutics “a unified ontology is as inaccessible to our method as a 
separate ontology.”52 And yet for Ricoeur there is still an “implied ontology” to be 
gleaned from the interpretive movement from symbol to self-understanding. 
Competing hermeneutics rival one another over the symbol’s mode of “opening” 
within the world, over the frame of interpretive reference and its mode of 
methodological engagement, but in each instance the path to self-understanding 
confirms the same essential pattern; “a true dismissal of the classical problematic of 
the subject as consciousness; then a restoration of the problematic of existence” in 
accordance with that particular mode o f opening. In every hermeneutic, “the self must 
be lost in order to find the “I” [le je ] .53
In psychoanalysis for example, narcissism constitutes a mode of false 
consciousness, a false cogito which presumes to set itself up as an origin of meaning. 
Through the work of psychoanalysis, through the interpretation of dreams, fantasies 
and their symbolic contents, the ego succumbs to the disclosure of latent drives, to the 
unconscious with its instinctual roots in the impulses of desire; to the psychoanalyst’s 
original frame of symbolic reference that is. In this way the false consciousness of the 
ego is surpassed in the movement o f reflection, seconded to the more original relation 
of language and desire. In each hermeneutic, claims Ricoeur, the self is surpassed in 
the movement of reflection to be reinstated as a secondary affect.
Clearly, from the Ricoeurian perspective psychoanalysis does not present 
philosophy with a radical renunciation of the subject, nor can its philosophical 
implications for consciousness be read in any absolutist manner. Psychoanalysis 
testifies to the onto-hermeneutical relation of backwards relatedness, of interpretation 
and understanding outlined in Being and Time, where consciousness finds itself in the
51 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 19.
52 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 18.
53 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 19.
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midst of its own questioning. In psychoanalysis consciousness may surpass itself in 
its own origins of longing but to this mode of self-interpretation Ricoeur adds what he 
calls a teleology of the subject, a kind of interpretive self-surpassing which draws the 
subject “in front of itself, toward a meaning in motion”.54 Here interpretation takes 
the form of a projection towards a future horizon of self-understanding, an 
anticipatory interpretation such as one finds in Hegel’s Phenomenology o f  the Spirit. 
Pitched in terms of this prospective horizon, interpretation takes the form of a guided 
teleology. Read hermeneutically, the spirit of Hegel’s phenomenology is the 
achievement of a self-understanding realised solely through the interpretation 
(Hegel’s dialectic) of successive figures. There is of course no ultimate moment of 
realisation for Ricoeur; interpretation is the non-finalisable condition of human 
historicity. Once more it is not Hegel’s essential philosophical conclusions that count 
but the extent to which the Hegelian trajectory conforms to the hermeneutical model 
of understanding as interpretation, via the detour of double meaning; as “a reading of 
the hidden meaning inside the text of the apparent meaning.”55 Psychoanalysis and 
the phenomenology of spirit confirm the essential movement of interpretation and 
self-understanding and the essential detour through which understanding founds the 
self as a mediated cogito.
For the self to find itself it must lose itself, only to find itself in the movement 
of interpretation from which it cannot be detached. This is what rival hermeneutics, in 
all their divergence, confirm. For Ricoeur, the symbol comprises that deep resource of 
potential significance where “force and form collide”; the interpretation of symbols 
which founds every rival hermeneutic as method occurs at the interchange of 
multivocity and its reduction in accordance with the frame of reference. “True 
symbols”, Ricoeur writes,
contain all hermeneutics, those which are directed toward the emergence 
o f  new meanings and those which are directed toward the resurgence o f  
archaic fantasies.56
Indeed what the true symbol testifies to is the historicity of interpretation from 
whence its own unsurpassable content arises. In its unceasing augmentation, the
54 Ricoeur, ib id , p. 21.
55 Ricoeur, ibid.
56 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 23.
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symbol confirms the irreducible multiplicity of human experience and the unending 
will to interpret this experience. In its resistance to conceptualisation, in its excess, the 
symbol confirms the impossibility o f a “unified ontology” which would presume to 
level the multiplicity o f symbolic interpretation to a single formula or conceptual 
framework. Thus it is only in a “conflict of rival hermeneutics”—where such 
historical diversity manifests— “that we perceive something of the being to be
• 57 rpi •interpreted.” The task of philosophical hermeneutics is to bring these rival 
interpretations into philosophical coherence, not for the sake of arbitration or some 
dry intellectual exercise, but in order to reflect upon the vital interchange to which the 
symbol attests, between life and understanding, bios and logos. As we know, the 
symbol’s power for Ricoeur belongs within the purview of Kant’s schematism and 
the theory of conceptual synthesis. Whilst the symbol always resists conceptual 
limitations, the symbol does not contradict the work of the concept.
Inexhaustible in its content, the symbol presents thought the gift of further 
thinking, but it also imparts a sense of finitude within the mind of the beholder. 
Thinking, in its failure to drain the infinitude of this resource, comes up against its 
own limits. Through doing so, we gain a fleeting sense of the infinite, of what 
Ricoeur calls the totally other. This is why symbols cannot be fully explained by a 
semantic theory of interpretation. Nevertheless, if symbols could not be in some way 
accounted for, this sense of alterity and infinity would pass us by. This is the 
fundamental dialectic o f being and non-being, identity and difference. For this reason, 
the symbol must be thought o f as same and other. Since human understanding must 
always pass through language, so too must the understanding of the symbol. For this 
reason it is necessary to look to the symbol’s semantic aspect as metaphor.
Ricoeur will go on to define metaphor as the figure of discourse par 
excellance. But this semantics o f metaphor will not restrict itself to the verbal. In 
reaching beyond the verbal constitution of metaphor towards a semantics of the non­
verbal, Ricoeur will return the question of double meaning to its non-semantic aspect.
In The Rule o f  Metaphor, Ricoeur moves from a consideration of classical 
rhetorical theories and their repetition within latter-day semiotic analyses towards a 
cognitive semantics in which he questions not only the function but also the 
ontological import of metaphorical, that is to say literary or fictional truths. Once
57 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 18.
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again, Ricoeur moves slowly, meticulously, from the formal quarantine of semiotic 
linguistics, via a semantics of discourse and double meaning, towards a picture of 
human understanding. In fact, what he establishes is the basis for a phenomenology o f  
imagination, something which, as Richard Kearney points out, both Heidegger’s 
radical poetising and Gadamer’s critique of aesthetic idealism gestured towards, but 
which neither accomplished in a positive or constitutive manner. For Kearney,
Ricoeur’s tentative and always provisional probing o f a poetic
hermeneutic o f  imagination represents, we believe, the ultimate, if
58discreet, agenda o f  his entire philosophical project.
The current investigation enjoins itself to that “we”. The explication of a dynamic, 
productive theory of metaphor, in which new semantic possibilities arise, presents the 
justification for a transformative view of cognition. Opposing classical theories of a 
metaphorical redescription, Ricoeur’s theory of the semantic imagination designates 
man’s fundamental power to create, and the most compelling indictment of linguistic 
determinism.
58 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl o f  Minerva, ibid. pp.36-7.
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4 .3
M e t a p h o r  a n d  t h e  Q u e st io n  of P h iloso phy
Postructuralism: Derrida / Ricoeur
If Ricoeur’s critique o f structuralism, his interpretation of Heidegger, and his 
reformulation of a “wounded cogito” condemned him to the peripheries during 
France’s formalist hay-day of the 1960s, one may expect the shift towards post- 
structuralism in the early 1970s to have exiled him further. But as much as Derrida’s 
practice began as a radicalisation of structuralism—as a critical “super­
structuralism”59 intent upon the exposure o f trenchant logocentrism (in structuralism’s 
founding texts no less)— deconstruction was also a reversal of structuralist dogma 
insofar as the principle o f differance, o f the restless mobility of the signifier, recast the 
signifying structure in terms of a dynamic and hence temporally implicated system of 
relations.60 The claim for diachrony, subordinated by Saussure, suppressed altogether 
by Hjemslev, was thus reinstated. Furthermore diachrony’s role was no longer 
subordinate to the vertical framework of the structure; with the assertion differance, 
Saussure’s spatial logic o f synchronic difference was not only temporalised but 
ineradicably subverted, movement within the system pointing to the impossibility of a 
final identity.61 The progress towards fixed meaning was based upon a system of 
differences in which the marriage o f the differential relation was infinitely deferred. 
Differance named both a dynamic movement within the system and the impossibility 
of the system’s stability or closure therefore. And whilst the qualification of an 
internal diachrony appeared to uphold the formalist opposition to extrinsic genetic 
accounts of meaning, the concept o f differance itself worked to erode the parameters 
upon which these founding distinctions lay. As the watch-word for a deconstructive 
“logic” and practice, differance was more than a linguistic principle or a textual 
strategy for reading, it was a means to questioning the conditions for the possibility of 
meaning and reality; whilst deconstruction was a critical outgrowth of structuralism,
59 “Super-structuralism” was the title o f  Richard Harland’s early work on Derrida and the new 
generation o f post-structuralists.
r° Derrida writes that “the theme o f  differance is incompatible with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, 
ahistoric motifs in the concept o f  structure”. Positions, trans. Alan Bass, University o f  Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1981. p.27.
61 Derrida propounds this pivotal perspective in the Writing and Difference essay “Force and 
Signification”. See Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 1-35.
161
the notion of differance was as much a critical descendent of ontological difference 
within the Heideggerian corpus as well.
Where Heidegger’s assertion of ontological difference after Being and Time 
asserted the absent conditioning of a present being, of being’s relationship to the 
absent, timeless essence o f being, and with it, an end to the unitary presence of 
Western onto-theology, Derrida’s assertion of differance proclaimed both fidelity to 
Heidegger and a radicalisation of his critique. According to Heidegger, ontological 
difference confounds the horizon of metaphysics, as the primary un-thought sthat 
metaphysics itself cannot think: “The essence of presencing, and with it the distinction 
between presencing and what is present, remains forgotten. The oblivion o f  Being is 
oblivion o f  the distinction between Being and beings.” 62 Accordingly Being’s 
resurrection marks the possibility of a new departure, into that singularising and pre- 
onto-theological modality o f poetic and apophatic thinking. But with differance, 
Derrida announced something more akin to the beginning of an inextricable albeit 
radicalised return to metaphysics, one which must follow in pursuit of this repression 
of difference at the site of its inception. In Derrida’s early work this suppression goes 
by the name of the phone, or rather the privileging of speech—as the locus of a full 
and self-present meaning, and a natural identity with thought—over the abstract and 
graphic re-presentational character o f writing. The binary associations of speech and 
writing (of presence, identity, immediacy and naturalness on the one hand, of absence, 
non-identity, mediation and artifice/technique on the other) for Derrida confirm the 
system of suppression named by Heidegger not in terms of being and beings, but of 
signification and the split between signifier (writing) and signified (speech). “The 
formal essence of the signified is presence, and the privilege of its proximity to the 
logos as phone is the privilege of presence.”63 With this linguistic permutation, of 
being as the logos, as phone (logocentrism), Derrida claims his advance upon 
Heidegger. If the privileging of presence and speech is also the privileging of the 
signified (the existent), then it follows that these terms must themselves be preceded 
by the cognate terms of the signifier. Thus Derrida asserts a more radical pre­
condition to the condition o f ontological difference; the onto-theological
62 Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, Harper and Row, 
New York, 1975, p.50. Quoted by Derrida in “Diffdrance”, Margins o f  Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, 
Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982, p.23.
63 O f Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1997. p. 18.
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determination of being as presence could not have lodged itself as the origin of 
metaphysics without the prior suppression of writing and the signifier. It is this 
suppression of the sign or “trace” within logocentrism, which gives rise to onto- 
theology not vice versa. Now differance and the pre-existent trace provide the 
condition of presence’s metaphysical privilege and the pre-condition for the 
possibility of differentiation in the first place. In this way Derrida claims differance to 
name a more “original” and a more radical relation which founds the apprehension of 
ontological difference and its suppression.
Yet whilst Derrida could be seen to draw the order of signification “further 
back”, this radicality was not to be thought of in the straightforward manner of a more 
primordial origin. As a relation, as a principle of the signifier’s constant deferral and 
difference, the radicality o f differance rests in its refusal of spatio-temporal 
determinations. Accordingly the indices of origin and end, archia and telos, 
metaphysics and its closure are disrupted, the relation of one to another depending 
upon the relative stability of its terms. In this way deconstruction worked to vitiate the 
standard hermeneutical/semantic account of meaning, subverting the rectilinear 
procession of signification and reference within the traditional historical framework 
and challenging the teleological assumptions implicit to both a generalised 
hermeneutical account of signification and interpretation (the dialectical progression 
from part to whole) and structuralist accounts of the code’s composition as a series of 
discrete identifiable units.
With Derrida, the theme of history was thus reintroduced against its 
monolithic inscription within classical philosophy, as a series of plural, partial 
histories, incapable o f being synthesised or any way completed because of the 
unceasing motion within the order of signification itself. In the absence of a unified 
and stable order of signification, and thence a unitary interpretive directive, 
significations must co-exist within multiple orders of historical interpretation, within 
distinct signifying chains, each with their own historicity, their own relation to other 
signifying orders. With Derrida the Heideggerian critique of anthropocentrism within 
Western metaphysics, in Kant as much as Descartes, became the deconstructive 
critique of logocentrism, of the speaking subject as the presumed origin of meaning 
and the point of a presumed fixity within history. In this way Derrida went on to 
expose and to deconstruct the operational prejudice for presence and being within the 
Western tradition and with it the cognate concepts of origin and end. In the absence of
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determinate origins, points o f present fixity, there could be no determinate point of 
finality, only the infinite deferral named by differance. As a principle of historical 
mediation the Derridean movement enjoins the critique of historicism and objectivism 
initiated by the hermeneutic philosophers of the previous century. But as a post- 
Heideggerian, critical of Dasein’s true radicality as a departure from the 
anthropological viewpoint, the onto-phenomenological emphasis of historical critique 
in Being and Time is supplanted by the more radical proposition of linguisticality, the 
order of signification and its infinite non-identity. Where Dasein emerges within the 
movement of Being, in the historicity of its relation to Being, the preceding conditions 
of signification and interpretation arise within the indeterminacy of the already 
emergent trace. Unlike the Heideggerian relation of Being and beings, the trace 
functions as a limit concept, intended to debar the possibility of a clear distinction 
between the two terms; the trace is neither before nor after, present nor absent.64 Thus 
Derrida’s Heideggerian affiliation, like Gadamer’s in this respect, belongs to the work 
of radical poetising subsequent to Being and Time. But as we shall see, Derrida’s 
relation to the later Heidegger is not a matter of straightforward complicity.
In Prophets o f  Extremity, a work dedicated to the aestheticist or singularising 
turn in Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida, Alan Megill introduces Derrida 
by way of an assimilation to Maurice Blanchot, an author and critic for whom the 
boundaries of the literary and the critical were consciously indistinct. In Megill’s 
words, Blanchot is a “negative Heideggerian”, “for while he insists, like Heidegger, 
on the ‘impersonality’ of art, he at the same time rejects the notion that art has ‘truth 
value’”.65 If this is an accurate portrayal of Derrida too (and there are many who 
challenge the repudiation of truth in Derrida’s texts) then Derrida’s relation to Ricoeur 
takes the form of more or less straightforward opposition with regard to the project of 
philosophical rationalism. As regards the question of literary theory and the textualist 
hegemony, Derrida’s prominence within literary theory will present the 
straightforward paradox of a discipline enthralled by the literary rhetoric of an 
essentially anti-literary thinker, one for whom the literary text is an impersonal, 
autotelic, irreducible and generically indistinguishable proliferation of chance 
significations. But if  Derrida’s renunciation of aesthetic truth is not of itself a
64 Whilst the trace works to negate the ruse o f  the transcendental signified, it is not necessarily wrong to 
read it de-ontologically, as a transcendental negativity.
65 Alan Megill, Prophets o f  Extremity, University o f  California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p.281.
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rejection of all truth, if  double meaning does not condemn us to a radical 
heterogeneity, then Derrida’s characterisation within the textualist paradigm will 
amount to a doubly paradoxical situation for literary theory: to a predicament wherein 
Derrida has been read both inaccurately and what is more, to the unnecessary 
detriment of literature’s aesthetic distinction.66 By calling Derrida’s scepticism into 
question, we thus call into question Derrida’s relation to Ricoeur, and by extension, 
the issue of Ricoeur’s relative exclusion within the literary theoretical paradigm. It is 
with their debate regarding double meaning and the metaphoricity of philosophical 
language, that this relation clarifies itself.
As fellow post-structuralists and fellow post-Heideggerians, both intimately 
schooled in the doctrine of Husserl, the proximity between Derrida and Ricoeur is 
confirmed by their respective theories of mediated signification. Together Ricoeurian 
distanciation and Derridean differance testify to the turn to a linguistically enriched 
mode of philosophical enquiry and a return to those questions of ultimate import 
previously excluded from the formalist enclosure. What Derrida’s enormous success 
facilitated was a return to the theme of reference (albeit deferred) and with it, 
language’s ontological relation; the mode of linguistically enriched philosophical 
enquiry they both practised rose to the fore, and signification was once more 
connected to its referential function within the philosophical arena. It is possible to 
see how in this light, Ricoeur’s project of a universal hermeneutic may have begun to 
look rather different, the attempt to connect the smallest unit of signification to 
questions of the largest philosophical import appearing less like an outmoded 
schematics and more like a modish expression of our ultimate implication within 
signification. But the overlap between differance and distanciation was by no means 
unanimous or thoroughly clear, and whilst it is possible to locate a profound sympathy 
between their grounding propositions (that signification is inherently mediated, that 
historical mediation is the condition for the possibility of meaning, of interpretation 
and historical consciousness, in essence the basic historicity of structure and the basic 
structurality of history), they strongly disagree over the contingency of these relations 
and the nature of their manifestation within the world/text/reader.
661 say all truth rather than aesthetic or literary truth in the conviction that Derrida does characterise all 
language as literary, but that such a characterisation is not an automatic condemnation o f all truth 
claims.
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Like Derrida, Ricoeur rejects the hypothetical completion upon which the 
code’s viability depends; signification is inherently unstable and therefore incomplete 
for both thinkers. But where Derrida accounts for this incompletion in terms of a 
negatively charged historical mediation (dissemination and deferral), Ricoeurian 
distanciation provides an all together more positive account, guided by the Kantian 
principle of imagination. For Derrida, differance points to the primacy of an 
irreducible semiological stratum, a restless “first term” or more accurately, “first 
relation” within signification. Crucially this relation of differences is not a simple 
negation which would prevent the possibility of signifying relations all together. 
Differance implies “an economic system of differences which in fact presupposes the 
intervention of the same.”67 For Derrida however, the semiological relation founds the 
possibility of signification and the signifying subject in the first place. Conditioned by 
this primary relation, there is no subsequent act of discourse which could presume to 
curtail its affect. For Ricoeur by contrast, the differential relation propelling 
signification constitutes a “functional instrument of discourse” itself. This means that 
the differential relation, the negative charge of signification, is in fact preceded by the 
positive charge of a projected identity. With the act of discourse, with predication, 
denomination, with shifters and indexicals, one seeks to fix meaning and to establish 
an identity. Whilst Ricoeur and Derrida agree over the essential composition and the 
essential historicity or movement within signification, they disagree over the primacy 
of the semiological relation (between identity and difference) and the order of its 
affect. Differance names an irreducible precedence from whence the signifying 
intentions of discourse first emerge. Distanciation on the other hand names the 
process or act whereby a projected identity works to limit difference and diminish 
instability for the time being. It is a dialectical exchange of identity and difference 
located in the schematising powers of the mind itself. Ricoeur’s semantic re-working 
of imagination testifies to this power to interpret and to re-interpret signification 
according to the infinite demands and infinite contexts of human experience. This 
power to describe and to re-describe the world for Ricoeur testifies to the existence of 
a regulative horizon or a principle of identity rooted within the wilful act of discourse 
itself. Like the new combinations of the Kantian schema, Ricoeur’s theory of
67 Derrida, Round-table Discussion Between Ricoeur and Derrida, Fifteenth Congress o f the 
Association o f the Society for Philosophy in the French Language, Montreal, 1971, reproduced by 
Lawlor, Imagination and Chance, ibid, pp. 131-163, quoted by Lawlor in the same text, p.49.
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semantic innovation testifies to the powers of assimilation borne of similarity and 
difference. And it is in the experience of poetic language, of metaphor—where 
semantic ambiguity and intellectual control enjoy their most intense complicity—that 
this principle of imaginative enlargement is most readily felt. So it is that metaphor 
provides the semantic kernel at the very heart of Ricoeur’s theory of imagination and 
understanding, and the nodal point of intersection with Derridean deconstruction.
Looking to Ricoeur’s text therefore, we intend to gain a clearer understanding 
of the Ricoeurian hermeneutic as regards literary interpretation, and with regard the 
implied polarity of hermeneutics and deconstruction within textualist discourse.
Metaphor and Poststructuralism
That metaphor should have proved hermeneutics’ point of intersection with 
deconstruction was no coincidence. With a return to the issue of reference, in Derrida, 
Ricoeur and the Anglo-American philosophers whom they both discussed, came a 
necessary return to the question o f fictional reference, at the heart of which metaphor 
in its unrestricted definition lies. Save for some notable exceptions, the question of 
metaphor within philosophy had heretofore remained a theme upon which very little 
had been said within the Continental tradition. For this reason it was an obvious topic 
for a discipline seeking to re-evaluate its own parameters and prejudices. But 
metaphor was not just an incidental issue to be drawn into the philosophical fold like 
an overlooked interest. As the principle figure of rhetoric, and the figure which 
intersects most readily with philosophy, the question of metaphor resuscitated the 
question of disciplinary parameters. As Ricoeur writes, “rhetoric is philosophy’s 
oldest enemy and its oldest ally. ‘Its oldest enemy’ because it is always possible for 
the art of ‘saying it well’ to lay aside all concern for ‘speaking the truth’”.68 Whilst 
past philosophers had sidelined metaphor as a superfluous stylistic device of little or 
no philosophical import, metaphor’s growing centrality within non-philosophical 
contexts—in psychoanalysis, in linguistics and structuralist poetics for example 
suggested an altogether more motivated and tactical suppression within the text of 
philosophy, one which chimed in perfect harmony with the overlapping critiques of
68 Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, 
SJ, Routledge, London, 2003, p. 10.
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Marxist theorists and structuralists at the time. On this view, metaphor’s potential 
cognitive imports had not been underrated or overlooked, but consciously suppressed 
by a discipline seeking to safeguard the propriety of its own language, its own 
concepts and thus its own epistemological hegemony. If metaphor was in any way 
constitutive of rational thought, it would severely jeopardise the purity of its own 
distinctions, and not only for the Platonist or the objectivist who held conceptual 
truths to exist in a ready-made manner. And so one finds both the British empiricists 
and the French rationalists studiously ignoring metaphor or exiling its claims outright. 
By the logic of this argument even Hegel, notable and rare in his direct attentions to 
metaphor, is complicit within the suppression of its disruptive powers. By this account 
one reads of Hegel’s entire dialectical effort in terms of a kind of neutralising of 
metaphor’s affect. Rather than exiling metaphor outright, Hegel incorporates it within 
the dialectical progress towards Spirit. With Hegel metaphor is granted a positive role 
within the process of concept formation, but one which is then neutralised and 
absorbed by the concept’s teleological advance. In this way metaphor is accredited but 
it is also controlled in such a way that any threat to the stability of the concept is 
quickly repudiated. Whilst Hegel’s incorporation of metaphor within philosophy was 
a rare exception, from a postructuralist vantage it represents the ingenious ruse of a 
conquering and repressive metaphysics all the same.
Whilst there were certain exceptions to the rule, a handful of figures who 
sought to address metaphor as a constitutive power, none were powerful enough to 
foment a serious challenge to its negative treatment as a mere accessory explicable by 
formal rhetoric. A philosophical irrelevancy or a philosophical danger, the dominant 
theory of metaphor function and its affectivity remained virtually unchanged until the 
rise of Kantian phenomenalism and philology in the nineteenth century conspired to 
challenge the govemability of rhetoric’s formal relations, between language and ideas, 
“proper” meanings and their immutable references. Indeed, with the rise of romantic 
aesthetics, metaphor’s horizon expanded to incorporate the very act of creation itself, 
taking on the associated values borne of a radical aestheticism. The governing and 
substantive position to which art ascended in this period, thanks to the concentration 
and enlargement of the Kantian aesthetic in Schiller and Schelling most notably, 
transformed the process of artistic representation into a glorified mode of immediacy, 
into an instance of re-presentation, wherein the work itself was equal to the essential 
truth it described. This represented not only a transformation of the classical concept
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of mimesis in its dubious Platonic light therefore; it was also a radical inversion of the 
concept’s hierarchical priority within philosophy. By this account concepts belie their 
phenomenal status, dissimulating what is in fact an insupportable mode of humanly- 
independent truth. But with the disordering of conceptual categories within the 
imagination, the aesthetic process reawakens the complex multiplicity of potential 
truths that have been shut down within the determination of concepts. What is more, 
the mode of recognition within the aesthetic experience is deemed to be one of vital 
immediacy. Romantic aesthetics in fact inverted the priority of conceptual knowledge 
over artistic pleasure, placing art in the role of an unmediated and original experience. 
An actuality rather than a mere copy, aesthetic truth was deemed to surpass the 
purported truth of concepts insofar as concepts, in their rigidity, confined the complex 
reality of perception to the ordered categories of its unique epistemic viewpoint.
And yet in spite o f this dramatic inversion, or perhaps precisely because of it, 
the borders of metaphor’s postructural renaissance are circumscribed not by the 
romantics, but by the lone precursor Friedrich Nietzsche, whose complex relations to 
the romantics can be seen to bridge the claims of an aesthetic immediacy and an 
infinite mediation. Nietzsche’s most celebrated pronouncement upon philosophical 
metaphoricity demonstrates the reversal proper to this shift from a positively 
productive view of metaphor, in which the metaphor would participate in the 
prioritisation of an aesthetic immediacy, in the unification of subject and object, of 
heretofore unconnected categories within the transfer of the name, to a sceptical 
aestheticism wherein the figure of the trope exposes the lie of intuition, and the 
humanly authored illusion of conceptual transcendence. Man “strives to understand 
the world as something analogous to man, and at best he achieves by his struggles the 
feeling of assimilation”.69 It is this feeling of assimilation that bears the lie of idealism, 
the lie of transcendent concepts:
What then is truth? A movable host o f  metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum o f  human relations which have been 
poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, 
after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths 
are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that 
have become worn out and have been drained o f sensuous force, coins which
69 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, extract from Clive Cazeaux (ed.), 
The Continental Aesthetics Reader, Routledge, London, 2000, p.57.
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have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as
70corns.
Now the figure of the trope is not a means to intellectual unity, but a testament to the 
concept’s illusory grasp. With this pronouncement Nietzsche thereby opened the way 
for a discourse of unlimited metaphoricity, for an interpretive relativism in the manner 
of Richard Rorty, and for the scepticism of the textualists. But what the latter group 
missed was the fundamental irony of Nietzsche’s position. The illusory character of 
the concept does not condemn man, rather it confirms him in his humanity, creating 
him within the culture to which man and his concepts give rise. To this extent a flatly 
nihilistic reading of Nietzsche depends upon the hidden continuity of the romantic 
framework, one in which the impossibility of the concept would exile man from the 
natural universe. Paradoxically, given the romantic prejudice against hermeneutics, it 
is the perpetuation of these romantic values (and their origins) which determines the 
measure of the rift between textual scepticism and a postructural hermeneutics.
When Nietzsche re-launches the question of metaphor under the aegis of 
deicide and metaphysical apocalypse (in The Gay Science), it is the Platonic aspiration 
to transcendent knowledge he deconstructs, not historical man in his imperfect 
knowledge, and certainly not the poet maligned by Plato. This paradox rebounds upon 
our own question regarding the literary-theoretical reception of poststructuralist 
discourse. For one may argue that metaphor’s disruption of the metaphysical concept, 
of philosophical truth, is ultimately premised upon the same polarising framework 
established by Plato himself; one must choose literature or metaphysics, metaphor or 
concepts. The logic of the Nietzschean deconstruction of metaphysics, when read non- 
ironically, implicates the same framework, for the impossibility of a capitalised truth 
within philosophy is an assertion premised upon the same Platonic irreconcilability of 
concepts and metaphors; genealogically speaking, metaphysics is thwarted by the 
concept’s “contaminated” root in sensible meanings. The paradox of counter- 
Platonism within a postructural context, the kind exemplified by Derrida, is that it 
utilises the same criterion of discontinuity. Revoking the possibility of pure discourse 
upon the grounds of an inherent metaphoricity, it too confirms the intransigent 
opposition established by Plato. It remains to he seen how accurate a picture o f  
Derridean deconstruction this really is. But there is plentiful evidence to suggest in
70 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, ibid., p.56.
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the form of primary readings and subsequent counter-readings—that the conditions of 
literary theory were ripe to interpret matters in this way.
This paradox rebounds upon our own perplexity concerning the literary- 
theoretical preoccupation with certain modes of deconstruction at the expense of a 
poststructural hermeneutics. As we have said, the question is predominantly one of 
reception histories; why should literature departments have taken so readily to 
elements of a discourse in which literature’s ontological distinction is voided, in 
which all discourse becomes “merely” literary upon the basis of an unbounded 
metaphorics? Why should theoreticians of literature have chosen to import the most 
philosophically sceptical approaches to the literary work, approaches grounded in 
Nietzschean scepticism and the projected rivalry of literature and philosophy? Why 
limit poststructuralist critique to the rivalry of a Platonic framework?
It would be facile and unduly cynical to suggest (as a great many have) that 
literary theorists simply misread deconstruction or chose to exaggerate the anarchic 
aspects of Derridean practice for their own enthrallment; literary postmodemity, the 
call of radical heterogeneity, radical metaphoricity and radical instability—in Paul 
Muldoon, in Angela Carter, Paul Auster, Don DeLillo or any other author of lit.- 
theory’s high-noon— were surely responses to, rather than prompts for a suitable 
philosophy? Doubtless Plato’s injunction against the poets, representing as it does a 
kind of agonistic and heuristic foil to the history of the liberal canon, has something to 
do with this. If literary-critical history has been shaped by this Platonic preoccupation, 
if, as the examples of Shelley and Eliot both attest, Platonism constitutes the unifying 
rebuke of all ages, then it is clear to see how the Nietzschean inversion, in its 
powerful contrariety and conformity to the rule, could come to dominate the literary
• • • • * 7 1imagination, and perhaps misconstrue deconstruction in terms of a similar inversion.
But perhaps the most coherent explanation for the paradox of “inverted 
Platonism” and an unbounded metaphoricity within literary studies, follows from the 
theoretical core of its own long-held, yet speedily jettisoned aspirations for 
epistemological probity, and the long-tenanted formalism upon which this ideal was 
premised. Surely the more radical, more irrationalist readings of deconstruction within
71 It follows from our own postructural eyes that we look upon romanticism as the most luminous 
rebuttal of Plato, but one which all the same remains fixed within the Platonic framework; in his 
inordinate originality, Shelley’s poet conquers the statesman not by contradicting him but by 
outflanking him. If this latent fidelity fuels the critique o f  metaphysics in Nietzsche, then Nietzsche’s 
relation to Heidegger and Derrida, and their own pronouncements upon metaphor, could quite easily be 
read in terms o f this continuity also.
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literary theory were not a product of poor reading, but the logical consequence of a 
discipline indoctrinated by its own claims for autonomy? With their shared desires to 
jettison the jargon of metaphysics, the New Critics and the structuralists in fact 
proceeded to confirm the very character upon which the poets’ civic exile was based, 
namely a non-standard relation to “reality” and truth. The poet’s dissimulation of 
reality, the criterion o f intrinsic form and the arrested or rather short-circuited 
reference of the Jakobsonian autotelic all confirm literature’s status as a deviant, 
irregular or unique mode of signification in which the standard relation between 
naming and things/ideas is in some way subverted. That the formalists transform this 
into a positive trait—the grounds for an autonomous and quasi-scientific discipline— 
does not effect the fundamental framework upon which the distinction rests in the first 
place, that is between standard reference (in Platonic terms primary representation) 
and a subverted metaphorical self-reference (secondary representation, a duplicity that 
fails to speak of the thing it names). For both Plato and Jakobson it is the inner 
metaphoricity of literary language which debars it its truth claims. It is only this 
Platonic equation of truth and standard reference, fiction and metaphor, which enables 
the so-called collusion of metaphor and metaphysics named by Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and arguably Derrida, to be interpreted as an indictment of all truth claims anywhere. 
Inverted Platonism repeats the Platonic prejudice against metaphorical reference 
therefore. That the proponents of literary studies should have shot themselves in the 
foot so to speak, anointing the professed collusion between metaphysics and 
metaphorics, confirming the inherently literary nature of philosophy, and thereby 
reducing literature’s unique status within the liberal-humanist paradigm (beyond the 
repetitious claim of singularity), follows from the metaphysical refusal of 
metaphorical reference. Against this refusal, Ricoeur and Derrida postulate an 
historically mediated mode of reference. It remains to be seen however, how these 
modes of mediation differ with regard to the character of their manifestation and their 
ultimate implications for philosophy and literature. It is not until the very end of The 
Rule o f Metaphor that Ricoeur contrasts his own theory of metaphorical reference and 
philosophical truth with that of Derrida, and it is only once the dynamics of this rule 
and its pivotal role for thought have been digested, that Ricoeur s true relation to
Derrida can be appreciated.
To best appreciate Ricoeur’s and Derrida’s common departure from the 
Platonising equation of truth and standard reference, from idealist metaphysics and
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modem formalisms, it is worth attending to the opening movements of The Rule o f 
Metaphor. Here we find Ricoeur attacking metaphor’s superficial reduction as a non­
standard reference and preparing the way for a theory in which metaphor is 
philosophically fundamental. Central to this move is the invalidation of the standard 
substitution theory of metaphor from whence both a self-referential poetry and a 
deceitful poetry arise.
Rhetoric Old and New
Perversely, it was not Plato but Aristotle who furnished metaphor’s defining 
characterisation, as “the epiphora of the name”, a transfer or substitution of a non­
standard figurative name for a standard name. The critical issue surrounding this 
definition for subsequent critics—Ricoeur especially—relates to the issue of what 
today we would call its semantic content. A substitution theory of metaphor focussed 
upon the word, the exchange o f one word for another, determines a fundamentally 
extrinsic, formal view of metaphor in which the meaning or content of the message 
remains the same. Upon a substitution view, metaphor can be translated into a literal 
utterance without any loss or deviation to the message. This is because the logic of 
substitution is understood upon the basis of a shared and pre-existent resemblance 
between the two terms. So whilst metaphor is apprehended upon the basis of a 
predicative deviation it is understood upon the basis of a predicated resemblance. In 
this way the meaning of the substituted term is extended to incorporate the literal 
meaning it replaces. Equally, the substituted term can easily be translated or re­
substituted for the literal term without any change to the overall meaning. “Hence the 
substituted figure does not represent any semantic innovation”.72 By extension the 
metaphor cannot be seen to have any particular cognitive function within the 
apprehension of reality. Of course for the ancient realists and the ancient idealists this 
was just so, and for the modem rationalists who followed—keen to ensure the validity 
of their own concepts—there was no cause to revise this theory of minimal 
philosophical disturbance.
72 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol”, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f  Meaning, 
p.49.
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Accordingly Aristotle s treatment of metaphor does not actually arise within 
the compass of philosophy but between the pages of the Poetics and the Rhetoric. It 
was the veritable success of Aristotle’s distinctions between the two, and more 
importantly their distinction from philosophy, which Ricoeur claims to have sealed 
metaphor’s fate as a superficial stylistic phenomenon and a philosophical irrelevancy. 
The persistence of a substitution theory of metaphor in which the content does not 
change, is intimately bound up with rhetoric’s progressive independence from (or 
depending upon one’s view, growing containment by) philosophy. For Ricoeur, 
whose entire argument is built upon the opposing view—that metaphor is not a simple 
substitution between words, but constitutes an integral phase within the creation of 
new meaning and the apprehension of new ideas within philosophy—a critique of this 
disciplinary segregation is a crucial corrective to the presumed incompatibility of 
metaphor and philosophy.
But whilst Aristotle provided rhetoric’s founding distinction, instituting the 
classificatory divisions of rhetoric, poetry and philosophy, curtailing metaphor’s 
affectivity as an external substitution of terms, rhetoric’s decline into little more than 
a hierarchy of tropes, “defunct” and “amputated” from the realm of reflective thought, 
was the work of subsequent minds. In Aristotle, Ricoeur informs us, rhetoric still 
retained a strong link to philosophy insofar as he defines it against the empty flattery 
and seduction of sophistry.
With Aristotle we see rhetoric in its better days; it constitutes a distinct 
sphere o f philosophy, in that the order o f the ‘persuasive’...is  solidly 
bound to logic through the correlation between the concept o f persuasion 
and that o f the probable.73
Upon the basis of this link between the rhetorical concept of persuasion and the 
logical concept of the probable, Aristotle constructed “the whole edifice of a 
philosophy of rhetoric”.74 Furthermore, the basis for rhetoric’s distinction from logic 
was grounded upon the dialogical, that is to say inter-subjective and dialectical 
character of persuasion, a criterion that once more disabuses rhetoric of its sophistic 
connotations upon the basis of its responsiveness and engagement with the other.
Similarly Aristotle grants poetry, and by implication poetic metaphor, its own
73 Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, ibid., p.31.
74 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 11.
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degree of reflective and cognitive validity, defining it as the presentation of valid 
truths by fictional means. Rescinding the Platonic characterisation of mimesis as an 
inferior modality of presence and an imitation based upon pure resemblance, 
Aristotelian imitation exists as the reciprocal element of a creative process. What 
poetry intends is not the static imitation of an extrinsic reality, but rather “to speak the 
truth by means of fiction, fable, and tragic muthos”. 75 Accordingly, the measure of the 
poetic work s truthfulness is not a measure of its fidelity to the living world but rather 
its capacity to articulate genuine truths fictionally. For Aristotle “the work of art can 
be judged on purely intrinsic criteria, without any references (contra Plato) from 
moral or political considerations, and above all, without the burdensome ontological 
concern for fitting the appearance to the r e a lf1(> Aristotelian mimesis “preserves and 
represents that which is human, not just in its essential features, but in a way that 
makes it greater and nobler”:
There is thus a double tension proper to mimesis: on the one hand, the 
imitation is at once a portrayal o f  human reality and  an original creation; 
on the other, it is faithful to things as they are and it depicts them as 
higher and greater than they are.77
From the double bind of mimesis and muthos comes the suggestion that poetry 
exceeds the parameters of resemblance, instantiating new and previously unforeseen 
meanings. Such a thesis inevitably leans towards a productive rather than a 
reduplicative view of literary language. By extension, it would seem to oppose those 
predominantly rhetorical theories to which metaphor belongs as the merely decorative
75 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 13.
76 Ricoeur, ibid., p.47. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle distinguishes three spheres o f knowledge,
the theoretical (episteme), the productive (techne) and the practical (phronesis). Where the theoretical 
pertains to necessary truths, to things that cannot be other than they are, the practical realm of ethics 
and the productive realm to which art belongs both admit o f things being otherwise. Art and ethics 
contrast with one another according to the relationship between their means and their ends. In ethics, 
means and ends are indissociable; the ethical act is an end in itself. With art, where means and end do 
not coincide, Aristotle opens the way for a debate surrounding the possibility o f art’s ethical end, which 
would distinguish it both from its technical production and from its subordinate position within the 
Platonic scheme. This is precisely what Wordsworth and Coleridge advocate when, acknowledging 
poetry’s status as techne, they assert poetry’s distinct ethical force. As Ricoeur’s quote makes plain 
however, such an interpretation is inspired by ambiguity more than any definitive statement on 
Aristotle’s part; in Aristotle the poetic work has truthfulness, but at the same time such truthfulness 
need not reflect extrinsic moral, political or ontological criteria. See David P. Haney, “Aesthetics and 
Ethics in Gadamer, Levinas, and Romanticism: Problems o f Phronesis and Techne”, Publications o f  the 
Modem Language Association, Vol. 114, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 32-45.
77 Ricoeur, Rule o f  Metaphor, p.45.
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appendage of a referential content. Indeed, whilst Aristotle defines metaphor in terms 
of a substitution, Ricoeur tells us that he also grants metaphor two distinct functions 
(one pertaining to persuasion and rhetoric, the other to poetic presentation). Not only 
does metaphor not compromise these disciplinary parameters, it actually founds them. 
By this reading, metaphor’s function precedes the mode of representation to which it 
appears to belong. In this determinative role metaphor can be seen to inculcate an 
important distinction between modes of re-presentation and representation itself, 
between what are in fact modalities of presence, distinct from the representations they 
offer. By implication, the supposed complicity of metaphor and dissimulation, be it 
the rhetorical deceit or the poetic illusion, is bome of a partial metaphysics, wherein 
the primary instantiation of the metaphorical function is mistaken for the sensual form 
in which it is clothed.
For those familiar with the theory of discourse, there is a compelling parallel 
to be drawn here: as modes of discourse, rhetoric and poetry possess separate 
functions, but as discourse in general, they share the same operations. Most 
importantly, these operations are granted ontological independence from the 
representations they bear. Just as the theory of discourse works to combat the 
formalist claims of structuralism within Ricoeur’s critique of semiology, so the 
implied parity within Ricoeur’s Aristotelian opening, with its emphasis upon 
metaphorical function, presents a challenge to the perpetuation of Platonic values 
within modem formalist accounts of metaphor, accounts which must, by virtue of the 
code’s distribution, subscribe to the cognitively superficial theory of substitution 
common to rhetoric. By privileging synchronicity at the expense of diachrony, 
structural semiotics must also privilege a paradigmatic model focussed upon the 
relations between individual signs. Even whilst the sign’s referential autonomy 
exorcises the metaphysical association of the literal with the “proper”, of a word’s 
natural correspondence to an object or an idea, it is still treated like a word in so far as 
the sign represents the fundamental bearer of signification to which all other levels of 
organization within language are deemed homogeneous. Where English language 
authors followed the example of propositional logic, and focussed their attentions 
upon the sentence, “the overriding preoccupation” of Saussure was to identify, to 
define, to demarcate the fundamental linguistic unit, the sign . Whilst this formal
78 Ricoeur, ibid., p .l 19.
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emphasis would become increasingly radicalised, Saussure’s dedication to the single 
unit was also compounded by French semanticists, who framed the science of 
signification entirely upon words and their deviation, and by whom Ricoeur claims 
the initial Saussurean science of signs to have been influenced. Whilst the theory of 
the sign would later absorb the semantic theory of the word, Ricoeur claims “the 
Saussurean sign is par excellence a word”.79 It is this word or sign monism which 
forbids the possibility of an interaction theory of metaphor at the level of the sentence 
in French linguistics and which, in spite of itself, repeats the basic theory of 
substitution named by Aristotle. The possibility of an interaction theory of metaphor 
is thus debarred upon the basis of the presupposition that there is no greater level of 
organization than the primary difference upon which signs depend. By refusing the 
possibility of a higher level unit such as the proposition, French linguistics was 
confined to a theory of figuration based upon the substitution of one name for another.
In postulating the co-existence of two signifying units, the sign and the 
sentence, Benveniste’s theory o f discourse overlaps with the propositional emphasis 
of the English language philosophers without denying the important role of the sign. 
As an irreducible unit within its own right, the sentence is by definition more than the 
sum of its parts. By necessity the metaphor must be construed as an affect of the 
sentence in its entirety and not as the transposition of a word’s figurative counterpart. 
And so Ricoeur’s Aristotelian opening within The Rule o f  Metaphor serves a purpose 
beyond historical excursus. Whilst Aristotle himself granted rhetoric and metaphor 
philosophical profundity, the very success of the distinction of poetics and rhetoric in 
fact predisposed rhetoric to the reduced status it eventually held, as a superficial, and 
by extension philosophically inimical stylistics, an etiolated taxonomy of tropes 
divorced from the reflective movements of thought itself. This lament, for the 
philosophical depletion of rhetoric and metaphor, a depletion which furthermore was 
not inevitable but was rather the drawn-out consequence of a defensive and 
imperialistic Platonism, also serves as a premonitory caution and a paradoxical 
foreshadowing of latter-day metaphor theories within French linguistics. And this 
paradox, which Ricoeur turns against some of the more recent characterisations of 
metaphor—portrayals consonant with the wider critique of metaphysics also turns 
upon the over-riding paradox by which our own current study is propelled.
79 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 120.
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Why, we ask, did literary studies enshrine themselves within the self- 
abnegating scepticism of textualism and relativism, positions which read double 
meaning as a condition of irreducible despair? The treatment of metaphor within 
philosophy, between the movements of romanticism and anti-romanticism and an 
anti-metaphysical formalism, brings this history into focus. But what the question of 
metaphor brings into real focus is the line of continuity by which these vacillating 
impulses are fixed within the same Platonic paradigm. In classical rhetoric as in 
structuralism, metaphor is limited to a word for word substitution. If metaphor is a 
simple substitution, then by necessity, the transposition from a literal to a 
metaphorical nomination is of no intrinsic cognitive value; substitution presupposes a 
pre-existent value and a pre-existent sign for that value. Metaphor deviates from 
standard reference but it does not innovate. By extension, the work of literature 
constitutes a necessarily derived and imitative representation, a translation, creative 
only to the extent that it deploys an interesting or unusual choice of figurative 
window-dressing. In textualism, where the idea of intentional rhetoric is discarded for 
the irrepressible logic of an autonomic grammar, the idea of metaphor as a conscious 
act, or as a work of creativity is conclusively lost from sight. Unmoored from design 
and intention, all language falls into the chasm of an unfathomable metaphoricity, to 
the detriment of both literature and the critical discourse by which it presumes to 
know itself. All language is “contaminated” by metaphor, all interpretive discourse 
“mere” literature. At one and the same time metaphor is universal and necessary but 
cognitively really rather superficial.
It is against this homogenising drift, with its reductive implications for 
literature and creativity, that Ricoeur’s renunciation of the substitution theory and the 
elaboration of an interaction theory of metaphor at the level of the sentence (the 
minimal unit of discourse), rather than the single word, militates.
Metaphor and Discourse
Of course the structuralists would reject the philosophical implications 
inherent to the interaction thesis not because they wished to safeguard metaphysics, 
on the contrary, but because the parameters of its field debarred the external postulate 
of the predicative act. With the sign undergoing its absolutist expansion in the years 
subsequent to the Cours de linguistique generale, the disciplinary boundaries that
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Saussure had once himself set were, as we have noted, essentialised into something 
more akin to ontological conditions. With the subject of predication supplanted in 
favour of a structural systematicity, the indissoluble unity of the predicate would have 
been an entirely alien and contradictory proposition based upon the logical anteriority 
of the subject and its cognitions. What divides the theories of substitution and 
interaction and what makes them representative of the wider gulf between the two 
traditions concerns the issue of the code’s autonomy. Within a substitution theory of 
metaphor a sign may be replaced by another sign without interference from 
surrounding signs. Because substitution confers no actual change upon the message, 
upon the signification as such, the change that does occur only exists as a temporary, 
localised and superficial alteration to the extrinsic relation of signifier and signified. 
Essentially metaphor confers no lasting change upon the code or the internal relations 
between its signs. In this sense the code retains its synchronic autonomy from the 
creative designs of language-users. Alterations exist as deviations to be minimised 
and ironed-out by the code. Upon a substitution theory, metaphor remains beholden to 
the code it subverts, its impact as cosmetic and ephemeral as it was for classical 
rhetoric.
In Jakobsonian linguistics, the binary rule may stipulate the sign’s dependency 
upon other signs, but it is still the unitary signifier which bears the particular weight 
of a given signification. Change to the system is synchronic, affecting every unit 
simultaneously and individually; the sign therefore never integrates with other signs. 
In the 1953 article “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbance”, Jakobson famously transformed metaphor from a limited operation 
within language into one of language’s two constitutive modes of distribution. The 
production of meaning for Jakobson could be aligned along one of two poles, the one 
metaphoric, wherein signs arrange themselves paradigmatically, according to a 
criterion of selection (and hence substitution) based upon resemblance, the other 
metonymic, where a syntagmatic arrangement is drawn from the combination of 
contiguous elements. In consequence Jakobson not only ramified metaphor s classical 
definition as a word for word substitution based upon similarity, overlooking the 
Benvenistean distinction of semantics and semiotics (for Jakobson all units are 
reducible to the sign, hence the idea of interaction at the level of the sentence is lost 
within a generalised account of metonymic or metaphoric arrangements between 
signs), he also entrenched metaphor’s characterisation as a synchronic structure,
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which, in its configuration as a substitution, must oppose the metonymic pole of 
contiguity and combination just as the synchronic opposes the diachronic. Just as 
rhetoric s decline from a philosophical discipline focussed upon speech, upon the 
intertwining of nouns and verbs (Aristotle’s definition of the logos), to a taxonomy 
of tropes divorced from the dialogical situation, was the product of a growing 
preoccupation with the single word, with naming and attribution, so the formalist drift 
away from speech repeated this tendency.
Within the interaction theory by contrast, new meanings emerge from a set 
of particular and possibly unique combinations forged in the historical instance; signs 
interact with one another in heretofore undiscovered ways leading to a revision of the 
code’s internal relations. The code’s synchronicity is subordinated to the historical 
movements of an external, historical principle. For the structuralists, studiously aloof 
from the logical positivist and ordinary language traditions of Britain and America, 
the proposition of an interaction theory of novel meaning would have opposed the 
substitution theory with all the contrary indications of a subject-bound metaphysics, 
with semantic innovation gesturing squarely towards the kind of reflective and 
productive powers of a Kantian epistemology. Without the cross-fertilizations of 
phenomenology and structuralism within poststructuralist hermeneutics and 
deconstruction therefore, the paths of the French linguists and the Anglo-American 
language philosophers may have remained as intellectually removed from one another
on
as their precursors, Saussure and Frege, had once been. A rare collaborator and co­
respondent amongst his peers, Ricoeur’s dialectical vision in The Rule o f  Metaphor is 
staunchly focussed upon bringing these two theories and the traditions they represent 
into dialogue with one another. In a less ecumenical spirit, Derrida was also bringing 
the Anglo-American challenge to the forefront of French thought at this time. Ricoeur 
was unique in taking these claims and appropriating them to the wider policy of a 
general hermeneutics o f existence. Once more, it was the example of Benveniste and 
the dialectical potentialities of discourse which facilitated this symbiosis.
80 The Fregean tradition, being directed towards the external world, towards reference as well as sense, 
towards Austinian “speech acts”, chimed with the existential emphases o f  phenomenology without 
opposing the objectivity asserted in formal theories. Ricoeur writes o f their polarity within the French 
tradition: “The ‘return to the speaking subject’ which Merleau-Ponty foresaw and began, following the 
later Husserl, is conceived in such a way that it rushes past the objective science o f signs and moves too 
quickly to speech...Because from the beginning the phenomenological attitude and the objective have 
been placed in opposition...”. “The Challenge o f  Semiology”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations, p.242.
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If the smallest unit o f discourse comprises the sentence and the sentence is 
irreducible to the semiotic unit o f the sign, then a discursive treatment of metaphor 
must automatically challenge the classical and formal monism of rhetoric and 
structuralism. Discourse’s in-built capacity to transcend the constraints of language’s 
systematic and formal aspect, to “touch” the reality it names, and for language users 
to reflect upon the mechanisms of this feat, all conform to the hermeneutical 
movement of thought characterised by Ricoeur’s own methodology in The Conflict o f 
Interpretations. Just as the study of multiple interpretations entails a semantic, a 
reflective and an existential stage, so the function of double meaning within Ricoeur’s 
rule of metaphor operates according to a principle of reflective interpretation, wherein 
metaphor’s referential (and existential) reality—for thought and perception—both 
confirms and is confirmed by the reflective abilities innate to language-users. True to 
the logic of The Conflict, Ricoeur grounds metaphorical function within the theory of 
discourse, repeating the characteristics there distinguished as formative traits for a 
consideration of the semantic, the reflective, and ultimately the existential traits of 
metaphor. It is from these existential traits that Ricoeur will eventually gesture 
towards his own poetic ontology, and it is from these implications that a Ricoeurian 
perspective of literature and literary interpretation will eventually be drawn.
The dialectic of immanence and transcendence, potentiality and actuality to 
which Benveniste’s semiotic/semantic distinction attests, and its justification for a 
discursive treatment of metaphor at the level of the sentence, are compounded by 
ordinary language philosophers, some of whom Ricoeur enlists in his earlier critique 
of formal linguistics in The Conflict essay “Structure, Word, Event”. Once again 
Ricoeur starts by stipulating the fundamental dialectic of event and meaning which 
distinguishes discourse from la langue\ Benveniste’s criterion of the instance of 
discourse speaks of an event in meaning. Whilst meaningfulness makes the event 
“eminently repeatable”, this repeatability is not to be confused with an element’s 
identity within a system. The event in each instance is singular to the extent that 
someone speaks forth from the particularity of their context. We recall that the 
intentionality of the speaker conditions the possibility for language to transcend itself 
in speech, and for language to “stick” to the world. For Ricoeur, Paul Grice s 
delineation between utterance meaning, meaning of utterance and utterer s meaning 
corroborates the discursive interplay and separation of meaning and event and the 
designation of a subject. It “belongs to the very essence of discourse to allow these
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distinctions” he writes. Another “fundamental polarity” of discourse is borne out by 
P.F Strawson’s “identifying function” and “predicative function”. In the “interlacing” 
of nouns and verbs within discourse, one always finds the identification of individuals 
and the predication of universals. Every proposition bears upon a “logically proper 
subject” and the predication of universal properties such as relations, adjectives of 
quality or classes to which the individual belongs. “The notion of existence” Ricoeur 
writes, “is linked to the singularizing function of language. Proper logical subjects are 
potentially existents”.81 On the other hand, the predication of universals concerns the 
nonexistent; there is thus “an ontological dysemmetry of subject and predicate” which 
has its equivalent within the distinction of semiotics, with its generic function, and 
semantics’ “view to the singular”, where there is always a subjectivity designated 
within the act of speech. It is only within discourse that a universal term can take on 
singularising qualities therefore.
The theory Benveniste himself assimilated to discourse very easily was J.L 
Austin’s conception of speech acts. With the locutionary act of saying one is able to 
“anchor” within language a corresponding mental or illocutionary act. Discourse 
provides a content (of predication and identification) whilst distinguishing the 
particular act of the locutionary agent. Within discourse the same locutionary content 
can apply to different illocutionary acts. Such a distinction points to the moment of 
transcendence in discourse, when a potential meaning is actualised and individualised 
through the realisation of agency in the instance of speech. Whilst Frege’s famous 
separation of sense and reference applies to the content of speech, to the message 
rather than the relation of message and messenger, it too substantiates the same 
movement from a potential generic meaning to its specific realisation. In order to 
distinguish what is said (sense) from that o f  which one speaks (reference) one must 
first acknowledge the sentence as a fundamentally distinct and indivisible unit; it is 
only in the full composition of the sentence that one may speak of sense and reference. 
And it is only in the actualisation of speech that reference to an outside world can 
distinguish itself from an immanent sense. The pairing of sense and reference thus 
confirms the sentence— as the possibility of this interplay as the unit of discourse, 
and discourse as the rightful model through which to analyse communication. In the 
concept of reference one finds a postulate of transcendence, of a relationship between
81 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.82.
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language and the world, signs and things such as discourse and semantics promote, 
whilst sense delivers one once more to immanence and the intra-linguistic relations of 
semiotics. The pairing o f sense and reference hence confirms the existence of two 
non-homogenous levels of signification such as a semantics of discourse upholds, the 
one pertaining to combination/integration at the level of discourse (semantics), the 
other, to the differential system o f signs, phonemes and morphemes at the semiotic 
level distinguished by Saussure.
Ricoeur’s final two pairs of traits are not attributed to other philosophers but 
certainly overlap with the former in their implications. Within reference itself there is 
both reference to reality and reference to a speaker.
To the extent that discourse refers to a situation, to an experience, to 
reality, to the world, in sum to the extra-linguistic, it also refers to its own 
speaker by means o f  procedures that belong essentially to discourse and 
not to language.82
These procedures include personal pronouns and the tenses of verbs, both of which 
are “auto-designative”. Personal pronouns in themselves possess no significance, they 
are “asemic”, but in the instance of discourse “I” serves to designate a reference to the 
one who is speaking. It is only when someone speaks and self-designates that “I” 
signifies. Because discourse is distinguished by its eventhood, as the moment of 
speech, Ricoeur asserts “the personal pronoun is the function of discourse essentially”. 
With verb tenses and many adverbs, speech is anchored within the present, 
confirming the actuality of the present instance of discourse. “Insofar as it is auto- 
referential, discourse establishes an absolute this-here-now” and a definite subject. 
This referential dialectic between speaker and reality recalls the theory of speech acts, 
for the illocutionary modalities o f the sentence express the way in which a speaker 
engages with his discourse. Ordering, asking, and imparting are all modalities of the 
I-here-now, communicative acts dependent upon the auto-referential aspect of 
discourse.
82 Ricoeur, ibid., p.86. By “language” Ricoeur means the linguistic system named la langue by 
Saussure, but discourse is not commensurate with Saussure’s counter-concept o f parole. The latter does 
not involve discourse’s dialectical relation to the system. Only in discourse is the sentence accredited as 
an irreducible unit.
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The traits with the most immediate consequences for metaphor Ricoeur saves 
until last. Benveniste s distinction o f semiology and semantics calls for a revision of 
the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic such as they are understood by semiotic 
linguists such as Jakobson. According to the structuralists’ binary law, paradigmatic 
relations belong to the semiotic sphere (to the synchronic system), the syntagmatic to 
the arrangements of meaning within sentences. If, as so many have previously 
claimed, metaphor is a matter of substitution, and substitution is a paradigmatic law, 
then substitution is a semiological operation. This means that a discursive treatment 
of metaphor would have to call its operations syntagmatic. As a phenomenon of 
discourse, therefore, metaphor is no longer a paradigmatic case and the process of 
metonymy it follows can no longer be called syntagmatic. For if discourse stipulates 
the sentence its smallest measure, then metaphor must be considered the meaning 
effect of word interactions within a sentence, that is, syntagmatically.83 Whilst 
semiotic units are homogeneously organised, all conforming to the law of internal 
difference, and are therefore reducible amongst themselves, the sentence marks the 
point at which a new integrative signifying function emerges. The justification for a 
discursive treatment of metaphor based upon syntagmatic relations within the 
sentence rather than the paradigmatic law of substitution—which follows if one does 
not recognise the unity o f the sentence— once more revolves around the limitation of 
Saussurean linguistics and the consolidation of alternative models. The opening to 
metaphor’s philosophical reawakening comes not with the growth of linguistic 
science, therefore, but with I.A Richard’s bold and revisionary rehabilitation of 
rhetoric in the 1930s. Against the hemmed-in and superficial listings of a 
degenerative tropology, Richards introduces a distinctly discursive vision in which 
the mechanisms of trope acquire profound cognitive implications. Dominant amongst 
these processes is the metaphorical, which Richards calls—in stark contrast to its
^  The question o f the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic, metaphor and metonymy was raised to a level 
of paramount importance in Paul de Man’s major publication Blindness and Insight. It is testament to 
Ricoeur’s distance from American deconstruction that de Man insists upon metaphor s ultimate 
reducibility to metonymic structures. For de Man, the idea that metaphor creates irreducible 
innovations in meaning is an illusion, a kind o f wish fulfilment inherited from the romantics. For de 
Man the illusion o f metaphor—a symptom o f unrigorous reading—is a correlate o f the romantic symbol, 
with its presumed synthesis o f  disparate categories. Unscrupulous reading belies the aporetic 
irregularities with which the text itself resists such easy assimilations.
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prior determination as a deviation and as a work “done on” language—“a talent of 
thinking” and “the omnipresent principle” of all linguistic constructions.84
Turning away from the dominant formalism of French linguistics, Richards 
provides Ricoeur with the first major consideration of metaphor beyond substitution, 
and the first opening towards an interactive theory fit to accommodate the principles 
of Benvenistean discourse. Ricardian rhetoric is discursive insofar as it confirms the 
reversal of word/sentence priority named by Benveniste. With this reversal Richards 
attacks what he calls the “proper meaning superstition” upon which a classical word 
substitution theory of metaphor operates. This is the false belief that words in their 
literal form adhere to fixed entities and ideas and that a metaphorical “deviance” 
entails the substitution of an “improper” name for that of the “proper”. It is the same 
intransigent relation which dominates naming within the Cratylus. By contrast 
Richards formulates a “context theorem of meaning” based upon a principle of 
“delegated efficacy”. Now what a word signifies is a function of context and not a 
“fixed association with data” (Ricoeur). But this is not an argument based upon 
associative psychology by any means. Delegated efficacy names the range of 
potential meanings salient to the word in a given context where context names “a 
whole cluster of events that recur together”.85 Context thus enables one to refine a 
word’s current determinations by means of the interpretive instance rather than 
convention. What a word means at any one time is “the missing parts of the contexts 
from which it draws its delegated efficacy”.86 Delegated efficacy and context thus 
confirm a sentential unity in which words together comprise the context’s missing 
parts. In discourse different contexts (attached to different words) interpenetrate 
within the sentence, but they do so with varying levels of stability. As products of 
their contexts therefore, the interpretability, clarity and “stability” of words in a given 
discourse are contingent upon the stability of word-context. And context stability 
within discourse grants the measure of discourse’s semantic character, its degree of 
ambiguity, figuration or its univocity. The more interaction there is between different 
contexts within the sentence, the less stable and the more multivocal its discursive 
character. By contrast, a low interaction amongst contexts produces univocal, 
scientific and technical discourse. Contrary to classical wisdom, it is the extreme
841.A Richards, The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, p. 90, quoted by Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.92.
85 Richards, ibid., p.34, Ricoeur, ibid., p.89.
86 Richards, The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, p.35, Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.89.
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stability attached to univocal meaning and not the relative instability of ordinary 
language which deviates from the norm. Literary language, which operates at the 
other end of the spectrum, consists in restoring “the interplay of the interpretive 
possibilities of the whole utterance”.87
From this it follows that metaphor is the product of interaction amongst 
contexts. Far from being a special case, a departure from the norm affected for 
decorative or persuasive purposes, metaphor is pervasive and “omnipresent”, a 
principle of language usage not a secondary product. A “transaction between 
contexts” is no “simple transfer of words” but rather “commerce between 
thoughts”.88Metaphor is thinking itself. With metaphor however, there is not simply a 
convergence of two thoughts, two contexts within the one phrase however. The 
figure’s distinction rests in a moment of disruption which, preventing a total synthesis 
leads to the partial obscurity of one of the two thoughts. One thought, the “tenor”, is 
thus described through the other, the “vehicle”. Crucially this vehicle does not 
conform to the usual decorative function since the metaphor results from the equal 
interaction of the two components. In metaphor, the vehicle is changed as much as the 
tenor. Literal meanings are now nothing more “proper” than instances in which tenor 
and vehicle are indistinguishable.
As well as quashing a theory of substitution based upon an illusion of proper 
meaning, Richards challenges the standing assumption that metaphorical relations 
pertain only to resemblance. Whilst the relationship between tenor and vehicle 
exhibits an underlying rationale or “ground”, resemblance is just one amongst a range 
of possible connecting logics. It is connection itself, in what ever direct or tangential 
form it may take, which grounds the metaphor. “The mind” Ricoeur quotes from 
Richards,
is a connecting organ, it works only by connecting and it can connect any
89
two things in an indefinitely large number o f  different ways.
Metaphor is the figure of thought par excellence. Ricoeur concludes,
87 Richards, ibid., p.55, Ricoeur, ibid., p.91.
88 Ricoeur, ibid., p.92.
89 Richards, ibid., p.125, Ricoeur, ibid., p.93.
186
There is no language, then, that does not bestow meaning on that which 
first created tension in the mind.90
But if tension is a pre-requisite of connection, Richards’s does not elaborate this 
condition himself. Richards’ rhetoric is primarily dedicated to the interactive 
functioning of the sentence itself. For Ricoeur, seeking to demonstrate the ultimately 
linguistic nature of understanding and imagination, it will be necessary to show how 
this tension is already a bestowal o f language itself. Max Black’s logical grammar 
provides a decisive advance in this direction.
Black’s first refinement is to clarify the relationship between the metaphorical 
statement and the word. Even as an interaction at the level of the phrase, there is still 
undeniably a key word upon which the metaphor hinges. It is the presence of this 
word which justifies a metaphorical interpretation. Thus Black gives us a terminology 
with which to distinguish the metaphorical statement, the “frame”, from its operative 
word, the “focus” without returning thought to the old illusion of proper names. The 
focus word functions in relation to the rest of the phrase, thus confirming and 
clarifying Richards’ interaction theory.
For Black, the theory of interaction opposes the classical model of substitution 
irreconcilably. Substitution involves replacing the literal expression with an 
expression which in its usual usage covers a different sense. The equivalence of these 
expressions means that it is possible to translate the one into the other. There is thus 
no cognitive gain involved in metaphor. Models based upon similarity and analogy 
are just expressions of a more fundamental substitution in which likeness is presumed 
to pre-exist the trope itself. As Black intends, the example of similarity, always a 
subjective quality in any case, emphasises the false mode of mimetic realism 
underlying the substitution theory. In Richards’ context theorem the principle of 
substitution is rejected but still the metaphorical rationale is one of comparison; the 
vehicle leads us to apprehend relative qualities within the tenor. Reducing comparison 
to a mode of substitution (on the basis that comparison draws forth analogy and that 
analogy produces a literal translatable equivalent) Black rejects all theories which 
postulate, like the rhetorical taxonomists and like Richards s notion of context and 
rationale, that metaphor depends upon the existence of a common ground . There is
90 Ricoeur, ibid., p.95.
187
no such pre-existent entity for Black, only the edict borne of the metaphor itself, 
which tells us to “connect two ideas” in some way.
Black entrenches the polarity of substitution and interaction, of semiotics and 
semantics, providing us with a theory in which a distinctly living, discursive system 
of associated commonplaces” supplants the predetermined grounds of substitution. 
Within every community of language-users there exists this system of connections, 
opinions and preconceptions borne of language usage itself rather than pre-existent 
facts. In a metaphor one finds these systems operating in complicity with literal word 
uses governed by linguistic laws. In combination they invoke a “system of 
implications that lends itself to more or less easy invocation”.91 So to call a man a 
wolf as Black demonstrates, evokes a lupine system of associated commonplaces. But 
to speak of them, semantic and syntactical laws command the deployment of a wolf- 
language which screens the field of potential associations, suppressing some whilst 
accentuating others. This constitutes an irreducible operation of the intellect which 
paraphrase cannot match.
Black’s theory leads to sizeable questions concerning the validity of his stark 
distinctions between the semiotic and the semantic, substitution and interaction. 
Whilst Black equates his method of “logical grammar” with semantics and opposes 
this semantics to both syntactic and “physical inquiry”, he cannot in fact provide a 
purely grammatical analysis which could identify metaphorical values independently 
of utterance contexts, actions and speaker-intentions. And as Ricoeur points out, the 
existence of certain metaphors across language divides points to a phonetically and 
grammatically independent constitution, to the importance of “pragmatics” as much 
as semantics. What is more, a system of associated commonplaces does not strictly fit 
within a semantic model. Whilst the implications and preconceptions of 
commonplaces are “governed by rules to which the speaking subjects of a linguistic
• • 92community are ‘committed’”, they are not themselves lexical entities. Black may 
wish to stress these rules against a psychological view of commonplaces but what 
they in fact point to in Ricoeur’s view, and what Black fails to elaborate, is the 
“creative activity”, cognitive but not psychological, that such a system implies. And 
this problem relates to other issues concerning the production of meaning within 
Black’s theory. How, for example, can Black account for the creation of genuinely
91 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 101.
92 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 104.
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novel patterns of association such as one expects of the greatest literary productions? 
Can common associations account for the rare, epoch-changing moments by which 
our literary and social history is punctuated? What of Eliot’s opening lines in 
Prufrock lines which draw themselves, figure themselves between the failing sky of 
old and the muted aspirations o f a new idiom—or what of Shakespearean innovation, 
for that matter?
Black’s theory does not surpass the enigma of creativity, “of novel meaning 
beyond the bounds o f all previously established rules”.93 In fact neither Black nor 
Richards are capable of joining the semantic thrust of their analyses to the existential 
implications of a metaphorical mode of cognition. This is an inability which Ricoeur 
attributes to the absence of any clarification of the semantic relation to reference, or 
rather, the obliteration o f reference within a purely sense-orientated semantics. This 
lack is what motivates Ricoeur’s final example of a non-substitutional theory of 
metaphor, taken from the literary critical perspective of Monroe Beardsley. Clearly 
the question of meaning within a literary critical semantics will always implicate 
referential concerns at some level. Hermeneutical questions of truth and meaning are 
the obvious consequence o f an analysis directed, as literary criticism is, towards the 
whole work; provenance and consequence belong to the work’s totality, after all.94
Because the primary concern for Beardsley is the meaning of the work in total, 
and because he takes the metaphorical utterance and the work as homogeneous 
units—the metaphor comprising a poem in miniature, the poem an expanded 
metaphor or the organon of multiple irreducible metaphors—metaphor analysis is to 
provide him with a test case for the work in total. And the question he puts to the 
work is precisely one o f truth content or lack thereof. Beardsley wishes to justify the 
process of literary interpretation against relativism. If metaphor can be shown to have 
a determined and explicable content, then so too can the work of literature. From our 
own vantage point, we find a focal confluence of themes within Beardsley’s approach. 
Our own concern for Ricoeur follows precisely the same impulse against literary 
critical relativism as Beardsley’s. And Ricoeur’s interest in Beardsley is catalysed by 
the clarity which a literary critical attitude towards the work sheds upon a semantics 
of metaphor. Beardsley’s is a significant signpost along the path to an implied
93 Ricoeur, ibid., p. 104.
94 A formal semiotics is the exception, o f  course.
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ontology an implied ontology of the work—within a detour through metaphor 
therefore.
But Beardsley’s overarching concern for the work in total is intersected by the 
philosophical distinction of his discipline; for literary critics the meaning of the work 
and the meaning of the language are not one and the same thing. As a hermeneutics, 
literary criticism distinguishes itself from naive readings upon the basis that it 
temporarily suspends the passage from sense to reference. Bracketing reference in 
this way, literary criticism reverses the order of priority between the two Ricoeur 
claims. In literary criticism the ontological import of the work’s meaning is 
suspended in favour of its verbal design, as discourse comprised of an “intelligible 
string of words”. Whilst spontaneous discourse automatically moves towards its 
referential fulfilment, literary criticism forestalls this fulfilment, subordinating the 
referential function to the internal semantic functioning of sense. In this way the 
question of reference is only taken up again in light of an explication of sense; 
splitting up the movement from sense to reference, a semantics of literature then 
reverses their priority. But what significance does this hold for metaphor or indeed for 
metaphor’s cognitive import?
The prioritisation of sense over reference, of internal semantic configurations 
over referential objects, clearly compounds the philosophical commitments attached 
to the principle of discourse, gesturing, like Richards’s and Black’s theories, towards 
a semantically mediated mode of cognition. In Black and Richards however, sense 
remains an internal property sealed off from the metaphor’s proposed reference. 
Ultimately, whilst gesturing towards an interactive theory, the incompatibility of 
metaphorical sense and literal reference only conforms to another mode of the 
substitution theory; metaphor has sense upon the basis that it cancels out a literal 
reference. But with Beardsley’s concern for the overarching work, metaphorical sense 
and literal reference acquire their own dialectical productivity; with Beardsley 
metaphor leads to the reassessment of the work’s reference in terms o f  its sense.
With his aspiration for a non-emotive and non-relativistic definition of 
literature, semantics for Beardsley, as much as Ricoeur, holds the key to a non- 
psychologistic account of interpretation. Defining the work semantically in terms 
of a sentence to which the work itself is homogeneous—Beardsley draws the external 
opposition between cognitive and emotive interpretations into the internal workings 
of the sentence itself. Semantically speaking, the sentence comprises an explicit
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primary statement and an implicit secondary suggestion. In a correlative move, 
Beardsley divides the word into an explicit denotative function and an implicit 
connotative function. The interplay between connotation and denotation within a 
given word is determined according to the specific contextual character of the 
sentence to which it belongs, with the context exerting a kind of filter effect upon the 
range of potential connotations. As with Richards, it is the degree of stability within 
this context, between its components, which determines the variable degree of 
connotative or denotative value within its range. The more determined the sentence’s 
context, the fewer the connotations. The stronger the words’ denotative values, the 
more determined the sentence’s context. Accordingly in technical discourse one finds 
connotation at a customary zero degree, whilst literature conforms to a maximal 
degree of connotative “liberation”. But whilst the liberation of connotative powers 
promotes a degree of ambiguity within literary discourse this is not a justification for 
relativistic criticism; connotative liberation is by no means a mode of confusion or 
irreducible heterogeneity. On the contrary, literature is the construct of a pre-eminent 
design, in which the primary and secondary, the denotative and connotative, are of 
concurrent value. Finally, whilst Beardsley confirms the basic pattern of Richards’ 
and Black’s theories— metaphor as a kind of attribution comprised of a primary 
subject/focus/tenor and a secondary modifier/vehicle/frame—he also revises the 
presumed character of the relations between the two components, asserting the role of 
incompatibility over and above any shared similarity or resemblance between the 
subject and the modifier.
With the stress upon incompatibility, the Ricoeurian vision of productive 
interpretation truly sets sail. If metaphor is a form of “logically empty attribution”, or 
a “self-contradictory attribution”, then it automatically presents thought with a work 
of interpretation. Metaphorical sense is the production of thought alone, the projection 
of a heretofore unprecedented meaning forged in the initial clash of primary 
meanings.95 It is the reader’s resulting impulse to sift the context of connotations for a 
secondary meaning adequate to the requirement of sense. And it takes the literary 
critical practitioner of semantics, a practitioner who arrests the movement towards
95 Ricoeur points out that whilst numerous tropes conform to the criterion o f empty or contradictory 
attribution—none more so, for example, than the oxymoron— metaphor’s distinction rests in its greater 
degree of ambiguity. Unlike the oxymoron, metaphor does not point to the direct contradiction of a 
“living death” for example, but to a range o f  possible connotations which indirectly contradict the 
subject.
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reference in order to analyse the sense of words alone, to perceive this productive 
function. According to Beardsley, “metaphor transforms a property (actual or 
attributed) into a sense”.97
With the criterion o f similarity neither Richards nor Black could broach the 
logic of association within metaphor. This meant that neither of them could account 
for the emergence o f new and perspective-altering metaphors. Upon such theories 
metaphor could only clothe a pre-existent sense within a deviant form, a “proper” 
meaning within a “figurative” one. Because Beardsley situates the figurative within a 
relationship of incongruity, because he elevates the role of sense over reference, and 
because this transposition deposes the standard ontological hierarchy of the literal and 
denotative as the “proper”, Beardsley enables Ricoeur to anticipate a theory of 
fictional reference premised upon the temporary suspension of an actual reference 
within the mind of the interpreter.
It is the reader, in effect, who works out the connotations o f  the modifier 
that are likely to be meaningful.
For this reason, metaphorical attribution is superior to every other use of 
language in showing what “living speech” really is; it is an ‘instance of 
discourse’ p a r  excellence. Accordingly, Beardsley’s theory is directly 
applicable to new ly invented metaphor.98
It is for this reason that Ricoeur entirely disregards the cognitive import of dead 
metaphors and catechresis, for in such instances the impertinence, the initial semantic 
clash within the predicate, has been almost entirely neutralised, either by usage or 
necessity. Because it is only the instance of novel, live metaphor which activates an 
interpretive command upon the reader, and thence the possibility for re-orientating 
one’s view of the world, it is only the live metaphor which arouses questions of
9  ^ If one wishes, as the literary critic does, to attend to the work’s semantics properties, one must first 
suspend the question o f its ontological import. There is thus a duality within the notion of meaning 
which corresponds to the work’s verbal design on the one hand, and its reference on the other. The 
possibility of this duality is a condition o f  discourse itself. A semantics o f the sentence within literary 
criticism gives rise to two possible notions o f  meaning; what the work intends, its reference to an 
outside world, and its immanent sense. In contrast to natural language, where sense automatically 
passes over into reference, literary criticism splits these traits and suspends the spontaneous motion 
towards reference, thereby reversing the order o f their priority.
97 Beardsley, Aesthetics, p.302, quoted by Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p .l 13.
98 Ricoeur, ibid., pp. 111-112.
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genuine cognitive validity. According to Ricoeur dead metaphor is not strictly 
speaking metaphor but rather an element of the lexis; a metaphor that has so long ago 
lost its innovative edge as to have been entirely standardised or literalised. Between 
the live metaphor and its lexicalisation there lies a gulf of historicity, of usage, so vast 
as to render them epistemologically discontinuous, a thesis corroborated by the theory 
of speech acts and one from which the semiotic, that is to say synchronic account of 
metaphor is necessarily exiled. As we shall see, dead metaphor is the concept’s hope, 
not its despair.
Imagination and the Birth of the Figure
Whilst Beardsley “accentuates the inventive and innovative character of the 
metaphorical statement”, a semantic theory of sense alone cannot justify the transition 
from a predicative impertinence to a new predicative pertinence." Semantics cannot 
explain interpretation itself, even if it constitutes the pre-eminent possibility for such 
a task. Following the pattern established in The Conflict, the semantic moment of 
interpretation must be exceeded, or mediated, by a subsequent reflective moment. It 
belongs to the power of reflection alone— albeit linguistically mediated—to facilitate 
the hermeneutical passage from interpretation to that which eventually confirms 
philosophy’s highest task, namely ontological understanding. If metaphor founds the 
possibility for new disclosures regarding our perception of the world, then 
metaphorical interpretation must proceed along similar lines. With this transition we 
are led into a territory of thought hitherto unmentioned, but one which implies itself 
every time we speak of metaphor in terms of a “work” or a “production”. To the 
reflective moment of live metaphor Ricoeur appropriates the Kantian theory of 
productive imagination. By means of this appropriation the relationship of mediation 
between language and consciousness can be seen to revolve full circle, for where 
language mediates the procession of thoughts and meanings according to the 
vicissitudes of form and historical happenstance, so the generation, both of language s 
formal distribution and its semantic evolution, are mediated by the offices of 
productive imagination.
99 Ricoeur, ibid., p .l 12.
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For Ricoeur, imagination is the “third term, the intermediate term” between 
sensibility (sensory perception and experience) and understanding (intellection).100 To 
put it another way it is the principle of distanciation in psychic actuality. Since 
understanding is a capacity to put matters into words, and this capacity is itself 
conditioned by imagination, Ricoeur can assert an innate circular dependency 
between imagination and predication. This model is no more apparent than in the 
production of metaphorical meaning, where Ricoeur claims imagination to mediate 
and assimilate an initial impertinence, or “category mistake”, to an eventual 
pertinence, where one finds the creation of new relations between categories. 101 The 
Kantian schemata are thus transposed from an order of pure self-presentiality 
(idealism) to the language-orientated horizon of postructural hermeneutics.
There are three distinct moments to chart within the procession of semantic 
innovation, the first being the predicative assimilation of an initial impertinence. 
Within the metaphor one finds an ill-fitting order of categorization between the 
subject and its predicate (between the focus and its frame), two clashing “categories” 
that must somehow be reconciled. But in order to understand the metaphorical value 
of this “mistake”, “one must continue to identify the previous incompatibility through 
the new compatibility”.102 The good metaphor retains a tension within the mind of the 
interpreter, between the literally incongruous and the metaphorically valid, between a 
prior order of categorisation and its re-organisation. Upon the basis of this tension a 
likeness can proceed to emerge.
The insight into likeness is the perception o f the conflict between the 
previous incompatibility and the new compatibility. “Remoteness” is 
preserved within “proximity”. To see the like is to see the same in spite of, 
and through, the different. This tension between sameness and difference 
characterises the logical structure o f  likeness.103
100 Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles Kelbey, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1965, p.57
101 Ricoeur borrows the term “category mistake” from Gilbert Ryle. See The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.201 
and “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling , Critical Inquiry, Vol.5, No. 1, 
Autumn 1978, pp.143-160, p.148; the concept o f  “category mistake” “consists in presenting the facts 
pertaining to one category in the terms appropriate to another. All new rapprochement (between terms) 
runs against a previous categorization which resists, or rather which yields while resisting...
102 Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling , ibid., p. 148.
103 Ricoeur. ibid.
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The restructuring of categories is a dialectical operation which retains the previous 
order of categorisation in tension with the new order. Such is “the schematism of 
metaphorical attribution” in its semantic, “quasi-verbal” aspect.104 In metaphor, it is 
schematization that enables the birth of a new predicative pertinence to rise from the 
ashes of impertinence. At this point Ricoeur defers to the Kantian schema, one 
function of which is to provide images for a concept. The schema is a method for 
giving an image to a concept. It is, Ricoeur writes “the very operation of grasping the 
similar, by performing the initial predicative assimilation answering to the initial 
semantic shock. Suddenly, we are seeing as...; we see old age as the dusk of day, 
time as a beggar, nature as a temple with living pillars.”105
In the second phase this newly apprehended similarity proceeds to grant a 
“pictorial dimension”, a “quasi-optical” image but an image that is none the less still a 
“being pertaining to language”. 106 When one encounters the poetic image, the 
schematisation of metaphorical language creates what he calls a “reverberation”. The 
imagination is “diffused in all directions, reviving former experiences, awakening
1 ft7dormant memories, irrigating adjacent sensorial fields.” Within the image there is 
what Ricoeur calls a projection o f possible meanings and a schematic synthesis of 
these potentials, of semantic fields which have hitherto been unconnected. Where the 
initial semantic interaction conforms to the play of Black’s division of frame and 
focus—the clash between the contextual setting of the phrase as a whole, and the 
particular term which bears the shift in meaning—the production of the image, of 
metaphor’s “iconic” aspect, constitutes a second order interaction between the 
conceptual import o f Richards’s tenor and the contrasting modality of its quasi- 
sensible vehicle.108 Whilst the image does not form a part of the initial semantic 
operation, iconic presentation is none the less controlled, limited and guided by the 
potentials of the semantic field; the image is “bound or tied to the emerging meaning”
Ricoeur, ibid., p. 149.
105 Ricoeur, “Imagination in Discourse and in Action”, From Text to Action; Essays in Hermeneutics II, 
trans. Kathleen Blarney and John B. Thompson, The Athlone Press, London, 1991, p. 173.
106 Ricoeur adopts the latter phrase from Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics o f  Space. See Ricoeur, The 
Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling”, ibid., p. 149.
107 Ricoeur, ibid.
1011 But this relationship is not condemned to the endless vacillation o f interpretive possibilities, the 
over-riding context o f the metaphorical statement, the frame, restricts the play o f  potential projected 
meanings between image and schema, enabling an eventual determination or synthesis according to a 
criterion of fittingness.
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and is thereby integral to the emergence of any future conceptual identification to 
follow from the metaphorical predicate.109
By displaying a flow o f  images, discourse initiates changes o f logical 
distance, generates rapprochement. Imaging or imagining thus, is the 
concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities. To 
imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture o f  something but to display 
relations in a depicting mode. Whether this depiction concerns unsaid and 
unheard similarities or refers to qualities, structures, localizations, 
situations, attitudes, or feelings, each time the new intended connection is 
grasped as what the icon describes or depicts.110
As a novel synthesis and a new production, Ricoeur’s Kantian image conforms to the 
kind of poetic instantiation attributed to the totality of the poem such as one finds 
within a poetics of singularity. We may recall Gadamer’s reference to the Lutheran 
proclamation of the word as “standing written” in The Relevance o f  the Beautiful; as a 
pure presence, the poetic word transcends the usual division of its sensible and 
intelligible aspects to become a kind of icon, an unmediated presence that must be 
opposed—irreconcilably— to the sign’s representational and referential character. In a 
similar fashion, the poetic image of the Ricoeurian imagination is neither a copy of 
some naturalistic phenomenon nor a kind of psychological replica or memory. In 
those instances, the image, like the sign, merely represents a form of pre-existent 
reality, an absent reality, but a reality no less. With the novel synthesis of the 
metaphorical image, however, no such absent presence pertains. Although the 
metaphorical image is almost certainly comprised of elements that are drawn from 
reality, the metaphor, being irreducible to its components, has no such basis within 
the real world. Lacking reference to the real world therefore, the metaphorical image, 
unlike the representational image with its absent original, is deemed both fully present 
and unreal}n Of course the Ricoeurian image is not to be confused with the word of 
Gadamerian poetics; the image is a psychological consequence of the word, lacking in
109 Lawlor, Imagination and Chance: The Difference Between the Thought o f  Ricoeur and Derrida, 
ibid., p.67.
110 Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling”, ibid., p. 150.
111 The mental actualisation o f  the image and the objective content o f expression participate within a 
dialectical relationship therefore. But this relationship is not to be condemned to the endless vacillation 
of interpretive possibilities either; the over-riding context o f  the metaphorical statement, the frame, 
restricts the play o f potential projected meanings between image and schema,- enabling an eventual 
determination or synthesis according to a criterion o f  fittingness.
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materiality. Nevertheless, in their depictions of an unprecedented signification, the 
Ricoeurian image and the Gadamerian word confirm their rootedness within a shared 
attitude towards the nature of imagination.
True to the Gadamerian model, the Ricoeurian image is certainly not that 
mode of pure origin named and shamed within the “misguided Kantianism” of the 
idealists. The Ricoeurian image is intrinsically intertwined with the predicative 
process, with the objective limits of expression and the formal limits of predication. 
These are the productive constraints upon which the emergence of the image depends. 
Equally, the success o f the predicative assimilation is a response to the insistence of 
the image. From the “thickness of the imagining scene displayed by the verbal 
structure” comes “the intuitive grasp of a predicative connection”. 112 Image and 
predicate are thus engaged within a relation of dialectical dependency catalysed by 
the initial “grasp” of intuition. Whether we use the Kantian term or the more 
hermeneutical term of “pre-understanding” named in the hermeneutic circle, it is the 
specific hermeneutical status o f intuition which founds both Ricoeur’s theory of the 
semantic, metaphorical imagination and the Gadamerian poetics of singularity.
Somewhat before the purported turn in his thinking, roughly between the 
years of 1926 and 1936, Heidegger had immersed himself in what has become known 
as his “Kantian decade”, a period upon which he would reflect—with somewhat 
uncharacteristic humility— that it was “as though scales fell from my eyes and Kant 
became for me an essential confirmation of the rightness of the path on which I 
searched.”113 His reading of Kant was characteristically iconoclastic however. In true 
provocation he re-wrote Kant’s theory of productive imagination in terms of an 
“aesthetic ontology”, in which Heideggerian Being and Kantian productive 
imagination were drastically elided. Projecting his own fundamental postulate of 
temporality over the condition of pure imagination, Heidegger wrote that ‘ The 
imagination forms in advance and before all experience of the object, the aspect in the 
pure form (Bild) of time and precedes this or that particular experience of an
112 Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p. 151. „ _
113 Heidegger, Phdnomenologische I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Winter 
Semester 1927/28, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 25, ed. Ingtraud Gorland, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 
1977, p. 431, quoted (and translated) by Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Kantian Turn: Notes to his 
Commentary on the Kritk der reinen Vernunft, Review o f Metaphysics, 45.2, Dec. 1991, pp. 328-361, 
p.329.
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object . Against the reductive polarity of a purely productive or a purely 
reproductive imagination, Heidegger wrote that,
As a faculty o f  intuition, imagination is formative in the sense that it 
produces a particular image. As a faculty not dependent on objects of 
intuition, it produces, that is forms and provides images. This “formative 
power” is at one and the same time receptive and productive 
(spontaneous). In this “at one and the same time” is to be found the true 
essence o f the structure o f imagination.115
In a most enlightening and useful text, Richard Kearney attributes the genuine 
development of the hermeneutical imagination—as an historically constrained and yet 
critically autonomous operation— almost solely to Ricoeur and his theory of semantic 
innovation.116 Unqualified though I am to comment upon this, the third and final step 
of Ricoeur’s rule o f metaphor certainly presents a critical development away from 
Heidegger and Gadamer, and one which must surely contribute to the qualification of 
this high accolade. Although, as Kearney relays, Heidegger himself confirmed 
imagination as the ultimate source of all knowledge, and although Gadamer rejects 
the aestheticist implications of Kantian idealism, neither thinker in fact develops a 
theory of imagination which could adequately explicate the link between poetic 
disclosure and non-poetic modes of understanding. Ricoeur’s rejection of the Kehre 
and the continuity of his critique o f Heidegger, between Being and Time and The 
Origin o f the Work o f  Art, here asserts itself. For where the early Heidegger failed to 
demonstrate the link between ontological understanding and historical knowledge— 
“as the derived form of a more primordial form”—the later Heidegger fails to show 
the connection between the most primordial of poetising and language in its derived 
forms. Indeed, with Heidegger’s turn to thinking and poetising the demand for such a 
link all but disappears.
The truth of poetry for Heidegger and Gadamer rests in its capacity to open up 
new modalities of being, ways which are all too often obscured by our technological 
and verificationist attitudes towards language. In this way the truth of poetry stands 
in irreconcilable opposition to the order of conceptual determination. This opposition,
114 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem o f  Metaphysics, trans. J. Churchill, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1962, p. 140.
115 Heidegger, ibid.
116 See Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl o f  Minerva, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004, p.36.
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between standard representation and poetry was fomented in the altogether abstruse 
context of structuralism. We recall that Jakobson distinguishes the poetic according to 
an essential deviation in the referential function. For the most radical structuralists the 
poetic and the referential were mutually exclusive terms; the function of poetry being 
to elevate the code, the function of reference being to efface the code and to name an 
external reality.117 Whilst Ricoeur’s Rule o f  Metaphor testifies to a unique mode of 
signification within poetry, Riceour does not place this distinction in irreconcilable 
opposition to standard reference. Rather, in the third and final stage of the 
metaphorical process Ricoeur espouses a theory of “split reference” consequent to the 
production of the image and the instance of iconic augmentation.118
Ricoeur is keen to point out that Jakobson himself did not so much oppose the 
referential to the poetic as he distinguished an alternative, non-standard mode of 
reference within the poetic. The ambiguity of the poetic message does not destroy the 
referential function so much as render it doubly, that is to say ambiguously, referential. 
It is from Jakobson himself then, that Ricoeur draws the final stage of “split 
reference” within the metaphorical process. True to the hermeneutical path outlined in 
The Conflict (from the semantic to the reflective to the existential), this conclusion 
comprises a kind of phenomenological epoche, or suspension of the metaphor’s direct 
(literal) reference. As with the production of metaphorical sense, the emergence of 
metaphorical reference at once abolishes and maintains the initial literal significance; 
the standard literal reference is the negative condition from whence, in Ricoeur’s 
terms, a more primordial reference is bom. Just as metaphorical sense is not a flat-out 
oxymoron or contradiction, but rather the birth of a new semantic pertinence forged in 
the ruins of a literal impertinence, so the failure of the metaphor’s literal reference, 
the initial suspension of reference “is the negative condition for the emergence of a 
more radical way of looking at things”.119 Ricoeur writes that
117 Given the antinomial pressures these discourses otherwise exert, it is little wonder that literary 
theory should have fortified the assertion o f these ivory tower limitations, against the contrary
indications of the Ricoeurian hermeneutic. , . , .
118 Iconic augmentation being the point at which Heidegger and Gadamer make their claims for poetic
singularity. n
119 Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling , p. 154.
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there is no other way to do justice to the notion o f metaphorical truth than 
to include the critical incision o f the (literal) “is not” within the 
ontological vehemence o f the (metaphorical) “is”. . . 120
Ambiguous reference calls for a mode of what W. Bedell Stanford calls “stereoscopic 
vision” between a false literal reference and a supposed figurative reference. It is their 
interplay alone which creates a new “vision” of the world.
Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative assimilation 
between terms by its synthetic insight into similarities nor does it merely 
picture  the sense thanks to the display o f  images aroused and controlled 
by the cognitive process. Rather, it contributes concretely to the epoche o f  
ordinary reference and to the projection  o f new possibilities o f  
redescribing the world.
In a sense, all epoche is the work o f imagination. Imagination is 
epoche. As Sartre emphasized, to imagine is to address oneself to what is 
not. More radically, to imagine is to make oneself absent to the whole o f  
things. Yet I do not want to elaborate further this thesis o f  the negativity 
proper to the image. What I do want to underscore is the solidarity 
between the epoche and the capcity to project new possibilities. Image as 
absence is the negative side o f  image as fiction. It is to this aspect o f the 
image as fiction that is attached the power o f symbolic systems to “re­
make” reality, to return to [Nelson] Goodman’s idiom. But this 
productive and projective function o f  fiction can only be acknowledged if  
one sharply distinguishes it from the reproductive role o f the so-called 
mental image which merely provides us with a re-presentation o f things 
already perceived. Fiction  addresses itself to deeply rooted potentialities 
of reality to the extent that they are absent from the actualities with which 
we deal in everyday life under the mode o f empirical control and 
manipulation. In that sense, fiction presents under a concrete mode the 
split structure o f  the reference pertaining to the metaphorical statement. It 
both reflects and completes itself. 121
In Kearney’s words Ricoeur’s semantic imagination represents an act of responding 
to a demand for new meaning, the demand of emerging realities to be by being said in
Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.302.
121 Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling , ibid., p. 154.
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9 122new ways”. On the one hand, Ricoeur can be clearly seen to corroborate the 
ontological argument promoted in texts such as The Origin o f  the Work o f Art, where 
Heidegger elevates poetry— as a disclosure comprised of language, of the language 
within which we “dwell”— as the highest and most ontologically profound mode of 
aletheia; in his rule o f metaphor Ricoeur characterises a wholly semantic theory of 
imagination, to which linguistic innovation corresponds as a similarly effulgent mode 
of disclosure. But on the other hand, whilst the theory of split reference confirms the 
ontological structure of poetic truth as both revealment and concealment, as both an 
“is” and an “is not” determined by the absence of an original referent, it also works to 
abrogate the ultimate postulate o f singularity, of a total discontinuity between aletheia 
and conceptual verification. Insofar as metaphorical reference (and sense for that 
matter) incorporates the literal “is not”, the literal reference can be seen to participate, 
albeit negatively, within the production of the metaphorical truth. This is a slightly 
different proposition from the one Heidegger presents when he describes the 
ontological structure of poetic truth in terms of a revealment and a concealment. In 
that instance the dialectical presentation of poetic truth can be seen to oppose the 
postulate of direct reference altogether, with direct reference heralding precisely that 
mode of conceptual mastery he condemns. Since direct reference presupposes an 
identity between a given intellectual/semantic content and its referent, it must, by its 
very nature conform to that modality of inauthentic truth bome of the presumed 
mastery of conceptual thought.123 For Heidegger, the arrow-like notion of reference 
as a kind of intrinsic pointer would simply be wrong-headed; we do not deploy 
language after all, we dwell in it.
With Ricoeur, however, the assertion of split reference implies a potential 
continuity between the poetic function and the outwardly-directed descriptive 
function named by Jakobson. In short, whilst the metaphor enables a more 
“primordial” vision of the world, such ontological prestige is only possible upon the 
condition of a dialectical interplay between the symbolic realm of double meanings 
and a second-order realm of conceptual determination. This is evinced by the critical 
instance of the referential epoche, where the incision of the “is not , the negative 
suspension of the referent, is preconditioned by the prior determination of a pre-
122 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The O wl o f  Minerva, ibid., p. 40.
123 If technological thought is premised upon the intellectual grasp o f concepts, and concepts confirm 
the unanimous identity o f  thoughts and their signs, then technological thinking presumes within the 
sign a direct reference to the real.
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existent conceptuality; were such an apparatus not in place, the comparison upon 
which the suspension depends would not itself be possible.
Ricoeur and Derrida on Metaphor and Philosophy
We know that Heidegger opposes the progression towards conceptual identity 
as something at once inimical to ontological disclosure and extrinsic to the mode of 
understanding he champions. It is inimical not only because it obscures potential 
ways of being in the world—ways which, as the Russian Formalists would concur, 
poetry vivifies—but because it also obscures the postulate of being-in-the-world, as 
that more primordial mode of existence to which the very distinction of metaphor and 
concept is a foreign derivation. This is why, in The Principle o f Reason (Der Satz vom 
Grund), Heidegger makes the celebrated and proximally Nietzschean assertion that 
“the metaphorical exists only in the metaphysical”.124 The propinquity of Heidegger 
and Nietzsche is a pressing issue for the fate of literary theory, and none more so than 
in the particular instance of metaphor, where the tenor of Heidegger’s assertion and 
the level of scepticism it arouses, cuts to the very heart of Ricoeur’s exchange with 
Derrida. When Ricoeur finally introduces the issue of Derrida and the deconstruction 
of metaphor within “White Mythology”, he leaves no uncertainty as to the alliance he 
perceives and to the distinction of his own debt to Heidegger. Circumscribing 
Nietzsche and Derrida within a “‘genealogical’ manner of questioning”, Ricoeur 
makes sure to insert his own critical precis of Heidegger before moving on to the 
Derridean text. Now Ricoeur’s main aim is to demonstrate precisely why Heidegger’s 
aphorism is not the startling denunciation of truth it at first appears to be. The logic of 
genealogy generates a pretty unambiguous interpretation: the metaphorical exists only 
within the metaphysical because the presumed transfer of a “proper” literal meaning 
into a deviant figurative meaning is only recognisable within the remit of metaphysics, 
more precisely Platonic and neo-Platonic metaphysics, where the highest forms of 
knowledge correspond to a transfer from the sensible to the intelligible, the visible to 
the invisible. Metaphor and metaphysics involve one and the same transfer. Rhetoric, 
and the rhetorical definition of metaphor are implicitly Platonic therefore. Now
124 Martin Heidegger, The Principle o f Reason, quoted by Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor,p.331.
202
Nietzsche’s point was that the interdependency of metaphysics and metaphor 
rendered the truth of metaphysics little more than forgotten metaphors; metaphysics 
generates its truths according to a metaphorical transfer from the sensible to the 
intelligible, thus the Platonic ontology is itself a mere metaphor that time forgot. But 
from the surrounding context of Heidegger’s assertion Ricoeur finds a rather different 
target, not metaphysical truth itself so much as the metaphysical-rhetorical definition 
of metaphor as a “mere” transfer, from the proper to the improper, and from the 
sensible to the intelligible.
This is bome out by Heidegger’s treatment of the principle of sufficient reason. 
In fact the principle of sufficient reason really only furnishes an opportunity for 
Heidegger to demonstrate why all metaphor is not a “mere” transfer. “Nothing is 
without a reason” the principle states. Now Heidegger claims that this statement 
exemplifies how one can sometimes see a situation clearly, but not really grasp what 
is at issue. In order to really grasp a situation one needs insight, and such insight in 
fact requires a more distinct form of hearing. When one stops seeing and starts really 
listening to the principle of sufficient reason for instance, we gain a true grasp of the 
situation when we “perceive [...an auditory...] harmony between ‘is’ and ‘reason’.” 
Now when we read this principle we hear “Nothing is without a reason” rather than 
“Nothing is without a reason”. Those committed to the standard rhetorical view of 
metaphor will certainly object that seeing and hearing are only thinking insofar as 
they are transpositions, metaphors involving the transfer of an initial sensible activity 
into a subsequent intellectual one. “To which the philosopher replies”—in conformity 
to Kant—“that there is not first sensible seeing and hearing, which would be 
transposed to the non-sensible level. Our hearing and our seeing are never a simple 
reception by the senses.” 125 Only the Platonist (or the empiricist) may therefore 
denounce metaphor as a “mere” transposition and an un-truth, for it is only the 
Platonist who presupposes a rectilinear hierarchy from the sensible to the intelligible. 
By Ricoeur’s reckoning the denunciation of Platonism must apply every bit as much 
to Nietzsche as to the tradition he denounces. For Heidegger, as we know, the point 
about metaphor is that the very notion should be abandoned; truth is neither 
metaphysics nor metaphor. For Ricoeur, however, “the constant use Heidegger makes
125 Ricoeur, ibid., p.332.
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of metaphor is finally more important than what he says in passing against 
metaphor.”126
Against his contrary protestations, Heidegger’s use of metaphor, his 
deployment of metaphor in the fight against representationalist attitudes, corroborates 
the fundamental principles laid out in The Rule o f Metaphor, that metaphor is 
absolutely vital to philosophy, precisely in its distinction from concepts. Heidegger’s 
metaphorics attests to the fundamental poverty of the substitution theory enshrined by 
metaphysics. The critic who objects to Heidegger’s metaphors, objects to them upon 
the basis that they transpose a “proper” meaning into an “improper” meaning, a 
visible and sensible impression into an invisible idea. By extension, by necessity, the 
critic who condemns Heidegger must also assume metaphor’s classical rhetorical 
definition, as a substitution of one term for another. Rejecting this paradigm, 
Heidegger’s metaphors, and as a case in point, his treatment of the principle of 
sufficient reason, testify to Ricoeur’s semantic theory of metaphor as a vital cognitive 
operation involving the inter-animation of the whole phrase. More than anything, 
Heidegger’s mode of radical poetising lends its support to the philosophical 
profundity of living metaphor over and against the morbid preoccupations of 
Nietzsche. “Is not the entropy of language just what a philosophy of living metaphor
177wants to forget?” And yet, because Heidegger has absolutely no interest in 
salvaging the concept of metaphor from metaphysics, metaphor—in name at least— 
must ultimately go the same disreputable way. In their interdependency, the 
destruktion of metaphysics is the destruktion of metaphor, just as Nietzsche 
demonstrated.
This is why, according to Ricoeur, Heidegger’s “restrained criticism” 
facilitates both an ontologically orientated theory of live metaphor such as his own 
and Derrida’s “unbounded ‘deconstruction’ in ‘White Mythology’”. Here Derrida 
proceeds “to enter the domain of metaphor not by way of its birth but, if we may say 
so, by way of its death.”128 Accordingly, Ricoeur’s debate with Derrida has a lot more 
to do with the status of so-called dead metaphors than it does to do with semantic 
innovation. Upon a cognitive semantic theory, the dead metaphor is philosophically 
redundant, the predicative impertinence of the initial semantic “shock” having long
126 Ricoeur, ibid.
127 Ricoeur, ibid., p.336.
128 Ricoeur, ibid.
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since been assimilated and “fixed” within the lexicon. According to the (anti-) logic
of differance and dissemination, however, the notion of the figure as ever in any way
“completing” itself, of ever really neutralising its affect, is a metaphysical illusion
dreamt-up and perfected in the pristine history of the Hegelian Aufhebung. By
demonstrating metaphor’s fundamental complicity within the Hegelian sublation,
within the model of concept-formation it describes, Derrida appears to consummate
Nietzsche’s ironic mode of scepticism; metaphysics cannot regulate the metaphorical
foundations of its own concepts. “What then is truth?” Nietzsche decries most
famously, but an ever-shifting parade of tropes, a dissimulation of figures, akin in
their reduction to the defilement of old coins?129
In “White Mythology” Derrida chooses to translate the double-play of
economic value (the coin’s reduction to mere metal, the figure’s dissimulation into
concepts) in terms of an effacement of the figure; of “coins which have their obverse
110effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely metal.” The
figurative complicity borne of the economic metaphor—of figures as coins that have
lost their value, that have become effaced and de-valued, of figures as linguistic
currency—both here, and in the more arcane context of Anatole France’s The Garden
o f Epicurus, furnishes Derrida’s notion of metaphorical usure (from usury). As with
all Derrida’s monikers, this is a completely ambidextrous term, a limit concept
intended to draw the myriad tangents of his text together within the force-field of one
central aporia. As Derrida makes plain, usure “belongs to the concept of metaphor 
111itself’. It too must suffer “the paradox of the auto-implication of metaphor” as
Ricoeur calls it.132 The paradox proper to metaphor is this: because metaphor never
truly loses its efficacy, because conceptuality is a metaphorical illusion, all attempts
to inscribe metaphor within a philosophical, conceptual framework involve the
deployment of metaphor. “There is no non-metaphorical standpoint from which to
111perceive the order and the demarcation of the metaphorical field.” In Derrida’s 
words,
129 See Nietzsche as quoted on p. 168.
130 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense”, Complete Works o f Nietzsche, 
ed. D. Levy, London, 1911, Vol. 2, p. 180. Quoted by Derrida, “White Mythology”, Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982, pp. 238-271, p.217.
131 Derrida, “White Mythology”, Margins o f  Philosophy, ibid., p.215.
132 Ricoeur, ibid., p.338.
133 Ricoeur, ibid., p.339.
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Metaphor has been issued from a network of philosophemes which 
themselves correspond to tropes or to figures, and these philosophemes 
(assuming that the quotation marks will serve as a sufficient precaution 
here), cannot be dominated. It cannot dominate itself, cannot be 
dominated by what it itself has engendered, has made to grow on its own 
soil, supported on its own base...If one wished to conceive and to class 
all the metaphorical possibilities o f philosophy, one metaphor, at least, 
always would remain excluded, outside the system: the metaphor, at the 
very least, without which the concept o f metaphor could not be 
constructed...134
The paradox of metaphor discloses the metaphoricity of the concept. Now beneath 
every philosophical figure an infinity of exegesis opens up, “The field is never 
saturated”.135 Usure is not the mere erosion of the figure—indeed not, this is the lie of 
the metaphysical Aufhebung—contrary to the laws of lending it is also the 
unpredictable generation of unforeseen values; a fluctuation that neither the 
metaphorics of metaphysics nor the metaphysics of rhetoric can control. Usure is 
another name for the law of supplementarity. For Derrida as well as Heidegger then, 
metaphor and concept are derivations of an earlier precedence; not the difference 
between Being and beings this time, but the “more original” relation which enables 
the perception of ontological difference in the first place, namely the formal relations 
of differance.
Turning the full force of his semantic theory, with its emphasis upon 
imagination and the originary powers of the hermeneutical imagination, against the 
aporia of supplementarity, Ricoeur rejects the efficacy of dead metaphor and with it, 
the supposed collusion of metaphor and metaphysics. In the first instance, the hidden 
fecundity presumed of dead metaphor is a symptomatic exaggeration of semiotics. It 
is only in semiotic theories, where the order of the code limits metaphor to a theory of 
substitution, to a transposition of the name, that this over-exaggeration can occur. 
What is more, this over-emphasis upon denomination must carry along with it the 
implicit metaphysical distinction between a primary “proper” meaning and its 
figurative transposition. Of course, for Ricoeur the real issue of metaphorical 
innovation involves the whole predicate, the transition from an initial impertinence to
134 Derrida, “White Mythology”, ibid., p.220.
135 Derrida, ibid.
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a new predicative pertinence. If a metaphor no longer arouses the initial demand for 
assimilation, if it is no longer incongruous, then its cognitive status as metaphor is 
severely limited, the semantic instability of the initial shock having been absorbed at 
the site of its inception. Here a sceptic may wish to align these rationalising powers of 
assimilation with the illusory refinement of the figure’s metaphysical effacement, and 
to thereby unleash upon Ricoeur the full force of Derrida’s critique. But in fact 
Ricoeur is in no disagreement as to the illusory powers of effacement; dead 
metaphors may not command interpretation, but effacement alone does not make for 
concepts. The dead metaphor enjoys neither a subversive afterlife nor a spiritually 
rarefied one. Rather, it enters the lexicon of standard usage, where the imaginative 
heuristic function is all but lost.
In lexicalisation the predicative context is shed, all that remains is the original 
focus upon which the subsequent contrast centred.136 As with Ricoeur’s example of 
the French word for head, tete, the metaphorical origins of which must be re-traced 
etymologically (to the Latin testa, meaning “little pot”), common usage causes us to 
forget the similarity within the difference and “to overlook the deviation in relation to 
the isotopy of the context.” Now when the French refer to la tete,
the metaphor has been lexicalized to such an extent that it has become the 
proper word; by this we mean that the expression now brings its
lexicalised value into discourse, with neither deviation nor reduction o f  
deviation.™
Because metaphor is defined in terms of a command for interpretation, a semantic 
theory based upon usage dispels the association of literal with “proper”. Semantically 
speaking, the literal meaning is the lexicalised meaning not the original meaning.
Whilst lexicalisation renders the usure of metaphor “more seductive than earth-
shaking”, Ricoeur does not deny the potential for metaphors to be re-activated or de- 
lexicalised (indeed were this not possible lexicalisation would amount to 
conceptualisation), but what he does deny is the co-existence of standard lexicalised 
usage and the subterraneous fealty of the supplement;
136 Being mistaken for the whole operation, this remnant or after-effect is one reason why the 
substitution theory has proved so endurable.
137 Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.343. Emphasis added.
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The reanimation o f a dead metaphor...is a positive operation of de- 
lexicalizing that amounts to a new production of metaphor and, therefore, 
of metaphorical meaning.
Furthermore,
De-lexicalization is... in no way symmetrical to the earlier 
lexicalization.138
This is of no small consequence for literature and the creative powers of the author. 
Raising metaphor from the sediments of familiarity, is an affect obtained “by various 
concerted and controlled procedures -  substituting a synonym that suggests an image,
1 'IQadding a more recent metaphor, etc.” From this we could say that metaphor’s 
heuristic function is doubled, with a reference being made to the relation of real 
properties in the first instance, and a meta-linguistic, historical relation between 
metaphor and the lexis in the second.140 The re-animation of past metaphorical values 
is in no way an autonomous or chance occurrence, some unplanned slippage within 
the global hors-texte, but rather a concerted design stemming from the author’s 
imaginative and tutelary powers. In the case of philosophical metaphor Ricoeur 
proclaims a similarly conscious re-deployment. By way of demonstration he takes the 
conspicuous example of false etymologism common to Heidegger, to Hegel and to 
Plato. Bearing witness to a false or fictional history within the once figurative and 
now sedimented term, the philosopher effectively seeks to create a new meaning, a 
living metaphor. The figure’s return is thus an independent procedure from the term’s 
more unconscious passing into the lexicon. This, then, is the true remit of the dead 
metaphor for Ricoeur.
Concept formation is a process equally independent of lexicalisation and 
revived metaphor. With the justification of this process and the claim for its 
autonomy from the dead metaphor, Ricoeur seeks to dispel the presumed collusion of 
metaphor and metaphysics, and to consecrate the fundamental discontinuity of poetry 
and philosophy. Within concept formation there is not one but two processes. The
138 Ricoeur, ibid, p.345.
139 Ricoeur, ibid.
140 Ricoeur does not make this point but it is none-the-less coherent with his theory o f split reference, 
where, against a purely autotelic reference, he defines the operations of a fictional reference forged in 
the simultaneous reality of the image and unreality o f its original. The image is unreal and yet it exists.
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first (which Derrida accuses Ricoeur for falsely assimilating to “White Mythology”), 
“takes a proper meaning and transports it into the spiritual order”. 141 From this 
metaphorical transfer both lexicalisation and concept formation may follow. But 
whilst both processes emerge from the reduction of the so-called dead metaphor, their 
paths remain distinct. Deferring to Hegel’s concept of the Aufhebung, Ricoeur 
characterises concept-formation in terms of a second operation of “suppression- 
preservation”, in which a new abstract meaning is drawn from the initial transposition 
from the sensible to the intelligible. In the initial metaphorical stage the sensible sense 
remains in tension with the intelligible sense. The second process therefore accounts 
for the suppression of the sensible and the preservation of the intelligible. Just as the 
Kantian schema provide thought with an initial symbolic (quasi-sensible) framework, 
and the production of an intelligible concept in no way reducible to its schema, so the 
secondary stage of suppression-preservation creates an autonomous abstract concept.
What must be realized is precisely that giving up sensible meaning does 
not simply give us an improper expression but rather a proper expression 
on the conceptual level. The conversion o f this process o f wearing away 
into thought is not the wearing away itself. If these two operations were 
not distinct, we could not even speak o f the concept of wearing away, nor 
of the concept o f metaphor; in truth, there could be no philosophical 
terms. That there are philosophical terms is due to the fact that a concept 
can be active as thought in a metaphor which is itself dead.142
In conclusion, Ricoeur attributes the supposed collusion of worn-out metaphor 
and philosophy, in part at least, to the unfortunate endurance of the substitution theory. 
The “supposed collusion between the metaphorical pair of the proper and figurative 
and the metaphysical pair of the visible and invisible” dissipates entirely once the 
predicative theory has worked to shatter the affinity between substitution and 
dialectical overcoming. 143
141 Ricoeur, ibid.
142 Ricoeur, ibid., p.346. Emphasis added.
143 Ricoeur, ibid., p.348.
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“Regulated Dynamism” and Differance
Understandably, our focus so far has been trained upon Ricoeur’s arguments 
in the “Eighth Section” and his perceived distinction from Derrida in “White 
Mythology”. Before we elaborate the wider implications of Ricoeur’s thesis, for 
imagination, for philosophy and most importantly, for literary theory, it is only right 
that we say a bit more about Derrida’s own views on metaphor and the law of 
supplementarity. Throughout this study we have repeatedly, if sometimes only 
implicitly, questioned the tendency to polarise poststructural hermeneutics and 
Derridean deconstruction. It is only right therefore that we gauge the true measure of 
Derrida’s assertions and the character he himself perceives in his relation to Ricoeur. 
We must acknowledge straight off that Derrida’s response to Ricoeur, in a subsequent 
essay called “The Retrait of Metaphor”, threatens our own rather more ecumenical 
view of their relationship. Derrida criticises Ricoeur for some more or less wanton 
misreading, for over-simplifying his argument in the first place, for falsely eliding it 
with Heidegger’s, and for failing to appreciate usure’s productive, positive aspect for 
philosophical thought. To put it most brutally, Derrida accuses Ricoeur of making 
some of the same simplifications that we ourselves levy against deconstruction’s 
more vulgar stereotypes. But then again, Derrida himself is never shy of working a 
situation to its best intellectual, best rhetorical affect, even if this distorts his 
interlocutor’s message slightly.144 What then, is the true measure of Ricoeur’s 
relationship to Derrida? How are these two distinguishable, how are they proximal? 
And what does their relationship say about Ricoeur’s omission from the literary- 
theoretical canon?
In an excellent display of concision and erudition Leonard Lawlor has 
characterised the gap between Ricoeur and Derrida as one of imagination and 
chance.145 We are now very familiar with the role of imagination in the Ricoeurian 
theory of semantic innovation. As we shall see, imagination also fuels Ricoeur’s 
liberal affirmation of critical discourse, the capacity that is, to stand back, to hold at a 
distance and reflect upon the conditions of the production of discourse. We may reject
144 Generally speaking, an element of mis-reading is usually attributed to both sides. Lawlor writes that 
Derrida and Ricoeur “speak at cross-purposes” (48), that Ricoeur “too hastily equates Derrida with 
Heidegger” (44) and that each thinker fails to do full justice to the other’s theory of mediation (48). 
Lawlor, Imagination and Chance; The Difference Between the Thought o f  Ricoeur and Derrida.
145 See Lawlor, ibid.
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the romantic connotations that attach themselves to theories of imagination, but 
mercifully we need not deny Ricoeur’s place within a venerable tradition of liberal 
Kantianism. Oceanic jouisance and hard, critical clarity are the twin gifts of 
imagination. But what of chance?
What the opposition of chance and imagination conjures so effectively is the 
fundamental distinction between the orders of Ricoeurian and Derridean mediation. 
For Ricoeur, mediation is a dialectical process which has its formal origins within the 
synthetic operations of imagination. Consciousness is mediated by language and by 
historical effect, but still the recognition of these traits is conditioned by our capacity 
to distance, or rather to distanciate ourselves from these affects, to form concepts and 
to reflect upon the predicament of our being-in-the-world. Such is the philosophical 
importance attached to the possibility of concept formation.
Whilst operating dialectically, distanciation must, in the strictest of theoretical 
senses, be understood to mediate, as a third term, between the power to act and the 
power to interpret. To put it another way, distanciation mediates the dialectic of event 
and meaning146 Utterly irreducible, it is a transcendental or essential condition. 
Ricoeur likens this essential character to the Husserlian notion of intentionality, 
where Husserl describes the capacity for consciousness to transcend itself through the 
apprehension of repeatable structures. For Ricoeur as for Husserl, the power to 
delineate objective and universal structures from the purely subjective and singular, 
signals the birth of the subject as a self-transcending intellect.147 For Ricoeur, as we 
know, there is no understanding, subjective or otherwise, beyond the field of language. 
The possibility in life, as in the text, for repeatable structures of meaning, belongs to 
the possibility for linguistic identities, in spite of, and furthermore as a condition, of 
difference. Ricoeur’s entire oeuvre organises itself around this central dialectic of 
identity and difference; belonging and distanciation, predicative impertinence and 
semantic pertinence, and the split reference of fiction, all testify to a rational capacity 
to stabilise the inherent indeterminacy of the signifying system. Placing signification 
within the frame of discourse, distinguishing between modes of discourse—the lexical, 
the symbolic, the metaphorical and the conceptual, all with their independent aims— 
Ricoeur posits a fundamental order within an otherwise seemingly heterogeneous
146 Elsewhere Ricoeur writes of this dialectic in terms of force and form. See Interpretation Theory; 
Discourse and the Surplus o f Meaning, p.59 and “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action 
Considered as a Text”, in From Text to Action; Essays in Hermeneutics II, pp. 144-167.
147 See Lawlor, ibid., p.53.
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universe of signification. In the final section we shall see how speculative discourse 
fields this dialectic or “regulated dynamism” against the Wittgensteinian chaos of 
language games. As Stellardi writes,
Speculative discourse relies on language’s ability to produce a distance 
from itself, and to consider itself as a totality related to the totality of 
being: It is the knowledge o f  its own relation to being. The fact that there 
is no linguistic space outside language, and that all utterances on language 
are by necessity included in language, should not justify any intellectual 
paralysis. The philosophy o f language, and philosophy tout court, find 
their respectful space and task in the capacity o f  distantiation that is 
inherent to language.148
For Ricoeur the epistemological consequence of this distanciating capacity is the 
hermeneufs ability to articulate the deeper ontological relations uniting the 
multifarious discourses of human understanding. In The Conflict o f Interpretations 
Ricoeur seeks to co-ordinate conflicting interpretations according to their mode of 
signification and their level of phenomenological manifestation. Superficially, 
Ricoeur’s confidence in stipulating the discontinuity of say structuralism and 
psychoanalysis, may appear like an act of violence; what “superior” vantage enables 
such a judgement after all? Contrariwise, unless one fully absorbs the 
phenomenological argument within the theory of semantics, unless one accepts the 
postulate of a semantically mediated ontology, the fundamental unity Ricoeur posits 
of human discourse, and the capacity he proclaims on behalf of the hermeneut—to 
reflect upon the ontological implications of these manifest expressions of 
understanding—may only muster the faint damnation of relativistic good-will.
Whilst signification for Derrida is premised upon a very similar relation of 
identity and difference, whilst Derrida and Ricoeur both confirm the innate 
indeterminacy of signification (that the signified of each signifier is another signifier 
in turn), Derrida parts company regarding the govemability of this instability. Whilst 
distanciation names a fundamentally regulative condition for the possibility of 
intellection, the mediating powers of differance are conceived in terms of an 
intractable precedence which puts the primary categories of subject and object,
148 Guiseppe Stellardi, Heidegger and Derrida on Philosophy and Metaphor; Imperfect Thought, 
Prometheus Books, New York, 2000, p.88. N.B: Stellardi writes of “distantiation” whilst I employ the 
alternative “distanciation”.
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identity and difference in abeyance from the off. Differance is a relation of deferment 
that has always already proceeded to destablise the production of meaning and its 
interpretation. To compare it to the formal triangulation of Ricoeurian mediation, we 
must say that Derridean mediation precedes the terms of mediation in themselves. For 
Derrida, the difference, the differance of the semiological strata, always precedes the 
positing act. In its precedence, in its autonomy, the production of meaning within the 
signifying milieu is a wholly unregulated, avowedly non-linear and chance 
occurrence. This is why in “White Mythology” Derrida addresses the metaphorical 
process genealogically, from the vantage of dead metaphor and the un-thought, un­
said within the predicative process, rather than from the position of the “live” 
predicative act.
For the textualists, the aestheticists, the nihilists and the postmodernists of 
the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s, the postulate of chance proved an invitation to reject the 
authority of reason as little more than an illusory fiction. All truths are metaphorical 
and all metaphor subverts the referential function. For some this was not only an 
illusion but a pre-contractual dogma arranged by the powers that be (a position ill- 
equipped to explain its own assent to such partial, prior insight). But Derrida’s claim 
for metaphoricity is not an assertion of all out nihilism. Derrida “does not merely 
refer metaphor to a linguisticality more fundamental than meaning; metaphorization 
designates the very movement that produces presence, identity and sameness in the 
first place”.149 If metaphors cannot be externally regulated, if their semantic surcharge 
cannot be set and fixed determinately within the purity of the concept, and if this 
semantic surcharge does not in fact die, but subsists subterraneously, then the 
dissemination of metaphor is also responsible for the creation of semantic innovations. 
Metaphor’s relation to philosophy in “White Mythology” is entirely uncontrollable, 
but at the same time wholly productive for thought. And this is where the 
postmodernists, the textualists and the relativists misread Derrida. Derrida’s, like 
Ricoeur’s, is still a philosophy of conditions. Following Heidegger, both thinkers 
reject the easy certainties of Romanticism and the Enlightenment with equal measure, 
but neither one rejects the integrity or indeed the sustained rigor of philosophical 
enquiry. For both Derrida and Ricoeur, mediation not only condemns the identity of 
transcendent truths (truths which theoretically pre-exist language), it also founds the
149 Lawlor, Imagination and Chance, p.91.
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condition for the possibility of meaning in the first place. Their point of disagreement 
stems from the different characterisations they bequeath this condition and their 
subsequent implications for the signifier.
To a certain extent, the perceived gulf between Ricoeur and Derrida can be 
attributed to an element of personal misunderstanding between the two. Whilst 
Derrida criticises Ricoeur for an over-hasty assimilation between Heideggerian 
metaphor and White Mythology, it is fare to say that Derrida never really comes to 
grips with Ricoeur’s argument for distanciation. The focus of their debate rests 
heavily upon the question of dead metaphor, of unconscious ambiguities rather than 
the creative tensions elaborated in the Ricoeurian thesis of live metaphor. Had 
Derrida said more about this creative element, it is just possible that his own 
philosophy might not have been so readily absorbed within a generalised textualism, 
where the idea of a constrained or controlled productivity must be squarely opposed.
Ricoeur and Derridas’ true point of departure then concerns the status of the 
transcendental Aufhebung, the simultaneous preservation ahd elevation of the 
Hegelian dialectic. As philosophers of mediation, both thinkers subscribe to the innate 
circularity of interpretability, but it is only for Ricoeur that this circular path can be 
called progressive in the sense that it facilitates an orderly, self-conscious detachment 
from the enquiry undertaken. The Ricoeurian power to reflect can be likened to the 
orderly progression of a spiral staircase. To mount, one must pass various levels, but 
at the same time, it is only possible to proceed if these levels are preserved at the level 
of their own distinction. The end result is the spatio-temporal remove, the capability 
to reflect backwards upon the intellectual journey. Thought for Ricoeur is dialectical 
from the ground up, and this reflective ability is a power of the mind itself, more 
importantly, of the imagination. Live metaphor is the beating heart of this power. The 
infinite freedom to which the structure of double meaning attests, to endlessly renew 
itself in the exchange of interpretation, confers testament to the infinite task of being- 
as-interpretation. But similarly, this freedom to create, confirmed in the process of 
semantic innovation, in the dynamism of the semantic “clash” and the birth of a new 
semantic pertinence, is also the freedom to identify and re-identify determinate 
meanings, to grasp language and to reflect self-consciously.
As we have seen, this freedom to create new semantic pertinences (and 
concepts potentially) is thoroughly dependent upon the assertion of a discursive 
theory of metaphor, upon the assertion of interaction between the composites of the
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sentence or phrase, and not the word for word substitution of conventional rhetoric. In 
their adherence to substitution theories, rhetoricians of the classical and indeed the 
structuralist guard confirm their loyalty to Platonism, to the reductive sphere of a 
purely representative mimesis. Here the metaphor is merely the striking outer-garment 
of a pre-existent idea, a superficial transformation from the mundane to the exotic. 
Furthermore, this shuttling between standard and novel form arrests the referential 
thrust towards a world beyond. Repeating the gesture of aestheticism, we find 
Jakobson exiling the literary work from the living totality; in its failure to refer 
beyond itself, the work of literature must remain detached from the discourse of 
historical reality. If, by contrast, metaphor is shown to create new meaning, then 
literary art, like Heideggerian art, is world-constituting. It is thoroughly apposite, 
given Ricoeur’s disregard for conventional parameters, to find him confirming this 
purportedly romantic thesis with theories drawn from the so-called Analytic tradition 
of Britain and America, from the interaction theory of I. A Richards and the refining 
modifications of Max Black. With his background in psychology and literature, 
Richards was the first to furnish a theory of metaphor which inscribed the process of 
interpretation as an intrinsic element of the metaphorical function. Rejecting the word 
as the bearer of intransigent values, Richards re-envisaged the word in terms of its 
inherent relativity to other words. Metaphorical significance was now the product of a 
delegated efficacy conferred through absence, from the “missing links” of the 
surrounding context and the interpretive drive to make sense. Anchoring meaning 
within the historico-phenomenological act of interpretation, whilst by-passing 
interpretation’s subjectivistic connotations, Richards’s context theorem proved a 
remarkable precursor both to speech act theory and Benvenistean discourse. It is this 
existential grounding, within the instance of discourse and within the aims of the 
speech act, which founds the absolute centrality and profundity of the live metaphor 
within Ricoeurian hermeneutics. Metaphor testifies to the powers of imagination, to 
create new meanings and to liberate itself from the strictures of conceived conceptual 
norms. But most importantly, the powers of imagination are only liberating insofar as 
they can be constrained or fixed by the reciprocal powers of distanciation, the power 
that is, to identify and re-identify signifying elements. Without this capacity, without 
the power to conceptualise, imagination could be neither theorised nor liberating. It is 
this dialectic of creation and reflection, metaphor and concept, which is lacking from 
the Heideggerian poetic. Heidegger’s erosion of critical parameters (between work,
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author and critic) and the subsequent failure to generate any kind of ethical leverage 
from within the discourse of aesthetic singularity both confirm this. It is towards 
literary reflection’s ethical re-investment that we turn to Ricoeur’s account of 
speculative discourse.
4 .4
Speculative  D isco u r se  a n d  C r itic a l  A u to n o m y
Having dissociated the live, poetic metaphor from the commonplace banality 
of dead metaphor, Ricoeur assures the discontinuity of literary and philosophical 
discourse. Only where there is a demand for interpretation and the deployment of 
certain sense-making apparatus does true metaphor really exist. In all other instances, 
the absence of the interpretative demand only confirms the moribund afterlife of the 
lexicalised figure and the process of lexicalisation itself. In this way the dead 
metaphor functions like any other literal word, its residual connotative force being no 
more “threatening” or unstable than any other standard usage. Accordingly, Ricoeur 
puts paid to the presumed metaphoricity of the metaphysical concept-based upon the 
metaphoricity of the Aufliebung—as a concept founded by the same movement. But it 
is only with Ricoeur’s final proposition of speculative discourse, that the process of 
lexicalisation, and more importantly of concept-formation, is explicitly dealt with. It 
is here that Ricoeur’s literary-critical, literary-theoretical value comes fully to light.
Because semantic innovation depends upon the pre-existence of a regulative 
horizon, because metaphor exists in dialectical reciprocity with concepts (both at the 
level of innovation, where a tension of pre-existent values exists, and at the meta­
level of conceptualising this process), Ricoeur’s theory of the metaphorical 
imagination would not be complete if it failed to elaborate the process of concept 
formation whereby signification is stabilised and in those final, rare instances “fixed” 
to a unanimous content. Innovation and preservation are dialectically wed. Since all 
understanding comes to expression through language, Ricoeur asserts that this process 
must conform to its own level of discourse; in turn such a discourse must, as the 
expression of understanding, reflect the transcendental claim for distanciation itself.
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This is the intermediate space of speculative discourse which mediates the gulf 
between poetry and philosophy.
Ricoeur writes that speculative discourse
. . .  is the discourse that establishes the primary notions, the principles, that 
articulate primordially the space of the concept...[T]he speculative is the 
condition o f  the possibility o f the conceptual.150
On the one hand, “speculative discourse has its condition of possibility in the 
semantic dynamism of metaphorical utterance”; without new metaphors, without the 
condition of double meaning, understanding would encounter no interpretive demand, 
no requirement to disambiguate multivocal expression.151 On the other hand however, 
Ricoeur writes that speculative discourse “has its necessity in itself.”152 Confirmation 
of Ricoeur’s transcendental commitment, speculative discourse reflects “resources 
that doubtless belong to the mind itself, that are the mind reflecting upon itself.”153 
With the elaboration of speculative discourse Ricoeur will thereby elaborate a 
semantic account of distanciation. In turn this reflective, distanciative function will 
lead once more to the ontological question of the being that interprets. There is no 
direct ontology to be gleaned from the semantics of metaphorical utterance itself. To 
locate the being of interpretation it will be necessary to “erect a general theory of the 
intersections between spheres of discourse”, in order to understand how-against the 
thesis of radical heterogeneity-the multiple fields of discourse relate one to another. 
These relations will then speak for the operations of the mind itself.
Throughout the various stages of Ricoeur’s analysis one common motif stands 
out, namely the tension or conflict upon which all dialectical models are generated. 
Beyond the principle of comparison, metaphor has proved itself to be a fundamental 
innovation wrought through conflict. Semantically speaking, metaphorical utterance 
betrays an initial “impertinence”, a conflict amongst the terms of the utterance. In 
order to make sense, it is necessary to impose a “twist” upon the non-sensical
150 Ricoeur, The Rule o f  Metaphor, p.355.
151 Ricoeur, ibid., p.349. Emphasis added in first instance.
152 Ricoeur, ibid.
153 Ricoeur, ibid., p.350. If conflicting hermeneutics testify to different regions of intelligibility—the 
claim of The Conflict o f  Interpretations-then  speculative discourse reflects the primary condition from 
whence these multiple modes o f understanding organize themselves; it is the discourse to found all 
others. At the same time however, it is not really an identifiable discourse so much as a mediating 
movement between discourses.
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predicate. This new metaphorical sense subsequently creates an alternative tension 
between the metaphorical reading and the literal reading of the same utterance, 
proceeding to grant the “stereoscopic” vision of the referent, the split reference of the 
metaphorical “is” and the literal “is not”. The generation of new semantic pertinences 
and new meanings for the referent emerge within the interplay of predicate and 
reference. To consider standard language acquisition, new and increasingly abstract 
predications are mastered comparatively, by relating unfamiliar predicates to the 
entity they designate. Through reference, Ricoeur tells us, we gain predicates. 
Likewise, we investigate new referents by describing them as accurately as possible, 
by utilising past predicative experience. The reciprocity of predicate and reference is 
the process by which we gain more rigorous, more refined and indeed more abstract 
ascriptions of reality. This possibility resides in the instability of signification itself 
and designates its rightful historicity. Now meaning “appears less like a determined 
content” and more “like an inductive principle capable of guiding semantic 
innovation.”154
“If it is true that meaning, even in its simplest form, is in search of itself in the 
twofold direction of sense and reference”, then it follows that “the metaphorical 
utterance only carries this semantic dynamism to its extreme.”155 Far from subverting 
reference, metaphor presents the common dynamic of standard reference in an 
exaggerated, and for that reason exemplary, form.
Where standard predication pertains to the one referential field, metaphorical 
utterance functions in two referential fields at once. This is the result of the tension 
between the statement’s metaphorical and literal readings. In the latter case, reference 
applies to a known referential field, but in the metaphorical reading the referential 
field remains unknown. Without knowledge of the referential field, the usual 
dynamism of predicate and reference is therefore denied. In order to work out this 
unfamiliar field it is necessary to extend the predicate in question to a “network of 
predicates that already function in a familiar field of reference.” 156 Although the 
referential field of the metaphorical predicate is unknown, it possesses a semantic 
“scope”, an as-of-yet unclarified force which exerts “pressure” upon the known field 
and a transfer of its predicates. A “semantic potential” therefore arises from the
154 Ricoeur, ibid., p.353.
155 Ricoeur, ibid.
156 Ricoeur, ibid.
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gravitational pull of the metaphorical utterance upon the known field. The dynamism 
of signification present within the process of standard predication is thus doubly 
apparent within the metaphorical transfer, where the literal predicate and reference 
combine with the metaphorical predicate to create a new reference. The resulting aim 
in meaning is thus “doubly sketchy”, extending the already constituted meaning 
(which may itself lack conceptual clarity) into an unknown field of reference. But it is 
through this process that speculative discourse works to clarify the uncertainties of 
poetic ambiguity, providing thought the preliminary sketch of a conceptual 
determination. The condition of the possibility of this competency rests in the 
instability of signification itself. But whilst this is so, it is absolutely crucial to 
recognise the fact that instability itself cannot explain the operations of the 
speculative realm; signification does not simply engage itself within the process of 
transfer and exchange. At the origin of this process resides what Ricoeur forcefully 
clarifies as the “ontological vehemence of [the] semantic aim”.157 It is this vehemence 
which determines the primary scope of the metaphor’s semantic range, catalysing the 
process of clarification with its eventual “sketch”.
An experience seeks to be expressed, which is more than something 
undergone. Its anticipated sense finds in the dynamism of simple meaning, 
relayed by the dynamism o f split meaning, a sketch that now must be 
reconciled with the requirements o f the concept.158
In this way speculative discourse enables an implicit poetic discourse to be made 
explicit in its aims, and to distinguish the work of metaphorical interpretation from 
the determination of the concept. To reiterate, speculative discourse “is the discourse 
that establishes the primary notions, the principles, that articulate primordially the 
space of the concept.” 159 Because speculative discourse testifies (by virtue of its 
explanatory power) to our ability to reflect upon this process, to reflect upon the 
inherent dynamism of signification, it is possible to deflect the usual cynicism 
attached to the instability of the signifier, the same cynicism that is, which refutes the 
possibility of the concept beyond the laws of mere convention and which decries the
157 Ricoeur, ibid., p.354.
158 Ricoeur, ibid.
159 Ricoeur, ibid., p.355.
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possibility of ever attaining a standpoint “outside of language” from which to reflect 
upon its operations.160
For Ricoeur, speculative discourse “expresses the systematic character of the 
conceptual in a second-order discourse” which itself is neither conceptual nor 
metaphorical. Whilst speculative discourse articulates a regulated dynamism within 
the field of signification, whilst it deals with signification and of course emerges 
within its own order of signification, the speculative expresses the operations of the 
mind itself, the process of distanciation whereby the mind reflects upon its own 
articulations:
If, in the order o f  discovery, the speculative surfaces as a second-level 
discourse -  as meta-language, if one prefers -  in relation to the discourse 
articulated at the conceptual level, it is indeed first discourse in the order 
of grounding.. .Even if  one does not recognize that it can be articulated in 
a distinct discourse, this power o f the speculative supplies the horizon or, 
as it has been called, the logical space on the basis o f which the 
clarification o f  the signifying aim o f concepts is distinguished radically 
from any genetic explanation based on perception or images.161
Speculative discourse grounds the power to predicate in the first instance; not on the 
basis of an extended “act of seeing” (Husserl’s Erklarung), where the identity of the 
concept would be image-bound, but on the basis of a reflective “act of knowing” 
(Husserl’s Aufklarung), whereby ambiguity is reduced through the exchange of 
referent and predicative field:
If a sense that is ‘one and the same’ can be discerned in a meaning, it is 
not just because one sees it that way but because one can connect it to a 
network o f  meanings o f the same order in accordance with the 
constitutive laws o f  the logical space itself...The speculative is what 
allows us to say that ‘to understand a (logical) expression’ is something 
other than ‘finding images’.162
160 Paul de Man writes o f  this convention: “The innumerable writings that dominate our lives are made 
intelligible by a preordained agreement as to their referential authority; this agreement however is 
merely contractual, never constitutive. It can be broken at all times and every piece of writing can be 
questioned as to its rhetorical mode.” (Allegories o f  Reading, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979, 
p.204).
161 Ricoeur, ibid., p.355.
162 Ricoeur, ibid., pp.355-6.
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In the metaphorical utterance, new meanings are forged in the assimilation of 
abstruse contexts, in the projection of a known referent into an unknown predicative 
field or vice versa. This “predicative assimilation” constitutes the kernel of Ricoeur’s 
semantic theory of imagination. Where the Kantian imagination involves an image- 
bound schematism, Ricoeurian imagination involves the schematism of semantic 
predicates. Because predicates are always themselves the consequence of an exchange 
of referent and prior predicates, the historicity of understanding is semantically 
mediated through and through. “Imaginatio is a level and an order of discourse” 
writes Ricoeur. We can conclude that this innate productivity finds its most assured 
and self-conscious deployment within the language of literature, where understanding 
is time and again challenged to elicit new referents from within the highly organised 
and pre-arranged predicative networks of the author’s design. In Ricoeur's definition 
o f speculative discourse we fin d  something approaching its critical counterpart.
Where metaphor schematises, assimilates and enlarges, speculative reflection 
involves the systematization of this enlargement. “Because it forms a system,”
the conceptual order is able to free itself from the play o f double meaning 
and hence from the semantic dynamism characteristic o f the metaphorical 
order.164
As we have seen, the success of the schematism is grounded by the regulative 
principle of the speculative. Without the “horizon of the speculative logos” there 
could be no imaginative enlargement. This means that the speculative grounds the 
possibility of the poetic-metaphorical whilst at the same time ensuring its own 
autonomy. Semantic reflection conditions both metaphor and concept, assuring their 
discontinuity through its own powers of articulation at a non-metaphorical level.
In speculative discourse, in the interpretation of metaphor, meaning emerges 
thanks to the regulative limits of the predicative horizon, but it does not serve to 
abolish the structure of double meaning or to clear away the symbolic base. This is 
the distinction to be drawn between speculative interpretation, where the play of
Ricoeur, ibid., p.357.
164 Ricoeur, ibid.
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double meaning is elucidated, but also emphasised, and conceptual analysis, where 
one strives to negate the symbolic base altogether.
Interpretation is then a mode o f discourse that functions at the intersection 
o f two domains, metaphorical and speculative. It is a composite discourse, 
therefore, and as such cannot but feel the opposite pull o f two rival 
demands. On the one side, interpretation seeks the clarity o f the concept; 
on the other, it hopes to preserve the dynamism o f meaning that the 
concept holds and pins down... where understanding fails, imagination 
still has the power o f  ‘presenting’ (Darstellung) the Idea. It is this 
‘presentation’ o f the Idea by the imagination that forces conceptual 
thought to think more. Creative imagination is nothing other than this 
demand put to conceptual thought...Metaphor is living not only to the 
extent that it vivifies a constituted language. Metaphor is living by virtue 
of the fact that it introduces the spark o f imagination into a ‘thinking 
more’ at the conceptual level. This struggle to ‘think more,’ guided by the 
‘vivifying principle, ’ is the ‘sou l’ o f  interpretation}65
Interpretation is a movement which parleys between the “gift” of figurative discourse 
and the speculative probing of new and unforeseen ways of understanding. We may 
conclude that this pull of rival demands is the very challenge alluded to in the 
introduction of this study, namely the critic’s task of staying true, whilst saying 
differently. For this reason, literary critical discourse must remain an essentially 
mixed discourse of the kind condemned in the articulation of a unified literary 
“science” or philosophy. This does not indicate a weakness on the part of the 
interpreter, nor does it refer to the kind of positivistic “importation” from other 
disciplines maligned by formalist critics such as Paul de Man. Literature’s claim for 
universal significance does not rest in the appropriative projection of pre-defined 
categories, in its powers to confirm the thought of other disciplines (psychology or 
psychobiography say) but in the articulation of the hermeneutical relationship of 
imagination and understanding, innovation and interpretation, outlined in Ricoeur’s 
theory of metaphor. The relationship between literary text and literary interpretation 
is then the paradigm for hermeneutical understanding. Vice versa, within Ricoeur’s 
elaboration o f the speculative we find  the justification for a literary critical practice
165 Ricoeur, ibid., p.358. Emphasis added.
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capable o f  honouring the singularity o f literary works, without rescinding the critical 
distance, the critical autonomy, upon which its judgements depend.
As a self-conscious interrogation, speculative discourse testifies to language’s 
self-conscious, reflective capacity to “place itself at a distance”, to relate to language 
“in its entirety” and to ultimately relate this entirety “to the totality of what is”: 
Language designates itself and its other.166 Semantically speaking, the other of 
language is the referent denied by formal linguistics, summoned in the act of speech 
and the instance of discourse. Ontologically, it is the alterity of which Heidegger 
speaks when he writes of poetry in terms of an upsurge in Being, where language 
pushes through the veneer of representation to utter existence in its very becoming. In 
the Heideggerian treatment however, the unity of Being and language professed of 
poetry threatens to shut down the very “hold upon nearness” it claims to disclose. 
Such a hold, for Ricoeur, is the self-same hold of the speculative, where language 
places itself at a distance and reflects upon its relation to existence.
For Ricoeur as for Heidegger, poetry possesses the power to re-make the 
world; to make Being unfold as a projection and a creation. This power for invention 
does not testify to a radically original ego, but to our rootedness within the historical 
horizon which makes us.
Poetic discourse brings to language a pre-subjective world in which we 
find ourselves already rooted, but in which we also project our innermost 
possibilities. We must thus dismantle the reign of objects in order to let be, 
and to allow to be uttered, our primordial belonging to a world which we 
inhabit, that is to say, which at once precedes us and receives the imprint 
o f our works. In short, we must restore to the fine word invent its twofold 
sense o f  both discovery and creation.167
As invention, literary criticism delivers this creation to a wider community; the 
critic’s logical dependency upon the literary work is also the very possibility by 
which future works are conditioned.
166 Ricoeur, ibid., p.359.
167 Ricoeur, ibid., p.362.
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C o n clu sio n
I think that we too can say that there is no mystery in language; the most 
poetic, the most “sacred”, symbolism works with the same semic 
variables as the most banal word in the dictionary. But there is a mystery 
o f  language, namely that language speaks, says something, says 
something about being.1
During his lifetime Ricoeur published over thirty works of philosophy, a 
monumental output spanning seven decades and three distinct phases within the 
course of European philosophical debate. The Conflict o f Interpretations and The Rule 
o f Metaphor comprise just two works from Ricoeur’s early-middle period. In the 
context of wider philosophical debate they confirm the greater trend away from pure 
reflection towards what has been called both a linguistic and a hermeneutical turn in 
continental thinking. It is wrong of course to treat philosophical discourse as if it were 
a series of neatly articulated projects; a subtext of this study has been the refusal of 
just such compartmentalising attitudes. No one demonstrates the poverty of this 
temperament quite like Ricoeur. Whilst moving beyond the explicit debates of the 
linguistic epoch, beyond the dialectic of structure and event, linguistic immanence and 
speaker’s transcendence, and beyond the theory of semantic innovation, these 
arguments remain at the heart of the Ricoeurian vision as it develops in his later works. 
There may be no mystery in language, but still the mystery o f  language remains the 
fulcrum of the hermeneutical project. Beyond the formal, analytical attributes of 
linguistic function, there remains the irreducible act of language understood in its 
widest sense, as meaningful exchange and fellow understanding. This is the activity 
by which the most historically and geographically distant texts as well as the most 
intimate conversants are brought into meaningful dialogue with one another. It is this 
activity which marks us all as translators, interpreters and literary critics. In the 
hermeneutical philosophy of Ricoeur, the “existential” theme of activity, and the 
philosophical questions which cling to the acts of communication and understanding 
are never far from the surface of their enquiry.
1 Ricoeur, “The Problem o f  Double Meaning”, The Conflict o f  Interpretations'. Essays in Hermeneutics, 
ed. Don Ihde, Continuum, London, 2004, p.75.
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It was language in this wider acceptation which characterised the 
philosophical landscape of Ricoeur’s later years. The third distinct phase to which 
Ricoeur’s work testifies is the transition in European debate from strictly linguistic 
considerations of dialogue and interpretation to the wider ethical implications of 
meaningful exchange. Titles from Ricoeur’s later career— The Just (1995), Love and 
Justice (1996), or The Course o f  Recognition (2004) for example—certainly conform 
to this wider “ethical turn”. The themes of Derrida’s later works were in similar 
accord with this newly emergent ethical imperative. In Derrida one finds the aporia of 
linguistic exchange (between signifiers, or between figures and concepts) give way to 
the essentially non-linguistic exchanges of hospitality and gift-giving and the ethical 
aporia of debt and gratitude which surround them.
From the close and perhaps premature perspective of the present, one figure 
who appears to have influenced this turn more than any other is the French 
philosopher and Talmudic commentator Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas ethics is not 
something to be prescribed in the manner of an inductive code; beyond the verbal 
commands of ethical statutes, ethics as “first philosophy” begins in the silent and 
unparalleled encounter with the Other. This deceptively simple yet uncompromising 
demand of the face to face is for Levinas the philosophical sine qua non to which all 
other considerations must defer.
Levinas’ distinctly ethical brand of phenomenology may only have risen to 
prominence in the years following the great structuralist/poststructuralist debate of the 
mid-twentieth century but he was in fact a contemporary of this period. Significantly, 
from the generation of structural/postructural philosophers who surrounded him, it 
was Ricoeur whom Levinas identified as the singly most important.2 What this fact 
attests to is the wider ethical framework within which all Ricoeur’s work, even in its 
most linguistically abstract, theoretical moments, belongs. It is the Ricoeurian theory 
of imagination, scrupulously delivered in The Rule o f  Metaphor, which resides at the 
heart of this wider concern. With its rejection of the pure intellectual image (in Kant 
and Husserl), Ricoeur’s semantic imagination may confirm the irreducibly mediated 
character of human understanding, but it also constitutes a most rigorously and hard- 
won victory for the imaginative freedom upon which all ethics must turn. Ricoeur’s 
demonstration of a “regulated dynamism” within signification, and for the speculative
2 See Dosse, The History o f  Structuralism , Vol.2, trans. Deborah Glassman, University o f Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1998, p.311.
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distinction of poetry and concepts, presents the justification for this freedom. The 
fastidious demarcation of the “live” metaphor, of genuine poetry and non-poetic 
forms of discourse, ensures both the work’s autonomy, its “singularity” as a distinct 
mode of discourse, and the theoretical independence of the critic’s reflections. Like 
the face to face encounter, the realisation of such autonomy is conditioned 
dialectically, through the recognition and exchange of self and other. Construed 
linguistically, this exchange is governed by the corollaries of linguistic identity and 
pre-established semantic norms, and the non-identity or difference of the predicative 
impertinence within creative language. In the interpretation of these initial “clashes”, 
an imaginative enlargement of one’s individual understanding, and of one’s own 
interpretive horizon emerges. This possibility of seeing things anew, of creating the 
world anew, confirms our freedom as moral agents.
In Britain and America, the demand for an “ethical turn” within 
postructuralism—in literary-theoretical circles especially—gathered momentum with 
the posthumous discovery of Paul de Man’s anti-semitism. Like the “Heidegger 
question” a few years earlier, the dismal correlation between de Man and his works, 
his politics and his philosophy, could not be overlooked. As with Heidegger, an 
unflattering relation emerged. The 1990s witnessed a return to the implications of 
writing and authorship as acts of intentionality and historical consequence. As much 
as these questions served to extend the literary theoretical conversation, breathing new 
life into the theoretical fortress, they also served to erode the once monolithic divide 
of Theory and criticism, Text and subject.
It has been the aim of this study to diagnose the historical and philosophical 
conditions which enabled such a false dichotomy to take root, and to place these 
claims in critical counterpoise to the dialectical vision of Ricoeurian interpretation. 
Three defining arguments support this vision, recommending Ricoeur’s greater 
inclusion within literary-theoretical, literary-critical debate. The first concerns 
Ricoeur’s ontological commitment to interpretation, the second, to the conviction that 
poetry and philosophy, poetry and literary-critical discourse can and must function as 
independent discourses. Both of these claims pivot upon the third, seemingly narrow 
conviction that language oscillates between structure and event, between the 
immanent and impersonal relations of the code and the reflective power to take a hold 
of language within the act of discourse and make it mean anew.
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If the flight from the romantic subject facilitated the false impasse between 
subject and Text and an imputed irrationalism within the heyday of literary theory, it 
also assured very little appetite for a poststructural hermeneutics such as Ricoeur’s. 
With the subject held in such mistrust, with the Theory moniker being made to 
represent all creditable forms of literary consideration, there was little or no room for 
a mode of interpretation which challenged the autonomy of theoretical method and 
which strove to validate the subject beyond the claims of intention and psychology. 
This, at least, is the thesis underpinning the present assessment of Paul Ricoeur and 
his place within the history of the theoretical revolution.
From the ashes of the Text-subject divide a series of literary alternatives have 
been mooted in more recent years. Against the absolutist claims of their forbears, a 
new generation of literary thinkers have set about reconceiving the aims and practices 
of literary studies, mindful of the dangers inherent to the radicalised, at times over 
prescriptive and even alienating rhetoric of an autonomous Theory. The task 
expressed by this later generation relates to the need to honour the particularity of the 
work of literature without foregoing the social, political and moral considerations 
which surround the work. Balancing the literary work’s aesthetic properties with its 
historical dimensions, moving “beyond” Theory without resorting to a kind of 
philistine anti-theory, of somehow putting the lessons of literary theory to a positive, 
but less autocratic, more reflective and indeed more humble usage at the service of 
literature; these are the questions which impel literary-theoretical, literary-critical 
debate of more recent times. In his Reading After Theory (2002), Valentine Warner 
asks “What now? What do we readers do, what should we do, what might we do, in 
the wake -  the huge wake -  of theory?”3 His diagnosis is a careful re-balancing of the 
work/theory relationship and a call to better, closer readings of the work itself. Under 
the banner of The New Aestheticism (2003) John Joughin and Simon Malpas express 
the need to consider “the equiprimordiality of the aesthetic”,
- that, although it is without doubt tied up with the political, historical, 
ideological, etc., thinking it as other than determined by them, and 
therefore reducible to them, opens a space for an artistic or literary
3 Valentine Warner, Reading After Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, p.l.
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specificity that can radically transform its critical potential and position 
with regard to contemporary culture.4
This claim for a re-conceptualised aesthetic discourse, in which the false distinction of 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic response is overturned, betokens a return to the site of 
aesthetics itself and a re-evaluation of aesthetic categories. In a different work, Isobel 
Armstrong calls for a similar re-consideration of the presumed distinction of aesthetic 
and non-aesthetic categories. Her thesis in The Radical Aesthetic (2000) takes a 
familiarly Gadamerian turn: the rejection of aesthetic categories universal to the age 
of theory was premised upon the spurious alliance of Kant and the subjective idealists 
of the romantic era. In this regard the theoretical objection to aesthetic categories is 
based upon a false association in need of overturning.5
Common to all of these new directions is a claim for the mutuality of historical 
and aesthetic reflection, and a strong desire for dialogue not competition with 
philosophy. Strangely these new voices make little or no reference to Ricoeur.6 From 
the tenor of their debate however, it would seem that now more than ever Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of imagination, of an imagination that has “worked through” the 
implications of theory, of linguistic scepticism and aestheticism, emerging “wounded” 
but wiser for it, commands our literary-critical, literary-theoretical recognition.
4 J. Joughin and Simon Malpas, The New Aestheticism, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, 
p.3.
See Isobel Armstrong, The Radical Aesthetic, Blackwell, Oxford, 2000.
6 Valentine Warner makes a passing reference to Ricoeur when he uses the term “the hermeneutics of 
suspicion” in Reading After Theory, but his point in doing so is to demonstrate the sense in which all 
“post-theoretical” discourse necessarily invokes the language of earlier “theoretical” debate. Warner’s 
reference to Ricoeur has nothing to do with an alternative “post-theoretical” Ricoeurian imagination 
and everything to do with the more general point regarding our belated position within critical debate. 
In our posteriority, certain “theoretical” terms and phrases have entered the general lexicon, and with 
them the propositions which found them. The need to cite Ricoeur within the context of a 
“hermeneutics o f suspicion” no longer exists therefore.
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